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the 1990s, the number of people in the world who are undernourished has increased from 600 million to 800 million. The number of people who are malnourished has increased from 1.2 billion to 1.5 billion. The number of people who are obese has increased from 100 million to 300 million.

There are a number of reasons for this. One is that the world population has increased from 5 billion to 6 billion. Another is that the world population is becoming more urban. A third is that the world population is becoming more affluent. A fourth is that the world population is becoming more mobile. A fifth is that the world population is becoming more educated. A sixth is that the world population is becoming more health conscious. A seventh is that the world population is becoming more aware of the environment. A eighth is that the world population is becoming more aware of the need for sustainable development. A ninth is that the world population is becoming more aware of the need for social justice. A tenth is that the world population is becoming more aware of the need for peace.

There are a number of ways in which we can address these problems. One is to increase the production of food. Another is to improve the distribution of food. A third is to improve the quality of food. A fourth is to improve the health of people. A fifth is to improve the environment. A sixth is to improve the social justice. A seventh is to improve the peace.

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
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
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
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HISTORY OF SICILY

E. A. FREEMAN

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THE
HISTORY OF SICILY

FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES

BY

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REGIUS PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY

FELLOW OF ORIEL COLLEGE

AND HONORARY FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE

VOLUME IV

FROM THE TYRANNY OF DIONYSIOS TO THE DEATH OF AGATHOKLES

EDITED FROM POSTHUMOUS MSS.

WITH SUPPLEMENTS AND NOTES

By ARTHUR J. EVANS, M.A.

KEEPER OF THE ASHMOLEAN MUSEUM

HONORARY FELLOW OF BRASENOSE COLLEGE

WITH MAPS AND NUMISMATIC PLATE

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In Memoriam

EDWARD AUGUSTUS FREEMAN

DIED AT ALICANTE, SPAIN, MARCH 16, 1892

CALLED TO HIS REST, THOUGH NOT ON THAT LOVED STRAND
THAT CLAIMED HIS LAST LIFE-LABOUR, NOW DENIED
ITS HIGH FULFILMENT,—YET HE SLEEPS BESIDE
BLUE MEDITERRANEAN WATERS, IN A LAND
OF PALMS AND COLUMNS, OVER-TOWERED OF OLD
BY THAT WHITE ROCK WHOSE SUNLIT BASTIONS BROUGHT
LIGHT TO HIS DARKENING EYES. FOR THERE, TOO, ROLLED
TH' 'ETERNAL STRIFE' WHOSE ISLAND-FIELDS HE SOUGHT
FROM MONGIBELLO TO THE WIND-SWEPT CREST
OF JULIAN AND ASTARTÊ. EAST AND WEST,—
THRALDOM AND FREEDOM,—WERE TO HIM NO THEME
SCHOLASTIC, BUT THAT MIGHTY HUMAN HEART,
OUTPOURING WORDS OF THUNDER, STILL TOOK PART
IN EACH UPRISING, WERE IT BUT A DREAM.

A. J. E.



PREFACE.

THE untimely death of Mr. Freeman at Alicante on March 16, 1892, left his great work on Sicilian History still unfinished. Considerable fragments, however, of its continuation remained in manuscript, sufficient when put together to fill more than one volume. Of these a fairly consecutive part extends from the beginning of the tyranny of Dionysios to the death of Agathoklès; another contains the Roman Conquest of Sicily; a third the Norman. It has been thought desirable that these should see the light.

By the force of circumstances, and the personal relation in which I stood to the author, the publication of the fourth volume of the History of Sicily, which continues the story of Dionysios, begun in the preceding volume, and carries on the narrative to the death of Agathoklès, has devolved on myself. For one not professedly a historian, and hitherto content with the humbler walks of antiquity, such a task was necessarily an arduous one. But it was a task that piety could not refuse. Such qualifications as I have are a fairly intimate knowledge of

the sites, derived from repeated visits to the island, which I have traversed on foot from sea to sea; some special researches in the field of Sicilian archæology and numismatics; and something, perhaps, of personal tradition.

It has been necessary to fill many gaps existing in the text, and to supply by far the greater part of the notes. Thanks to the kindness of Mr. Fisher Unwin I have been able to bridge over the gaps in the narrative by the insertion of passages from Mr. Freeman's small "Story of Sicily," and, although the accounts thus derived were necessarily of a summary character, they have at least the great advantage of showing the line that Mr. Freeman would have taken had he lived to complete these portions of his greater history *in extenso*. In cases again where subjects—as it seemed to me, indispensable—were not to be found treated either in this source or in the MS. itself, I have endeavoured to supply the deficiency either by the insertion of more copious foot-notes, or by means of supplements placed at the end of the chapters that they illustrate. Thus I have thought it desirable to give a general view of the Monarchy of Dionysios and the extent of his dominions; a detailed account of his Adriatic Colonies; and an examination of his financial expedients, especially in the new light thrown on them by recent numismatic discoveries. I have also devoted separate essays to numismatic illustrations of the careers of Timoleôn and Agathoklês, to which a plate has been annexed; and

have drawn up maps of the dominions and dependencies of Dionysios, of the sites of Motya and Lilybaion, and of the African provinces of Carthage, which were the field of Agathoklês' campaigns.

The notes have been a considerable labour. The places to be annotated were indeed marked in the MS., but in the great majority of cases not only had no attempt been made by the author to supply the notes themselves, but no indication was given of the references to be made. In compiling them I have endeavoured where possible to supplement the sources made use of in the text by the indication of fresh material or of more recent criticism. It has moreover from time to time been necessary to make use of the notes as a vehicle for conveying dissent from the views expressed in the text. It must be constantly borne in mind in this connexion that, though, on the whole, the work in its present form seems to be such as Mr. Freeman when he wrote it desired to set before the public eye, there is no part that he might not have revised or modified had fresh evidence bearing on the points at issue come under his notice. He was himself accustomed to re-write large passages of his works: and his mind was always open to fresh lights.

But, although in the notes I have ventured here and there to adduce evidence for a different view from that expressed in the text, I have, except in the case of obvious verbal slips, regarded the text itself as sacred. I have altered nothing, and I have taken away nothing. I have moreover been careful,

except when occasionally it has been necessary to insert a few words to complete the sense, to add nothing of my own. All such small insertions as it was requisite to make, together with my own notes and supplements, are easily distinguishable by their being placed within square brackets.

My special thanks are due to Professor Holm and Mr. F. Haverfield for looking over my proofs and for many useful hints. In the earlier part I received valuable help in the correction of proofs and the verifying of references from my beloved wife, Mr. Freeman's eldest daughter, whose constant devotion had rendered the same services to her father during his lifetime. But, within a year of his own death, she too was gathered to the father she so truly loved, and the rest of my work, such as it is, has been done without that help and without that encouragement.

ARTHUR J. EVANS.

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CHAPTER X.

THE TYRANNY OF DIONYSIOS.

ERRATA

Page 24, note 2, for '*della Antiche Città*' read '*delle*' &c.

„ 138, note, and page 231, l. 8 from foot, for '*pentekonters*' read '*pentôreis*'

Sicily, Vol. IV

REGARDING THE SOURCES FOR THIS PERIOD MR. FREEMAN IN HIS STORY OF Sicily (p. 156) expresses himself as follows: "The main authority for the reign of Dionysios is still the narrative of Diodôros. This part of his work is of very different degrees of value. Some parts are very good and full, evidently reproducing older writers, largely Philistos. In other parts he is very meagre and confused, and towards the end of the tyrant's life he tells us very little. We have also a little really contemporary matter from two Attic writers, the orator Lysias and the pamphleteer Isokratês. There is also a series of letters attributed to the philosopher Plato, dealing largely with Syracusan affairs, beginning in Dionysios' time. There is no reason to think they were really written by Plato; but they were most likely written by some one of his school not long after; so they may well give us Plato's views of things. Plutarch's Life of Diôn also begins in Dionysios' time. The fame of the tyrant was so great that the references to him and stories about him in later writers are endless, almost equal to those about Phalaris. And we begin to have some documentary evidence, in the form of Attic inscriptions with decrees in honour of Dionysios. But we unluckily have no documents from Syracuse of his age." (See Appendix I.)



CHAPTER X.

THE TYRANNY OF DIONYSIOS.

B.C. 405-367¹.

THE power of Dionysios cannot be looked on as fully established, or his reign as actually beginning, till the conclusion of his first treaty with Carthage. In that he for the first time appears as an acknowledged potentate, treated as such by foreign powers. By whatever means and under whatever forms, he was now lord of Syracuse, and henceforth he acts as such at home and abroad. Both at home and abroad he has enemies to strive against; once and again his power seems on the point of crumbling away; but it never actually fails him; he remains master

¹ Regarding the authorities for this period Mr. Freeman in his *Story of Sicily* (p. 156) expresses himself as follows: "The main authority for the reign of Dionysios is still the narrative of Diodoros. This part of his work is of very different degrees of value. Some parts are very good and full, evidently reproducing older writers, largely Philistos. In other parts he is very meagre and confused, and towards the end of the tyrant's life he tells us very little. We have also a little really contemporary matter from two Attic writers, the orator Lysias and the pamphleteer Isokratēs. There is also a series of letters attributed to the philosopher Plato, dealing largely with Syracusan affairs, beginning in Dionysios' time. There is no reason to think they were really written by Plato; but they were most likely written by some one of his school not long after; so they may well give us Plato's views of things. Plutarch's *Life of Dion* also begins in Dionysios' time. The fame of the tyrant was so great that the references to him and stories about him in later writers are endless, almost equal to those about Phalaris. And we begin to have some documentary evidence, in the form of Attic inscriptions with decrees in honour of Dionysios. But we unluckily have no documents from Syracuse of his age." (See Appendix L.)

CHAP. X. of Syracuse, master of much more than Syracuse, nearer than any man had ever been before him to being master of all Sicily. That position he never really reached; but he was lord of so large a part of Sicily, lord of so nearly the whole of Greek Sicily, he spread his power so far beyond the bounds of Sicily, that it is not wonderful if to many, both in his own day and in after-times, he seemed to be lord of the whole island. His power was such as had never before been seen in the Greek world; the one thing that was like it lay beyond that world. In his own day Dionysios was looked on, both by friends and by enemies, as, if not altogether the fellow of the Great King, yet as second to him in a competition in which there was no third. The lord of Syracuse and the lord of Susa were, on one side, looked on as the two among mortals who were lifted up most highly above their fellow-men; they were, in the vulgar reckoning of happiness, the happiest of mankind, the two who had the fullest means of carrying out every wish and gratifying every desire¹. From another side they were looked on as the two most dangerous enemies of Greece and her freedom; between Dionysios on the West and Artaxerxes on the East free Greece is hemmed in within very narrow bounds, and is threatened even within those bounds². And assuredly, even in Sicily itself, there is one side of Dionysios in which he distinctly appears as an enemy of Greece and

Dionysios
and Artaxerxes.

[¹ This comparison was made by Polyarchos to Archytas of Taras. It is quoted by Athénaios (xii. 545, 546) from Aristoxenos' life of Archytas. For the preeminence of Dionysios and the Persian King, cf. Diod. xv. 23; *οἱ μέγιστοι τῶν τότε δυναστῶν, λέγει δὲ τὸν Πέρσων βασιλέα καὶ τὸν Σικελίας δυνάστην Διονύσιον.*]

[² Schol. ad Aristid. Panath. i. (p. 177 Jebb); *οὗτος γὰρ (Διονύσιος) ἦλθε βουλόμενος μὲν τῷ σχήματι Λακεδαιμονίους βοηθῆσαι κατὰ Ἀθηναίων, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ βουλόμενος τὴν Ἑλλάδα μετὰ τοῦ Πέρσου μερίσασθαι, ἐκείνου δηλώσαντος αὐτῷ, ὡς Ἐφορος Ἱστορεῖ. The Adriatic plantations of Dionysios and the alliance he formed with the Molottians and South Illyrians look as if he harboured designs of dominion in Old Greece as well as in Sicily and Italy.]*

of Greek life. He is not the first Greek ruler, not the first lord of Syracuse, to destroy Greek cities; Gelôn had done that before him¹. But he is surely the first Greek ruler to turn Greek cities, emptied of their Greek inhabitants, into dwelling-places of barbarians. This we shall, as we go on, find Dionysios doing in more forms than one. But we may say that, even in this matter, if he sinned against Greece, he did not sin against Europe. In this matter he looks backward and forward; commonly the enemy of the older inhabitants of the island, he sometimes acts as their friend, and, in one way or another, in peace and war, his reign is a marked time in the process of bringing the Sikels, as adopted and assimilated Greeks, within the Hellenic pale. On the other hand, by the settlement of Italian mercenaries in the island he foreshadows and prepares the way for the subjugation of Sicily, first of all lands out of Italy, to an Italian power. Yet, on the whole, his reign is, in a certain sense, a time of Greek advance, in the same sense, that is, in which the reigns of the Macedonian conquerors is a time of Greek advance. No earlier Greek had such widely spread dealings with many lands, Greek and barbarian. Besides his dominion in Sicily and Southern Italy, he is the first Sikeliot ruler who becomes a power in Old Greece and in the lands to the north of Greece; he plants Greek colonies on both sides of the Hadriatic; he extends his power, and thereby the name and influence of Greece, by hiring mercenaries to the west and to the north, in Spain and in Gaul, and employing them in the wars not only of Sicily, but of Greece itself. Forerunner of Agathoklès, in some sort forerunner of Pyrrhos, his dominion has far more in common with that of the Macedonian princes than with that of

CHAP. X.

Dionysios
a fore-
runner of
Rome in
Sicily.Becomes
a power in
Old Greece
and Illyria.

[¹ For Gelôn's destruction of Kamarina see Sicily, vol. ii. 130, 497, 498; of Megara Hyblaia, ii. 131, 132, 498, 499. In both cases the inhabitants were transferred to Syracuse.]

CHAP. X. any Greek ruler of earlier times. He has enslaved his native city; he has made his fellow-citizens his subjects; but he has made Syracuse the greatest city of the European world, and he has made her the head of a dominion such as the European world had never before seen.

Dominion
of Dionysios
forerunner
of Macedonian.

With Dionysios then we may fairly place the beginning of that extended Greek life of Macedonian times, in which Greek freedom of the old type, the freedom of the several city-commonwealths, gives way to the wider field of action, the more varied political relations, which give us a foreshadowing of modern times such as is not to be found in the elder political system of Greece. The world of Philistos, as compared with that of his elder contemporary Thucydides, has made a larger advance towards the world of Polybios. But that wider world is only foreshadowed; it does not actually come into being. It was in the East, not in the West, that the main field for Greek dominion and influence was to be opened. It was perhaps not without a contrast in his own mind between Sicilian and Macedonian dominion that Aristotle contrasted the nations of Europe and Asia, the latter so easy to conquer, the former so hard to subdue¹. Later conquerors or deliverers, such as the Molottian Alexander, threw the same truth into a more epigrammatic form². It was not so easy to establish a dominion at the cost of Latins and Samnites as at the cost of Syrians and Egyptians. The wars of Dionysius therefore led to no such direct result as the wars of the Macedonians. But they mark a distinct epoch in the military art. They show us war on a far wider scale and carried on with far more of scientific appliance than in the earlier wars of Greece. Under the rule of Dio-

[¹ Aristotle, Pol. vii. 6, and compare iii. 9.]

[² Aul. Gell. xvii. 21; "Eum Molossum, cum in Italiam transiret, dixisse accepimus se quidem ad Romanos ire, quasi in ἀνδραγαθίην; Macedonem isse ad Persas, quasi in γυναικαγαθίην."]

nysios improvements are made in every branch of the art CHAP. X.
 of warfare by sea and land; he first begins that systematic
 use of troops of various arms and nations, acting in com-
 bination towards a single end, which the Macedonian
 Alexander afterwards carried to perfection.

One notable feature in the reign of Dionysios is its Long
reign of
Dionysios.
 remarkable length, a contrast to the short reigns of the
 earlier tyrants of Syracuse. A Greek tyrant seldom kept
 his power for life; Dionysios not only kept his for life,
 but a life which lasted thirty-eight years after his seizure
 of the tyranny. Many causes combined to enable him to
 do this. One of them is undoubtedly to be found in the
 nature of the tyranny as it was wielded by his hands.
 Dionysios stuck at no crime, at no deed either of blood
 or treachery, which he thought likely to advance his
 purposes; he destroyed the political freedom of his own
 city and the very being of some other cities; the amount of
 human wretchedness which he caused was beyond reckoning;
 but of the mere personal insolence of tyranny he shows
 very little. There is nothing small about him, except
 when he sinks into that strange literary vanity which he
 shares with some other rulers of men. His crimes are
 mainly political; he is the enemy of the commonwealth;
 he is not, in the same way as many other tyrants, the
 personal enemy of each of its citizens¹. In one important
 respect the subjects of Dionysius were better off than the
 subjects of most tyrannies and of some oligarchies; better
 off than the citizens of Corinth in the days of Archias.
 He was a sober and temperate tyrant, altogether free from
 that special form of wrong which guided the dagger to
 the heart of so many of his fellows. No man in Syracuse

[¹ Cf. Corn. Nepos, *De Regibus*, 2; "Dionysius prior et manu fortis et belli peritus fuit et, id quod in tyranno non facile reperitur, minime libidinosus non luxuriosus non avarus, nullius rei denique cupidus nisi singularis perpetuæ imperii, ob eamque rem crudelis. Nam dum id studuit munire, nullius pepercit vitæ quem ejus insidiatorem putaret."]

CHAP. X. feared outrage for his wife, his daughter, or his son at the hands of his master. An illustrative anecdote told how, when he found his son in an intrigue with another man's wife, he told him that, if he did that kind of thing, he would not be tyrant long; it was by keeping himself from such deeds that he had been able to hold power for so many years¹. We are told of particular occasions on which he cast aside the outward signs of tyranny, and bore himself again as the equal of his fellow-citizens². We may suspect that such was not only his occasional, but his usual demeanour, so far as his safety allowed. But we may be sure that, whether Dionysios was stern in mien or genial, his trusty spearmen were never far off.

Dionysios' body-guard: the badge of his tyranny.

It was the presence of those spearmen, the body-guard whom the deluded assembly at Leontinoi had first voted to him, which made the difference between his position and that of the lawful magistrate of any Greek commonwealth. They were the outward badge of a power which rested, not on law but on force, a power which was emphatically the rule of unlaw. Dionysios was none the less a tyrant because he kept himself from some particular forms of oppression, because he in no case took a direct delight in oppression for its own sake. That his government was a tyranny was a simple matter of fact; he is spoken of as a tyrant by his friends as well as by his

[¹ Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophtheg.; τὸν δὲ υἱὸν αἰσθόμενος, ᾧ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπολιπεῖν ἐμελλεν, ἀνδρὸς ἐλευθέρου διαφθείραντα γύναιον, ἠρώτησε μετ' ὀργῆς, τί τοιοῦτον αὐτῷ συνοιδεν. Εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ νεανίσκου, Σὺ γὰρ οὐκ εἶχες πατέρα τύραννον, οὐδὲ σὺ, εἶπεν, υἱὸν ἔξεις, ἐὰν μὴ παύσῃ ταῦτα ποιῶν.]

[² Thus on the occasion of his building the wall on Epipolæ, Dionysios took his place among the common workmen and imposed on himself the hardest tasks (Diod. xiv. 18); καθόλου δ' ἀποθέμενος τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς βάρος ἰδιώτην αὐτὸν ἀπεδείκνυε, καὶ τοῖς βαρυτάτοις τῶν ἔργων προϊστάμενος, ἐπέμενε τὴν αὐτὴν τοῖς ἄλλοις κακοπάθειαν. So too after the stormy meeting of the Ekklesia described by Diodoros (xiv. 64-70), we read, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα φιλανθρώποις λόγοις χρησάμενος καθωμύλει τῷ πλήθει . . . τινὰς δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ συσσίτια παρελάμβανε.]

enemies¹. If we are asked what was his formal position in Syracuse, we can only say that, in his character of tyrant, he had no formal position. We should be glad indeed if we had any formal documents of his reign, to see under what names and forms his rule was actually carried on. But we may be certain of one thing, that the words "Dionysios the Tyrant" would not be found in them as a formal description. It is equally certain that, whatever we say as to the possible kingship of his Deinomenid predecessors, not a shadow of kingship ever rested on Dionysios or his son. The tyranny of Dionysios was a fact without a legal name. There is no outward mark, no name or badge of any kind, to distinguish a coin struck under the tyranny of Dionysios from one struck under the lawful magistracy of Hermokratēs or of Timoleôn. We may believe that the name of the Senate and People was still used in all public formulas; we may believe that the Senate and the Assembly still met to pass such decrees as the tyrant thought good; we may believe that courts of justice still sat to condemn those whom the tyrant wished to have condemned, perhaps to do fair justice between man and man in all causes in which the tyrant's interest was not concerned. Whenever the name of Dionysios appeared at all, we may suspect that it was accompanied with the name of the office to which he had once been chosen, that of general with extraordinary powers². The commission which that office conveyed would naturally last only a single year; he may have kept it on as a decent

CHAP. X.

Dionysios
tyrant in
fact, not
in title.

[¹ *Dion* could retort to *Dionysios* who was jesting at the expense of his predecessor *Gelôn*, καὶ μὴν σὺ τυραννίς διὰ Γέλωα πιστευθείς (*Plut. Dion*, v). The younger *Dionysios* is made by implication to address his father as a tyrant (*Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth.*; σὺ γὰρ οὐκ εἶχες πατέρα τύραννον), and *Dionysios* (*loc. cit.*) speaks of himself as τύραννος to the Corinthian envoys. Yet he had the audacity to write the line, ἡ γὰρ τυραννὶς δόκιμος μήτηρ ἐφύ (Stob. Flor. xlix; vol. ii. p. 285, Mein.)]

[² *στρατηγὸς ἀντοκράτωρ*. See Supplement I. pp. 211 seqq.]

CHAP. X. name to use whenever a name was wanted; at the same time we may easily believe that an assembly which was not likely to be attended by any but his own creatures re-elected him to the post in thirty-seven successive years. On these points we have no certain evidence; but men love legal forms, and Dionysios was wise enough to see that it was his interest to indulge that love whenever it did not stand in the way of his designs. One thing is certain; Dionysios was not, either in name or in fact, a lawful king; he may have been in name, he was not in fact, a republican magistrate. During all the years of his dominion at Syracuse he held a power over Syracuse which the law of Syracuse had not given him. For a man in such a position the Greek tongue had a name, and that name was *Tyrant*.

Periods of
Dionysios'
reign.

B. C. 405-
397 [398].

The tyranny of Dionysios falls naturally into several divisions, which are best marked by his wars with Carthage. For the first eight years of his reign he was at peace with the Phœnician enemy; but he was all the while making ready for the struggle which we may be sure that he was already designing when he swore to the peace which made Leontinoi independent and Kamarina tributary to Carthage. During this time he is strengthening his power over Syracuse; he is extending his dominion in Sicily; he is beginning to meddle in the affairs of Italy.

B. C. 397-
396.
[398-397.]

Then comes his first Punic War, a war waged on both sides of the island, a war which beheld the memorable sieges of Phœnician Motya by the Greek and of Greek Syracuse by the Phœnician. The war is ended without any formal treaty, but Hellas practically receives again all that she has lost, with the drawback that Hellas is just now represented by a tyrant. The third period of his reign is the time between his first Punic war and his second, a time of busy action on his part in the north of Sicily. It

B. C. 396
[397]-392.

is a time of advance on his part till his failure before CHAP. X.
 Taumenien. After this his power goes back somewhat,
 and his second war with Carthage follows, a war chiefly B. C. 392.
 memorable for the part played by Sikel allies on both sides,
 but a war in which Dionysios again has the advantage, and
 which he ends by a highly favourable treaty. In the fifth
 period, the interval between his second Punic war and his B. C. 392-
 third, Dionysios enlarges his power in Italy, plants colonies 383.
 in the Hadriatic, and appears as a threatening power to the
 north of Old Greece. It is now that the general hatred
 towards him felt in Greece shows itself in the famous
 attack on his legation at Olympia. Of the latter years of
 his dominion our knowledge is less detailed; but a third B. C. 383.
 Punic war follows. It is ended by a treaty in which the
 Carthaginian frontier again advances, at the cost of Hellas,
 and the Halykos becomes the boundary. A time of fifteen
 years follows, in which we hear of him again in Italy and B. C. 383-
 as a supporter of Sparta in Peloponnêsos. Lastly, a fourth 368.
 Punic war was going on at the time of his death; it was B. C. 368.
 ended by a treaty by which the Halykos was again fixed
 as the boundary of Greek and Phœnician, which it long
 remained.

The primary aspect of Dionysios in general history is Diony-
 thus that which is most creditable to him. Whatever his sios as
 motives, he does, as a matter of fact, play a part in the champion
 great strife of all, which is in the main successful. After of Hellas.
 having for a moment betrayed Hellas and Europe to the
 Semitic invader, he turns about and gives his best energies
 to win back all, and more than all, that he has betrayed.
 And, if in his later warfare he again loses part of what he has
 recovered, the state of things at his death is at least more
 favourable to Greece than that which was in existence when
 his career began. But this and his Hadriatic colonization
 are the only parts of his life on which we can look with any
 satisfaction. While driving back the Carthaginians from

CHAP. X. some parts of the island, he did much in others to weaken the strength of Greek life in Sicily; and his destruction and foundation of his cities, his wholesale removals of inhabitants from one spot to another, did much to increase that general instability and uncertainty of things in the island which men had noticed long before.

§ 1. *The Establishment of the Power of Dionysios in Sicily.* B.C. 405-397 [398].

We have in the last chapter traced the course of the second great invasion of Greek Sicily by the Carthaginians, their destructive advance from Selinous to Kamarina. Alongside of the later stages of this war we have marked the rise of Dionysios to power in Syracuse, down to the treaty by which, as the price of his acknowledgement by Carthage, he surrendered the whole of the Greek cities of the south coast of Sicily to Phœnician dominion or supremacy. Such a submission as this was meant to last only till he felt himself strong enough to win back what had been lost. To that end he had first to strengthen his power in Syracuse itself, and to extend it as far as he could over other parts of Sicily.

It must be remembered that the power of Dionysios was something that was still quite new, and that, setting aside the strong suspicion of direct treason under which Dionysios lay, his reputation had been in every way damaged by the war and the treaty which ended it. The war was over, a war in which Syracuse had gained no honour, and in which her master had won neither dominion nor distinction. The thoughts of men, enslaved at home and disgraced abroad, were likely to turn to designs for the recovery of their freedom. For the defence of his power and person, the tyrant needed a stronghold. In most cities that stronghold would naturally have been found in the oldest and strongest and

also the loftiest quarter, in the akropolis strictly so called. CHAP. X.
 At Syracuse things were otherwise. The oldest and strongest quarter was not the loftiest; the physical akropolis of the city within its present boundaries would have been found on the top of Achradina. But such a site would not have suited the purposes of Dionysios. It was the Island, it was Ortygia itself, which, of all the quarters of Syracuse, could be best defended as a separate fortress¹. It had the docks, older and newer, on each side of it, and the artificial isthmus could easily be fortified against the mainland. Dionysios saw the advantages of the site, and he determined to make the Island the stronghold of his power. He parted it off from the rest of the city by a lofty wall, thickset with towers². This must have been built on the mainland, a little in advance of the isthmus, as it was carried on so as to take the Lesser Harbour within its line of defence³. Just within the new wall, seemingly on the isthmus itself, Dionysios reared his castle, the chosen home of tyranny⁴. By the strange but easy misapplication of a word, he is said to have built an *akropolis*. That is to say, he built a fortress which, though planted on the lowest ground, was meant to fulfil the same purpose which in other cities was fulfilled by the fortress on the highest ground. Indeed he did more. By a still stranger use of language, we hear of two *akropoleis* in the Island; so thoroughly had the word put on this secondary meaning. The second akropolis was also the work of Dionysios⁵, and there can be little doubt that we

[¹ Diod. xiv. 7. See Sicily, vol. i. pp. 352, 353.]

[² Diod. xiv. 7; τὴν Νῆσον . . . ἀμφικοδόμησεν ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως τείχει πολυτελεῖ, καὶ πύργους ὑψηλοὺς καὶ πυκνοὺς ἐνφυκοδόμησε.]

[³ Ib.; καὶ συμπερίελαβε τῇ ταύτης τείχει τὰ πρὸς τῇ μικρῇ λιμένι, τῇ Λακκίῳ καλουμένῃ, νεώρια.]

[⁴ Ib.; ἐφυκοδόμησε δ' ἐν αὐτῇ πολυτελεῖς ἀχυραιμένην ἀκρόπολιν πρὸς τὰς αἰωνιδίους καταφυγάς.]

[⁵ Ib. xvi. 70; Τιμολέων δὲ παραλαβὼν τὴν νῆσον καὶ φρούρια τὰ Διονυσίῳ πρότερον ὑπακούοντα τὰς μὲν κατὰ τὴν νῆσον ἀκρόπολεις . . . κατέσκαψε, and cf. xvi. 9 and 13.]

CHAP. I. must look for its site at the other end of the Island, a point also of no small importance to defend.

Fortifications of
Dionysios and
Charles V.
at Syracuse.

The choice which Dionysios made of sites for his military works has been abiding. The castle at the furthest point of the Island is represented to this day in the castle of George Maniatis and King Frederick. Nor does the great fortress on the isthmus lack its modern representative, though the brutal destruction in which modern improves rejoice in Sicily no less than in England will soon make the likeness much less striking. The gigantic works of the Emperor Charles the Fifth call up at every moment the thought of the works of the native tyrant. And this, though the plans of defence go on exactly opposite principles. Dionysios, finding the artificial isthmus welded Island and mainland together, even while parting them asunder by his new wall. Charles, on the other hand, cut through the restored isthmus which he found and parted mainland and Island by more than one channel and bridge. But both masters of Syracuse alike piled up a vast mass of defensive works in the same spot: and there was one special point of likeness between the two. He who now passes from *Acinapura* to *Ortygia* passes under the endless gateways of the Emperor, and he who made the same journey in the days of Dionysios passed through the *Pentaporia*, the Five Gates, of the tyrant. Those too were doubtless gates one behind the other, though they must have been much nearer to one another than the gates of the later work. For Charles was simply strengthening one of the endless cities of his dominions: Dionysios was strengthening himself and making himself a house which should be the strongest of human dwellings. In that house the lord of Syracuse lived, master of land and sea on both sides of him, master above all of those docks in the Lesser Harbour which under him grew to an importance which quite outstripped the older docks in the Great Harbour. In these newer docks he

regularly kept sixty triremes, defended against attack from without by a new mole across the mouth of the haven. That mole was pierced by what is called a gate, which opened and shut to let one trireme at a time in and out¹. Within the fortified space he built treasure-houses; and, besides these works of defence and government, he did not neglect the ornament of the favoured quarter by the building of stately colonnades². For the Island became the exclusive abode of himself and of those on whose support his power rested. It was a fortress and a capital within a capital.

Great changes in the civil condition of Syracuse followed on this full establishment and strengthening of the power of the tyrant. The slaughter and driving out of the richest men in Syracuse, carrying with it of course the confiscation of their lands and goods, which had followed the attempt of the horsemen³, made Dionysios master of a well-filled hoard. He had ample means of rewarding all those who had done him service and of winning over all whom he wished to attach to his person and power. He gave citizenship to many slaves, most likely those of the slain and banished men, thus forming a class of citizens who were sure to be wholly creatures of his own⁴. These *New Citizens*, as well as others, both Syracusans and strangers, were further bound to him by the grant of lands and houses out of the forfeited estates. But the richest part of those estates,

Enfranchisement of slaves and creation of New Citizens.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 7; νεώρια . . . ἐξήκοντα τριῆρεις χωροῦντα, πύλην εἶχε κλειομένην, δι' ἧς κατὰ μίαν τῶν νεῶν εἰσπλεῖν συνέβαινε.]

[² Diod. loc. cit.; ἐνφοκοδόμησε καὶ πρὸ αὐτῆς χρηματιστήρια καὶ στοὰς δυναμέας ὅχλων ἐπιδέχεσθαι πλῆθος. These buildings are placed by Schubring (Aohradina, 37) and Holm (see Lupus, Stadt Syrakus, 167) on the Agora. Diodoros (xiv. 41) speaks of τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν στοαῖς.]

[³ Diod. xiv. 7; τῆς δὲ χώρας τὴν μὲν ἀρίστην ἐξελόμενος ἐδαρῆσατο τοῖς τε φίλοις καὶ τοῖς ἐφ' ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένοις, τὴν δ' ἄλλην ἐμέρισεν ἐπ' ἴσους ξένῳ τε καὶ πολίτῃ.]

[⁴ Ib.; συμπεριλαβὼν τῷ τῶν πολιτῶν ὀνόματι τοὺς ἡλευθερωμένους δούλους οὓς ἐκάλεε νεοπολίτας.]

CHAP. X. as well as all the houses within the Island, were reserved for his immediate friends and for the mercenary soldiers who were the real support of his power¹. He now held himself to be fully master of Syracuse². He had punished his enemies; he had enriched his friends; he had gained a new class of supporters to his side, and he had fixed his dwelling-place in a fortress of prodigious strength, inhabited only by men whom he believed that he could trust. To the old citizens of Syracuse the Island, the oldest and holiest part of their city, had become something like a foreign settlement at their gates. The temples of Athênê and Artemis, the sacred fountain of Arethousa, might seem to have passed away from the true citizens of Syracuse, to become possessions of the strangers and barbarians by whom they were held down in bondage.

Dionysios
breaks
treaty with
Carthage.

Attacks
Sikels.
B. C. 404.

As Dionysios had sacrificed so much to obtain a guaranty of his power at the hands of Carthage, it is to be supposed that fear of Carthaginian intervention was one of the means on which he relied for establishing his power at Syracuse. But as soon as his power was fully established, as soon as he felt himself safe in his island fortress, he began to trample the treaty with Carthage under foot. By one of its clauses, the Sikels were to be independent; yet the first recorded act of Dionysios, after his works in the Island were completed, was a campaign whose object was to enlarge his dominions at the cost of the Sikels³. He began, whether on any provocation we are not told, by a march to besiege the Sikel town of Herbessus⁴. This, his

[¹ Diod. xiv. 7; διέδωκε δὲ τὰς οἰκίας τοῖς ὀχλοῖς, πλὴν τῶν ἐν τῇ Νήσῳ ταύτῃ δὲ τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τοῖς μισθοφόροις ἰδιωχῆσατο.]

[² Ib.; τὰ κατὰ τὴν τυραννίδα καλῶς ἐδόκει διαπικνεῖσθαι.]

[³ Ib.; τὴν δύναμιν ἐξήνεγκεν ἐπὶ τοὺς Σικελούς, πάντας μὲν σπεύδων τοὺς αὐτονομίους ὑφ' αὐτὸν ποτῆσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ τοὺς διὰ τὸ συμμαχεῖσθαι πρότερον Καρχηδονίους.]

[⁴ Diod. l. c. For Herbessus see Sicily, i. 149. It lay on the borders of the territory of Syracuse and Leontinoi. Its site is still uncertain. The identification by Fazello and the older Sicilian antiquaries of Herbessus

first military enterprise since the full establishment of his power, led at once to a revolt against him. This was the first and one of the most dangerous revolts of several ; but as all of them were in the end unsuccessful, the result in each case was simply to strengthen the power of the tyrant. The attack on the Sikel town was disturbed by a threatening military revolt. That part of the army who were native Syracusans, once more finding arms in their hands, felt more disposed to use them against their master than against enemies who at least did not threaten their liberties. Men came together in groups ; they talked over the state of affairs ; each man began to blame the other for not having helped the horsemen in their attempt against the tyrant on the march from Gela. An officer of Dionysios, in command of a Syracusan division, Dôrikos by name, made use of threats to a soldier who made himself conspicuous by the boldness of his language. The story almost reads as if Dôrikos was not a Syracusan, in regular command, say, of

CHAP. X.

Siege of
Herbessus.Mutiny in
Dionysios'
army.

with Pantalica has however found support from Dr. P. Orsi, the most recent explorer of that old Sikel settlement. Besides the prehistoric tombs, the contents of which show Mykénæan influences, he notes the occurrence of Greek vases and a system of fortification—the peninsular hill-top cut off by a rock-hewn trench, here in form of a trapeze, the inner side of which is crowned by a wall—which, like the similar works at Leontinoi, seems to draw its inspiration from Dionysios' fortress at Euryálos. (*Contributi all' Archeologia preellenica Sicula*, Parma, 1891, 166.) The construction of the wall itself above the trench reminds us of the wall of Hermokratês at Selinous. The most convincing proof that Herbessus was thoroughly Hellenized is to be found in its fine fourth-century bronze coins (Imhoof-Blumer, *Monnaies Grecques*, pp. 19, 20), the obverse of which represents the myrtle-crowned head of Sikelia, the reverse at times the forepart of a man-headed bull, at times an eagle and serpent. These coins are always overstruck on Syracusan pieces with the head of Zeus Eleutherios, and belong to Timoleôn's time. The bull signifies a River-God, and if the site of Herbessus is to be identified with Pantalica this must be the Anapos. E. Pais on the other hand (*Osservazioni sulla Storia, &c. della Sicilia durante il dominio romano*, p. 48, note), following C. Müller (note to Ptol., *Par. ed.* p. 403), cites a corrupt passage of Vibius Sequester connecting Herbessus with the Helôros, on the strength of which he seeks the site at Busceimi, where an ancient necropolis also exists.]

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[² Ib.; τὰ κατὰ τὴν τυραννίδα καλῶς ἰδόμεναι διακημέναι.]

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 And, if in his later warfare he again loses part of what he has
 recovered, the state of things at his death is at least more
 favourable to Greece than that which was in existence when
 his career began. But this and his Hadriatic colonization
 are the only parts of his life on which we can look with any
 satisfaction. While driving back the Carthaginians from

CHAP. X. some parts of the island, he did much in others to weaken the strength of Greek life in Sicily; and his destruction and foundation of his cities, his wholesale removals of inhabitants from one spot to another, did much to increase that general instability and uncertainty of things in the island which men had noticed long before.

§ 1. *The Establishment of the Power of Dionysios in Sicily.* B.C. 405-397 [398].

We have in the last chapter traced the course of the second great invasion of Greek Sicily by the Carthaginians, their destructive advance from Selinous to Kamarina. Alongside of the later stages of this war we have marked the rise of Dionysios to power in Syracuse, down to the treaty by which, as the price of his acknowledgement by Carthage, he surrendered the whole of the Greek cities of the south coast of Sicily to Phœnician dominion or supremacy. Such a submission as this was meant to last only till he felt himself strong enough to win back what had been lost. To that end he had first to strengthen his power in Syracuse itself, and to extend it as far as he could over other parts of Sicily.

It must be remembered that the power of Dionysios was something that was still quite new, and that, setting aside the strong suspicion of direct treason under which Dionysios lay, his reputation had been in every way damaged by the war and the treaty which ended it. The war was over, a war in which Syracuse had gained no honour, and in which her master had won neither dominion nor distinction. The thoughts of men, enslaved at home and disgraced abroad, were likely to turn to designs for the recovery of their freedom. For the defence of his power and person, the tyrant needed a stronghold. In most cities that stronghold would naturally have been found in the oldest and strongest and

also the loftiest quarter, in the akropolis strictly so called. CHAP. X.
 At Syracuse things were otherwise. The oldest and strongest quarter was not the loftiest; the physical akropolis of the city within its present boundaries would have been found on the top of Achradina. But such a site would not have suited the purposes of Dionysios. It was the Island, it was Ortygia itself, which, of all the quarters of Syracuse, could be best defended as a separate fortress¹. It had the docks, older and newer, on each side of it, and the artificial isthmus could easily be fortified against the mainland. Dionysios saw the advantages of the site, and he determined to make the Island the stronghold of his power. He parted it off from the rest of the city by a lofty wall, thickset with towers². This must have been built on the mainland, a little in advance of the isthmus, as it was carried on so as to take the Lesser Harbour within its line of defence³. Just within the new wall, seemingly on the isthmus itself, Dionysios reared his castle, the chosen home of tyranny⁴. By the strange but easy misapplication of a word, he is said to have built an *akropolis*. That is to say, he built a fortress which, though planted on the lowest ground, was meant to fulfil the same purpose which in other cities was fulfilled by the fortress on the highest ground. Indeed he did more. By a still stranger use of language, we hear of two *akropoleis* in the Island; so thoroughly had the word put on this secondary meaning. The second akropolis was also the work of Dionysios⁵, and there can be little doubt that we

[¹ Diod. xiv. 7. See Sicily, vol. i. pp. 352, 353.]

[² Diod. xiv. 7; *τὴν Νῆσον . . . διακοδόμησεν ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως τείχει πολυτελεῖ, καὶ πύργους ὑψηλοὺς καὶ πυκνοὺς ἐνικοδόμησε.*]

[³ Ib.; *καὶ συμπερίλαβε τῇ ταύτης τείχει τὰ πρὸς τῇ μικρῇ λιμένι, τῇ Λακκίῳ καλουμένῃ, νεώρια.*]

[⁴ Ib.; *ἐικοδόμησε δ' ἐν αὐτῇ πολυτελεῶς ἀχυρωμένην ἀκρόπολιν πρὸς τὰς αἰφνιδίους καταφυγὰς.*]

[⁵ Ib. xvi. 70; *Τιμολέων δὲ παραλαβὼν τὴν νῆσον καὶ φρούρια τὰ Διονυσίου πρότερον ὑπακούοντα τὰς μὲν κατὰ τὴν νῆσον ἀκρόπόλεις . . . κατίσκαψε,* and cf. xvi. 9 and 13.]

CHAP. X. must look for its site at the other end of the Island, a point also of no small importance to defend.

Fortifica-
tions of
Diony-
sios and
Charles V.
at Syra-
cuse.

The choice which Dionysios made of sites for his military works has been abiding. The castle at the furthest point of the Island is represented to this day in the castle of George Maniakés and King Frederick. Nor does the great fortress on the isthmus lack its modern representative, though the brutal destruction in which modern improvers rejoice in Sicily no less than in England will soon make the likeness much less striking. The gigantic works of the Emperor Charles the Fifth call up at every moment the thought of the works of the native tyrant. And this, though the plans of defence go on exactly opposite principles. Dionysios, finding the artificial isthmus, welded Island and mainland together, even while parting them asunder by his new wall. Charles, on the other hand, cut through the restored isthmus which he found, and parted mainland and Island by more than one channel and bridge. But both masters of Syracuse alike piled up a vast mass of defensive works on the same spot; and there was one special point of likeness between the two. He who now passes from Achradina to Ortygia passes under the endless gateways of the Emperor, and he who made the same journey in the days of Dionysios passed through the *Pentapyla*, the Five Gates, of the tyrant. Those too were doubtless gates one behind the other, though they must have been much nearer to one another than the gates of the later work. For Charles was simply strengthening one of the endless cities of his dominions; Dionysios was strengthening himself and making himself a house which should be the strongest of human dwellings. In that house the lord of Syracuse lived, master of land and sea on both sides of him, master above all of those docks in the Lesser Harbour which under him grew to an importance which quite outstripped the elder docks in the Great Harbour. In these newer docks he

regularly kept sixty triremes, defended against attack from without by a new mole across the mouth of the haven. That mole was pierced by what is called a gate, which opened and shut to let one trireme at a time in and out¹. Within the fortified space he built treasure-houses; and, besides these works of defence and government, he did not neglect the ornament of the favoured quarter by the building of stately colonnades². For the Island became the exclusive abode of himself and of those on whose support his power rested. It was a fortress and a capital within a capital.

Great changes in the civil condition of Syracuse followed on this full establishment and strengthening of the power of the tyrant. The slaughter and driving out of the richest men in Syracuse, carrying with it of course the confiscation of their lands and goods, which had followed the attempt of the horsemen³, made Dionysios master of a well-filled hoard. He had ample means of rewarding all those who had done him service and of winning over all whom he wished to attach to his person and power. He gave citizenship to many slaves, most likely those of the slain and banished men, thus forming a class of citizens who were sure to be wholly creatures of his own⁴. These *New Citizens*, as well as others, both Syracusans and strangers, were further bound to him by the grant of lands and houses out of the forfeited estates. But the richest part of those estates,

Enfranchisement of slaves and creation of New Citizens.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 7; νεώρια . . . ἐξήκοντα τρήρεις χωροῦντα, πύλην εἶχε κλειομένην, δι' ἧς κατὰ μίαν τῶν νεῶν εἰσπλεῖν συνέβαινε.]

[² Diod. loc. cit.; ἐνφοκοδόμησε καὶ πρὸ αὐτῆς χρηματιστήρια καὶ στοδὸς δυναμένας ὀχλῶν ἐπιδέχεσθαι πλῆθος. These buildings are placed by Schubring (Achradina, 37) and Holm (see Lupus, Stadt Syrakus, 167) on the Agora. Diodoros (xiv. 41) speaks of ταῖς κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν στοαῖς.]

[³ Diod. xiv. 7; τῆς δὲ χώρας τὴν μὲν ἀρίστην ἐξελόμενος ἐδαρῆσατο τοῖς τε φίλοις καὶ τοῖς ἐφ' ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένοις, τὴν δ' ἄλλην ἐμέμεικεν ἐν ἴσῃ ξένῳ τε καὶ πολίτῃ.]

[⁴ Ib.; συμπεριλαβὼν τῷ τῶν πολιτῶν ὀνόματι τοὺς ἡλευθερωμένους δούλους οὓς ἐκάλεε νεοπολίτας.]

CHAP. X. as well as all the houses within the Island, were reserved for his immediate friends and for the mercenary soldiers who were the real support of his power¹. He now held himself to be fully master of Syracuse². He had punished his enemies; he had enriched his friends; he had gained a new class of supporters to his side, and he had fixed his dwelling-place in a fortress of prodigious strength, inhabited only by men whom he believed that he could trust. To the old citizens of Syracuse the Island, the oldest and holiest part of their city, had become something like a foreign settlement at their gates. The temples of Athênê and Artemis, the sacred fountain of Arethousa, might seem to have passed away from the true citizens of Syracuse, to become possessions of the strangers and barbarians by whom they were held down in bondage.

Dionysios
breaks
treaty with
Carthage.

Attacks
Sikels.
B. C. 404.

As Dionysios had sacrificed so much to obtain a guaranty of his power at the hands of Carthage, it is to be supposed that fear of Carthaginian intervention was one of the means on which he relied for establishing his power at Syracuse. But as soon as his power was fully established, as soon as he felt himself safe in his island fortress, he began to trample the treaty with Carthage under foot. By one of its clauses, the Sikels were to be independent; yet the first recorded act of Dionysios, after his works in the Island were completed, was a campaign whose object was to enlarge his dominions at the cost of the Sikels³. He began, whether on any provocation we are not told, by a march to besiege the Sikel town of Herbesus⁴. This, his

[¹ Diod. xiv. 7; διέδωκε δὲ τὰς οἰκίας τοῖς ὀχλοῖς, πλὴν τῶν ἐν τῇ Νήσῳ ταύτας δὲ τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τοῖς μισθοφόροις ἐδωρήσατο.]

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Dionysios
and the
revolted
troops.

This insult to their comrade at once kindled the spirit of the whole band; Dôrikos was slain; a cry for freedom rose from all the native Syracusans in the army. They were at once in open mutiny; they remembered that those whom they blamed themselves for not having helped were still able to help them. They sent to the horsemen who had fled to Ætna, and who still held that post as its garrison³. Dionysios meanwhile broke up the siege of Herbessus, and this time reached Syracuse before his enemies⁴. The revolted put themselves into a more regular order by the choice of generals. These officers were doubtless meant to be, not only leaders of the Syracusan army, but also magistrates of the restored Syracusan commonwealth. The men chosen for the post were those who had made themselves the most marked opponents of the tyrant by taking the lead in the slaughter of Dôrikos⁵. The force under their command, strengthened by the horsemen from Aitna, marched against Syracuse, where Dionysios was ready for them. Again, as in the days of Thrasyboulos and the mercenaries⁶, Syracuse was besieged by its own citizens.

Dionysios
besieged in
Syracuse.

B. C. 403.

The revolted Syracusans now occupied the old battleground of the Athenian besiegers; they encamped on Epipolai, and hemmed in the city. They must have trusted to their own powers of blockade; at least we hear nothing of the building of any walls; but it is clear that none

[¹ Dôrikos is described as *ὁ καθεσταμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ Διονυσίου τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἡγεμὼν*.]

[² Diod. xiv. 7; *ἐπῆλθεν ὡς πατάξων*.]

[³ Ib.; *μετεπέμνοντο τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Αἰτνῆς ἱππεῖς· οὗτοι γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς τυραννίδος ἐκπεποικότες, φέκουν τοῦτο τὸ φρούριον*. See Sicily, iii. 578.]

[⁴ Diod. xiv. 8.]

[⁵ Ib.; *οἱ τὴν ἀπόστασιν ποιησάμενοι στρατηγούς εἰλοντο τοὺς ἀποκτείναντας τὸν ἑπαρχον*.]

[⁶ See Sicily, ii. 305-308.]

could go in or out of the gate of Achradina¹. Again as in the days of Thrasyboulos, days which a few aged men could remember, they sent for help to other Greek cities both in Sicily and Italy. It will be remembered that no men had better ground for a grudge against Dionysios than the Italiot allies who had fought and suffered before Gela. They had marched away in bitter wrath against the tyrant whom they believed to have betrayed them². It was in that quarter therefore that the insurgents at Syracuse sent for help. The two cities of Messana and Rhêgion, who in this matter at least seem to have acted together, could between them muster eighty triremes, and this whole force was willingly sent to help the cause of Syracusan freedom³. Later events might make us think that some of the nearer Sikeliot cities did something towards the same work⁴; but only Messana and Rhêgion are named. The new Syracusan government, from its quarters on Epipolai, put forth a proclamation, the exact words of which would be precious, offering a large reward to any who should slay the tyrant⁵,

[¹ Diod. xiv. 8; *ἐν ταῖς καλουμέναις Ἐπιπολαῖς ἀντεστρατοπέδευσαν τῷ τυράννῳ καὶ διέκλεισαν αὐτὸν τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν ἐξόδου*. But Diodôros says nothing about Achradina, and from his following statement, *κατεσκευάσαν δὲ καὶ μηχανήματα δι' ὧν τὰ τεῖχη σαλεύοντες ἐξέλωσι καὶ προσέβαλλον καθ' ἡμέραν τῇ Νήσῳ*, it certainly looks as if Dionysios had retired into the "Island," and that the wall attacked by the engines was the new wall across the isthmus. That in a moment of emergency he should have preferred to oppose to the enemy the extended line made up of the walls of Achradina, Tyche and Temenitês, rather than the wall across the isthmus which he had himself constructed, in view of emergencies such as the present (see above, p. 11, note 4; Diod. xiv. 7), it is hard to understand. So too Holm (*Gesch. Siciliens*, ii. 102) understands Diodôros to mean that Dionysios was besieged in his peninsular castle, and Grote (c. lxxxii) remarks, "Dionysios maintained himself in his impregnable position in Ortygia . . . if he even continued master of Achradina he must have been prevented from easy communication with it."]

[² Sicily, iii. 574.]

[³ Diod. xiv. 8.]

[⁴ Dionysios' hard treatment of Naxos and Katanê might in this way be partly accounted for.]

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 And, if in his later warfare he again loses part of what he has
 recovered, the state of things at his death is at least more
 favourable to Greece than that which was in existence when
 his career began. But this and his Hadriatic colonization
 are the only parts of his life on which we can look with any
 satisfaction. While driving back the Carthaginians from

CHAP. X. some parts of the island, he did much in others to weaken the strength of Greek life in Sicily; and his destruction and foundation of his cities, his wholesale removals of inhabitants from one spot to another, did much to increase that general instability and uncertainty of things in the island which men had noticed long before.

§ 1. *The Establishment of the Power of Dionysios in Sicily.* B.C. 405-397 [398].

We have in the last chapter traced the course of the second great invasion of Greek Sicily by the Carthaginians, their destructive advance from Selinous to Kamarina. Alongside of the later stages of this war we have marked the rise of Dionysios to power in Syracuse, down to the treaty by which, as the price of his acknowledgement by Carthage, he surrendered the whole of the Greek cities of the south coast of Sicily to Phœnician dominion or supremacy. Such a submission as this was meant to last only till he felt himself strong enough to win back what had been lost. To that end he had first to strengthen his power in Syracuse itself, and to extend it as far as he could over other parts of Sicily.

It must be remembered that the power of Dionysios was something that was still quite new, and that, setting aside the strong suspicion of direct treason under which Dionysios lay, his reputation had been in every way damaged by the war and the treaty which ended it. The war was over, a war in which Syracuse had gained no honour, and in which her master had won neither dominion nor distinction. The thoughts of men, enslaved at home and disgraced abroad, were likely to turn to designs for the recovery of their freedom. For the defence of his power and person, the tyrant needed a stronghold. In most cities that stronghold would naturally have been found in the oldest and strongest and

also the loftiest quarter, in the akropolis strictly so called. CHAP. X.
 At Syracuse things were otherwise. The oldest and strongest quarter was not the loftiest; the physical akropolis of the city within its present boundaries would have been found on the top of Achradina. But such a site would not have suited the purposes of Dionysios. It was the Island, it was Ortygia itself, which, of all the quarters of Syracuse, could be best defended as a separate fortress¹. It had the docks, older and newer, on each side of it, and the artificial isthmus could easily be fortified against the mainland. Dionysios saw the advantages of the site, and he determined to make the Island the stronghold of his power. He parted it off from the rest of the city by a lofty wall, thickset with towers². This must have been built on the mainland, a little in advance of the isthmus, as it was carried on so as to take the Lesser Harbour within its line of defence³. Just within the new wall, seemingly on the isthmus itself, Dionysios reared his castle, the chosen home of tyranny⁴. By the strange but easy misapplication of a word, he is said to have built an *akropolis*. That is to say, he built a fortress which, though planted on the lowest ground, was meant to fulfil the same purpose which in other cities was fulfilled by the fortress on the highest ground. Indeed he did more. By a still stranger use of language, we hear of two *akropoleis* in the Island; so thoroughly had the word put on this secondary meaning. The second akropolis was also the work of Dionysios⁵, and there can be little doubt that we

Ortygia
made the
tyrant's
castle.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 7. See Sicily, vol. i. pp. 352, 353.]

[² Diod. xiv. 7; *τὴν Νῆσον . . . διακοδόμησεν ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως τείχει πολυτελεῖ, καὶ πύργους ὑψηλοὺς καὶ πυκνοὺς ἐνικοδόμησε.*]

[³ Ib.; *καὶ συμπεριέλαβε τῇ ταύτης τείχει τὰ πρὸς τῇ μικρῷ λιμένι, τῇ Λακκίῳ καλουμένῃ, νεώρια.*]

[⁴ Ib.; *ἐικοδόμησε δ' ἐν αὐτῇ πολυτελεῶς ὀχυρωμένην ἀκρόπολιν πρὸς τὰς ἀφνειοῦς καταφυγάς.*]

[⁵ Ib. xvi. 70; *Τιμολέων δὲ παραλαβὼν τὴν νῆσον καὶ φρούρια τὰ Διονυσίῳ πρότερον ὑπακούοντα τὰς μὲν κατὰ τὴν νῆσον ἀκρόπόλεις . . . κατέσκαψε, and cf. xvi. 9 and 13.]*

CHAP. X. must look for its site at the other end of the Island, a point also of no small importance to defend.

Fortifica-
tions of
Diony-
sios and
Charles V.
at Syra-
cuse.

The choice which Dionysios made of sites for his military works has been abiding. The castle at the furthest point of the Island is represented to this day in the castle of George Maniakés and King Frederick. Nor does the great fortress on the isthmus lack its modern representative, though the brutal destruction in which modern improvers rejoice in Sicily no less than in England will soon make the likeness much less striking. The gigantic works of the Emperor Charles the Fifth call up at every moment the thought of the works of the native tyrant. And this, though the plans of defence go on exactly opposite principles. Dionysios, finding the artificial isthmus, welded Island and mainland together, even while parting them asunder by his new wall. Charles, on the other hand, cut through the restored isthmus which he found, and parted mainland and Island by more than one channel and bridge. But both masters of Syracuse alike piled up a vast mass of defensive works on the same spot; and there was one special point of likeness between the two. He who now passes from Achradina to Ortygia passes under the endless gateways of the Emperor, and he who made the same journey in the days of Dionysios passed through the *Pentapyla*, the Five Gates, of the tyrant. Those too were doubtless gates one behind the other, though they must have been much nearer to one another than the gates of the later work. For Charles was simply strengthening one of the endless cities of his dominions; Dionysios was strengthening himself and making himself a house which should be the strongest of human dwellings. In that house the lord of Syracuse lived, master of land and sea on both sides of him, master above all of those docks in the Lesser Harbour which under him grew to an importance which quite outstripped the elder docks in the Great Harbour. In these newer docks he

regularly kept sixty triremes, defended against attack from without by a new mole across the mouth of the haven. That mole was pierced by what is called a gate, which opened and shut to let one trireme at a time in and out¹. Within the fortified space he built treasure-houses; and, besides these works of defence and government, he did not neglect the ornament of the favoured quarter by the building of stately colonnades². For the Island became the exclusive abode of himself and of those on whose support his power rested. It was a fortress and a capital within a capital.

Great changes in the civil condition of Syracuse followed on this full establishment and strengthening of the power of the tyrant. The slaughter and driving out of the richest men in Syracuse, carrying with it of course the confiscation of their lands and goods, which had followed the attempt of the horsemen³, made Dionysios master of a well-filled hoard. He had ample means of rewarding all those who had done him service and of winning over all whom he wished to attach to his person and power. He gave citizenship to many slaves, most likely those of the slain and banished men, thus forming a class of citizens who were sure to be wholly creatures of his own⁴. These *New Citizens*, as well as others, both Syracusans and strangers, were further bound to him by the grant of lands and houses out of the forfeited estates. But the richest part of those estates,

CHAP. X.

Enfranchisement of slaves and creation of New Citizens.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 7; νεώρια . . . ἐξήκοντα τριῆρεις χωροῦντα, πύλην εἶχε κλειομένην, δι' ἧς κατὰ μίαν τῶν νεῶν εἰσπλεῖν συνέβαινε.]

[² Diod. loc. cit.; ἐνφυκδοῦμηνε καὶ πρὸ αὐτῆς χρηματιστήρια καὶ στοὰς δυναμένας ὄχλων ἐπιδέχεσθαι πλῆθος. These buildings are placed by Schubring (Achradina, 37) and Holm (see Lupus, Stadt Syrakus, 167) on the Agora. Diodōros (xiv. 41) speaks of ταῖς κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν στοαῖς.]

[³ Diod. xiv. 7; τῆς δὲ χώρας τὴν μὲν ἀρίστην ἐξελόμενος ἐδαρῆσατο τοῖς τε φίλοις καὶ τοῖς ἐφ' ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένοις, τὴν δ' ἄλλην ἐμέμμεν ἐπ' ἰσῆς ξένῳ τε καὶ πολίτῃ.]

[⁴ Ib.; συμπεριλαβὼν τῇ τῶν πολιτῶν ὀνόματι τοὺς ἡλευθερωμένους δούλους οὓς ἐκάλει νεοπολίτας.]

CHAP. X. as well as all the houses within the Island, were reserved for his immediate friends and for the mercenary soldiers who were the real support of his power¹. He now held himself to be fully master of Syracuse². He had punished his enemies; he had enriched his friends; he had gained a new class of supporters to his side, and he had fixed his dwelling-place in a fortress of prodigious strength, inhabited only by men whom he believed that he could trust. To the old citizens of Syracuse the Island, the oldest and holiest part of their city, had become something like a foreign settlement at their gates. The temples of Athênê and Artemis, the sacred fountain of Arethousa, might seem to have passed away from the true citizens of Syracuse, to become possessions of the strangers and barbarians by whom they were held down in bondage.

Dionysios
breaks
treaty with
Carthage.

Attacks
Sikela.
B. C. 404.

As Dionysios had sacrificed so much to obtain a guaranty of his power at the hands of Carthage, it is to be supposed that fear of Carthaginian intervention was one of the means on which he relied for establishing his power at Syracuse. But as soon as his power was fully established, as soon as he felt himself safe in his island fortress, he began to trample the treaty with Carthage under foot. By one of its clauses, the Sikels were to be independent; yet the first recorded act of Dionysios, after his works in the Island were completed, was a campaign whose object was to enlarge his dominions at the cost of the Sikels³. He began, whether on any provocation we are not told, by a march to besiege the Sikel town of Herbessus⁴. This, his

[¹ Diod. xiv. 7; *διέδωκε δὲ τὰς οἰκίας τοῖς ὄχλοις, πλὴν τῶν ἐν τῇ Νήσῳ ταύτας δὲ τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τοῖς μισθοφόροις ἐδωρήσατο.*]

[² Ib.; *τὰ κατὰ τὴν τυραννίδα καλῶς ἐδόκει διακητέναι.*]

[³ Ib.; *τὴν δύναμιν ἐξήνεγκεν ἐπὶ τοῖς Σικελόσι, πάντας μὲν σπεύδων τοὺς αὐτόνομους ὑφ' αὐτὸν ποθεῖσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ τοῦτον διὰ τὸ συμμαχεῖσθαι πρότερον Καρχηδονίους.*]

[⁴ Diod. l. c. For Herbessus see Sicily, i. 149. It lay on the borders of the territory of Syracuse and Leontinoi. Its site is still uncertain. The identification by Fazello and the older Sicilian antiquaries of Herbessus

first military enterprise since the full establishment of his power, led at once to a revolt against him. This was the first and one of the most dangerous revolts of several; but as all of them were in the end unsuccessful, the result in each case was simply to strengthen the power of the tyrant. The attack on the Sikel town was disturbed by a threatening military revolt. That part of the army who were native Syracusans, once more finding arms in their hands, felt more disposed to use them against their master than against enemies who at least did not threaten their liberties. Men came together in groups; they talked over the state of affairs; each man began to blame the other for not having helped the horsemen in their attempt against the tyrant on the march from Gela. An officer of Dionysios, in command of a Syracusan division, Dôrikos by name, made use of threats to a soldier who made himself conspicuous by the boldness of his language. The story almost reads as if Dôrikos was not a Syracusan, in regular command, say, of

CHAP. X.
Siege of
Herbessus.

Mutiny in
Dionysios'
army.

with Pantalica has however found support from Dr. P. Orsi, the most recent explorer of that old Sikel settlement. Besides the prehistoric tombs, the contents of which show Mykénæan influences, he notes the occurrence of Greek vases and a system of fortification—the peninsular hill-top cut off by a rock-hewn trench, here in form of a trapeze, the inner side of which is crowned by a wall—which, like the similar works at Leontinoi, seems to draw its inspiration from Dionysios' fortress at Euryálos. (*Contributi all' Archeologia preellenica Sicula*, Parma, 1891, 166.) The construction of the wall itself above the trench reminds us of the wall of Hermokratês at Selinous. The most convincing proof that Herbessus was thoroughly Hellenized is to be found in its fine fourth-century bronze coins (Imhoof-Blumer, *Monnaies Grecques*, pp. 19, 20), the obverse of which represents the myrtle-crowned head of Sikelia, the reverse at times the forepart of a man-headed bull, at times an eagle and serpent. These coins are always overstruck on Syracusan pieces with the head of Zeus Eleutherios, and belong to Timoleôn's time. The bull signifies a River-God, and if the site of Herbessus is to be identified with Pantalica this must be the Anapos. E. Pais on the other hand (*Osservazioni sulla Storia, &c. della Sicilia durante il dominio romano*, p. 48, note), following C. Müller (note to Ptol., *Par. ed.* p. 403), cites a corrupt passage of Vibius Sequester connecting Herbessus with the Helôros, on the strength of which he seeks the site at Buscemi, where an ancient necropolis also exists.]

CHAP. X. his own tribe, but one of the mercenary dependents of Dionysios¹. When the soldier answered with yet more daring words, Dôrikos lifted up his hand to strike him².

Dionysios
and the
revolted
troops.

This insult to their comrade at once kindled the spirit of the whole band; Dôrikos was slain; a cry for freedom rose from all the native Syracusans in the army. They were at once in open mutiny; they remembered that those whom they blamed themselves for not having helped were still able to help them. They sent to the horsemen who had fled to Ætna, and who still held that post as its garrison³. Dionysios meanwhile broke up the siege of Herbessus, and this time reached Syracuse before his enemies⁴. The revolted put themselves into a more regular order by the choice of generals. These officers were doubtless meant to be, not only leaders of the Syracusan army, but also magistrates of the restored Syracusan commonwealth. The men chosen for the post were those who had made themselves the most marked opponents of the tyrant by taking the lead in the slaughter of Dôrikos⁵. The force under their command, strengthened by the horsemen from Aitna, marched against Syracuse, where Dionysios was ready for them. Again, as in the days of Thrasyboulos and the mercenaries⁶, Syracuse was besieged by its own citizens.

Dionysios
besieged in
Syracuse.

B. C. 403.

The revolted Syracusans now occupied the old battleground of the Athenian besiegers; they encamped on Epipolai, and hemmed in the city. They must have trusted to their own powers of blockade; at least we hear nothing of the building of any walls; but it is clear that none

[¹ Dôrikos is described as *ὁ καθισταμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ Διονυσίου τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἡγούμενος*.]

[² Diod. xiv. 7; *ἐπῆλθεν ὡς πατάξων*.]

[³ Ib.; *μετεπέμνοντο τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Αἰτνῆς ἱππεῖς οὗτοι γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς τυραννίδος ἐκπετακότες, φέκουν τοῦτο τὸ φρούριον*. See Sicily, iii. 578.]

[⁴ Diod. xiv. 8.]

[⁵ Ib.; *οἱ τὴν ἀπόστασιν ποιησάμενοι στρατηγούς εἶλοντο τοὺς ἀποκτείναντας τὸν ἐπαρχον*.]

[⁶ See Sicily, ii. 305-308.]

could go in or out of the gate of Achradina¹. Again as in CHAP. X. the days of Thrasyboulos, days which a few aged men could remember, they sent for help to other Greek cities both in Sicily and Italy. It will be remembered that no men had better ground for a grudge against Dionysios than the Italiot allies who had fought and suffered before Gela. They had marched away in bitter wrath against the tyrant whom they believed to have betrayed them². It was in that quarter therefore that the insurgents at Syracuse sent for help. The two cities of Messana and Rhêgion, who in this matter at least seem to have acted together, could between them muster eighty triremes, and this whole force was willingly sent to help the cause of Syracusan freedom³. Later events might make us think that some of the nearer Sikeliot cities did something towards the same work⁴; but only Messana and Rhêgion are named. The new Syracusan government, from its quarters on Epipolai, put forth a proclamation, the exact words of which would be precious, offering a large reward to any who should slay the tyrant⁵,

[¹ Diod. xiv. 8; *ἐν ταῖς καλουμέναις Ἐπιπολαῖς ἀντεστρατοπέδευσαν τῷ τυράννῳ καὶ διέκλεισαν αὐτὸν τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν ἐξόδου.* But Diodôros says nothing about Achradina, and from his following statement, *κατεσκευάσαν δὲ καὶ μηχανήματα δι' ἃν τὰ τεῖχη σαλεύοντες ἐξέλωσι καὶ προσέβαλλον καθ' ἡμέραν τῇ Νήσῳ*, it certainly looks as if Dionysios had retired into the "Island," and that the wall attacked by the engines was the new wall across the isthmus. That in a moment of emergency he should have preferred to oppose to the enemy the extended line made up of the walls of Achradina, Tyche and Temenitês, rather than the wall across the isthmus which he had himself constructed, in view of emergencies such as the present (see above, p. 11, note 4; Diod. xiv. 7), it is hard to understand. So too Holm (*Gesch. Siciliens*, ii. 102) understands Diodôros to mean that Dionysios was besieged in his peninsular castle, and Grote (c. lxxxii) remarks, "Dionysios maintained himself in his impregnable position in Ortygia . . . if he even continued master of Achradina he must have been prevented from easy communication with it."]

[² Sicily, iii. 574.]

[³ Diod. xiv. 8.]

[⁴ Dionysios' hard treatment of Naxos and Katanê might in this way be partly accounted for.]

[⁵ Diod. l. c.; *ἐπεκέρυξαν δὲ καὶ χρημάτων πλῆθος τοῖς ἀνελούσι τὸν τύραννον.*]

CHAP. X. and also promising citizenship to any of his mercenaries who would come over and join them¹. The siege was pressed vigorously; the besiegers made themselves battering-engines with which we are told they shook the walls. The walls against which the engines would be brought must have been the wall of Gelôn, carrying down the old west wall of upper Achradina to the Great Harbour, and the newer walls of Tycha and Temenitês². Gelôn's wall was likely to be a serious obstacle; but the other walls, thrown up hastily for special purposes, were likely to be below the average strength of Greek defences. But behind them stood the old wall of Achradina, and, strongest of all, the new defences of the Island. While the outer walls were thus assaulted by land, daily attacks were made on the Island itself, which could have been made only by the ships that had come from Messana and Rhêgion³. The hopes of the besiegers seemed so good that not a few of his mercenaries forsook him. They accepted the offers which were made to them by the revolters, and were welcomed by them as comrades⁴.

It seems to have been the desertion of his mercenaries which drove Dionysios for a moment to despair⁵. He held a council of his most trusted friends, the debates at which, recorded in the first instance by one who had a chief place at the board, have come down to us in a variety of shapes. Strange to say, it is the tyrant himself who is set before us as the most faint-hearted in the assembly. He gave over

[¹ Diod. xix. 8; καὶ τοῖς μεταβαλλομένοις τῶν ξένων ἐπηγγέλαντο μεταδόναι τῆς πολιτείας.] [² See above, p. 17, note 1.]

[³ See above, p. 17, note 1. In the margin of the MS. there is a pencilled "!" which seems to show that Mr. Freeman himself doubted whether the attack on the island could only have been made by the ships.]

⁴ Diod. xiv. 8; τοὺς μεταβαλλομένους τῶν ξένων φιλανθρώπων ἀπεδέχοντο. We seem both here and just before to catch the words of a formal decree. The civil term ξένοι should be marked.

⁵ Ib.; ὑπὸ τῶν μισθοφόρων ἐγκαταλειπόμενος. Here Diodôros, or his authority, speaking for himself, no longer speaks of ξένοι.

all hope of overcoming the revolted Syracusans ; he thought only of finding some end to his power which should not be utterly inglorious. Then Helôris, called by some his adopted father, uttered the famous words, to be spoken ages after in the ears of one of the most famous of Rome's Cæsars, "The robe of the ruler is a goodly winding-sheet¹." His kinsman Polyxenos bade him mount his swiftest horse, and ride with all speed to the Campanians in the service of Carthage. Another counsellor, of whom all we can say with certainty is that he was not Philistos², retorted with another epigram ; let not the ruler, he said, ride away from his dominion on a swift horse ; let him rather cleave to it till he is dragged out by the leg. To him Dionysios hearkened ; he would endure all things rather than give up his power of his own free will³. To gain time, he opened a pretended negotiation with his enemies ; he asked for leave to go away from Syracuse with his own property⁴. The lawful goods of Dionysios, as distinguished from the confiscated property of the men who were waiting outside to recover them, would perhaps have been no very heavy burthen. And the saying of Polyxenos grew in the tyrant's mind into a very practical piece of advice. He would not ride to the Campanians in person ; but he contrived to send messengers to them, praying them to come to his help, and offering them any rewards that they might demand⁵.

CHAP. X.

Counsels of
Helôris and
Polyxenos.Dionysios
pretends to
treat.

The besiegers were thoroughly fooled by the tyrant. An agreement was made by which Dionysios agreed to leave Syracuse with five ships⁶. His enemies deserved their

¹ See Appendix II.

[² Plut. Diôn, 35 ; see Appendix II.]

³ Diod. xiv. 8 ; *ὁ προσχὼν ὁ Διονύσιος ἔκρανε πᾶν ὑπομείναι πρότερον ἢ τὴν δυναστείαν ἐκλιπεῖν ἐκουσίως.*

⁴ Ib. ; *μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων ἀπελθεῖν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως.*

⁵ Ib. ; *δόσκειν χρήματα ὅσα ἂν αἰτήσασιν εἰς τὴν πολιορκίαν.*

⁶ Ib. 9 ; *ἐξουσίαν δόντες τῷ τυράννῃ μετὰ πέντε νεῶν ἀποπλεῖν.*

CHAP. X. fate, when, on the strength of this agreement, they sent
 The be- back the horsemen from Aitna, whose help they had so
 siegers out- eagerly sought for. Horsemen were of no use in the siege¹.
 witted. And they thought that there was to be no more siege for
 any one. They deemed that the tyranny was already over-
 thrown; they simply waited for the tyrant to go. The
 horsemen were gone; the more part of the footmen gave
 up all military duty, and scattered themselves about the
 country. Syracusan citizens doubtless had houses and
 lands which they might wish to visit²; but one would
 like to know what became of those of the tyrant's mer-
 cenaries who had gone over to the popular side. Their loss
 was soon well supplied. While the blinded besiegers were
 Arrival of every hour expecting the tyrant to set sail with the five
 the Campa- ships allowed him, twelve hundred Campanian horsemen
 nians. came to his help. We have heard of them already in the
 service of Carthage; they had been left by Himilkôn in
 garrison in some part of Sicily³. The geography of the
 story seems to show that they were quartered at some point on
 the northern coast, where the Punic dominions now reached
 as far eastward as the territory of Himera had reached.
 That they should be sent to help Dionysios against the
 people was strictly according to his treaty with Carthage,
 far more strictly according to it than his warfare with
 Herbessus could have been. Carthage had given a guaranty
 for the dominion of Dionysios over Syracuse; she now ful-
 filled that guaranty. The Campanians set forth; on their
 way they passed by Agyrium, and the local piety of our chief
 guide has preserved the fact that they left their baggage

¹ Diod. xiv. 9; τοὺς μὲν ἑπὶ αὐτῷ ἀπέλυσαν πρὸς τὴν πολιορκίαν οὐδὲν χρησίμους ὄντας.

² Ib.; τῶν δὲ πλείστοι οἱ πλείστοι κατὰ τὴν χώραν ἐξήεσαν. So Grote, ch. lxxlii.

³ In Diod. xiv. 8 they are spoken of as in the "Carthaginian Dominion." O. Meltzer (N. Jahrb. f. Phil., 1873, 232) suggests that they had been settled by Himilkôn at Halæsa, and this view is supported by Holm (G. S. 433). It would explain the march by Agyrium.]

with Agyris, lord of Agyrium, an important personage of whom we shall presently hear more¹. They then made their way with all speed to Syracuse. They must have come from the north; a decent watch could easily have kept horsemen from scaling the sides of Epipolai. But no watch seems to have been set, though some besiegers were still on the height; all had not gone off on their urgent private affairs. The Campanians at once set upon those whom they still found there, slew not a few, and forced their way into the city to Dionysios². Just at the same time another reinforcement of three hundred joined him by sea from some quarter not mentioned³. His hopes began to revive, and they were further strengthened by dissensions among his enemies. Some wished to stay and go on with the siege; others thought that it was wiser to break up the camp and leave the city altogether⁴. While the besiegers were in this disunited and disorderly case, he himself being strengthened by this new accession of force, the tyrant thought that the time was come to attack instead of simply resisting attacks. It must have been by the gate of Achradina that Dionysios led out his troops, and set upon the unprepared and scattered masses who were supposed to be besieging him. He easily routed them, we are told, at the New City, *Neapolis*⁵. This name, the fellow of Carthage and Naples, as of Newton and Newbury, is

CHAP. X.

Victorious sally.

¹ Diod. xiv. 9; τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπ' Ἀγύριον παρεγενήθησαν· ἐκεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀποσκευὴν Ἀγύρι παραθέμενοι τῷ δυναστεύοντι τῆς πόλεως. With Holm (ii. 430) I do not share the difficulty of Grote (ch. lxxxii) about the geography. He seems to have thought that the Campanians must have come from the extreme west of Sicily. At this moment, though the town itself is some miles off, Agyrium has a station on the railway between Palermo and Syracuse. [See pp. 40, 41, note 3.]

² Ib.; ταχὺ δὲ διανύσαντες τὴν ὁδὸν, ἀπροσδοκῆτως ἐπεφάνησαν τοῖς Συρακουσίοις, καὶ πολλοὺς αὐτῶν ἀνελόντες, εἰσεβιάσαντο πρὸς τὸν Διονυσίον.

³ Ib.

⁴ Ib.; τῶν δὲ λύσει τὸ στρατόπεδον καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐκλιπεῖν.

⁵ Ib.; ἐξήγαγεν ἐπ' αὐτοὺς τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ τεταραγμένοις ἐπιπεσὼν, βρῆδαις ἐτρέψατο περὶ τὴν Νέαν πόλιν καλουμένην.

CHAP. X. now heard for the first time in Syracusan history. At a later time it becomes much better known, and it may be that it is found here only by carrying back to this time the language of the historian's own day. But the district meant is perfectly plain. It is what we may call the region of the theatre; the region west of lower Achradina, and reaching from the south wall of Temenitès to the Great Harbour¹. The slaughter was not great; it was just now the policy of Dionysios to be merciful; he rode along his lines and bade his soldiers to spare the fugitives². Taken as they were on the level ground, their flight was easy; they were scattered hither and thither through the country. Presently they recovered themselves, and a body of seven thousand were glad to join the horsemen at Aitna whom they had so lately sent away³.

Clemency
of Dio-
nysios.

B.C. 402.

The siege was now over, and Dionysios was relieved from all immediate danger. He carried on the conciliatory policy which he had begun to show on the day of battle. In the utter rout of that day the burial-truce had not been thought of; the dead lay unburied; Dionysios had the opportunity of doing a popular act by giving them the usual funeral rites⁴. Of this he took care to boast when, as his next step, he sent a message to the seceders at Ætna, inviting them to come back to Syracuse, and pledging his word that all grudges should be forgotten⁵. Some, who had left wives and children in the city, were won over. But the more part refused to hearken to the tyrant. To his boast of having buried the dead they answered that they would be glad

[¹ See Lupus, *Stadt Syrakus*, 36 seqq. and 168, 169. The clearest datum for the site of the Neapolis is supplied by Cicero, *Verr.* iv. 53, "ad summam (Neapolim) theatrum maximum."]

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to do the same service for him, and that they hoped the gods would soon give them the chance¹. Notwithstanding this mockery of their comrades, Dionysius welcomed and well treated those who did come back, in the hope that the rest might be won over to follow them². CHAP. X

An event now followed, far away from Syracuse, which was in some sort an incidental result of the civil struggles of Syracuse, but which in truth marks a new stage of Sicilian history. A new element was to be added to the mingled population of the island, not wholly foreign to one of its chief existing elements, and pointing to much that was to come in the nearer as well as the more distant future. We have now come to the first instalment of settlement in Sicily on the part of the native nations of Italy, the forgotten kinsfolk of the Sikel. The cities of Sicily, Hellenic and Hellenized, were now to feel here and there what the Greek cities of Italy had long been enduring. It was the Campanian mercenaries who had won the victory for Dionysius; but he put no faith in them; he had no wish to keep them in his service now his power was set up again. He sent them away loaded with gifts³. This time they marched straight away to the far West. They reached the Sikan town of Entella, which would seem to have been at this time an ally or dependency of Carthage. The soldiers of Carthage were welcomed friendly; the people of Entella were even persuaded—we should gladly know more of the process—to receive the new-comers as fellow-dwellers in their town⁴. Presently

[¹ Diod. xiv. 9; ἔφασαν αὐτὸν ἄξιον εἶναι τυχεῖν τῆς ὁμοίας χάριτος, καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἡβχοντο τὴν ταχίστην αὐτὸν ἐπιδεῖν ταύτης τυγχάνοντα.]

[² Ib.]

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CHAP. X. in the night season the Campanians rose, slaughtered the men of Entella, and took the women to themselves. They are spoken of as the lawful wives of their captors¹, which may suggest a wish to connect themselves with the former owners of Entella and to keep alive the traditions of the place. Yet the new Campanian community of Entella in no way shrunk from proclaiming its nationality, but announced itself as Campanian on its coins². This was the first settlement of the kind in Sicily; but not the last. Italy had no lack of armed sons to whom Sicilian lands and dwellings were tempting. The Mamertines were still to come, and the Romans were to come to their help³.

Affairs in
Old Greece.

Sparta and
Corinth.

Our field widens in every direction. The connexion between Sicily and Old Greece begins in the days of Dionysios to grow closer and to put on new shapes. In the days of the Athenian invasion Sparta had fought alongside of Syracuse on behalf of Syracuse. Political combinations in Old Greece were now beginning to take new shapes; the Peloponnesian confederacy which had waged the Peloponnesian war was breaking up, and before long Athens and Corinth were to be fighting side by side against Sparta. It is not unlikely that a direct opposition between Sparta and Corinth in their dealings towards Syracuse may have helped to lead to this turning about of parties.

¹ Diod. xiv. 9; τὰς γυναῖκας τῶν παρὰ σπονδῆθέντων γήμνατες.

[² On the Campanian coins of Entella see Holm, G. S. ii. 430, 431; Salinas, *Le Monete della Antiche Città di Sicilia*, Tav. iii; Head, *Coinage of Syracuse*, p. 36, note 47; *Hist. Num.* 119. They were not struck till Timoleón's time according to Head. See below, p. 352.]

³ Holm (ii. 103) compares Kymé. But the Samnite occupation of Kymé was the advance of a people in its own land, while the Campanian settlement at Entella was made in a new land. On the other hand, the fall of the illustrious Greek city of Kymé was more striking than that of Sikan Entella. What the new folk of Entella found it convenient to become I have mentioned already. See vol. i. p. 214.

Sparta, the city which had never seen a tyrant, was held to have a traditional hatred of the class; but that hatred was felt far more strongly at Corinth, where the memory of the Kypselid dynasty was not forgotten. A hundred years before our time, when Sparta had thought of Athens again under the yoke of the tyrants whom she had cast forth, it was by the vigorous opposition of Corinth that she was saved from such a base forsaking of her habitual policy¹. The same parts are now again played by the two cities with regard to Syracuse. The tale is told very meagrely and with much confusion; but we can at least see that, as sixty years later, the heart of Corinth was stirred at the enslavement of her great colony. The aristocratic parent could sympathize with the domestic tyrant no less than against the foreign invader. A Corinthian agent, Nikotelês by name, was now at Syracuse, in what avowed character we are not told; but his business was clearly to act as a helper of Syracusan freedom². Presently a Lacedæmonian agent also appeared on the field, charged with quite another errand.

Sparta, under the influence of Lysandros, had now quite cast aside her old traditions; she had cast aside the professions with which she had entered on the Peloponnesian war. The watchword of that war on the Peloponnesian side had been the independence of every Greek city³, and no one had as yet dared, as Epameinôndas did at a later day, to argue that that principle involved the existence of Amyklai and Helos as cities independent of Sparta⁴. It was as the tyrant city that held other Greek cities in submission that Athens had been warred against and overthrown by Sparta and her allies. The practical result had been the setting up of a dominion on the part of

CHAP. X.

Tyrannical
dominion
of Sparta.¹ Herod. v. 92.² Diod. xiv. 10.³ Thuc. i. 139, and other passages to the same effect.⁴ Xen. Hell. vi. 5.

CHAP. I. Sparta immeasurably more oppressive than the dominion of Athens had ever been. Some cities were directly ruled by Spartan harmosts, others were under the dominion of oppressive oligarchies of their own citizens, maintained by Spartan influence. The famous Thirty at Athens were essentially of the same class as the *dekarchies*, the governments of ten men, which were set up in other allied cities¹. Sparta could even stoop, when it suited her purpose, to give her support to a tyrant. So it was at Syracuse, now, since the Athenian siege and the war in Asia that followed it, fully looked on as a member of the Lacedæmonian alliance. Here the policy of Sparta was likely to be best supported by an alliance with Dionysios. In any possible dispute between Sparta and Corinth, a popular government at Syracuse was sure to take the Corinthian side; it was wise then to bind the tyrant firmly to Sparta by steady Spartan support. The alliance between Sparta and Dionysios was long and firm, and its importance in Spartan eyes is shown by the fact that, at some stage or other, no less a person than Lysandros himself appeared at Syracuse as a Lacedæmonian envoy². At the time which we have now reached, a less famous representative of Sparta, Aristos or Aretas, was at Syracuse³. The story is most confusedly told; we cannot see when he reached Syracuse, whether while the siege was going on or not till later, in what exact official character he came, whether he brought any force with him or whether he simply came in the strength of the Spartan name. We are only told that the Spartans, wishing to win over Dionysios by benefits, sent Aristos, one of their chief men, under a pretence of putting down the tyranny, but with the

Alliance
between
Sparta
and Dio-
nysios.

¹ Grote, c. lxx.

² Plut. Lysand. 2.

³ Diod. xiv. 10; ἀπέστειλαν Ἄριστον ἄνδρα τῶν ἐπιφανῶν εἰς Συρακοῦσας. In c. 70 we read, Ἀρέτης ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος, ἀντιλαμβανομένων αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας, ἐγένετο προδότης. The same man must be meant.

real purpose of strengthening it¹. He sailed to Syracuse; he had a private interview with Dionysios; he called upon the Syracusans to rise and promised them help in establishing their freedom². He found means to put to death the Corinthian Nikotelês, who had taken the part of a Syracusan leader³; and by some means or other, betraying those who had put trust in him, made the tyrant fast in his power⁴. How and when all this was done is by no means clear; but it is clear that Spartan help conveyed in some shape by Aristos was held to have been of essential service to Dionysios in the firmer establishment of his tyranny.

CHAP. X.
Intervention of
Spartan
envoy,
Aristos.

As far as we can make out the story, it was somehow the result of the treacherous intervention of Aristos that Dionysios was able to take further measures to secure his power over a people who had made up their minds to endure anything rather than submit quietly to his rule⁵. One measure that we hear of sounds a little too much as if it came out of the general stock of tales about tyrants. The time of harvest had come; the Syracusans, as in time of full peace, had gone forth each man to the reaping of his fields. The tyrant took that opportunity to search their houses and carry away their arms⁶. He then hired more mercenaries and built more ships, and took every means further to strengthen his power. Whatever we think of the story of the seizing of the arms, we may be sure

Dionysios
cements his
power.

¹ Diod. xiv. 10; τῷ μὲν λόγῳ προσποιούμενοι καταλείπειν τὴν δυναστείαν, τῷ δ' ἀληθείᾳ σπεύδοντες αἰετῆσαι τὴν τυραννίδα· ἤλπιζον γὰρ, συγκατασκευάζοντες τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἐπήκοον ἔξεν τὸν Διονύσιον διὰ τὰς εὐεργεσίας.

² Ib.; καταπλεύσας εἰς Συρακούσας, καὶ τῷ τυράννῳ λάβρα περὶ τούτων διαλεχθεὶς, τοὺς τε Συρακούσιους ἀναείσας καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀποκαταστήσειν ἐπαγγειλάμενος.

³ Ib.; Νικοτέλην τὸν Κορίνθιον ἀνείλεν, ἀφηγούμενον τῶν Συρακούσιων.

⁴ Ib.; τοὺς πιστεύσαντας προδοῦς, τὸν τύραννον ἰσχυρὸν κατέστησε.

⁵ Ib.; πείραν εἰληφὼς ὅτι πᾶν ὑπομένουσιν οἱ Συρακούσιοι χάριν τοῦ μὴ δουλεύειν.

⁶ Ib.; Διονύσιος τοὺς Συρακούσιους ἐπὶ τὸν θερισμὸν ἀποστείλας, ἐπῆλθε τὰς οἰκίας, καὶ τὰ ὅπλα πάντων ἀφείλετο.

CHAP. X. that the failure of the revolt was followed by redoubled energy in all these ways on the part of Dionysios. The most outwardly striking was a second wall with which he now fenced in his castle, his akropolis, on the Island¹. Men might now begin to say with truth that he had bound Syracuse under his tyranny with chains of adamant².

Dionysios
plans re-
covery of
Leontinoi.

The next step that the tyrant took was of another kind. He took up a character which was by no means unknown to Syracuse in her days of freedom, but which free Syracuse had never carried out with the same unrelenting energy. His first captain and father-in-law had preached the doctrine of friendship and union among all Sikeliots, not only as against barbarians, but as against Greeks from other parts of the world. Hermokratēs, a republican, if an oligarchic statesman, could put forth such a teaching. Even in his view, Syracuse was doubtless to be the head of Sikeliot cities; but it was to be no more than the head. The tyrant had other objects. He either shared, or found it convenient to profess to share, the old jealousy between Syracuse and the Chalkidian cities. To either a man or a community swayed by that feeling, there was something specially annoying in that clause of the Carthaginian treaty which secured the independence of Leontinoi. Carthage had done what Athens had failed to do; she had torn away a Syracusan possession from the dominion of Syracuse and her master. Dionysios had been largely kept in power by the help of soldiers of Carthage; but, having gained his objects, his engagements to Carthage did not trouble him. He recked little of the clause which bound him to respect the independence of Leontinoi or that which in the like sort secured the independence of the Sikels. He began to plan

¹ Diod. xiv. 10; μετὰ δὲ ταῦθ' ἕτερον τεῖχος ἐκποδόμενι περὶ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ ναὺς τε κατασκευάζετο, συνήγαγε δὲ καὶ μισθοφόρον πλῆθος, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ παρεσκευάζετο πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν τῆς τυραννίδος.

[² Plut. Dion., vii; τοὺς ἀδαμαντίνους δεσμοὺς ἐκείνους, οἷς ὁ πρεσβύτερος Διονύσιος ἔφη δεδεμένην ἀπολείπειν τὴν μοναρχίαν. Cf. Diod. xvi. 5.]

the recovery of Leontinoi, and much more. He had designs against various points, Sikel and Greek. Specially he had an object of which the recovery of Leontinoi formed a necessary part. He sought the absorption into his Syracusan dominion of all the Ionic cities of the eastern coast, of Katanê, the late ally of Athens, and of Naxos, eldest of Sikeliot settlements¹. And, before he attacked any of these, he had more immediate enemies of his own to chastise.

These were the Syracusan seceders and others who had established themselves at Aitna. If the town of Aitna be Inêssa, and if Inêssa be any of the points on the ridge of Hadranon below the slope of the great mountain, he must at least have shown himself on his march thither to the Leontines and Katanaïans. This may even have been part of his object. His warfare against Aitna is told us in a very few words. He took the fortress, because the exiles who were there were not able to withstand so great a force as he brought against them². This leaves it uncertain whether they simply withdrew before his coming, or whether he overthrew them in any battle or siege. Those who escaped, whether the whole or a part, were most likely scattered abroad to add to the crowds of disinherited men who were beginning to wander about Sicily, seeking homes where they might find them.

From Ætna Dionysios marched southward to his attack on Leontinoi. He crossed the Symaithos and the Erykas,

¹ Diodôros (xiv. 14) brings these events in with some chronological solemnity; Διονύσιος δὲ τῶν Συρακουσίων τύραννος, ἐπειδὴ τὴν πρὸς Καρχηδονίους εἰρήνην ἐποιήσατο, τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν στάσεων ἀπήλλακτο, τὰς ὁμῶν τῶν Χαλκιδίων πόλεις ἐσπευδεῖ προσαγαγέσθαι· αὗται δ' ἦσαν, Νάξος, Κατάνη, Λεοντῖνοι. He adds the notice; τούτων ἐπεθύμει κυριεῦσαι, διὰ τὸ συννορῆσαι αὐτὰς τῇ Συρακούσῃ [Συρακουσίᾳ] καὶ πολλὰς ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν ἀΐξιν τῆς δυναστείας. He does not mention the wholly different position in which Leontinoi stood to the other two, with regard both to its past history and to the treaty with Carthage.

² Ib.; τῶν φυγάδων οὐκ ὄντων ἀξιωμαχῶν πρὸς τηλικαύτην δύναμιν.

CHAP. X. and encamped by a third stream, the Têrias, that which runs through the Leontine lake and empties itself into the sea by an independent mouth south of the common mouth of Symaithos and his tributaries. He came prepared for an easy conquest, and he did not find it. He sent a herald to the Leontines, calling on them to surrender the town¹. Instead of the easy submission which he had looked for, they began to make every preparation for standing a siege. The hills and ravines of Leontinoi, with their twin akropoleis, stood up in their strength before the eyes of Dionysios. Such a place could not be taken without his full stock of military engines, and he had brought none such with him. He therefore put off any attack on Leontinoi for the present, and did nothing beyond a thorough harrying of the famous fields and the other territory of Leontinoi².

Attack on
Leontinoi
postponed.

Campaign
against
Henna.

This was not a very promising beginning of the great campaign which was to bring the Chalkidians into bondage to their Doric neighbours. And what immediately follows is startling. Dionysios now went on to set at nought another clause of the Carthaginian treaty, that which declared all the Sikel towns independent. If he had turned away from Leontinoi as from a city which it was rash to attack without military engines, his next steps were taken against a city before which it might almost have seemed that engines would be useless. In turning from Greeks to Sikels, he turned first against that Sikel town whose modern surname proclaims it as beyond the power of besiegers. His mind was still set on Naxos and Katanê; and it is said that it was mainly to lull the natural suspicions of the men of those cities, to make them less careful in their preparations against him, that he professed to wage his

¹ Diod. xiv. 14; ἐξαπέστειλε κήρυκα πρὸς τοὺς Λεοντίνους κελεύων παραδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν καὶ νομίζων τῷ φόβῳ καταπλεῖσαι τοὺς ἔνδον.

² Ib.; Διονύσιος, οὐκ ἔχων μηχανήματα, τὴν μὲν πολιορκίαν κατὰ τὸ παρὲν ἀπέγνω, τὴν δὲ χεῖραν ἀπασαν ἐλεηλάτησεν.

Sikel war, and set forth against Henna the *Inexpugnable*¹. CHAP. X.
 It is emphatically said that he spent time before it². He made no attempt to storm the mountain-city with or without engines. He knew, we may fancy, that, steep and rough as were the paths up the hill-side, an ass laden with gold could make its way up the steepest of them³. In this case indeed we do not directly hear of bribery; but an elaborate tale of intrigue, of double treason, seems to imply it. The value of the story lies in this, that it gives us one of our few glimpses of the inner politics of a Sikel commonwealth.

What most strikes us in our view is how fully Hellenized Politics in
Henna.
 some Sikel cities already seem to have been, Henna, we may well believe, more thoroughly so than any other. There are in Henna the same political elements, the same causes of discord, which there might be in any purely Greek town. The city is clearly a commonwealth after the Greek fashion. There is no king like Ducetius or Archônîdês; but there is an ambitious citizen, bearing the Greek name of Aeimnêstos, who is perfectly ready to tread the path of Dionysios. That it was the lord of Syracuse who suggested to him to seize the tyranny, promising him every help in such an undertaking⁴, implies that the wish had been already formed in the mind of Aeimnêstos himself. The stroke succeeded. We are not told by which of the received means of rising to power Aeimnêstos set to work; but, by some means or other, he seized the tyranny. What follows seems to show either that he was supported by a party in the city or else that he had contrived to strengthen himself by a force of mercenaries. But, once tyrant of Henna, Aeimnêstos had no mind to act as a dependent of the tyrant

[¹ Diod. xiv. 14.]

[² Ib. 14; διατρίβων δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἑνναν.]

[³ For the ass laden with gold see Plutarch, Reg. Apophth. s. v. Philippus; cf. Diod. xvi. 54. The earliest occurrence apparently is in Cic. Att. i. 16. 8.]

[⁴ Diod. xiv. 14; 'Αείμνηστον τὸν Ἑνναίων ἐπεισεν ἐπιθέσθαι τυραννίδα, συνεπιλήψασθαι τῆς προθέσεως ἐπαγγελλόμενος.]

CHAP. X. of Syracuse. He refused to admit Dionysios into the city. On this Dionysios changed sides, and stirred up the people of Henna to get rid of the master whom he himself had helped to give them¹. Aeimnēstos had not yet disarmed his subjects; for the citizens presently rushed into the *agora* with their weapons, shouting for freedom. All Henna was in confusion²; the tyrant must have had some force at his command which hindered the citizens from seizing his person. Dionysios watched his moment. Not seemingly with any large force, but with a party of his friends³—Philistos was surely among them to write the story—he climbed up by some unfrequented and unexpected path⁴—such paths may still be found on the steep sides of the hill of the Goddesses—and suddenly showed himself in the city. What followed is told in a few words which crave a comment. The lord of Syracuse appears in Henna as a kind of deity who could not be withstood, even if he came alone without helpers. “He seized Aeimnēstos, and gave him up to the men of Henna for punishment; and he himself went out of the city without doing any harm⁵.” This is all that we know of his acts; but we have a further account of his motives. He did not do what he did out of any zeal for right, but in order to lead the other cities to put trust in him⁶.

Dionysios
enters
Henna as a
deliverer.

It does not seem that Dionysios really did any hostile act towards Henna. That city had the privilege of seeing a tyrant within its walls, and becoming free through his presence. What Dionysios did was to intrigue successfully with two opposite parties, to set up a tyrant and then to

[¹ Diod. xiv. 14; τοὺς Ἐνναίους παρεκάλει καταλύειν τὸν τύραννον.]

[² Ib.; πλήρης ἦν ἡ πόλις ταραχῆς.]

[³ Ib.]

[⁴ Ib.; καὶ ταχέως διὰ τινος ἐρήμου τόπου ἐλθὼν παρεισέπυσεν εἰς τὴν πόλιν.]

[⁵ Ib.; καὶ τὸν μὲν Ἀείμνηστον συλλαβὼν παρέδωκε τοῖς Ἐνναίοις πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν, αὐτὸς δ' οὐδὲν ἀδικήσας ἀπῆλθεν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως.]

[⁶ Ib.]

put him down again. It is quite possible that at Henna he was looked on as a deliverer. At any rate he had shown that he could influence the fate of tyrants and commonwealths without himself drawing the sword. The next recorded fact shows us another glimpse of Sikel politics in a town whose appearance in our present story shows how far from Syracuse the power and the plans of Dionysios were spreading. This town was Herbita, among the Nebrodian hills, where another Archônidês was now in power. He is described by a title which would hardly be used of an acknowledged prince, but which leaves it open whether we are to count him as a tyrant¹. He seems at least something more than a republican magistrate. Why Dionysios, who at Henna had simply intrigued for and against Aeimnêstos, marched with hostile purpose against Archônidês and his city we are not told. We are told that Archônidês, with a view to the war with Dionysios, had taken into pay a body of mercenaries, and that a mixed multitude had come together in the city, seemingly seeking for shelter². We are told further that Dionysios attacked Herbita, but failed in his attempt³. We are told further again that he then made a peace with the men of Herbita. And the words used might almost imply that the peace was specially the act of the people, as distinguished from their ruler Archônidês⁴.

This story of Herbita is dark, but there seems to be no further light to be thrown upon it. In any case the dealings of Dionysios with the Sikel prince or tyrant were hardly of good omen for an attack on a far more powerful

[¹ Diod. xiv. 16; ὁ τῆς Ἑρβίτης ἐπιστάτης.]

[² Ib.; ἔιχε γὰρ μισθοφόρους τε πλείους καὶ σύμμικτον ὄχλον ὃς ἐν τῇ πρὸς Διονύσιον πολέμῳ συνέδραμεν εἰς τὴν πόλιν.]

[³ Ib. xiv. 15.]

[⁴ Ib. xiv. 16; ἐπειδὴ πρὸς Διονύσιον εἰρήνην ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἑρβιταίων συνέθετο, and compare xiv. 15; πρὸς μὲν τούτους (Ἑρβιταίους) εἰρήνην ἐποίησαντο.]

CHAP. X. Greek city. Yet the next thing that we hear is that he now at least turned his face towards Katanê. Perhaps the Katanê and Naxos betrayed to Dionysios. he kept up a warfare of another kind from that of arms, one which would perhaps have been useless if attempted towards Archônidês. On the low sites of Naxos and Katanê the ass laden with gold could find nothing to hinder his entrance. In both cities Dionysios tried the full strength of gifts and promises, and among the chief men of both he found traitors ready to hearken to him. The betrayer of Katanê was her general Arkesilaos. By his help Dionysios entered the city in the dead of the night, and became its master¹. His first dealings were comparatively merciful; he did but take away the arms of the citizens, and leave a strong garrison in possession². He was next called to Naxos, where another traitor, Proklês, a chief man whose office is less distinctly marked than that of his Katanaian fellow³, had been won over by

[¹ Diod. xiv. 16.]

[² Ib.; ἀφελόμενος δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν τὰ ὅπλα, φρουρὰν ἐν αὐτῇ κατέστησεν ἱκανήν.]

[³ Ib.; Προκλῆς δὲ τῶν Ναξίων ἀρχηγούμενος. It is an interesting coincidence that the name of Proklês occurs in minute letters, indicating the signature of an engraver, on the latest coins of Naxos. A signature of such a kind must be taken as an indication of artistic eminence, and the die-sinkers seem to have been also the responsible mint-officials in some Greek cities (see A. J. Evans, "Horsemen" of Tarentum, 120 seqq.). Proklês, with the exception of a single work (Weil, *Künstlerinschriften*, &c. 16) for the allied city of Katanê, is exclusively connected with the Naxian mint, and there is therefore a reasonable probability that he may have been an official of some importance in this city, and even one and the same person with the contemporary Proklês vaguely described by Diodôros as ἀρχηγούμενος or leader. But we cannot say more than this. Two principal views have hitherto been put forward on this subject. Carelli saw in the inscription the official stamp of the chief magistrate of Naxos, and necessarily the same person as the ἀρχηγούμενος. Von Sallet (*Die Künstlerinschriften auf griechischen Münzen*, 34), who rightly recognized that it was an engraver's signature, considered that this necessarily excluded any identification with the historic Proklês. But, as has been pointed out above, this conclusion is by no means obligatory. There is moreover, as we shall see,

the promises of the tyrant to do him the same shameful service. Naxos, by his agency, passed into the hands of Dionysios¹; the traitor received whatever the tyrant had promised, and his kinsfolk were set free from the common fate of their fellow-citizens². CHAP. X.

What that fate should be, the *purchaser*, we can hardly call him the *conqueror*, now sat in judgement to decide. The lord of Syracuse had to pronounce the doom of the two Hellenic commonwealths which had passed under his power. The fate of the two was not exactly the same; but the word went forth against both that they were to cease to be Hellenic dwelling-places. The lord of Syracuse, presently to show himself as the champion of Hellas, was minded—one hardly sees why—to deal with his new possessions as Hannibal had dealt with Selinous and Himera. He would cut Hellas short by two of her cities. In both alike the inhabitants were doomed to slavery. The men, women, and children of Naxos and Katané were carried off and sold in the market at Syracuse as they might have been sold at Carthage or Ekbatana³. Those who escaped, a feeble remnant, wandered about till, years after, they found new homes, till, after the tyrant's death, one body of them or their children found a home indeed Fate of
Katané
and Naxos.

a piece of internal evidence supplied by the coins themselves which tends to show that the mint-official and civic leader were one and the same person. (See p. 37, note 1.)]

[¹ Diod. xiv. 16. Compare the fuller account in Polyainos (v. 2, 5). Dionysios approaches the walls with 7,000 troops at a late hour, the traitors being in possession of some of the towers. At the same time he sends a fifty-oared vessel into the harbour of Naxos, having on board such a number of flute-players and coxswains (*κελευστὰς*) shouting, as it seemed, to the crews of so many triremes, that in the darkness it might be thought that a whole fleet was approaching on this side. This diversion, coupled with the discovery that the towers were occupied by traitors, struck the Naxians with panic, and they surrendered the city unconditionally.]

[² Diod. xiv. 15; *τὰς θανάτους ἀποδίδους τῷ προιδόντι, καὶ τοὺς συγγενεῖς αὐτῷ χαρισάμενος τὴν πόλιν ἐξηδραποδίστατο.* (Cf. Diod. xiv. 68.)]

[³ Ib. 15; *ἐλαφυροπώλησε τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους ἐν Συρακούσαις.*]

CHAP. X. hard by the forsaken dwelling-place of their forefathers¹.

Katanê
given to
Campan-
nians.

The spoil of both cities was given up to the tyrant's soldiers. Thus far, as far as their human inhabitants were concerned, the fate of Naxos and of Katanê was the same. As regards the buildings, the walls and houses, the fate of Katanê was lighter. It was allowed to keep its being as a city of men, but not of Hellenic men. Dionysios gave it over as a dwelling-place for his Campanian mercenaries². Greeks in Sicily, as elsewhere, had before now done harsh and cruel things to other Greeks; but Dionysios was the first to sweep away the Greek population of a Greek town and to hand over their homes to barbarians. Italian settlement on Sicilian ground is now advancing. At Entella it had been made at the cost of barbarians, and by the act of the barbarians themselves; it was now made at the cost of Greeks, and by the act of a Greek. This settlement marks a stage in the history of Katanê, of Sicily, and of Europe. The Campanian mercenaries were but the forerunners of Italian conquerors and settlers of quite another kind. Where the Campanian first fixed himself the Roman was to follow, and Greek Katanê was to pass into Roman Catina. Yet the soil, if lost to Hellas, was not lost to Europe. The Campanian was a kinsman of the Sikel; he was one of the same wider brotherhood as the Greek. Like the Sikel, he could, as we shall presently see, be brought within the pale of Hellenic culture.

While the change which Dionysios wrought at Katanê looks forwards, the change which he wrought at Naxos looks in a strange way backwards. The people of Naxos

[¹ The Rhégians held out a helping hand to the remains of the kindred Naxians and Katanaians (Diod. xiv. 40). For a moment, but a moment only, in 394 B.C. (Diod. xiv. 87), they settled them at Mylai. Finally, in 358 B.C. the remnant of the Naxians were planted by Andromachos at Tauromenion (Diod. xvi. 7). See below, p. 287. For the Naxian Neopolis, see below, p. 37, note 1.]

[² Diod. xiv. 15.]

fared as badly as the people of Katanê, but no worse ; CHAP. X.
 against the walls and houses of Naxos a sterner doom was Destruction of
 decreed. The oldest home of the Greek in Sicily was to Naxos.
 be swept with the besom of destruction ; the Naxian penin-
 sula was to be brought back to the same case in which it had
 stood before Theoklês had crossed the Ionian sea. The city
 was rased to the ground¹ ; the black walls of lava which
 fenced it in became, what they have been to this day, the
 quarry for meaner buildings. The soil where Naxos had
 stood, fertile with the same præ-historic overflow, was
 handed over, a specially welcome gift, to the remote de-
 scendants of its former owners². By a strange irony of

[¹ Diod. xiv. 15 ; τὰς μὲν κτήσεις ἐφῆκε τοῖς στρατιώταις διαρπάσαι, τὰ δὲ τεῖχη καὶ τὰς οἰκίας κατέσκαψε. A remarkable piece of numismatic evidence however shows that in spite of this destruction a Naxian Neopolis still continued to exist awhile. There has been found a small coin—a diobol—now in the Berlin cabinet (Sambon, Recherches sur les monnaies de la presqu'île italique, p. 142 ; Von Sallet, Künstlerinschriften &c., 35 ; R. Weil, Künstlerinschriften, &c., 15, 16), presenting, in a similar style to the last Naxian coins signed by Proklês, the same civic types—the head of Apollo and the squatting Seilênos—but with the legend ΝΕΟΠΟΛΙΣ instead of ΝΑΞΙΟΝ. Holm (G. S. ii. 432) has suggested that this coin was struck by the Naxians who were settled in Mylai (Milazzo) by the Rhêgians in 394 B. C. But this settlement (Diod. xiv. 87) was seemingly of the most momentary kind. Moreover, the continuance of the purely local types, the head of the Archêgetês, the reference in the reverse-type to the wine-producing nature of the volcanic soil, and the name Neopolis itself which suggests juxtaposition to the Palaiopolis, lead us to look nearer the ancient site. The absolute identity of style too indicates that this coinage was as nearly as possible contemporary with the fall of Naxos in 403. (Cf., too, Weil, op. cit. 16.) But, if a Naxian Neopolis was allowed to exist awhile in the neighbourhood of the destroyed city, it could only have been by the permission of Dionysios. We must therefore suppose that this new settlement had been allotted to Proklês and his supporters. The coin itself, though unsigned, seems to be from the same hand as those with the name of the engraver Proklês ("Offenbar von gleicher Hand," Weil, l. c.) ; and if, as suggested above, the mint official and the Naxian leader were one and the same person, this fact shows clearly of what element the new city was composed. From the mention of Naxos by Pliny and Antonine's Itinerary, Pais considers that a small town of that name continued to exist in Roman times (Oss. sulla Storia, &c. della Sicilia, p. 135).]

[² Diod. l. c. ; τὴν τῶν Νάξιων χώραν Σικελίοις τοῖς δημορῶσιν ἐδωρήσατο.]

CHAP. X. fate, the altar of Apollôn Archêgetês, the special and sacred badge of Greek settlement at the cost of the Sikel, now stood on soil which was again a Sikel possession. The whole Naxian territory, rent by Theoklês from the Sikel, became, by the gift of Dionysios, once more Sikel soil. The old folk of the land tilled the ground where the streets and towers of the Hellenic city had once stood, and to this day no man has bidden them rise again.

Syracuse
and Leontinoi.

Of the three Ionic cities of the eastern coast Dionysios had thus wrought his will upon two. He had also shown by his conduct at Henna that he could, if his policy so bade him, keep himself from any monstrous act of oppression. His object there, we are told, had been to induce other cities to trust him, and this object was gained at Leontinoi. The relations of that city to Syracuse and its master were wholly unlike those of Naxos and Katanê. The men of neither of those cities could, on any showing, be called rebels and traitors; the men of Leontinoi in some sort might. Naxos and Katanê had never been under Syracusan rule since the days of the Deinomenid dynasty; the present independence of Leontinoi had been won at no less a cost than the dismemberment or disintegration of the Syracusan dominion. Its independence was moreover the most galling provision in the treaty with Carthage¹. The Leontines might therefore with good grounds look for a worse fate for themselves than that which had fallen on Naxos and Katanê. On the other hand, it was quite certain that Leontinoi would not be, like Naxos and Katanê, handed over to barbarian possessors. It was sure, if it came into the hands of Dionysios, to be, in some shape or other, again incorporated with Syracuse. Submission might perhaps make this incorporation take a milder shape than was likely to follow in case of resistance.

[¹ Sicily, lli. 582.]

As it turned out, it was incorporation in the mildest shape which the tyrant of Syracuse offered to the men of Leontines. Dionysios drew near to the town with all his force, doubtless this time with the needful engines of war. He called on the inhabitants to leave Leontinoi and accept the citizenship of Syracuse¹. The change was distasteful; but things might have been much worse. With no hope of help and with the examples of Naxos and Katané before their eyes, the men of Leontinoi yielded to their fate. They accepted the tyrant's offer; they moved from Leontinoi to Syracuse, and were there received as citizens². Leontinoi again sank from the rank of an independent city to that of a Syracusan outpost; its citizens were again merged in the greater mass of the citizens of Syracuse. But when the like had happened to them at an earlier time³, they had been admitted as citizens of a free Syracusan commonwealth; now to be a citizen of Syracuse meant only to be a subject of Dionysios⁴. Still, when they looked on their neighbour cities, one lying desolate, the other changed into a home of barbarians, they might well think themselves lucky. It was a fall to become subjects of Dionysios instead of citizens of free Leontinoi; but it would have been a much lower fall to be sold in the slave-market.

The next recorded event is the foundation of a new Sicilian city under circumstances which call up thoughts of many kinds. We are carried back to the days of Duce-tius, when we hear of a Sikel ruler, whether we are to look on him as prince or tyrant or popular leader, calling into being a new commonwealth, and that on the north coast of

[¹ Diod. xiv. 15; ἐκέλευσαν αὐτοὺς παραδιδόναι τὴν πόλιν καὶ μετέχειν τῆς ἐν Συρακούσαις πολιτείας.]

[² Ib.; τὴν πόλιν ἐκλιπόντες εἰς Συρακούσας μετέβησαν.]

[³ Stelly, iii. 70.]

[⁴ See p. 6.]

CHAP. X. the island where Greek settlements at least were so scarce. Archônîdês of Herbita, after he or his people had made peace with Dionysios¹, seems to have found himself straitened within his own city. He had, as we have seen, a large body of mercenaries whom he had brought together for defence, and a mixed multitude who had seemingly come to Herbita for shelter². To get rid of them he proposed to found a new city. In this we cannot say that the Sikel was following the example of the Greek; he was rather setting before him a path which he followed. Dionysios was hereafter to be a founder of cities both in and out of Sicily. But he had not shown himself as such as yet. When he had provided any people, his mercenaries or any other, with new homes, it had been by driving out the earlier possessors of those homes. So the Campanians had been planted at Katanê; so the site of Naxos had been granted to the neighbouring Sikels. It was a more generous policy which led Archônîdês to provide for troublesome or dangerous inhabitants of his own city by the foundation of a new city elsewhere. Still, if in this work Archônîdês had the precedence over Dionysios, we feel that the Sikel leader is acting as a Greek. His foundation, like the earlier one of Ducetius, marks one of the stages of the Hellenizing process among the earlier inhabitants of Sicily.

The new colonists however did not consist wholly of mercenaries and refugees. Many citizens of Herbita joined in the settlement, and the city now founded was reckoned as a colony of Herbita³. Men of enterprise in an inland

[¹ See p. 33.]

[² Diod. xiv. 16; *εἶχε γὰρ μισθοφόρους τε πλείους καὶ σύμμικτον ὄχλον ὅς ἐν τῇ πρὸς Διονύσιον πολέμῳ συνέδραμεν εἰς τὴν πόλιν.*]

[³ Later on Halæsa, which had developed a large maritime commerce and had been granted immunities (*ἀνέλευσιν*) by the Romans, sought to disown its kinsmen of Herbita who were then in a condition of comparative poverty. But Diodôros (xiv. 16) observes that many family connexions still existed between the two cities, and that the sacrifices in the temple of

Sikel town might well be tempted to try their luck in a new home nearer to the sea, and which had a fair chance of winning for itself a higher place than Herbita among the cities of the earth. So it turned out. Yet the new plantation by no means wholly forsook the old Sikan and Sikel notion of building on the hill-tops. It was not a rival to Ortygia or to Panormos that Archônidês called into being. The eastern half of the great sweep of the northern coast of which Cephalœdium is the centre had as yet but few settled points, Greek or Sikel. The Kalê Aktê of Ducetius was indeed the only settlement of any moment between Cephalœdium and the headland of Agathyrnon or

CHAP. X.

Apollôn (at Halæsa, Ἀρχαγέτας) were made according to the same rites (παρ' ἀμφοτέρων συγγένειαι τε πλείονες διαμένουσι, καὶ τὰς κατὰ τὸ Ἀπολλωνέειον θυσίας τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔθεσι διοικοῦσι). He adds that "some say it was founded by the Carthaginians at the time that Himilkôn made his peace with Dionysios." On this Meltzer (N. Jahrb. f. Phil., 1873, 232) suggests that the Campanians left behind by Himilkôn in 405 (Diod. xiv. 8) had been settled by him here, which would explain their subsequent ride to Syracuse by way of Agyrion (see p. 21). Holm, G. S. ii. 433, points out in support of this earlier settlement that in the great inscription (C. I. G. 5594) describing the boundaries of many of the Halæsan farms there occurs a stream called Ὀπικανός distinctly pointing to an Oscan element. He might have added from the same inscription (which is of præ-Roman date) the name Τυρπίδιον, which seems to represent a diminutive of *turris*. This boundary record is, itself, of great topographical interest. The κλᾶροι (κλήροι) delimited are partly public farms let to individuals, partly private property. Among the landmarks are boundary stones or *τέρμους*, walls, ditches (σκαφίαι), mounds or banks (γαεῶνες), posts, marked olives, and various buildings, from huts (σκαυαί) to towers and temples. Besides the temple of Apollo mentioned above, those of Hadranus and the Melichian Zeus are named; and we read of the χαλκεία or smithies, the public cooking-place (μαγειρεῖον) so characteristic still of Greek and Oriental towns, and a bath (βαλανεῖον), the remains of which Fazello recognized in some imposing ruins on the shore. The names of the trees given throw an interesting light on the ancient vegetation of this part of Sicily; they are olives, wild-olives, fig, pomegranate, wild-pear (ἀχράς), thorns (δάμναι), and an oak-wood (δρυμός). Among the boundaries, streams, watercourses, and "the river" (Halæsus) naturally play a principal part, and a fountain Ἰστροπία is mentioned, perhaps that celebrated by Solinus, v. 20. A large spring with aqueducts leading from it to various quarters of the city is described by Fazellus, De reb. Sic. Dec. i. l. ix.]

CHAP. X. Orlando¹. It was perhaps the only one actually on the shore. Wherever we place Apollônia and Aluntium, they were not immediately on the sea. Nor was the new foundation of Archônîdês. He chose a site to the west of the still youthful city of Ducetius. At a point somewhat east of the small headland which keeps the Arabic name of Resigelbi, a small promontory, such as one could fancy the place for a Phœnician factory², is crowned by the modern castle of Tusa. Some way inland, on a lofty hill approached by a winding road, the town of Tusa sits on high. It is easy to mistake either for the creation of Archônîdês³. But we must go a little further to the east, near the mouth of the river Halæsus, now Pettineo, where the wide valley of that narrow stream opens to the low ground which here lies between the hills and the sea. On the hills immediately above the left bank of the stream, at a height a good deal higher than Himera and a good deal lower than Henna, the ruler of Herbita planted the town which took its name from the river⁴. We are told that, as there were other places

Site of
Alaesa.

[¹ See Sicily, i. 140, 143-145; ii. 378-381.]

[² For a similar site nearer Cefalù—now crowned by the *Torre della Caldura*—of Sicily, i. 142.]

³ I speak feelingly, having gone up a long way towards Tusa in the belief that I was going towards Alaesa. The walk is interesting, it is rich in fine views, it affords many studies of Sicilian cultivation, and Tusa occupies a noble site. But it hindered me from doing more than look at the real Alaesa from below. I was specially disappointed at this. For there are said to be large remains of the walls, and I wished to compare the military architecture of Alaesa with that both of Syracuse and of Tauromenion a little later. There is a wide difference between the work of the Greek tyrant on Epipolai and the irregular work of the Sikels on Tauros (see below, p. 109). One would expect the work of Archônîdês to come nearer to the work of Dionysios. The Sikel ruler could easily find Greek engineers to his hand. So in Gaul in the fifth century A.D., it made no difference whether a wall was built by order of a Roman emperor or of a Gothic king. Euric would get the best skill of his day at Carcassonne; so doubtless could Archônîdês at Alaesa.

[⁴ The ruins of Halæsa lie about the church of Sta. Maria le Palate on a hill above the Pettineo, and extend to the sea-shore. They are described by Fazellus (*De rebus Siculis*, Dec. i. l. ix).]

called Halæsa in Sicily, this particular one was distinguished by the name of its founder Archônidês¹. Even without climbing to the top, it is easy to see the akropolis rising above the rest and to mark part of the wall which surrounded it. CHAP. X.

One is rather surprised at the choice of a site. The tradition of the city set on a hill must have been still strong with Archônidês and his people. The sea must have been an object; but the sea is not close at the foot of the hill, and at the nearest point of the waters there is nothing very tempting in the way of a haven. We at once feel, as we look up at Halæsa on its hill top, that things have in some sort gone back since the days of Ducetius. Halæsa, sixty years later in point of date, belongs to a distinctly earlier stage than Kalê Aktê. Nor is this wonderful. Ducetius was evidently an enterprising genius, a man who made experiments and learned by his experiments. He may be called a scientific founder of cities and founder of colonies. Of his three creations each is an advance on the earlier one. He leads his people in a single lifetime, in truth in a very few years, through the experience of ages. He first founds the city on the hill, after the manner of his forefathers. He then comes down from the hill of Menænum and founds Palica on the inland plain. Last of all, after dwelling among Greeks, after using his powers of observation at Syracuse and at Corinth, he ventures on the final step of a settlement immediately on the shore. There is nothing like this, as far as we can see, implied in the foundation of Archônidês. The lord of Herbita does not stand out as the scientific colonizer, but simply as the man who has to meet an immediate need how he can. He has a number of people in his own city whom it will be a gain both to himself and to them to transplant to some

[¹ Diodôros (xiv. 16) calls it Ἀρχωνίδιος. On late coins of the city occurs the inscription HALAESA ARCHONIDA.]

CHAP. X. place other than Herbita. He gives them a new home; he founds for them a new city; but he founds a city after the use of his people, a city on the hill-top. Halæsa is undoubtedly an advance on the first foundation of Ducetius, the inland hill-town of Menænum. It overlooks the sea; it stands in some relation to the sea. Mosaic pavements and other remains on the flat ground between the hill and the sea show that, if the city itself stood on the height, it had its *Marina*, its haven on the low ground. Still Halæsa was essentially a hill-city, and not a foundation alone upon the shore like Kalê Aktê. Halæsa after Kalê Aktê, if not like Leontinoi after Syracuse, is at least like Akragas after Gela and Selinous.

The new city however took root and flourished. It so far outstripped its metropolis Herbita that it undutifully withdrew the reverence due to its parent. It declined to be any longer reckoned as a colony of a town so inferior to itself¹.

Fortifica-
tion of
Syracuse.

The next undertaking of Dionysios was a local one, affecting his own city. But it had very wide aims. We are given to understand, and there is every likelihood in the statement, that all this while, perhaps from the very moment of the Carthaginian treaty, he had been looking forward to the day when he could afford to attack the Carthaginian power. He had already shown how little he cared for the treaty in his conduct towards the Sikels and towards Leontinoi. His power had now greatly grown at home and abroad. His authority in Syracuse itself seemed firmly established, and he had largely increased the Syracusan dominion. He had indeed won no marked victory in the field over any enemy except his own citizens; but his power had advanced without victories, and there is something specially terror-striking in the course of the man who achieves great results without proportionate visible

[¹ See p. 40, note 3.]

means. He had succeeded so far as to make a war with Carthage an object of serious thought, but he still did not feel himself ready to face so great a risk at once¹. He had first to strengthen his capital—under him we may apply that name to the Syracusan city—and the experience of the Athenian war had taught him the way in which Syracuse needed to be strengthened. To that end he formed a design which was nothing short of the greatest work of military engineering that the Greek world had yet seen, and what he undertook he carried out with a speed which almost passes belief. At a single stroke he made Syracuse the vastest fortified city in Europe². At the time of the Athenian siege it was spoken of as a city in no wise smaller than Athens³. It was now to be made much greater, at all events in extent, than Athens or any other. The comparison with Athens was made when Syracuse consisted of Ortygia, Achradina, and Tycha, and it doubtless applied to Athens as contained within the wall of Themistoklēs, without taking in Peiraieus and the Long Walls which joined the haven in the inland city. Those Long Walls are said to have been in the mind of Dionysios when he undertook his great work of wall-building at Syracuse, and there is every likelihood that so it was⁴. But, if so,

[¹ Diod. xiv. 18.]

[² Ib. xv. 13; *καὶ τεῖχος περιέβαλε τῇ πόλει τηλικούτο τὸ μέγεθος ὥστε τῇ πόλει γενέσθαι τὸν περίβολον μέγιστον τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων.*]

[³ Thuc. vii. 28; *πόλιν οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω αὐτὴν τε καθ' αὐτὴν τῆς Ἀθηναίων.* Cf. vii. 55. 2. Lupus (*Stadt Syrakus*, 48, note) reckons that Athens then, including Peiraieus, covered a space of 8½ sq. kilometers; Syracuse, reckoning Ortygia and Achradina alone, contained 6½ sq. kilometers, but to this Tycha and Temenites have to be added. By taking in Epipolai Dionysios now raised the circumference of the city walls to 27½ kilometers—including a space of about 18.59 kilometers—thus leaving Athens far behind. The walls of Aurelian at Rome were 19 kilometers in circumference and contained a space of about 14 sq. kilometers.]

[⁴ I am unable to find any authority for this statement. Diodōros (xiv. 18) says that Dionysios wished to prevent any future enemy from hemming in Syracuse by building a wall from sea to sea, as the Athenians had tried to do.]

CHAP. X. it was the mere general idea that was suggested ; the circumstances of the two cases were in many respects different, and Dionysios knew perfectly well how to adapt himself to all circumstances. As at Athens, so at Syracuse, the object was not the extension of the city in the same sense as the extension under Gelón. At Athens we cannot strictly speak of an extension of the city at all. Both at Athens and at Syracuse, the primary object was military ; a point was to be joined to the city which for the safety of the city it was expedient to have joined to it. But at Athens the point to be joined on was the haven itself, a separate town from the city. The Long Walls secured the communication between Athens and Peiraieus ; but they did not fuse the two into one general mass of buildings. At Syracuse there was nothing to be joined to the city which at all answered to Peiraieus. Syracuse was its own haven, and the point to be joined on answered in some sort physically to the Athenian akropolis. The object was to fence in the whole of the hill of Syracuse, to bring within the city the whole region which adjoined its higher quarters, and above all to bring one point of special military importance into the one general line of defence. That is to say, Dionysios proposed to fence in the whole of Epipolai, as Tycha and Temenitês had been already fenced in. So to do was a physical extension of the city in a way that the union of Athens and Peiraieus was not. Whether the new part of the city was likely ever to be as thickly peopled as the old was another matter. But from the time that the work of Dionysios was done, we must reckon the city of Syracuse, as a fortified enclosure, as stretching from the furthest point of Ortygia to the neck of land which bears the name of Euryalos.

Walls of
Athens and
Syracuse
compared.

Dionysios, we must never forget, had seen the Athenian siege. He had doubtless taken his part as a young soldier in the Syracusan defence. He had marked how near

Syracuse had come to being hemmed in from sea to sea by the Athenian wall on the hill¹. He had doubtless marked with his own eyes the importance of the corner by which Lamachos and Dêmostenês had come up to attack and Gylippos had come up to deliver. He had heard too how earlier attacks on the existing Syracuse had been made from the top of the hill, when the city was besieged by its own people against Thrasyboulos and his mercenaries². More than all, he had seen and felt the same thing in his own person; he, as well as Thrasyboulos, had been besieged by revolted Syracusans encamped on Epipolai³. He made up his mind that nothing of the kind should ever happen again. Epipolai should be part of Syracuse, fenced in by the wall of Syracuse. That is, the existing walls should be carried on to the west, to meet at the western point of the triangle in a single strong fortress to guard that most important point. Of the building of the wall on the north side we have considerable details. The wall, by the advice of the engineers whom Dionysios consulted, was begun at the east end, near the point known, at least in after times, as Hexapyla or the Six Gates⁴. But we have no further description of the Hexapyla or Hexapylon, though it plays an important part in the very last stage of the history of independent Syracuse; we have no exact definition of its site, and it would rather seem that the name was later than the days of Dionysios⁵. We may be pretty sure that it stood at or near the western end of the north wall of

CHAP. I.

Wall of
Dionysios.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 18; εἰδὼς κατὰ τὸν Ἀττικὸν πόλεμον τὴν πόλιν ἐκ θαλάττης εἰς θάλατταν ἀποτεταχισμένην.]

[² Sicily, ii. 305-308.]

[³ See pp. 16 seqq.]

[⁴ See Appendix III.]

[⁵ The words of Diodoros, xiv. 18, are; ὃ νῦν τὸ πρὸς τοῖς Ἑξαπύλοις ἐπάρχει τείχος. As the Hexapylon did not exist in Diodoros' time, Schubring (Bewässerung von Syrakus, 631) observes that he must have taken this passage verbatim from his source—probably Philistos. He adds, "νῦν heisst somit seit dieser Zeit, nach der Analogie von Diod. xiv. 42." In this case both the name and building go back to Dionysios' time.]

CHAP. X.
Wall of
Dionysios.

Tycha ; but we have no definite statement as to the extent of Tycha towards the west. It is commonly placed at the point now known as *Scala Greca*, where the high road from Catania to Syracuse climbs the hill. This is a very important point of defence, being the point where the hill, making a slight angle to the south, no longer rises immediately from the sea. More truly we might say that at this point the sea forsakes the hill, and leaves a gradually increasing space of low land between the high ground and the water. The slope of the hill, for just here it is little more, is specially rough and rocky, deeply burrowed into both by nature and by præ-historic man. Both on the flat ground below, on the top of the hill itself, and even on its slope, are many cuttings, large and small, for the foundation of buildings. But what is specially distinctive of this corner of the hill is the great number of well-marked roads up the hill, some of them made with great military precaution. There is one such group at the point—the point of *Scala Greca*, where the modern road begins to go down the hill; there is also another somewhat further to the west. It is tempting to place the Hexapylon at either of these points. The more eastern one better agrees with the measurement of thirty stadia given as the length of Dionysios' building on this side of the hill¹; but the measurements of the ancient writers are seldom scrupulously exact. We may say with safety that the wall of Dionysios began wherever the elder north wall of Tycha ended. The exact point is of less importance for anything that directly touches the wall than as fixing the western limit of Tycha.

The wall was built by Dionysios mainly to secure his own power; still it was not, like the castle on the isthmus, a simple instrument of tyranny. It was a work wrought for the safety and greatness of Syracuse under whatever

[¹ *Diod. xiv. 18.* Cf. *Holm (Topografia Archeologica di Siracusa, 252),* and see Appendix III.]

form of government. This seemingly was understood at the time. The building of the wall was clearly a popular act. The lord of Syracuse set to work with all his might; and the people of Syracuse seconded his purposes. He brought together a crowd of men from all parts of the Syracusan territory. Of these sixty thousand freemen were chosen for the work; the defences of Syracuse were not to be wrought by the hands of slaves¹. Dionysios made his arrangements systematically; chief engineers were placed at the distance of a stadium apart; master-builders were planted at each *plethron* with two hundred workmen under each. Another multitude cut the stones, hewing them out of the rock, chiefly at the great quarry now known as *Latomia del Filosofo*², just to the south of the mound of Buffalaro. The stones had further to be cut to the shape in which they were needed, finely wrought rectangular blocks of the best type of Greek military masonry³. Six

CHAP. X.
The building of the wall.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 18; Τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας ὄχλον ἤθροισεν ἐξ οὗ τοὺς ἐθέτους ἀνδρας [ἐλευθέρους] ἐπιλέξας εἰς ἐξακισμυρίους ἐπεδείλε τούτοις τὸν ἐπιτελιχίζμενον τόπον.]

[² The older name for this quarry is *Latomia di Buffalaro*. As it is situated in Epipolai, and Ælian (V. H. 12. 44) states that the poet Philoxenos was imprisoned in a quarry of Epipolai, Bonanno and the earlier Syracusan antiquaries assumed that this was the scene of his imprisonment (see p. 195, note 3). The dimensions given by Ælian—three times as great as the quarry on Epipolai—and his further statement that Philoxenos was shut up in the finest of the quarries (τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ἐκεῖ σπηλαίων) point rather to *Latomia di Paradiso* or that of the *Capuccini*; but meanwhile, as Holm has no doubt rightly conjectured (Top. Arch. di Sir. 265, 266), the "*Latomia di Filoseno*" of the old Syracusan antiquaries has been transformed by the vulgar into the meaningless "*Latomia del Filosofo*."]

[³ Diod. xiv. 18 describes the wall as ἐκ λίθων τετραπῆδων φιλοτιμῶς συνειργασμένων. The blocks are 1.40 meters long, 0.6 m. high, and 0.70 wide. Their exterior surface is of rustic work with a smooth border five centimeters wide. (See Cavallari, Top. Arch. di Sir. 70.) They fit exactly together. The average thickness of the walls is about 3.10 m., in places it sinks to 2.10 m.; near Euryálos, on the other hand, it attains a width of 4.45 m. Cavallari considers that they originally attained a height of 6 meters. There were lofty towers at intervals along the walls.]

CHAP. X. thousand yoke of oxen were employed to draw the stones to the places where they were needed. The work was pressed on with all speed, every man zealously doing his best.

Participation of Dionysios in the work.

At such a moment the tyrant threw off his tyranny, and made himself again a private man¹. He made promises of large gifts to the engineers, the master-builders, the common workmen. He was everywhere, accompanied by his friends, looking into the work at every point, working himself, it was said, as hard as any man that was employed. We need not infer that he actually laid stones with his own hands, like Saint Hugh of Lincoln; it was enough if he went to and fro, ready for any call at any moment, like the engineers and master-builders. This politic affectation—perhaps more than affectation—of popular conduct distinctly marks the class of tyrants to whom Dionysios belongs from a meaner class. He was jealous and suspicious; when either policy or passion dictated such a course, he could be remorselessly cruel. But, except perhaps in matters of literary vanity, his head was never turned by senseless pride like that of so many meaner oppressors. When it suited his purpose to do a popular act, he could do it simply and gracefully.

Completion of the wall.

Pressed on in this sort, the work of building the wall was done with a speed as well as an excellence which amazed all who beheld². In the space of twenty days the whole northern brow of Epipolai, from the wall of Tycha to the point by Euryalos where the Athenians had first climbed up twelve years before, a space of not less than thirty stadia along the ins and outs of the line of the cliff was fenced in by the new wall of Dionysios. On that

[¹ Diod. xiv. 18; καθόλου δ' αποθέμενος τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς βάρος, ἰδιώτην αὐτὸν ἀπεδείκνυε καὶ τοῖς βαρυτάτοις τῶν ἔργων προσιστάμενος, ὑπέμενε τὴν αὐτὴν τοῖς ἄλλοις κακοπάθειαν.]

[² Ib. xiv. 18.]

side at least it was hoped that Syracuse had become a city CHAP. X. which could not be taken¹. The work of those twenty days of eager toil is still to be traced in a long series of well-preserved fragments along the whole line which it once defended. In many places we see the squared stones still abiding in the place where they were first laid under the eyes of the tyrant. Here they barely rise above the surface of the ground; there they stand up, course upon course, to tell us what the wall of a first-rate Greek fortress could be; here the stones, torn from their places, lie heaped in wild disorder on the edge of the cliff. In no place has the wall been left at its full height; we see the bases of many of the towers standing thick together as the historian's picture tells us; but nowhere does any tower stand up even to the same measure of height as many parts of the wall itself. At several points, specially at the The gate-ways. notable one already mentioned, we see the places where once were gateways; we see the roads by which they were reached from below, carefully guarded from the attacks of an enemy and almost hidden from his eyes. But it is at one point only, near the western end, the part where the finest pieces of wall are preserved, that the gate itself still survives. It is a small, low, and rather long passage, with its jambs and lintel; the apparent arch of Hermokratès at Selinous has no place in the work of Dionysios. The masonry proclaims the date and object; as far as the construction goes, it might be a cromlech of unrecorded times. It is something to step out the remnants of this great work, with the sky of Sicily above, with the blue Mediterranean below, and the life-giving breezes sweeping over the historic height. The bay of Megara with its peninsulas is at our feet; there is Thapsos, station of the ships of Athens; there is Leôn, landing-place of her soldiers; there is the plain over which Nikias and Lamachos

[¹ Diod. xiv. 18.]

CHAP. X. led them to their first climb, and where Marcellus held his camp when Syracuse made her last stand for independent being. *Ætna* of course soars over all with his torc of snow narrower or wider according as it is the time when kings and commonwealths go forth to battle or the time when they rest at home ; and now and then from the wall of *Dionysios* the eye lights on that Italy to which his long arm reached, and a slight exercise of fancy will carry us round both its southern peninsulas into the *Hadrian* sea which he studded with outposts of *Syracusan* power. Hardly equal in general charm to the view over the Great Harbour, the view from the wall of the tyrant shows us, as is fitting, more of the later days of the city to which he gave dominion in exchange for freedom. And there are favoured points from which both views may be looked down upon at once. On one of these *Dionysios* has left his mark in a form almost more impressive than that of the wall itself.

View from
wall of
Dionysios.

Castle of
Euryalos.

We have thus an unusually minute account of the building of the northern wall of *Epipolai*, and large pieces of the wall are there to speak for themselves. But our informant is strangely silent on two points, the building of the southern wall and the connexion of both with the castle on *Euryalos*. Of these last two the remains are there to bear their own witness, and we can hardly conceive the three as other than several parts of one great scheme of fortification. *Dionysios*, in planning the defences of his city, took care to do the work which *Athenians* and *Syracusans* alike had so strangely failed to do sixteen years before. The experience of that time led him to see that *Euryalos*, the key of *Epipolai* and of all *Syracuse*, must be made into a strong fortress. And large remains of a strong fortress are there. At the narrow neck which joins the triangle of *Epipolai* to the hill to the west, the height, as in many other parts, rises in two stages with

a terrace between. The upper ridge is narrow indeed ; it is on the ridge itself, just to the east of its narrowest point, where the isthmus first begins to lose itself in the general mass of the hill, that the fortress of Dionysios arose, with the ditch that forms its first defence across the very narrowest part of the ridge. The visitor from modern Syracuse, unless he has made a toilsome march over the whole length of the hill, will approach the castle of Euryâlos from the west, as if he were an enemy advancing to test the strength of the engineering works of the tyrant. The modern road at the foot of the hill climbs it at this point, and brings him in front of the best preserved part of the castle, five towers of fine masonry, placed closely side by side and with two deep ditches in front of them. The rest of the fortress is less perfect. Taking the group of towers as the centre, it sends forth two branches to the north and the south-east, to the points where the wall of Epipolai, north and south, parts from the castle to run its own course along the brow to the hill. An outpost of very irregular shape stands out to the north-west, near the point where the Athenians had climbed up. The works on the south side, where at this point the ascent is easier than on the north, are also of a remarkable shape. Taken as a whole, they form a long and very irregular triangle ; but this is made up of a nearly rectangular court adjoining the towers, connected by a small gate with its lintel with an irregular polygon to the east. The extreme eastern point of this building is one of the most striking that Syracuse can supply. It is the centre of the Syracusan territory, commanding the full view of the city and her belongings in the widest sense. The windings and different heights of the hill itself bring into view the greater part of the south side and some points on the north ; the Island is full in sight, with the Great Harbour and all that surrounds it,

CHAP. X. the plain, the isthmus, and the hills with their steep bluffs which seem to guard them. Between those hills and the more rugged bluff of Hybla, we get a glimpse of the ways that open to the inland regions of Sicily, to the outpost of Akrai and to the inner depths of the Sikel land. But the wonders of the castle of Dionysius are not all above ground. Beneath the towers and in front of them are underground chambers and passages which at first sight it is tempting to look upon as primæval works turned to account by Greek engineers, but which have so clear a reference to the buildings above that one is driven to conclude that they are all parts of the same work. Of several such passages the longest and most remarkable is that which leads from the great ditch in front of the towers to the northern fort. A shorter one also leads to the outer court on the south side. Special care is taken not to carry any of these underground works under the group of towers, so as not to endanger the strength of their foundations. By works like these, if an enemy had taken an outpost, he might still be attacked, like Veii in the story of Camillus, by a party making its way through the bowels of the earth. Some of the chambers were seemingly used as store-houses, and mysterious characters are carved by the entrance of one of them which are held to be figures in some unknown system of notation¹. Elsewhere rings seem to show places for tying up horses; such a retreat might well be needful when the garrison was hard pressed. The whole fortress is the most unique and the most striking of all the monuments of Syracuse, as the place where it stands is the most striking of all the points of view. The history of the city was wrought on both sides alike; and the mightiest ruler that she had yet seen, the man who spread her fame and power wider than Gelôn or Hierôn or Hermokratês, took care that this central

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It is strange that the making of such a work as this should nowhere be set down in history. But there can be no reasonable doubt that it is the work of Dionysios. It is so completely of a piece with his work of walling in the hill that the two must be part of the same design. It is almost as strange that, with so minute an account of the building of the wall on the north brow of the hill, we should hear not a word of the wall which answered to it on the southern side. We need not answer that such a wall was needful to carry out the purposes of Dionysios, for the wall is there to speak for itself¹. It may be followed, sometimes in very large and striking pieces, though none perhaps quite equalling the grandeur of some on the north side, from the castle on Euryálos to the *Portella del Fusco* eastwards. In some places we can see the thickness of the wall inwards; towers may be traced and the sites of gates; there is one clearly marked a little west of Tremiglia, and a specially striking approach between Tremiglia and Portella del Fusco. There is no room for doubting that this wall, too, is the work of Dionysios; we have only to account for the odd fact that the building of the southern wall is not recorded². We may further ask whether the

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
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Was the wall continued to the Great Harbour?

We have still further to account for the fact that, on the south side, when we have traced the wall from the castle to Portella del Fusco eastward, all signs of it stop¹. Yet

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
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We have still further to account for the fact that, on the south side, when we have traced the wall from the castle to Portella del Fusco eastward, all signs of it stop¹. Yet

[¹ A remarkable discovery made in 1886 has now thrown a wholly new light on this question. On the level space below the Portella del Fusco and between it and the lower terrace excavations conducted by Signor Cavallari at the expense of the Italian Government have brought to light a colossal wall traversing diagonally from N.W. to N.E. the modern Cemetery and the Contrada del Fusco. Its N.W. end points towards the Portella; in the central part of its course it makes an angular bend, and it runs as if it would reach the edge of the lower terrace a little to the east of the oil-mill of San Nicola. 135.40 meters of this work have been uncovered, and Cavallari (Appendice alla Topografia Arch. di Sir. 35 seqq.) has put forth the view that it is part of the Temenos wall of the double sanctuary of Démêtér and Korê, and that it served as a kind of "*Ambulacrum*" or Sacred Way for their votaries. But it is impossible to believe that this massive work (which attains a thickness of 5.66 meters) standing where





on no part of the hill was a wall more needed than between this point and the ground above the theatre, or, as a Syracusan of the age of Dionysios would have put it, between the temple of Héraklēs and the temple of Apollôn. For in this part the ascent is singularly easy; the terraces of the hill-side here die away into something little more than a somewhat steep and rough slope. It has therefore been suggested with all likelihood that, as it was from this point that the besieging wall of the Athenians was carried down to the Great Harbour, their work suggested to Dionysios the thought of a more permanent wall of defence along the same lines. That is to say, at Portella del Fusco, near the Hérakleion, the wall of Dionysios forsook the height, and was carried over the low ground down to the water. His old battle-field of Neapolis¹ would then be taken within the city and would become Neapolis in a stricter sense. This seems the most likely explanation; but we may take for granted that the wall did not end at Portella del Fusco, but was carried eastward in some shape or other. Dionysios was not one of those princes who begin to build and are not able to finish.

It does can be other than the continuation of the southern wall of Dionysios. It is beautifully compacted and worthy of the best skill of the tyrant's architects. The size of the blocks used answers roughly to those of the walls of Epipolæ, and if on the crest of the hill the wall of Dionysios attains at times a width of 4.45 meters it is reasonable to expect an even greater thickness on the lower ground. The view here expressed that this work in fact represents a continuation of the Dionysian wall was formed by the present writer on the spot, and has been now independently corroborated by Dr. B. Lupus in his review of Cavallari's *Appendice*.

The further course of the wall will, it is to be hoped, be revealed by future excavations. Should the foundation of the sanctuary of Déméter and Koré be eventually found within its limits, a proof will be afforded that this part of Dionysiós' circumvallation was not finished at the time of the Carthaginian siege of 397. For we know from Diodóros (xiv. 63) that Himilkôn took—apparently without having to storm any wall—the *ποδῶν* of Achradina (included in the later Neapolis) in which the Sanctuary lay.]

[¹ See p. 21.]

CHAP. X.
Predom-
inant posi-
tion of
Syracuse.

The tyrant had thus done something, by a wise and popular measure of local defence, to make his tyranny somewhat less hateful to the people of his own city. He had also taken a step which brought him not a little nearer to preparation for the great undertaking which he had most at heart. But the very advance that he thus made threw some hindrances in his way. The strengthening of Syracuse, which pleased the Syracusans, would have an opposite effect on the rest of the Greeks of Sicily. To them the new walls of Syracuse were simply a means for making Syracuse and her master yet stronger and more threatening. But it is well to stop and think how few the independent Greeks of Sicily at this moment were. The Carthaginians and Dionysios between them had left only one free Greek commonwealth in the island. Besides Syracuse, there was now only one independent Sikeliot city, Messana on the strait¹. Of the three Greek cities which had lately stood between Syracuse and Messana, one had been incorporated with Syracuse, another had been swept from the earth and its site handed over to the barbarians of the island; the third had become the dwelling-place of barbarians from the neighbouring mainland. The east coast of Sicily, once thick with Greek cities till an earlier lord of Syracuse had cut short their number², had now only Syracuse near one corner and Messana at the other, with an interval of barbarian coast between them. On the north and south coasts Himera had vanished in the great sacrifice of Hannibal; its successor Thermai, together with Selinous, Akragas, Gela, and Kamarina, frightfully weakened and cut short, all stood to Carthage in various degrees of subjection or dependence. And within the Sicilian lands which were still left to Hellas men were beginning to think that the barbarian was less hateful than the tyrant. The Phœnician

¹ See Holm, G. S., ii. 108.

² See vol. i. pp. 131, 132, 498.

slaughtered or enslaved in the hour of storm ; he solemnly destroyed where he had a slain grandfather to avenge ; but he did not sweep away Greek cities for no visible reason, as Dionysios had done at Naxos. Many Greeks in the dominions of Dionysios, chiefly, it would seem, those who had fled from the cities now under Carthaginian rule, took themselves back again to what was now Carthaginian territory, as to the less grievous bondage of the two. They were favourably received ; they were allowed to go back to their own cities, and to recover their properties¹. In such a state of things the remnant of independent Hellas in Sicily began to tremble, and the same feeling spread itself beyond the strait.

Messana and Rhêgion constantly come together at various stages of our history, and so it was now. Indeed it was Rhêgion that was touched sooner than Messana by the feeling of hatred and fear for the tyrant. Messana was indeed nearer ; but her mixed population was not so strongly stirred by the wrongs of the men of Naxos and Katanê as their Chalkidian kinsfolk at Rhêgion were². These last not unnaturally feared that he who had overthrown Katanê and Naxos on no ground but that they were Chalkidian might soon go on to attack them also³. They determined to forestall his attack by making war on him first. They were further stirred up by Syracusan exiles for whom Rhêgion was a specially chosen shelter, who, after the manner of exiles, told their hosts that they had only to march against Dionysios and the Syracusans would join

CHAP. X.

Messana
and Rhê-
gion allied
against
Dionysios.

¹ Diod. xiv. 41 ; ὁρῶν [ὁ Διονύσιος] τῶν Ἑλλήνων τινὰς εἰς τὴν ἐπικράτειαν τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀποτρέχοντας, τὰς τε πόλεις καὶ τὰς κτήσεις κομζομένους. These last words show whence they had come, as the words that follow show that they were at the time subjects of Dionysios ; πολλοὶ τῶν ὑφ' αὐτὸν ταττομένων. [But cf. p. 65, n. 2.]

² Ib. xiv. 40 ; Ἑγγίνοι δὲ Χαλκιδέων ὄντες ἄποικοι, τὴν ἀβέησιν τοῦ Διονυσίου χαλεπῶς ἔδραν. Νατίους μὲν γὰρ καὶ Καταναίους συγγενεῖς ὄντας ἐξηδραποδίστατο.

³ Ib.

CHAP. X.
Ineffective
action of
Rhêgines
and Mes-
sanians.

them in a body¹. The Rhêgines therefore made preparations for a campaign; they appointed generals, and gathered a force, large for a single city, six thousand foot, six hundred horse, and fifty triremes². It seems strange if they entered into no negotiations with their neighbours of Messana before they crossed the strait; but it seems to have been so as the story is told us. The Rhêgine army lands, and not till then do the Rhêgine orators set forth to the Messanian generals the wretchedness of seeing Greek cities utterly destroyed before their eyes, and pray them to join with them in their march against the doer of such deeds³. Without waiting for a vote of the Messanian people⁴, the Messanian generals join the Rhêgine force with a smaller force of their own, three thousand foot, three hundred horse, and thirty triremes. The united army marched as far as the Messanian frontier. Their next neighbours, one would think, must have been the new masters of the site of Naxos, the Sikels of Tauros, but they, as well as the Campanians beyond them, were doubtless reckoned as dependents of Dionysios. At the frontier a mutiny broke out. A certain Laomedôn called on the soldiers not to follow the generals in marching, without any vote of the people, against one who had not done them any harm⁵. Both grounds of refusal, as far as they went, were certainly unanswerable. Dionysios had as yet done no wrong either to Messana or to Rhêgion, and the peculiar feelings which stirred the Rhêgines were naturally felt much less keenly at Messana. The Messanian soldiers accordingly forsook their generals and marched back home.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 40; διδάσκοντες ὅτι συνεπιθήσονται τῷ καιρῷ πάντες οἱ Χυρακούσιοι.]

[² Ib.]

[³ Ib.; φάσκοντες δευρὸν εἶναι περιδεῖν ἀστυγέτονας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἄρδην ἀνηρημένas ὑπὸ τοῦ τυράννου.]

[⁴ Ib.; οἱ μὲν οὖν στρατηγοὶ πεισθέντες τοῖς Ῥηγίνοις ἀνευ τῆς τοῦ δήμου γνώμης ἐξήγαγον τοὺς στρατιώτας.]

[⁵ Ib.]

Meanwhile Dionysios had marched as far as the Syracusan border, awaiting the enemy's attack¹. By this, it would seem, we must understand the enlarged border of the immediate Syracusan territory, taking in Leontinoi, but not taking in Katanê. He there waited for the attack of the enemy. It was not his policy at the time to plunge into new warfare with Greeks in Sicily or Italy. He needed all his own strength, and all the strength that he could gather by hire or persuasion for the great work on which his mind was now bent. He was doubtless well pleased when he heard of the mutiny and retreat of the Messanian army, and when he further heard that the Rhêgine army, not deeming itself strong enough to act without the Messanians, had marched back also². He felt no call to wage an offensive war against either, and he marched back to Syracuse. Presently embassies came from both the cities which had taken up arms, asking for peace. Peace suited his purpose at the time, and peace was agreed to; we are not told on what terms³.

§ 2. *The First Punic War of Dionysios.*

B. C. 397 [398⁴].

At this point we may place the beginning of the wars of Dionysios with Carthage. The actual outbreak of hostilities does not come just yet; but the lord of Syracuse is now something more than planning warfare, he is directly making ready for it⁵.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 40; ἐπὶ τοὺς ὄρους τῆς Συρακοσίας.]

[² Ib.]

[³ Ib.; κρίνον συμφέρον εἶναι διαλύεσθαι τὴν ἐχθρὰν πρὸς τὰς πόλεις, συνέθετο τὴν εἰρήνην.]

⁴ See p. 127, note 2.

[⁵ The account of Dionysios' preparations is given in Diodôros, xiv. 41-43, probably from Philistos (cf. Holm, G. S. ii. 107, 108, 433; Grote, ch. lxxxii). Unfortunately, with the exception of the short paragraph inserted in the text from his little work on Sicily, p. 165, there is nothing on the subject from Mr. Freeman's hand. Dionysios tempted engineers and artisans with offers of high pay not only from Italy and Greece, but from

CHAP. X.
Military
and naval
prepara-
tions of
Dionysius.

"He hired mercenaries; he built ships of greater size than had been seen before, *quinqueremes*, with five banks of oars¹, as well as *triremes* with three. He invented the *catapult*, a machine for hurling great stones and darts, and made various military improvements."

the Carthaginian Dominion in the Island (*τῆς Καρχηδονίαν ἐμπικρείας*). He distributed for reproduction specimens of every kind of weapon and armour in use among the various peoples from which his mercenaries were drawn, thinking that they would best know how to use their national arms, and that the general effect of his armament would be more terrifying to his enemies. This manufacture of Gaulish, Iberian, and other barbarous weapons by Greek and perhaps Punic artisans has a singularly modern sound. Equally modern is the specialization of arms and equipment for various regiments; like dispositions gave rise to the Hussars and Uhlans of our own time. Such was the concourse and rivalry of the armourers that every corner of the city was full of them; the principal private houses, the market halls and Gymnasia, and even the Pronaoi and Opisthodomoi of the temples, being occupied by workmen. (Diod. xiv. 41.) Large prizes were offered for new military engines, and one of the results of the competition thus promoted was the invention of the catapult. (See p. 64, note 1.) Dionysios himself went daily round the workshops, encouraged the most zealous among the engineers with friendly words and gifts, and invited them to his table. Besides military engines and artillery, 140,000 shields, the same number of swords and helmets, and over 14,000 breastplates of every variety of form and surpassing excellence of fabric, were thus turned out.]

[¹ Diod. xiv. 42; ἤρξατο δὲ ναυπηγεῖσθαι τετρήρεις καὶ πεντηρέμια σκάφη, πρῶτος ταύτην τὴν κατασκευὴν τῶν νεῶν ἐπινοήσας. Compare Pliny, vii. 207, 208; "quadriremem Aristoteles Carthaginienses quinqueremem Mnesigiton Salaminios sex ordinum Xenagoras Syracusios (sc. primos fecisse)." Diodōros says (l. c.) that Dionysios, hearing that the Corinthians had first built triremes, was anxious that the colony of Corinth should have the credit of increasing the size of ships. Already at the time of the Athenian siege it had been the naval policy of Syracuse to build large vessels. The timber was obtained by Dionysios from Etna and the opposite Italian coast by means of rafts. 200 new ships were built, 110 old vessels refitted, and 160 new ship-houses, each of which was mostly able to contain two ships, were added to the 150 already existing round the circular basin of the Lakkian port. (Diod. l. c.; ἐκδόμει καὶ νεωσοίκους πολυτελεῖς κύκλω τοῦ νῦν καλουμένου . . . λιμένος, κ. τ. λ., where Schubring (*Achradina*, 27) no doubt rightly supplies Λακκιδόν.) The foundations of some of these νεώσοικοι, rectangular and of a size to contain a trireme, are still to be seen rising just above the surface of the water near the shore of the small harbour (see Schubring, op. cit. 26).]

The enterprise with which Dionysios opened his first Punic war brings impressively before us the change which had taken place in the affairs of Syracuse and all Sicily since the establishment of his dominion. We have passed out of the familiar Greek world of single cities, acting alone or with allies brought together for some immediate purpose. Syracuse had long been the chief city of Sicily and one of the chief cities of Hellas. But republican Syracuse cannot be said to have been a great power, even according to the Greek standard of great powers. It was only under the rule of Gelôn and Hierôn that she could at all pass as the peer of Sparta and Athens. But now she had again purchased greatness without at the cost of freedom within. Dionysios had made Syracuse, in physical extent the greatest city of Hellas, the greatest city of Europe. And under his rule she was fast advancing to the position of the greatest power of the Greek world. The mere numbers of the men who march at his bidding and of the ships that cover the sea in his service startle us after the modest figures to which we have been used in the warfare of the Sikeliot cities. The tale of the armies of Dionysios is on a scale Carthaginian rather than Sikeliot. But it is not a matter of mere numbers. Dionysios was a Greek; in resource and adaptation of means to ends he stands among the first of Greeks. It is not in mere numbers that he trusts, but in numbers parted out and arranged according to an intelligent will. The reign of Dionysios was one of the most memorable epochs in the history of the art of warfare. He was the first to do many things which the Macedonian princes after him did on a yet greater scale. He was the first to employ large bodies of men of various kinds of arms in skilfully planned relations to each other. Under him army and fleet, horsemen, heavy-armed, light-armed, artillery, all became parts of a whole, members of one living body, acting, each in its

CHAP. X.

Syracuse
the great-
est city
of Greece
and
Europe.

CHAP. X.
Invention
of the
catapult.

place, at the bidding of one who knew how to guide them. In artillery above all, in the construction of the warlike engines which now played so great a part in sieges, he ranks high as an inventor¹.

The increased scale on which military operations are now beginning to be carried on stands out strikingly in the opening campaign of the war. Dionysios began with an enterprise such as no Sikeliot commander before him had ever planned. And yet it may well have been suggested by warfare in which he had borne a part when he was not yet master of his own city. Dionysios, comrade of Hermokratēs in his attempted return to Syracuse², can hardly fail to have been with him at Himera. He may well have been within the restored walls of Selinous and in the fights before Motya and Panormos. His present purpose was to

[¹ The principal military invention of Dionysios' engineers (see pp. 61, 62. note 4) was the catapult. Diodoros expressly says (xiv. 42), *καὶ γὰρ τὸ καταπελτικὸν εὐρέθη κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν ἐν Συρακούσαις, ὡς ἂν τῶν κρατίστων τεχνιτῶν πανταχόθεν εἰς ἓνα τόπον συνηγμένον*. Diodoros (xx. 48, &c.) speaks of two classes of catapults; *πετροβόλοι* which threw stones up to three hundredweight (*τριτάλαντοι*), and the *δρυβελεῖς* which threw darts. In Roman times the name *catapulta* came to the latter class. The *πετροβόλοι* were known as *ballistæ*. According to Rüstow (*Griechisches Kriegswesen*, 208) the catapult began to be first used in Greece proper about thirty years after its introduction at Syracuse. From a passage in Plutarch (*Reg. et Imp. Apophth.*) it looks as if they were first used in the Peloponnese by the mercenaries of Dionysios, who helped Archidamos III of Sparta to gain his 'tearless' victory over the Arcadians and Argives in 367 B.C. The Spartan King, on seeing the new artillery, exclaimed: 'ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἀπόλαυνε ἀνδρὸς ἀρετά.' The effect resembled that of the invention of gunpowder on chivalry, and the revolution in military art may be judged by the fact recorded by Josephus (*B. J.* iii. 7. § 19, 23) that catapults were made that could throw stones a quarter of a mile. Dionysios (*v. infra*, p. 74) was shortly to use his new engines with great effect, not only against the ramparts of Motya, but from the shore of the Motyan lagoon against the Carthaginian ships. (*Diod. xiv. 50*; ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς γῆς τοῖς δρυβελέσι καταπέλτας οἱ Συρακούσιοι χρώμενοι, συχνὸς τῶν πολεμίων ἀνῆρουν. καὶ γὰρ κατάπληξιν εἶχε μεγάλην τοῦτο τὸ βέλος διὰ τὸ πρῶτος εὐρεθῆναι κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν καιρόν.)]

[² Sicily, iii. 505, 506.]

renew the enterprise of his former leader on a greater scale and with more abiding effect. He would use the whole force of his dominions towards striking a heavy blow at Carthage within her Sicilian possessions. He would conquer, he would at least destroy, where Hermokratês had simply plundered and won battles. The work was to be done both by land and sea. A fleet numbering nearly two hundred ships of war, with five hundred ships of burthen loaded with stores and engines, was sent forth under the command of Leptinês. They were to sail along the southern coast of Sicily to the western stronghold of Phœnician power, the island city of Motya¹. With the land force of Syracuse and her allies, and with the mercenaries in his service, Dionysios himself began his march in concert with the fleet. His immediate object was Eryx. His line of march lay along the south coast; as he passed, the Greek cities which had become subject or tributary to Carthage gladly welcomed him. "They hated the heavy yoke of the Phœnicians, and longed to win back their freedom²." By the treaty, Kamarina and Gela, though unwallèd towns, were still separate communities, paying tribute to Carthage. At that moment they stood free; they had slain or driven out any Carthaginians who were among them³. Their inhabitants joined Dionysios with their forces; the tyrant was at least less hateful than the barbarian. The next point on his march was Akragas, which the treaty had left, not even a tributary community, but an immediate part of the Carthaginian dominion. Here too the inhabitants who had overcome their Carthaginian masters hastened to join the Hellenic champion. In the like sort, the forces of the northern Thermai, the new

CHAP. X.

Expedition
against
Motya.Kamarina
and Gela
join Dio-
nysios.Akragas
and
Thermai.[¹ Diod. xiv. 47.][² Ib.; *μισοῦντες μὲν τὸ βᾶρος τῆς τῶν Φοινίκων ἐπικρατείας, ἐπιθυμοῦντες δὲ τυχεῖν ποτε τῆς ἐλευθερίας.*][³ Ib.]

CHAP. X. Himera, came across from their own coast to join the muster¹. The last point on his own march was the remnant of Selinous, whether within or without the walls with which Hermokratés had girded its akropolis. Here too Dionysios enlisted all whom the restored and now delivered town could furnish. What amount of increased force any of these places could give to the army we are not told; we suspect that they formed but a small proportion of the eighty thousand foot and far more than three thousand horse² at whose head the lord of Syracuse entered the land of the barbarians. And among those thousands every Sikeliot at least was fully minded to repay in kind on the barbarian enemy all that the men and the cities of Hellas had suffered at his hands.

Force of
Dionysios.

No Greek leader, we may safely say, had ever before stood at the head of such a force. Dionysios saw before him in actual being a force far greater than that which Gelôn had merely talked of. He commanded a fleet that fell little short of the greatest navies of Athens, and at the same time led forth a land-force such as no Spartan king had ever had at his bidding. And no Sikeliot leader had ever before gone forth on an errand such as his. Pentathlos and Dôrieus had come to seek their fortunes in the same regions, and they had had little joy of their enterprise. But since the power of Carthage had been fully established in western Sicily, no Greek leader had gone forth with a serious purpose of defying the Phœnician power in its own strongholds. Gelôn had thought it enough to beat back the Phœnician from Greek soil; he had not gone on himself to attack Phœnician cities. In

[¹ Diod. xiv. 47; μεθ' οὗς Ἱμεραίους μετεπέμψατο κατοικοῦντας ἐνὶ θάτερα μέρη τῆς Σικελίας. It is to be observed that Diodôros speaks of them by their older name. Their coins however struck about this time and later bear the inscription ΘΕΡΜΙΤΑΝ; Head, Hist. Num. 128.]

[² Diod. xiv. 47.]

the days of independence Akragas, perhaps Selinous, had waged successful wars with Motya; but there is no sign that they implied any attack on Motya itself¹. Hermokratês himself, in some sort the forerunner of Dionysios, could hardly have hoped that his raids would seriously weaken the Carthaginian power. But now a host such as Greek Sicily had never seen before set forth to do, at least for a moment, the work in which Dôrieus had failed and which Hermokratês had not ventured to attempt. CHAP. X.

Selinous was the last point of muster. Such recruits as it could supply formed the last addition to the Greek army. At the boundary-stream of Mazaros Dionysios crossed from the Greek land held in bondage by the Phœnician to the land whose Phœnician possession no Greek since Dôrieus had disputed. But it was not against any Phœnician city that the Greek leader first marched. He did not come, like Dôrieus, as the bearer of a divine commission to do the work of a son of Hêraklês. But it was in the path of Dôrieus that he marched. His first display of military power was made in the ancestral lands of Hêraklês, beneath the mount of Aphroditê².

At this point we get one of our few notices of Elymian politics, almost our only notice of the special politics of Eryx. The two Elymian towns were just now not of one mind. Segesta, the new dependency of Carthage, cleaves to Carthage. as we shall presently see, steadfastly to her allegiance. As for Eryx, we do not know what were its exact relations to Carthage at this time; but we are distinctly told that its people hated the Carthaginians³. Such hatred is in no way inconsistent with the old friendship between the Elymians and the older Phœnician settlements. Indeed

[¹ Sicily, ii. 339.]

[² See Sicily, i. 210 seqq.]

[³ Diod. xiv. 48; Ἐρυκῖνοι μὲν καταπλεγέντες τὸ μέγεθος τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ μισούντες Καρχηδονίους προσεχώρησαν τῷ Διονυσίῳ.]

CHAP. X. we wish throughout to know what was the feeling towards Carthage on the part of the old Phœnician settlements themselves, now that they were brought down to the level of Carthaginian dependencies. We can understand that the Carthaginian supremacy may have been not a little irksome, and yet that a wider Phœnician patriotism might lead the men of Motya, Panormos, and Solous to fight manfully for Carthage against a Greek invader. In the Elymian towns feelings of this kind would be less strong. Segesta had no ill will to Greeks as such. She had, just as a Greek city might have, grounds of enmity towards some Greeks and ties of friendship towards others. She had strong grounds for attachment to Carthage, and she had her own grievances against the present enemies of Carthage. Carthage had overthrown Selinous in her cause. Syracuse had been the ally of Selinous, and the remnant of the Selinuntines were in the Syracusan army. But the same motives might not tell at Eryx. We do not know the exact relations between that city and Segesta just at this time. At the time of the negotiations between Athens and Segesta, the connexion between the two Elymian towns clearly was of the closest kind. But in the later quarrels between Segesta and Selinous we have not heard a word of Eryx. At any rate, in whatever relations the two towns stood to one another, they took directly opposite courses in the present war. Segesta remained loyal to Carthage. The men of Eryx looked out at the host of Dionysios marching towards the foot of their hill, and they felt that even on their height they could not withstand it. Moreover they hated the Carthaginians and had no wish to withstand it. They accordingly joined the side of Dionysios, on what terms we are not told.

Eryx joins
Dionysios.

Motya meanwhile remained firm, whether we are to say in its Carthaginian allegiance or in its wider Phœnician patriotism. Its people were nerved for the defence with

all that stern and deadly resolution which is characteristic of the Semitic races. With them real resistance sometimes seems to begin at the point where the resistance of other nations seems to leave off. They looked for help from Carthage, they trembled not at the numbers of the enemy; they made all things ready for the siege. They believed that it was their special loyalty to Carthage which had marked them out for the first attack¹; and it was a point of honour with them to do deeds worthy of their reputation. The siege began, a siege which it would be hopeless to try to understand by a glance at the existing map only. But it becomes clear when we remember the relations of land and water as they must have stood at the time². The island of Motya still lay in the midst of its own haven, low and sheltered from the outer sea by a yet lower peninsula. The town, girded by walls, of which large traces still remain, covered the whole island, which was, at the north-eastern corner—if the word corner can be used at Motya—joined to the mainland by a mole. When the lord of Syracuse advances to the attack of Motya, the analogy between Motya and his own Ortygia comes still more strongly on our minds. The island city of the Phœnician on the western side of Sicily is attacked by the forces of the island city of the Greek on the eastern side. But in the hands of Dionysios Ortygia had become a mere stronghold of tyranny; the true Syracuse was now on the mainland. No such change had taken place at Motya. The city was still on the island, and on the island only. And it was a city which had indeed come to acknowledge the supremacy of another city of its own race, but which had not passed under the dominion of a domestic tyrant.

Of the forces by which Motya was at this time defended we are told nothing distinctly. The citizens of Motya

[¹ Diod. xiv. 48; δὲ τὸ πιστοτάτην εἶναι (τὴν Μοτίην) τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις.]

[² See Map.]

CHAP. X. were, as the story shows, thorough men of war after the Phœnician type. But we should expect to find also something of a Carthaginian garrison; and that such there was we learn from a single casual notice. Some of the defenders of Motya were mercenary Greeks—we have already heard of such in the great Carthaginian invasion¹—and the name of their captain, Daïmenēs, has been preserved². What share they took in the struggle against their countrymen we are not told.

Motyans
out con-
nexion
with main-
land.

New mole
made by
Dionysios.

The first act of the men of Motya when threatened with a siege was to break down the mole which joined their city to the mainland. The island should be again an island; no means of approach by land should be left open to the enemy³. But in the face of the engineers of Dionysios their toil was labour in vain. It was easier for him to build up than for them to pull down. The old mole had been a mere road; the mole of Dionysios was to be a piece of artificial land on which he could plant his engines and let them play on the wall of the city⁴. He now brought up his ships; but he designed no attacks on the wall by sea. The vessels of burthen he placed at anchor along the neighbouring shore of the mainland. The ships of war were taken into the inner haven to the north of the island, and there drawn up on the shore of the isthmus⁵. The crews of the ships were left to go on with the mole. Dionysios himself, to fill up the time till he could attack Motya by

[¹ Sicily, iii. 454, 470.]

[² Diod. xiv. 53.]

[³ Ib. xiv. 48; εἶχε δὲ καὶ ὁδὸν στενὴν χειροποίητον, φέρουσαν ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς Σικελίας αἰγιαλὸν, ἣν οἱ Μοτυηνοὶ τότε διέσκαψαν.]

[⁴ Ib.; Διονύσιος δὲ μετὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτόνων κατασκευάμενος τοὺς τόπους, ἤρξατο χώματα κατασκευάζειν ἐπὶ τὴν Μοτύην.]

[⁵ Ib.; καὶ τὰς μὲν μακρὰς ναῦς παρὰ τὸν εἰσπλοῦν τοῦ λιμένος ἐνέωλεσσε, τὰ δὲ φορηγὰ τῶν πλοίων ἔρμισε παρὰ τὸν αἰγιαλόν. In making Dionysios draw up his warships on the isthmus to the north of the island Mr. Freeman follows Holm (G. S. ii. 435). Schubring (Motye-Lilybæum, 54) places them south of the Mole on the S. E. side of the Motyan lagoon.]

land, made several expeditions at once to win allies to his side and to take, or at least to blockade, the towns which held out against him. CHAP. X.

At this end of Sicily whatever had not been occupied by Elymians, Phœnicians, or Greeks, still belonged to the oldest people of the land. The neighbouring Sikans, fearing the power of Dionysios and assuredly having no attachment to Carthage, threw off all Phœnician dominion or supremacy, and joined themselves to the Greek invader. Sikans
revolt from
Carthage. We must seemingly except the town of Ankyra, of which so little is known¹, if indeed it was Sikan at this time. It is spoken of as one of five towns which held out for Carthage. Of the other four two were naturally Phœnician, Panormos and Solous. The others were Segesta, as has been already mentioned, and Entella on its rock, now the stronghold of those Campanian mercenaries who had done good service to the tyrant against revolted Syracuse². Dionysios laid waste the lands of the two Phœnician towns and also of Ankyra; but he seems to have done nothing more than lay waste their lands. With Segesta and Entella he went further; he besieged them and made several assaults. Segesta
and
Entella
repulse
assaults of
Dionysios. The geographical position of these towns seems to explain this difference of treatment. Segesta and Entella might bar his march in many directions, so that it was a great object to take them, if possible, to hold them in check, while the siege of Panormos and Solous might be left till their turn came to be attacked, like Motya, for their own sake. But a siege of either Segesta or Entella was not an easy matter; and it appears that the assaults of Dionysios did little towards bringing either town under his power. Meanwhile the mole grew; Dionysios, like an eastern despot, had men enough for his work³. The new artificial isthmus

[¹ Diod. l. c., where the true reading is Ἀγκυραί, not Ἀλκυαί. Cf. Sicily, i. 121.]

[² Diod. xiv. 9. See p. 20.]

[³ Ib. xiv. 51; τῇ πολυχειρίᾳ τῶν ἐργαζομένων συντελέσας τὸ χῶμα.]

CHAP. X. could now bear the Syracusan artillery, and all things were ready for making an attack on the walls of Motya.

Renewed
attack on
Motya.

Dionysios now went back to his main object. He left troops enough to keep up the blockade of Segesta and Entella, perhaps of the other towns in the Carthaginian obedience. He deemed that, as soon as Motya fell, they would presently surrender¹. But Motya was not to fall without a vigorous effort on the part of Carthage to relieve her. A diversion was first tried. While the force of Syracuse was before Motya, a sudden blow might perhaps give Carthage possession of Syracuse herself. At any rate an attack on Syracuse might be likely to draw away the lord of Syracuse from Motya. Himilkôn was now busy in making ready for a great attempt to relieve the besieged town. He was seemingly still at Carthage when he bade his admiral take ten triremes, and sail with all speed and all stealth², so as to enter the Great Harbour by night, and

Carthagi-
nian reliev-
ing force
under
Himilkôn.

Descent on
the Great
Harbour of
Syracuse.

to destroy all the ships that were left there. The immediate plan was successfully carried out. The Punic triremes did enter the Great Harbour by night; they drove their beaks into such ships as they found there; they sent nearly all of them to the bottom, and sailed away to Carthage. But watch must surely have been kept at Syracuse in the absence of her master. Was there no chain, no defence of any kind, to guard the wide mouth between Ortygia and Plêmyrion? As a certain amount of damage done to the Syracusan power, this daring attack thoroughly succeeded. But it failed altogether in its main object of drawing away Dionysios from the siege of Motya. That work he had taken in hand, and from that work he did not stir.

The Carthaginian admiral had now no choice except to attack the Syracusan force, within the most strictly guarded

[¹ Diod. xiv. 49; ἤλπιζε γὰρ ταύτης ἐκπολιορκηθείσης τὰς ἄλλας εὐθέως αὐτὰς παραδόνειν.]

[² Ib.; κελύσας κατὰ τάχος λάθρα πλεῖν.]

home of Phœnician power, in the haven of Motya itself. CHAP. X.
 The mode of attack which Himilkôn chose was the repetition on a greater scale of the exploit of his officer in the Himilkôn attempts to destroy Dionysios' fleet in Motyan lagoon.
 Syracusan harbour. As the war-ships of Dionysios were not afloat, but were drawn up on land in the inner haven, the Carthaginian commander hoped by another sudden blow to destroy or get possession of them. The loss of his fleet would surely cause Dionysios to raise the siege of Motya, and would enable Himilkôn to transfer the war to Syracuse¹. With a hundred picked triremes, he sailed from Carthage; he reached the shore of Selinous in the night; he then followed the coast; he passed the point of Lilybaion, and appeared at day-break within the inland sea of Motya. Dionysios had no means of resisting him by sea. The war-ships were on shore at the other side of the haven to the north of the island. Himilkôn found no difficulty in burning or disabling the ships of burthen that were lying at anchor at its mouth². He then sailed into the haven, and put his ships in order to attack the Greek ships that were drawn up on its inner shore. His intended course must have been by the western side of the island, as the eastern channel was barred by the mole. Dionysios feared to put his ships to sea in the haven. The space was small; the Punic fleet kept the mouth to the south of the island. If he met the enemy in battle on those terms, far greater as was the number of his fleet, he would lose his advantage, as each ship would have to engage several of the enemy³. A sea-fight in the narrow waters between the isle of Motya

[¹ Diod. xiv. 50. How it came about that Dionysios, who must have expected the appearance of a large Carthaginian fleet for the relief of Motya, left his own galleys drawn up high and dry and his transports at the mouth of the harbour at the mercy of the first hostile squadron, is not explained. Dionysios' arrangements, as set forth by Diodôros, argue sheer imbecility.]

[² *Ib.*]

[³ *Ib.* Cf. Schubring, *Motye-Lilybæum*, 55 seqq.]

CHAP. X. and the peninsula to the west of it would have jeopardized all his plans.


Himilkôn's
fleet re-
pulsed by
catapults.

But the master of engineering craft was not without his resources. If he could not trust his ships to the waters, he could find a way out for them by land. The famous device of Mahomet the Conqueror was forestalled by the tyrant of Syracuse¹. The land-force of Dionysios was brought to the mouth of the haven. That is, it occupied the shore of the peninsula—now an island—west of Motya. There he placed his engines of war, above all, his own special creation, the catapults. On the ships themselves, on those at least that were nearest to the shore, were placed a crowd of archers and slingers. As Himilkôn sailed in to seize the foremost ships, he was met by a shower of arrows and bullets from the ships themselves. And more than these, the catapults, the new and fearful arm of war brought that day for the first time into action, hurled their mighty stones against the Punic navy. The newness of this form of destruction cowed most hearts². Many men were crushed, and one would think that some of the ships must have been crushed also. The navy of Himilkôn was beaten back without a single Greek vessel being put to sea to meet it.

Even while this work was going on, Dionysios was able to begin the carrying out of his scheme. The crews of his ships were available for his purpose, while the men of the

[¹ The Ottoman ships were transported a distance of six miles from the Bosphorus to the further part of the harbour of Constantinople. See Gibbon, ch. lxviii; and cf. Von Hammer (French ed., ii. 406 seqq.), who cites other parallels. Leonard of Khios says that Mahomet borrowed his idea from the Venetians, who twelve years before had transported their ships from the Adige to the Lake of Garda. The Laedæmonians in the Peloponnesian war carried their fleet across the Isthmus of Leukadia (Thuc. iv. 8). So too Hannibal dragged the Tarantine ships across the Agora of Taras from the *Mar Piccolo* to the outer sea (Polyb. viii. 36). Augustus according to Dion Cassius (l. and li.) twice dragged his ships overland—across the isthmus of Nikopolis and that of Corinth. This latter feat was repeated by the Patrician Niketas in the tenth century.]

[² See p. 64, note 1.]



land-force were hurling death at the Carthaginian seamen. CHAP. X.
 Roads of wood were laid across the low and muddy neck of Syracusan
 land which then parted the haven from the outer waters. fleet
 Along them, a distance of two miles and a half, the ships dragged
 were dragged into the open sea¹. A short sail round the across
 peninsula would have brought them again to the mouth of isthmus.
 the haven, ready to meet Himilkôn's fleet on their natural
 element. But, beaten back in his first attempt, seeing the
 success of the device of Dionysios, the Carthaginian com-
 mander feared to risk a naval battle with the far greater
 force of the enemy. When he saw that his attempt had
 failed, he at once sailed away to Africa, and left Motya to
 its fate.

It was now that the siege really began. On the Greek Assault on
 side as yet nothing had been done beyond making ready for walls of
 the attack. On the Punic side nothing had been done Motya.
 beyond fruitless attempts to hinder the work of the Greeks.
 But now the way was open for the Greek land-force to
 make its direct assault on the walls of Motya. The mole
 was already finished. The vast number of workmen em-
 ployed on it had enabled Dionysios to bring it to perfection
 with unexpected speed². We are tempted to ask whether
 Dionysios received any willing help, or pressed in any that
 was unwilling, from the friends and enemies of Carthage in

[¹ Polyæn. v. 2; Διονύσιος . . . παρεκάλεσε τοὺς ναῦτας καὶ στρατιώτας
 θαρρεῖν καὶ παρασκευάζεσθαι τὴν διαγωγὴν τῶν τριήρων [διὰ] τῆς περ-
 εχούσης ἀκρας τὸν λιμένα. τόπος ἦν ὁμαλὸς καὶ πηλώδης, εὖρος ἑικοσι στάδια.
 τοῦτων οἱ στρατιῶται ξύλοις φαλλαγγίσαντες ἐπερήμεκαν ὀγδοήκοντα τριῆρεις
 ἡμέρᾳ μιᾷ. Diod. xiv. 50; Διόπερ τῷ πλήθει τῶν στρατιωτῶν βῆλως
 διελεύσας τὰ σκάφη διὰ τῆς γῆς εἰς τὴν ἐκτὸς τοῦ λιμένος θάλατταν, διέσωσε
 τοὺς ναῦς. As Holm (G. S. ii. 435) remarks, the twenty stadia can only be
 obtained by supposing that what was then the tongue of land formed by
 the present islands of Isola Longa and Borrone was considerably broader
 than either of the existing islands.]

² Diod. xiv. 51; Διονύσιος δὲ τῇ πολυχειρίᾳ τῶν ἐργαζομένων συντελέσας
 τὸ χῶμα.

CHAP. X. the immediate neighbourhood. The men of Eryx, who hated Carthage¹, might be ready to do something in the cause of her enemy. On the other hand, we are struck by the fact that there is nothing in the story to imply the presence of even the smallest Punic force on Lilybaion. The city of that name was not yet, but one would have expected to find the point occupied as a Punic outpost to guard the Peraia of Motya. But we are now expressly told that Motya was left altogether without allies². The island city, cut off from all help, had to bear alone the full brunt of the whole power of the lord of Syracuse bringing into play the new engines of war whose earliest trial was to be made against the walls of Motya. It was a strange assault. The Macedonian Alexander was in some things the pupil of Dionysios, and it was from the siege of Phœnician Motya that Alexander learned the device which he brought to bear upon Phœnician Tyre³. Water had been turned into land to serve the purposes of the besiegers. It was on ground of his own making, by the new mole which had made Motya no longer an island, that the Syracusan battering-train was brought up to the attack. The main point of assault would therefore be on the north-east, where the great gate of the city led down to the elder mole⁴. The man who had fenced in the hill of Syracuse with the most finished work of the Greek military architects must have looked with some scorn on the ruder work, the rough stones, the unfinished angles, of the wall of free Phœnician days. But, in face of those ancient bulwarks, he must almost have felt himself, as we now see him, as the beginner of a new state of things for Sicily, Greece,

¹ See above, p. 67.

[² Diod. xiv. 51; *ὅντες ἑρημοὶ συμμάχων.*]

[³ Arrian, Anab. ii. 17. 26; Diod. xvii. 40-45; Q. Curtius, iv. 4-27. Alexander's mole at Tyre was 200 ft. wide and about a mile in length.]

[⁴ Remains of the great gate of Motya are still visible; see Sicily, i. 273, 274. It is there described as the Northern Gate.]

and the world. Amid the inland waters of Motya, within the innermost home of Phœnician sea-faring strength, but from which all Phœnician sea-faring strength had withdrawn before his coming, he had entered a new world, a watery world never before ploughed by the keel of an Hellenic warship. CHAP. X.

He was the first that ever burst
Into that silent sea.

He stood there as the pioneer of many a day to come. Eryx looked down on him, now in some sort his own, if but for a moment. What Dôrieus had failed to do, Pyrrhos was to do for another moment and Junius for a thousand years. But Dionysios showed them the way. Pioneer of a new age, he fitly came by a new path, and brought with him new devices.

The work began with his weapons of assault, new and old. The ram to batter the walls was nothing fresh. The wooden tower, the *beffroi* or *belfry* of later days¹, had been brought up with no small effect against the walls of Selinous². But the moving towers of Dionysios were of unusual height. They needed to be so. At Motya engines of war had to fight, not only against the walls of the city but against the houses of the citizens. Those citizens were many and wealthy, rejoicing in the splendour of their dwellings. But in the small compass of the island space was precious; the houses of the rich men of Motya took the shape of lofty towers, soaring above the walls of the

[¹ See Ducange, s. v. *Belfredus*; "Machina bellica lignea in modum excelsioris turris exstructa, variis tabulatis cœnaculis seu stationibus constans, rotisque quatuor vecta." Cf. Roman de Garin;

"Un engin fet, de tel parler n'oi
Qui ot de haut cent piez tos enterins.
Pres de la porte fist venir tel engin,
A sept estages tot droit de fust chemin
Arbalestriers i a mis jusqu'à vint,
Bien fut cloez, couvert de cuir boli."]

[² Sicily, iii. 463.]

CHAP. I. city¹. Against both them and the walls the moving engines were brought up on wheels. They were towers of six stages, rising to a height at which the soldiers who fought from them could fight on a level with the defenders of the loftiest dwellings in Motya. But above all there was the new and special device of Dionysios himself. While the ram beat on the wall itself, the catapults hurled massive stones to crush and sweep away its defenders². Of the whole force of Dionysios, a reserve was left on the landward side of the mole. But those to whom the actual work of assault was assigned greatly outnumbered the defenders of the town³.

Defence of
Motya.

But even in such straits as these, the hearts of the men of Motya did not give way. They had their devices for the defence, as Dionysios had his for the attack. Tall masts were set on the highest points of the walls, with projecting spars on which daring men, the most skilful seamen one would think, trusted themselves. Themselves well sheltered by breast-plates, they hurled lighted torches and masses of tow covered with pitch and set on fire, in the hope of burning the wooden towers and other engines⁴. Some of them were presently in flames; but the fire was soon quenched, and before long a breach was made in the wall by the strokes of the ram⁵. For the first time since Greeks and Phœnicians had held their several portions of the soil of Sicily, a Phœnician city seemed to stand open for the victorious Greek to enter and take possession.

But with such foes as the besiegers of Motya had to deal

[¹ Diod. xiv. 51; προσήγαγε δὲ καὶ τοὺς ὑποτρόχους πύργους τοῖς τείχεσιν ἐξαρόφους ὄντας οὗς κατεσκευάσας πρὸς τὸ τῶν οἰκίων ὕψος.]

[² Ib.; τοῖς δὲ καταπέλταις ἀνέστειλλε τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπάλξεων μαχομένους.]

[³ So much may be gathered from the account of the final assault. Diod. xiv. 52; μόγῳ οἱ Σικελιώται τῇ πλεῖσθι κατεπόνησαν τοὺς ἀνθεστηκότας. This was before the entry of Dionysios' full force.]

[⁴ Ib. xiv. 51; δάδας ἡμέρας ἠφρίεσαν καὶ στυπεῖα καύόμενα μετὰ πίττης εἰς τὰς τῶν πολεμίων μηχανάς.]

[⁵ Ib.; τοῖς δὲ κριοῖς πυκνὰς τὰς ἐμβολὰς διδόντες κατέβαλον μέρος τοῦ τείχους.]

with it was only now that the battle really began. The stern Semitic spirit of resistance to the last breath was wound up to its highest pitch in the hearts of the defenders. They saw their solitary city left without hope of any kinsman or ally to come to its help. The work to be done was now their own work only. We cannot say that in these wars the Greek and the Phœnician change places; for the Phœnician ever remains himself, while the Greek in a great measure puts on the Phœnician. At Selinous fear and hatred of the Semitic enemy had stirred up the Greek to defend every inch of his city with all but Semitic desperation. Still, at Selinous some could and did escape. In island Motya there was no means of escaping, and surrender was not in the mind of any man. Let the enemy once make his way into the city, and death or slavery were the only alternatives. But on the other hand experience of barbarian warfare had well nigh turned the Greek into a barbarian. When the breach was first made, the first thought in the minds of the soldiers of Dionysios was that the hour of vengeance was at last come. They could now pay back on the Phœnician all that any Greek had anywhere suffered at Phœnician hands¹. To that end they thronged to the breach. But in the breach they were met by men who thronged thither with a resolve as stern as their own. With no hope of succour, with no hope of flight by sea, with the remembrance—so Greek fancy at least loved to believe—of their own deeds before them, looking to be dealt with by others as they had dealt with others, knowing in sober earnest that the doom of bondage with its horrors was the lightest prospect before them—in such a case as this, the one purpose of the men of Motya was to die valiantly, and to defend every inch of their city hand

CHAP. X.

Desperate
resistance of
Motyans.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 51; Οἱ μὲν Σικελιώται κεκρατηκέναι τῆς πόλεως ἤδη νομίζοντες πᾶν ὑπέμενον ἕνεκεν τοῦ τοὺς Φοίνικας ἀμύνασθαι περὶ ἃν πρότερον εἰς αὐτοὺς ἡμαρτήκεισαν.]

CHAP. X. to hand against the invader¹. And something of this stern Semitic spirit may, by the mere power of military discipline and fellowship, have found its way into the hearts of the motley force of which a Punic garrison was likely to be made up. But the mercenary Greeks—how did they fare? Of them we hear not a word till the last stage of all. And what we hear then might make us think that a fear hung before their eyes which would nerve them for as fierce a resistance as any that the men of Canaan themselves could offer.

The
defence
within the
walls.

The walls of Motya had failed its citizens; but they still sought to shelter themselves by ramparts and bulwarks. They barricaded the narrow streets; they defended the tall and stately houses, the houses which were themselves a wall, a wall of richer and more costly workmanship than the common defences of a fortress². The Greeks who had pressed within the walls, and who deemed that Motya was already in their hands, found that there was still hard work before them. From the tops of the lofty houses showers of darts and missiles of all kinds rained down upon them. The siege had to begin again within the walls. The moving towers were now wheeled through the breach; from them alone could men fight on equal terms with the defenders of the towering houses. Bridges were thrown across from the towers, and by their means the Greeks strove to fight their way into the upper stories of the dwellings of Motya³. High in air they had to struggle hand to hand against desperate men. Some were struck down by the wounds which were given and taken in equal

[¹ Diod. xiv. 51; οὐκ ἀγεννῶς ὑπέμενον τὸν θάνατον.]

[² Ib.; ἐνέφραττον τοὺς στενωποὺς, καὶ ταῖς ἐσχάταις οἰκίαις ἐχρῶντο καθάπερ τειχίῳ πολυτελῶς ἀποδομημένῳ. With regard to its domestic architecture Diodorus (xiv. 48) remarks of Motya that it was τῷ πλήθει καὶ τῷ κάλλει τῶν οἰκίαν εἰς ὑπερβολὴν πεφιλοτεχνημένη, διὰ τὴν εὐπορίαν τῶν κατοικοῦντων.]

[³ Ib. xiv. 51; τοὺς ξυλίνους πύργους προσαγάγοντες ταῖς πρώταις οἰκίαις ἐπιβάθρας κατεσκεύασαν.]

fight¹; some, thrust back from the houses, fell headlong from the bridges to the ground². This kind of fighting lasted all day. At last Dionysios, like Hannibal at Selinous and Himera, called off his men from the bloody and as yet unavailing work. The walls of Motya had been breached; Greek and Phœnician had fought hand to hand within the wall. But that first day's struggle had not made Motya a possession of the Greek.

CHAP. X.

Dionysios
calls off his
men.

As in the case of Hannibal at Selinous, we are told that this fearful hand-to-hand fighting within the town went on for several days. Besieged and besiegers fought all day, and in the evening Dionysios called off his men by sound of trumpet³. In such a warfare he could not fail to win at last by sheer dint of numbers. But even a Greek tyrant could not venture to throw away the lives of men whom he called citizens and allies quite so recklessly as a Carthaginian Shophet could throw away the lives of African subjects and Spanish mercenaries. Motya must be taken; but some other way must be found for taking it. The work was at last done by a surprise by night. The Motyans had got used to the sound of the Syracusan trumpet every evening. They had come to look on it as a sign that the day's work was over, and that they might give themselves some measure of the rest that they so sorely needed⁴. By night then a valiant captain, Archylos of Thourioi, was sent in with a chosen party. One would like to know a little more clearly what it was that they did. They set ladders against the fallen houses. By these they climbed up, and so were able to let in Dionysios and his army at a favourable point, perhaps by the great gate near the mole of which the traces still remain⁵. The men of Motya were taken by surprise;

Renewed
struggle
within the
walls.Night sur-
prise.[¹ Diod. xiv. 52.][² Ib.][³ Ib. 52; τῇ σάλπιγγι τοὺς μαχομένους ἀνακαλούμενος ἔλνε τὴν πολιορκίαν.][⁴ Ib.][⁵ Ib. For the gate see Sicily, i. 273, 274.]

CHAP. X. but even at this last moment their hearts did not fail them.
 The last struggle at Motya. As soon as they could come together against their enemies, the last fight began. Everything was against the Phœnicians; but they were Phœnicians, and they fought on. The last armed man defended the last inch of his native soil. The Greeks overcame them by sheer dint of numbers only. But the work was done, and Motya was in the hands of the lord of Syracuse.

Fall of Motya. [B.O. 398.] The news that Motya had fallen presently reached the men whom Dionysios had left on the mainland. They now rushed along the mole into the captured city. The burning thought in their minds was not the mere greed of plunder, but the longing to have their share in the great vengeance which had been so long delayed. The *wergild* of Selinous and Himera was to be paid in full in the blood of the people of Motya. Now came one of those fearful scenes of massacre which the Roman war-law made the natural consequence of the entrances of the besiegers into a stormed town, but which in Greek warfare are spoken of only in moments which called for special vengeance. And, in making their way into the first Phœnician town which had ever yielded to Sikeliot arms, the soldiers of Dionysios held that they were called to a mission of vengeance indeed. To them the people of Motya were what the people of Himera had been to Hannibal. They were victims whom the gods had given over to their hands. Plunder was not thought of; slaughter was the one impulse; old and young, men, women, and children, every living soul of the hated race and his allies, were hewn down without mercy¹. Whether, as in a Roman storm, brute animals that came in their way shared the same fate, we are not told. Such slaughter was in the eyes of Dionysios useless and mischievous; every human being that was slain lessened the value of the prize

Massacre of the inhabitants by the Greeks.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 53; πάντας ἐφέφη: ἀνῆρουν ἀπλῶς, οὐ παῖδες, οὐ γυναῖκες, οὐ πρεσβύτου φειδόμενοι.]

by the price which he would have fetched in the slave-market¹. He first put forth an order bidding the slaughter to cease. But the rage of the Sikeliots could not be controlled; they went on slaying in spite of all orders². He then sent forth heralds to announce to the remnant of the people of Motya that all would be spared who took sanctuary in the temples of those gods whom Greeks and Phœnicians agreed in honouring³. This order did its work. The suppliants in the privileged temples were spared; and the soldiers, when they had begun to spare, turned altogether from slaughter to plunder.

CHAP. X.

Motyan
gods rever-
enced by
Greeks.

The question at once arises, What were the deities whose holy places were in this way common ground for such embittered enemies? The definition given might open some curious questions as to the mutual influence of Greek and Phœnician religion. There may have been in Motya temples of strictly Hellenic deities. Such there had been already at Carthage; such there were to be again. Or it may be implied that while, among the native Phœnician deities, there were some to whom the Greeks paid no respect, there were others whom the Greeks revered, as deeming them the same with the powers of their own religion. The Mount of Eryx, the Mount of Corinth⁴, could witness that the Greek had accepted a Phœnician worship, possibly under a name which had been always Greek. And the coins of

[¹ Diod. xiv. 53; Διονύσιος δὲ βουλόμενος ἐξανδραποδίσσασθαι τὴν πόλιν ὕπαι ἀδρουσῇ χρήματα.]

[² Ib.]

[³ Ib.; παρεστήσατο κήρυκας τοὺς μετὰ βοῆς δηλώσαντας τοῖς Μοτυαίοις φυγεῖν εἰς τὰ παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἱερὰ τιμώμενα.]

[⁴ See Sicily, i. 227, and *Errata*, p. xxxi; Sayce, Hibbert Lectures, p. 266. A curious bit of numismatic evidence bearing on the Semitic and Asiatic side of Aphroditê is supplied by an obol of Eryx (Salinas, *Sul tipo de' tetradrammi di Segesta*, 38, 39). The obverse of this coin has the legend ΕΡΥΚΙΝΑ beside the head of Aphroditê; the reverse ΠΟΡΝΑ, above her dog. At Abydos there was a temple of *Aphroditê Pornê*, Athen. xiii. 572.]

CHAP. X. Motya show that the nymphs and the Gorgons of Greek mythology had made their way into Phœnician belief¹. But we may doubt whether an altar dedicated to the rites which Gelôn was believed to have forbidden would have drawn to itself much reverence from the warriors of Gelôn's city. We know only that there were within the walls of Motya spots which were holy in the eyes alike of the captive and of the conqueror; in them therefore the conqueror first kept back his hand from the work of bloodshed.

Spoils of
Motya.

And now the work of plunder began. The spoil of the hard-won city was given up by Dionysios as the reward of the men whose toils had won it. Gold and silver in abundance, goodly garments, rich stuff of every kind, the whole wealth of the busy traffickers of a Phœnician city, was dragged forth as the booty of the hungry Greeks². Such was the tyrant's policy. Let the soldiers, citizen and mercenary, be allowed to glut themselves well with the riches of this first conquest, and they would be more ready to follow their lord to future toils³. Of those who escaped

[¹ A youthful head of a river-god also occurs—probably the local stream Akithios, now known as the Birgi. On other Motyan coins, however, as on those of Eryx, Segesta and Panormos, the river takes the form of a dog, in which we may perhaps see the influence of an Elymian cult. It is noteworthy that the types of the latest coins of Motya seem all to be copied from the works of the great Syracusan engravers Kimôn and Euainetos. The head of the river-god is taken from that of Anapos (or perhaps Assinaros) on the gold fifty litras of Euainetos (Syracusan "Medallions," &c., pp. 68, 69). The head of the island-nymph of Motya, sometimes facing, sometimes in profile, is taken with great appropriateness from those of Arethousa on the dekadrachms and tetradrachms of Kimôn (op. cit. 67 seqq.). Yet these coins belong to the period after the Carthaginian invasion of 410 B.C., from which date the Semitic inscription finally supersedes the Greek on the Motyan dies (op. cit. 64 seqq.). Nothing can be more remarkable than this numismatic tribute to the abiding force of Hellenism at Motya in days when, as the legends themselves attest, the official ties with Carthage had been drawn tighter.]

[² Diod. xiv. 53; *καὶ διεφορεῖτο πολλὸς μὲν ἀργυρος, οὐκ ὀλίγος δὲ χρυσὸς καὶ ἐσθῆτας πολυτελεῖς, καὶ τῆς ἀλλῆς εὐδαιμονίας πλεῆθος.*]

[³ Ib.]

the sword we hear nothing save only of a few who deserved special mention ; for the rest the ordinary doom of slavery is to be taken for granted. But there were some among them who were traitors of Hellas. Their treason was perhaps no blacker than that of Dionysios himself when he planted the Campanians at Katanê; but the destroyer of Naxos had now passed into the Hellenic champion. The Greek mercenaries in the Punic service had not, at least not all of them, taken a share in the last desperate resistance of the native Phœnicians. Daïmenês and several of his company came alive into the hands of Dionysios. The Greek had been corrupted by barbarian warfare, and neither slavery nor simple death was deemed punishment enough for the men who had forsaken Hellas for Carthage. They were to die, and to die by the death which Carthage meted out to her defeated generals. Daïmenês and his fellows ended their days on the cross ¹. But if Dionysios could specially punish, he could also specially reward. The booty of Motya was the common prize of the army; Archylos of Thourioi, to whom the last success was immediately owing, received the marked reward of a crown of a hundred minæ ².

CHAP. X.

Greeks in
Cartha-
ginian
service
crucified.

The work was over. For the first time in recorded Sicilian history, the Greek stood as victorious master within the walls of a Phœnician city. The lord of Ortygia was lord also of Motya. Dionysios, as a champion of Hellas, had outdone the fame of Gelôn. The elder tyrant had saved Greek cities from fear of the barbarian yoke; the younger had wrested from the barbarian one of his choicest jewels, one of his most precious fortresses. Such an exploit was enough for one campaign. The season of warfare was nearly over, and Dionysios put off fresh enterprises till the next year. With the mass of his army he marched back

Dionysios
returns to
Syracuse.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 53; Δαϊμένην δὲ καὶ τινὰς τῶν Ἑλλήνων συμμαχοῦντας Καρχηδονίοις λαβὼν αἰχμαλῶντας ἀνεσταύρωσε.]

[² Ib.; Ἀρχύλον ... ἑκατὸν μυαῖς ἰστέφάνωσε.]

CHAP. X. to Syracuse; but he left those behind him who were to go on with the less active duties of the campaign. Leptinês was left with a hundred and twenty ships to keep watch against any naval enterprises that might be undertaken at Carthage. Divisions of the Greek force, under leaders whose names are lost, were left to go on with the blockades of Segesta and Entella¹. In Motya itself he left a garrison under a Syracusan officer named Bitôn. His force consisted mainly of Sikels². Sikels could fight; and there might be policy in thus employing and trusting them. They had no reason to love Syracuse or her lord, and nearer the seat of his dominion they might have been dangerous. But any of the native races of Sicily, Sikans, Sikels, some even of the very Elymians, might—so Dionysios at least thought—be trusted to defend a Sicilian post against the Phœnician.

Motya gar-
risoned by
Sikels.

Fresh
expedition
of Himil-
kôn.
B.C. 396
[397].

The faithfulness of the allies of Dionysios, and the strength of his power in every way, were put to a hard test in the course of the next year. It was seen at Carthage that the Sicilian war called for greater efforts than had yet been made. Dionysios had altogether changed the state of things. Carthage had no longer to attack, but to defend. It was not as in the days of Hannibal, when her armies could take one Greek city after another, almost at pleasure. She had been robbed of a chief jewel of her island dominion. Of her allies some had gone over to the Greek side, others were blockaded by Greek armies. Such a time was a time for action under a vigorous chief. Himilkôn was chosen Shophet; armed with the authority of the chief magistrate of the commonwealth, he set to work again to gather a great force. By conscription and by hiring, in Africa, in Spain, among all the subjects and

[¹ Diod. xiv. 53.]

[² Ib.; τὸ δὲ πλεῖον μέρος ἐκ τῶν Σικελῶν ὑπήρχε.]

allies of Carthage, he got his force together. A moderate reckoning puts its numbers at a hundred thousand. Another account swells it to thrice that number of footmen only, with more than four thousand horse, four hundred ships of war, and four hundred ships of burthen. Four hundred war-chariots are also spoken of, that old Canaanite arm of war which we heard of in the days of Gelōn and Hamilkar, but of which we have no mention since¹.

Leptinēs meanwhile was watching off western Sicily, and Bitōn with his Sikel garrison was keeping Motya for their master. Dionysios himself, when the new season for warfare came, set forth from Syracuse with his whole force, and again marched into the barbarian corner. Wherever he marched, he harried. The Sikans of Halikyai, due east from Lilybaion, of late allies of Carthage, moved by the ravage of their lands, sent an embassy, and entered the alliance of Dionysios². The blockade of Segesta was still going on, and to this object Dionysios now gave his special attention. His coming against them in person seems to have stirred up the defenders of the city to a daring sally. Suddenly in the dead of the night, a party from Segesta came down to the Greek camp, and set fire to the tents. The flames spread widely; but of human lives only a few were lost. The men could escape; but the horses, tethered or haltered, were for the more part burned with the tents³. The loss on the Greek side was serious; but nothing was done to relieve the blockade, and Dionysios went on harrying the lands of Segesta as before.

Meanwhile the Carthaginian fleet was at sea. That it was so was not known in Sicily till the ships were actually

[¹ Diod. xiv. 54; Ἰσπεὶν δὲ τετρακισχιλίου χωρὶς τῶν ὁπμάτων ταῦτα δ' ἦσαν τετρακόσια. Cf. Sicily, ii. 185.]

[² Ib.]

[³ Ib.; τῶν δ' Ἰσπανῶν πλείστοι ταῖς σπηραῖς συνεκαυθήσαν.]

CHAP. X. in sight. Himilkôn had given the masters of the ships
 Himilkôn's sealed orders which they were not to open till they were at
 fleet sails sea¹. This was for fear of their course becoming known
 with sealed orders. through the spies of Dionysios at Carthage². Among
 these, it would seem from a somewhat confused story, were
 men of high position at Carthage, who were not ashamed
 to damage political opponents by betraying the secrets of
 the commonwealth³. It is most likely an exaggeration,
 but it is an instructive one, when it is said that, to avoid
 such dangers, the Carthaginian Senate made a law that no
 man in Carthage for the future should learn Greek⁴.
 This points to the shape which such communications took.
 It was all one-sided. That the Greek tongue and Greek
 arts were spreading in Carthage and other Phœnician cities
 we have seen from abundant signs⁵. But the Greeks who
 could understand Phœnician must have been few indeed.
 We may believe that Himilkôn was quite ready to speak
 Greek on occasion, while we may be sure that Dionysios
 did not know a word of the language of Canaan.

His desti-
 nation
 Panormos.

This time the device of the Punic Shophet succeeded as
 far as it could succeed. He and his fleet sailed forth from
 the haven of Carthage. The sealed letters were opened,

[¹ Diod. xiv. 55; 'Ἱμῖλκων δὲ τοῖς κυβερνήταις ἀπασὶ δούσι βιβλίον ἐπε-
 σφραγισμένον, ἐκέλευσεν ἀνοίγειν ὅταν ἐκπλεύσωσι καὶ ποιεῖν τὰ γεγραμμένα.
 (Cf. Polyæn. v. 10. 2; Front. Strat. i. 1. 2.)]

[² Ib.; πρὸς τὸ μηδένα τῶν κατασκόπων ἀπαγγεῖλαι τὸν κατάπλου τῷ
 Διονυσίῳ.]

[³ Justin, xx. 5; "Dux belli Hanno Carthaginienſis erat; cujus inimicus
 Suniatus potentissimus ea tempeſtate Pœnorum, quum odio ejus Græcis
 litteris Dionysio adventum exercitus et ſegnitiam ducis familiariter
 pronuntiasset, comprehenſis epistolis proditiſſionis damnatur."]

[⁴ Justin, loc. cit.; "facto ſenatus conſulto ne quis poſtea Carthagini-
 enſis aut litteris Græcis aut ſermoni ſtuderet; ne aut loqui cum hoſte aut
 ſcribere ſine interprete poſſet." The sudden change from Greek to
 Semitic epigraphy on the coins ſtruck during this period in the Carthaginian
Epikrateta (ſee above, p. 84, note 1) is a ſignificant commentary on this
 paſſage.]

[⁵ See Sicily, i. 302, and above, p. 83.]

and the orders were found to be to sail to Panormos. CHAP. X.
 What follows is not perfectly clear. The ships of burthen were to keep out in the open sea, while the ships of war were to sail to some point on the western coast of Sicily, and then to keep along the shore¹. The reason doubtless was that, by this means, Leptinês would be more likely to fall in with the ships of war which could resist him, not with the transports with their precious burthens, which would be an easy prey. As it was, things turned out the other way. It is not clear where the Carthaginian war-ships could have been when the watchers of Dionysios first saw the transports from some unknown point of the Sicilian coast². As soon as they were seen, Dionysios sent orders to Leptinês to sail against them with thirty triremes, to charge them with the beaks of his ships, and to sink as many as he could. This work of destruction was successfully carried out on fifty of the transport ships. The Greek ships sent them to the bottom, with five thousand soldiers and two hundred of the war-chariots. But the transports of Carthage had both sails and oars³; the wind was favourable to their course; the oars were plied, the sails were filled, and the rest of the transport fleet came safely to Panormos⁴. Himilkôn also reached the same haven with his ships of war; how he had escaped an encounter with Leptinês does not appear. At Panormos he disembarked all his forces; according to the report which gives those forces the smaller number, he was able to strengthen them by thirty thousand men brought together on Sicilian soil⁵.

Fifty transport ships sunk by Leptinês.

Himilkôn's forces disembark at Panormos.

[¹ The meaningless "*εἰς τὴν Λιβύην*" of Diodôros (xiv. 55) has been corrected "*εἰς τὴν Μορύνην*." Holm (G. S. ii. 435) suggests *ἐπὶ τὴν Λιλύβαιον ἀκρὰν*.]

[² Diod. xiv. 55.]

[³ Ib.]

[⁴ Ib.; *αὐτὸ δὲ λοιπὰ, κωπήρευσεν οὖσα καὶ τὸν ἀνεμὸν τοῖς ἰστίοις δεχόμενα, βαδίζας ἐξέφυγον*.]

[⁵ Diodôros, xiv. 54, gives the more moderate reckoning on the authority

CHAP. X.
Inconsequent
action of
Dionysios.

A campaign followed in which Dionysios showed less than his usual energy, and allowed the fruits of his last year's victories to slip out of his hands in a way which it is hard to understand. There was always a suspicion that the tyrant was not thoroughly in earnest in his Punic warfare. It was whispered that he did not wish to press the enemy too far, deeming that, in some turn of fortune, Carthage might again be the support of his tyranny against Sikeliot enemies¹. And there were stories of an oracle, which he understood as a warning that too signal a victory of his Punic enemies would be followed by his own death². On the other hand, it is quite possible that Dionysios had begun to doubt whether he could keep his distant conquests, so utterly cut off from the regions where his strength lay. And, so thinking, he may have deemed it the wisest policy to let them go by the chances of war. As far as our meagre narrative allows us to see anything at all, his outward course was that of a man who had set his heart on one object, to the neglect of objects of greater moment. Dionysios so busied himself with the siege of Segesta as to let Eryx and Motya fall away from his grasp, almost without an effort to keep them.

Successful
campaign
of Himil-
kôn.

Our narrative is indeed of provoking meagreness, a strange contrast indeed to the full and vivid account of the taking of Motya. But we can see that Himilkôn set forth with the full purpose of winning back for Carthage all that she had lost, and that, as far as the barbarian corner of Sicily was concerned, he did so most thoroughly. He set forth from Panormos with his land-force, bidding the war-ships follow along the coast. But it is disappointing to find his acts set down only in such a style as this; of Timaïos. The calculation which brought up the infantry of Himilkôn to 300,000 (see above, p. 87) was taken by him from Ephoros.]

[¹ Diod. xiv. 75. See pp. 142 and 149. Compare too the speech of Theodôros in the Syracusan Assembly; Diod. xiv. 65-69, esp. c. 68.]

[² Diod. xv. 74.]

"He took Eryx by treason. He encamped before Motya, CHAP. X. and, as Dionysios and his force were at that time before Motya and Eryx re- Segesta, he besieged and took it¹." That is all; we are taken by Himilkŏn. left to guess at every detail. We note indeed that Eryx was not surrendered, but betrayed. The betrayal was doubtless the work of some of the people of Eryx; but did it express the feeling of all of them? Had the men of Eryx, as a body, become weary of the alliance of Dionysios, perhaps of the presence of a garrison, or had there all along been a party by which the general hatred of Carthage had not been shared? It is yet more disappointing to come to another siege of Motya in the very year after the former, and not to be able to compare the two in a single point. The city was seemingly not surrendered, but taken by storm. The Sikel garrison of Dionysios might be true to their trust, and yet might not feel called on to make such a resistance unto death as had been made by Phœnicians warring against hope. We get no answer to the question where Leptinês was at this time; nor is any explanation given of the seemingly strange obstinacy with which Dionysios clung to the attack on Segesta instead of marching with all his force to the relief of Motya. As has been hinted, his course in that matter may have been a blind. It would seem that, when Motya Dionysios raises the siege of Segesta. was well lost, he was less eager to carry on the siege of Segesta. The Sikelots in his army were eager to carry on the war to the uttermost; seemingly by a march to give battle to Himilkŏn². But Dionysios, far away, it is said, from the cities in his alliance and finding provisions fail, thought it expedient to change the seat of war to other quarters³. The words have a suspicious likeness to words uttered both by himself and by others at an earlier stage of

[¹ Diod. xiv. 55.]

[² Ib.]

[³ Ib.; *Διονύσιος ὅμα μὲν μακρὰν τῶν συμμαχίδων πόλεον ἀπεωσμένος, ὅμα δὲ τῆς σιτοπομπίας ἐπιλιπούσης, διέλαβε συμφέρειν ἐφ' ἑτέρων τόπων συστήσασθαι τὸν πόλεμον.*]

CHAP. X. his career¹. Then their meaning was surely treasonable; now we have no ground for suspecting anything more treasonable than the conviction that his successes of the last year in the extreme west had been a mistake. That we know so much of the siege by which Motya was won and so little of that by which it was lost may be because Philistos was at both times at the side of his master. But he might have given us—most likely he did give us—a clearer account of a siege of the heights of Segesta carried on, as we may conceive it to have been, from the flat and muddy ground beside the Sicilian Skamandros.

Retreat of
Dionysios
to Syra-
cuse.

Dionysios, in short, now brought his second year's campaign to an end, and went back with his force to Syracuse, harrying as he went. He must have raised the siege of Segesta; all else that he did in western Sicily was to enter into a negotiation with the Sikans or some of them, proposing that they should leave their towns and enter his service. He would give them lands of equal value elsewhere; and, when the war was over, he would lead back to their own homes any whose wishes were that way². A few only agreed to these terms; and those, it is said, only for fear lest they should be plundered by his soldiers³. At the same time one of the chief of the Sikan towns, Halikyai which had so lately joined his alliance, now sent an embassy to the camp of Himilkôn, and went back to the alliance of Carthage⁴.

Dionysios then went back to Syracuse, leaving western Sicily much as it had been before he set out on the ex-

[¹ After the failure of the allies at Gela, the "Council of Friends" summoned by Dionysios were unanimous in the opinion *ἀνεπιτήδειον εἶναι τὸν τόπον* (Diod. xiii. 111). Cf. Sicily, iii. 571.]

[² Diod. xiv. 55.]

[³ Ib.]

[⁴ Ib.; *ἀπέστησαν δὲ παραλησίως καὶ Ἀλιναῖοι, καὶ πέμψαντες πρέσβεις εἰς τὸ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατόπεδον, συμμαχίαν ἐποιήσαντο.*]

pedition of the year before. He had raised a great many hopes, and he had shed a great deal of blood; but he had made neither lasting conquests nor lasting alliances. The Greek cities of the south coast had freed themselves before he set out, and the barbarian corner was a barbarian corner again. For twenty years he made no second attempt to make it otherwise; it was only towards the very end of his days that he again adventured himself in those regions. Motya, for less than a year an outpost of Hellas, passed back into the hands of its old masters and inhabitants. But it was not any longer to remain a stronghold of any power. Himilkōn decreed that Motya, as a city and fortress, should exist no longer. Its position, as one of the seats of Phœnician power in Sicily, as its main seat on the western side of Sicily, was to be translated to a spot on the neighbouring mainland, a spot of which we have often heard, and where we have been tempted to wonder that no city of men had already arisen. On the most western point of Sicily, by the sacred spring, a new city was founded, bearing the name of the spring¹. Motya was forsaken; we are told that such of the old inhabitants as could be found were invited to become citizens of the town which took its place². Like Naxos, the city never rose again. The wall that gave way to the arts of Dionysios is largely there, nearly everywhere in its line, in many places in its very stones. The great gateway still stands, at least in its lower courses. The line of the mole to which it opened is still plainly stamped on the waters. But all else is gone. The towering houses of Motya no

CHAP. X.

Motya forsaken and Lilybaion founded by Himilkōn.
[B.C. 397.]

Site of Motya.

[¹ Diod. xiii. 54; ἀπὸ τοῦ φρέατος ὃ ὀνομάζεται Λιλύβαιον. See Sicily, i. 271, and iii. 455. This spring from its supposed gift of soothsaying was afterwards connected with the Sibyl; and its grotto was in Christian days hewn into the Baptistery of St. John. Fazellus, De rebus Siculis, vii. 1. The actual foundation of Lilybaion is recorded by Diodōros, xxii. 10.]

[² Diod. xxii. 10; τοὺς γὰρ ἐκ ταύτης (sc. Μοτύης) ἐπολειφθέντας ἀνθρώπους κατέμειναν εἰς τὸ Λιλύβαιον.]

CHAP. X. longer rise against the sky. Within and without the wall, wheat and vines and the other fruits of Sicily grow in abundance over the sites of streets and temples. The green island makes a cheerful contrast to the dreary saltworks that stretch along the coast both of the mainland and of the surrounding islands. And from forsaken Motya we look out on half-forsaken Lilybaion. Modern Marsala covers not much more than half the site of the city of Himilkôn. And the point itself, most western spot of Sicilian ground, looks as we see it from the shore of Motya, more like a fellow of lowly Aigithallos¹ than the famous headland which was held to part the seas of Africa and Europe.

Site and
foundation
of Lily-
baion.

From this time Lilybaion becomes the centre of Carthaginian power in the extreme west of Sicily. It certainly plays a more conspicuous part in the history of Carthage in Sicily than Panormos itself. In a military sense it certainly plays a more honourable part. Panormos was taken, first by the Epirot and then by the Romans; Lilybaion was never taken at all. Its harbour, its general position, could never have been compared to those of Panormos; but, as the point of direct communication with Africa, it had an importance in Carthaginian warfare which even Panormos did not share. The point of Lilybaion had often been a camping-place for Carthaginian armies²; one thinks that there must have been at least a permanent fort; but there was as yet no city. But now a great city arose which took within its walls the most western point of the Sicilian

[¹ The ancient name (cf. Diod. xxiv. 1; Zonaras, viii. 15) of the former peninsula, now the Isola Lunga and Borromée. Ptolemy also mentions Aigithareos, which is probably the same as a cape (*despa*) between Lilybaion and Drepana. (See Schubring, *Motye-Lilybæum*, 57).]

[² The only recorded instance is in Diodoros, xiii. 54, on the occasion of Hannibal's landing at this point in 409 B.C. (Sicily, iii. 455). Whether he landed or encamped here in 406 does not appear.]

mainland and the holy spring beside it. The new town CHAP. X. took the shape of an irregular four-sided figure, two of whose sides, the south-west and north-west, were formed by the coast on each side of the point itself. The inland sides, south-eastern and north-eastern, were formed by two gigantic ditches cut in the solid rock, a work as great as the ditches of Arques or of the elder Salisbury, but cut with far greater toil through a harder material. Of those ditches Polybios speaks with wonder¹, and a large part of them still remains to speak for itself. Of the walls of Himilkôn we have small fragments indeed; but there are some fragments still.

The modern town of Marsala, in its Arabic name, given Lilybaion
now Mar-
sala. it by the devotion of its Saracen conquerors², not unfittingly carries on the Semitic tradition of the Phœnician city which it represents. But it represents it only as the part represents the whole. The south-eastern and north-eastern sides of Marsala coincide with part of those of the old Lilybaion, and the ancient ditch is preserved along the whole of the north-eastern side and along a great part of the south-eastern. But Marsala nowhere touches the sea; and it is plain that the ditches were carried down to the sea on both sides. The line of the north-eastern ditch can easily be traced. At the north-eastern corner of the present town, its direction has been changed to allow the building of a large bastion of the time of Charles the Fifth. Beyond that towards the sea the sinking of the ditch is clearly seen in the green fields. The walls on these two sides within the ditch naturally follow the Phœnician lines, and their lower

[¹ Polyb. i. 42; *τείχεσι διαφερόντως ἡσφαλισμένην καὶ πέριξ τάφρων βαθείῃ*. Diodôros (xxii. 10), speaking of Lilybaion on the occasion of its siege by Pyrrhos, says; *ὅσῃς δὲ τῆς πόλεως τὸ πλείστον μέρος ἐν θαλάσῃ τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς προσόδους ἐτείχισαν καὶ πύργους πυκνοὺς ἐποίησαν καὶ τάφρων δρύσαντες μέγαν, κ.τ.λ.* In xxiv. 1 he speaks of the fosse as extending from sea to sea and as being 60 cubits in width and 40 in depth.]

[² *Marsâ Ali* = the haven of Ali; not of *Allah*, as implied in the text.]

CHAP. X. course may keep traces of Phœnician masonry, but they
 Remains of have been patched up in every age, and they contain at the
 Lilybaion. south-eastern corner the shattered mediæval castle which, though planted on no great height, is the nearest approach to an akropolis that Marsala or Lilybaion has to show. The other two sides of the wall of Lilybaion ran along the edge of the sea. Their remains are slight, and they are constantly perishing, but something still is left. To the men of modern Lilybaion the work of their Phœnician founder seems to count for nothing. Much has clearly perished since the chief monograph of Lilybaion was written¹. Still, lying among the stones of the sea-shore, dashed by the waves or covered thick with the seaweed, we can even now see some poor fragments of the wall of Himilkôn. It was a wall of squared stones, a vast advance indeed over the rugged masonry of forsaken Motya. Now and then we can see one or two still in their places; many more lie as chance has thrown them, suggesting in the thick plaster which still covers not a few, that Phœnician Lilybaion may have shone as white in the evening sunlight as Saracen Tunis² or Kairouan. Here we light on a moulded stone; here a luckier moment than all reveals to us the capital of a half-column graven by the hands of the men of Canaan³. Here, by way of contrast, a fragment of a Doric column is built into a modern wall; here is the

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CHAP. X.

Marsala
a Roman
chester.

¹ See vol. i. p. 388.

² See Polyb. i. 47. We shall come to it in time.

CHAP. X.
Inconsequence
of action of
Dionysios.

A campaign followed in which Dionysios showed less than his usual energy, and allowed the fruits of his last year's victories to slip out of his hands in a way which it is hard to understand. There was always a suspicion that the tyrant was not thoroughly in earnest in his Punic warfare. It was whispered that he did not wish to press the enemy too far, deeming that, in some turn of fortune, Carthage might again be the support of his tyranny against Sikeliot enemies¹. And there were stories of an oracle, which he understood as a warning that too signal a victory of his Punic enemies would be followed by his own death². On the other hand, it is quite possible that Dionysios had begun to doubt whether he could keep his distant conquests, so utterly cut off from the regions where his strength lay. And, so thinking, he may have deemed it the wisest policy to let them go by the chances of war. As far as our meagre narrative allows us to see anything at all, his outward course was that of a man who had set his heart on one object, to the neglect of objects of greater moment. Dionysios so busied himself with the siege of Segesta as to let Eryx and Motya fall away from his grasp, almost without an effort to keep them.

Successful
campaign
of Himil-
kôn.

Our narrative is indeed of provoking meagreness, a strange contrast indeed to the full and vivid account of the taking of Motya. But we can see that Himilkôn set forth with the full purpose of winning back for Carthage all that she had lost, and that, as far as the barbarian corner of Sicily was concerned, he did so most thoroughly. He set forth from Panormos with his land-force, bidding the war-ships follow along the coast. But it is disappointing to find his acts set down only in such a style as this; of Timaios. The calculation which brought up the infantry of Himilkôn to 300,000 (see above, p. 87) was taken by him from Ephoros.]

[¹ Diod. xiv. 75. See pp. 142 and 149. Compare too the speech of Theodoros in the Syracusan Assembly; Diod. xiv. 65-69, esp. c. 68.]

[² Diod. xv. 74.]

"He took Eryx by treason. He encamped before Motya, and, as Dionysios and his force were at that time before Segesta, he besieged and took it¹." That is all; we are left to guess at every detail. We note indeed that Eryx was not surrendered, but betrayed. The betrayal was doubtless the work of some of the people of Eryx; but did it express the feeling of all of them? Had the men of Eryx, as a body, become weary of the alliance of Dionysios, perhaps of the presence of a garrison, or had there all along been a party by which the general hatred of Carthage had not been shared? It is yet more disappointing to come to another siege of Motya in the very year after the former, and not to be able to compare the two in a single point. The city was seemingly not surrendered, but taken by storm. The Sikel garrison of Dionysios might be true to their trust, and yet might not feel called on to make such a resistance unto death as had been made by Phœnicians warring against hope. We get no answer to the question where Leptinês was at this time; nor is any explanation given of the seemingly strange obstinacy with which Dionysios clung to the attack on Segesta instead of marching with all his force to the relief of Motya. As has been hinted, his course in that matter may have been a blind. It would seem that, when Motya was well lost, he was less eager to carry on the siege of Segesta. The Sikelots in his army were eager to carry on the war to the uttermost; seemingly by a march to give battle to Himilkôn². But Dionysios, far away, it is said, from the cities in his alliance and finding provisions fail, thought it expedient to change the seat of war to other quarters³. The words have a suspicious likeness to words uttered both by himself and by others at an earlier stage of

CHAP. X.
Motya and
Eryx re-
taken by
Himilkôn.

Dionysios
raises the
siege of
Segesta.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 55.]

[² Ib.]

[³ Ib.; Διονύσιος ὅμα μὲν μακρὰν τῶν συμμαχίδων πόλεον ἀπεωσμένος, ὅμα δὲ τῆς σιτοπομπίας ἐπιλιπούσης, διέλαβε συμφέρειν ἐφ' ἑτέρων τόπων συστήσασθαι τὸν πόλεμον.]

CHAP. X. his career¹. Then their meaning was surely treasonable; now we have no ground for suspecting anything more treasonable than the conviction that his successes of the last year in the extreme west had been a mistake. That we know so much of the siege by which Motya was won and so little of that by which it was lost may be because Philistos was at both times at the side of his master. But he might have given us—most likely he did give us—a clearer account of a siege of the heights of Segesta carried on, as we may conceive it to have been, from the flat and muddy ground beside the Sicilian Skamandros.

Retreat of
Dionysios
to Syra-
cuse.

Dionysios, in short, now brought his second year's campaign to an end, and went back with his force to Syracuse, harrying as he went. He must have raised the siege of Segesta; all else that he did in western Sicily was to enter into a negotiation with the Sikans or some of them, proposing that they should leave their towns and enter his service. He would give them lands of equal value elsewhere; and, when the war was over, he would lead back to their own homes any whose wishes were that way². A few only agreed to these terms; and those, it is said, only for fear lest they should be plundered by his soldiers³. At the same time one of the chief of the Sikan towns, Halikyai which had so lately joined his alliance, now sent an embassy to the camp of Himilkôn, and went back to the alliance of Carthage⁴.

Dionysios then went back to Syracuse, leaving western Sicily much as it had been before he set out on the ex-

[¹ After the failure of the allies at Gela, the "Council of Friends" summoned by Dionysios were unanimous in the opinion *ἀνεπιτήδειον εἶναι τὸν πόλεμον* (Diod. xiii. 111). Cf. Sicily, iii. 571.]

[² Diod. xiv. 55.]

[³ Ib.]

[⁴ Ib.; *ἀπέστησαν δὲ παραπλησίως καὶ Ἀλιναῖοι, καὶ πέμφαντες πρέσβεις εἰς τὸ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατόπεδον, συμμαχίαν ἐποιήσαντο.*]

pedition of the year before. He had raised a great many hopes, and he had shed a great deal of blood; but he had made neither lasting conquests nor lasting alliances. The Greek cities of the south coast had freed themselves before he set out, and the barbarian corner was a barbarian corner again. For twenty years he made no second attempt to make it otherwise; it was only towards the very end of his days that he again adventured himself in those regions. Motya, for less than a year an outpost of Hellas, passed back into the hands of its old masters and inhabitants.

But it was not any longer to remain a stronghold of any power. Himilkôn decreed that Motya, as a city and fortress, should exist no longer. Its position, as one of the seats of Phœnician power in Sicily, as its main seat on the western side of Sicily, was to be translated to a spot on the neighbouring mainland, a spot of which we have often heard, and where we have been tempted to wonder that no city of men had already arisen. On the most western point of Sicily, by the sacred spring, a new city was founded, bearing the name of the spring¹. Motya was forsaken; we are told that such of the old inhabitants as could be found were invited to become citizens of the town which took its place². Like Naxos, the city never rose again. The wall that gave way to the arts of Dionysios is largely there, nearly everywhere in its line, in many places in its very stones. The great gateway still stands, at least in its lower courses. The line of the mole to which it opened is still plainly stamped on the waters. But all else is gone. The towering houses of Motya no

CHAP. X.

Motya forsaken and Lilybaion founded by Himilkôn.
[B.C. 397.]

Site of Motya.

[¹ Diod. xiii. 54; ἀπὸ τοῦ φρέατος δ' ὀνομάζεται Λιλύβαιον. See Sicily, i. 271, and iii. 455. This spring from its supposed gift of soothsaying was afterwards connected with the Sibyl; and its grotto was in Christian days hewn into the Baptistery of St. John. Fazellus, De rebus Siculis, vii. 1. The actual foundation of Lilybaion is recorded by Diodōros, xxii. 10.]

[² Diod. xxii. 10; τοὺς γὰρ ἐκ ταύτης (sc. Μοτύης) ὑπολειφθέντας ἀνθρώπους κατέκτισαν εἰς τὸ Λιλύβαιον.]

CHAP. X. longer rise against the sky. Within and without the wall, wheat and vines and the other fruits of Sicily grow in abundance over the sites of streets and temples. The green island makes a cheerful contrast to the dreary saltworks that stretch along the coast both of the mainland and of the surrounding islands. And from forsaken Motya we look out on half-forsaken Lilybaion. Modern Marsala covers not much more than half the site of the city of Himilkôn. And the point itself, most western spot of Sicilian ground, looks as we see it from the shore of Motya, more like a fellow of lowly Aigithallos¹ than the famous headland which was held to part the seas of Africa and Europe.

Site and
foundation
of Lily-
baion.

From this time Lilybaion becomes the centre of Carthaginian power in the extreme west of Sicily. It certainly plays a more conspicuous part in the history of Carthage in Sicily than Panormos itself. In a military sense it certainly plays a more honourable part. Panormos was taken, first by the Epeiros and then by the Romans; Lilybaion was never taken at all. Its harbour, its general position, could never have been compared to those of Panormos; but, as the point of direct communication with Africa, it had an importance in Carthaginian warfare which even Panormos did not share. The point of Lilybaion had often been a camping-place for Carthaginian armies²; one thinks that there must have been at least a permanent fort; but there was as yet no city. But now a great city arose which took within its walls the most western point of the Sicilian

[¹ The ancient name (cf. Diod. xxiv. 1; Zonaras, viii. 15) of the former peninsula, now the Isola Lunga and Borrome. Ptolemy also mentions Aigitharos, which is probably the same as a cape (*ἀκρα*) between Lilybaion and Drepana. (See Schubring, *Motye-Lilybaion*, 57).]

[² The only recorded instance is in Diodoros, xiii. 54, on the occasion of Hannibal's landing at this point in 409 B.C. (Sicily, iii. 455). Whether he landed or encamped here in 406 does not appear.]

mainland and the holy spring beside it. The new town CHAP. X. took the shape of an irregular four-sided figure, two of whose sides, the south-west and north-west, were formed by the coast on each side of the point itself. The inland sides, south-eastern and north-eastern, were formed by two gigantic ditches cut in the solid rock, a work as great as the ditches of Arques or of the elder Salisbury, but cut with far greater toil through a harder material. Of those ditches Polybios speaks with wonder¹, and a large part of them still remains to speak for itself. Of the walls of Himilkôn we have small fragments indeed; but there are some fragments still.

The modern town of Marsala, in its Arabic name, given Lilybaion
now Mar-
sala. by the devotion of its Saracen conquerors², not unfittingly carries on the Semitic tradition of the Phœnician city which it represents. But it represents it only as the part represents the whole. The south-eastern and north-eastern sides of Marsala coincide with part of those of the old Lilybaion, and the ancient ditch is preserved along the whole of the north-eastern side and along a great part of the south-eastern. But Marsala nowhere touches the sea; and it is plain that the ditches were carried down to the sea on both sides. The line of the north-eastern ditch can easily be traced. At the north-eastern corner of the present town, its direction has been changed to allow the building of a large bastion of the time of Charles the Fifth. Beyond that towards the sea the sinking of the ditch is clearly seen in the green fields. The walls on these two sides within the ditch naturally follow the Phœnician lines, and their lower

[¹ Polyb. i. 42; *τείχεσι διαφερόντως ἡσφαλισμένην καὶ πέριξ τάφρον βαθείᾳ*. Diodôros (xxii. 10), speaking of Lilybaion on the occasion of its siege by Pyrrhos, says; *οὐσης δὲ τῆς πόλεως τὸ πλείστον μέρος ἐν θαλάσῃ τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς προσόδους ἐτείχισαν καὶ πύργους πυκνοὺς ἐποίησαν καὶ τάφρον δρύζαντες μέγαν, κ.τ.λ.* In xxiv. 1 he speaks of the fosse as extending from sea to sea and as being 60 cubits in width and 40 in depth.]

[² *Marsâ Ali* = the haven of Ali; not of *Allah*, as implied in the text.]

CHAP. X. course may keep traces of Phœnician masonry, but they
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¹ See vol. i. p. 388.

² See Polyb. i. 47. We shall come to it in time.

CHAP. X. does also to pull down the wall at points seemingly chosen at random. The most marked single feature in the wall must be, not of Punic but of Roman date. The line of the *Cassaro*—the name still lives—of Marsala¹ must have been partly changed, like that of the High Street of Exeter. The gateway, bearing the significant name of *Porta Nuova*, by which the *Cassaro* opens to the void space that was the open city, stands a little to the right of the spot where lately was a double gate of ancient masonry, clearly marked within and without. And not only was there the double arch in the wall itself; its fellow, the inner arch of the gate-house, was there also. Such a relic as this would make the fortune of a city of Britain or Northern Gaul. In Phœnician Lilybaion it is uncared for, and is left to be destroyed piecemeal, year by year, at the caprice of any to whom destruction is a sport².

Changes
in land
and sea.

At Lilybaion, as well as at the neighbouring Motya, the relations of land and water have changed a good deal. The modern haven of Marsala, with its rich merchandize of Sicilian wine, the haven by which the last deliverer of Sicily made his way into the island, lies on the other side of the western port from the old haven of Lilybaion. In the geography of Polybios, the old one lies on the sea of Sardinia and the new one on the sea of Libya³. The description implies that abiding error as to the shape of Sicily which has been mentioned more than once; but it marks that the two havens lie on different sides of the most western point of the Sicilian mainland. The old one is in truth the southern end of the haven of Motya. It looks out on that low island, and on the yet lower islands—

¹ *Castrum*, κάστρον, *caaster*, *kast*, *cassaro*. One is delighted to find a place where the name is allowed to live on. In this matter Marsala has not sunk so low as Palermo and Taormina.

² The double arches were perfect in 1887. In 1889 they had sunk to an impost in one place and the beginning of an arch in another.

[³ See Sicily, i. 271.]

a peninsula in Himilkôn's day—which shelter it. It looks out also to the north-east on the mighty mass of Eryx. To the north-west it looks out on the clearly cut outlines of Aigousa and the neighbouring islands, which Polybios, under the influence of the same error, so strangely places between Lilybaion and Carthage. At the point where the great ditch reached the sea on this side, amidst masses of ruined buildings, early and late, we trace large remains of the north-western wall of Lilybaion. We make out the signs of a sea-gate and of a mole stretching into the sea. And not far off we see the substructure of a small temple rising close above the waters, the house doubtless of one of the sea-faring gods of Canaan. Beyond to the north-east, the larger remains of another mole are clearly seen here and there above the waters; beyond that now is a long spit of land trending northwards, whose end worthily bears the name of *Punta d'alga*. But it is doubtful whether this last is not of later formation. It may be that it was the artificial mole rather than any natural feature, which went far to meet the peninsula stretching towards it from the north. Between them they left but a narrow passage into the joint haven of Motya and Lilybaion¹.

CHAP. X.

Moles and sea-gate of Lilybaion.

Ancient haven of Lilybaion.

The ancient haven of Lilybaion, it will be thus seen, lay outside the town on one side, as the present haven of Marsala lies outside the town on the other side. It must therefore have needed protection to the north-east. It has been suggested that it was defended and joined to the town, after the manner of the Long Walls of Athens, by a wall drawn to the sea at the point called *Portazza*. This is a point which seems to have parted the haven itself from a small bay which then occupied the site of the present

[¹ The εἰσπλους εἰς τὸν λιμένα mentioned above. The sea at the actual entrance to the lagoon of Motya was once deep and the waves beat here with great force. See Polybios, i. 47.]

CHAP. X. salt-marshes¹. Within the ancient haven, the water is now of the very shallowest. The keel of the boat is apt to touch the bottom, and progress is ever and anon checked by masses of sea-weed. This doubtless represents a state of things which has been coming on for ages, and which has caused the removal of the haven to the other side. For a long way round the point of Lilybaion the sea is comparatively shallow, and made dangerous by hidden rocks². But the haven of Lilybaion, when Lilybaion was chosen to be one of the chief seats of the maritime power of Carthage, must have been deeper than it is now. In any case he who ventures his craft between *Punta d'alga* and the mainland will have a lively impression of the shallows on whose hard navigation Polybios enlarges³. He may fancy that he has in this small Mediterranean inlet learned somewhat of the experiences of Hannôn on the Ocean. He will be better able to appreciate the gallant deeds of Hannibal the

The
ancient
haven of
Lilybaion.

[¹ Schubring, op. cit. p. 73; "Meine vermuthung, es möchte daher durch eine art langer mauern das beispiel der verbindung Athens mit dem Peiraeus nachgeahmt worden sein, hat an ort und stelle eine überraschende bestätigung gefunden. Die stadtmauer an der see setzt sich nämlich in nordöstlicher richtung jenseits der *fossa delle navi* fort, läuft wie vorher auf dem felsigen küstenrand bis an die saline des Giuseppe Polleri, wo einst der alte hafendamm sich abzweigte, jetzt aber die meergraszunge (*Punta d'alga*). Die anlage des salzwerkes hat jegliche spur verwischt; doch beginnt die befestigung auf deren östlicher seite wieder und zieht sich am ufferrande des hafens wohl erhalten bis zum thurm *Portazza* hin, dem 'thor,' dessen name bedeutsam ist, und wo auch nach der stadttradition alte anlagen sich befunden haben."]

[² Cf. Polyb. i. 42; ἡσφαλισμένην . . . καὶ τενάγῃσιν ἐκ θαλάττης δι' ἣν ἐστὶν εἰς τοὺς λιμένας εἰσπλους πολλῆς δεομένης ἐμπειρίας καὶ συνηθείας. So too Verg. *Æn.* iii. 705;

"Et vada dura lego saxis Lilybaeia caecis."

The low promontory on which Lilybaion stood—now Cape Boeo—is in fact continued out to sea as a broad reef of rocks and shoals.]

[³ In 1887 Mr. Freeman, in company with the writer, after circumnavigating the promontory of Lilybaion in a small yacht, tried to enter the lagoon of Motya, but was thwarted by a contrary wind. When near the old mole we put off in a boat in order to land in what was once the harbour of Lilybaion, but the shoals and sea-tang made the task one of great difficulty.]

Rhodian, who knew how to steer his way among shallows, sea-weed, and hostile ships ^{CHAP. X.} ¹.

Lilybaion in short was Motya translated from its island ^{Lilybaion and Motya.} to a point on the mainland at no great distance. The city and fortress were simply moved from one end of the inlet to the other. Lilybaion took upon itself the duties of Motya. The history of the one city begins where that of the other ends. At Motya we have to look for nothing later, at Lilybaion we have to look for nothing earlier, than the day when Himilkôn decreed that Motya should pass away and that Lilybaion should come in its place. Even during the lifetime of Dionysios, the new city was called on to discharge the calling which it had inherited from the elder one, to act as the Semitic bulwark against Hellas. But this was not yet. For many years the great war between Syracuse and Carthage was carried on in quite other parts of Sicily.

The war had thus far gone distinctly in favour of Carthage. It was a war of Dionysios' own beginning; ^{Himilkôn's expedition to N.E. Sicily.} and, as far as things had gone yet, he had lost all that he had won, and Himilkôn had won back all that he had lost. Dionysios had withdrawn from the region he had himself chosen as the seat of war; and Himilkôn had made that region safer against any future attacks by the foundation of a city and fortress whose value was proved in many later wars. But the Punic commander was by no means disposed to a defensive course only. He would carry the arms, and, if he could, the dominion of Carthage into a part of Sicily which had hitherto seen nothing of either. He had secured the barbarian corner in the north-west; he would go on and win a new barbarian corner in the north-east. His object in the end was of course an ^{Syracuse his ultimate object.} attack on Syracuse; but he would make his way to Syracuse by a new road. He saw that no point in Sicily

[¹ See Polybios, i. 46.]

CHAP. X. could be of greater value than Messana. The deep haven Himilkôn's sheltered by the *Danklon* could hold all his ships, more than designs on Messana. six hundred as they were¹. From that point he could hold the strait; he could hinder any help going to Sicily from the Greeks of Italy; he even hoped to hinder the allies of Dionysios in Old Greece from coming to his aid². The last time Messana had had any dealings with Carthage they had been of a friendly kind. Messana, under the tyranny of Anaxilas, had been at least a nominal ally of the Hamilkar who died at Himera³. By the treaty between Carthage and Dionysios the independence of Messana had been secured⁴. Since then, only yesterday, Messana, or at least her generals, had, out of mere jealousy of the power of Syracuse, without any special grievance to allege against the lord of Syracuse, gone forth with at least the will to war against him⁵. No war had really been waged; peace had been made, and since then Dionysios had put on a new character. He had become the champion of Hellenic Sicily. In that character he had Messana to his ally. We have not distinctly heard of any share taken by Messana in the two western campaigns; but, as the horsemen of the city were at this time at Syracuse⁶, we may infer that they had played their part in some of the warfare of the two years. We have no reason to think that the Messanians would in any case be other than zealous in the common cause, but just then Dionysios had in his hands most precious hostages for their faithfulness to it. Himilkôn doubtless knew all this, and he expected a stout resistance at Messana. Moreover it was the possession of Messana that he wished for and not

[¹ Diod. xiv. 56.]

[² Ib.; φησι(ε) τὰς τῶν Ἰταλιανῶν βοηθείας ἐμφορῆσαι καὶ τοὺς ἐκ Πελοποννήσου σκόλους ἐπισχεῖν.]

[³ Sicily, ii. 184.]

[⁴ Sicily, iii. 382.]

[⁵ See p. 59.]

[⁶ Diod. xiv. 56.]

its alliance or its tribute. We hear nothing of any negotiations, of any offer of terms. Himilkôn simply saw what a prize Messana would be in his hands, and he set forth to take possession. CHAP. X.

His starting-point would naturally be Panormos. From thence the fleet and army of Carthage advanced in concert along the north coast of Sicily. If Himilkôn had no thought of offering terms to Messana, it did not suit his policy to deal in the like sort with all the places on the road. He had no mind to tarry, and it suited him better to win the towns over than to take them by force. Two places only are mentioned; towards one of which nothing but the calmest policy could have kept back any Punic commander from dealing out the sternest vengeance. The men of the Himeraian Thermai, now spoken of as men of Himera, were Greeks who had supplanted a Punic settlement designed both as a trophy of Punic victory and as a defence of Punic territory¹. They had by the treaty been recognized as immediate Carthaginian subjects²; and—as no exception is made—it is to be presumed that they, like the other Greek subjects of Carthage, had taken a bloody vengeance on their masters at the moment of Dionysios' declaration of war³. Yet Himilkôn, in his eagerness to strike at Messana, and through Messana at Syracuse, could pass by all this, and could receive the men of Himera to a relation which is spoken of as friendship⁴. That word is vague; but it at least implies a state above that of mere subjection; it would mark the relation of Gela to Carthage rather than that of Selinous⁵. That the men of Cephalædium were also admitted to friendship is nothing wonderful. Himilkôn was just now acting on a very distinct policy

Himilkôn starts from Panormos.
The Himeraian Thermai and Cephalædium treated friendly.

[¹ See p. 65.]

[² See Sicily, iii. 580.]

[³ Diod. xiv. 47.]

[⁴ Diod. xiv. 56; *πρὸς μὲν Ἱμεραίους καὶ τοὺς τὸ Κεφαλαίδιον φρούριον κατοικοῦντας φιλίαν ἐποίησατο.*]

[⁵ See Sicily, iii. 580, 581.]

CHAP. X. of stirring up the Sikels against the Greeks. We should
 Advance of be glad to hear what action he took towards any of the
 Himilkôn other Sikel places on the road, and especially how the
 on Mes- new foundation of Archônidès fared at his hands. But we
 sana. hear nothing of Halæsa or any other point on the north
 coast eastward of Cephalœdium. The Punic fleet however
 did something in the way of warfare against a Greek city
 for which there must have been some special and unrecorded
 motive. Himilkôn sailed to Lipara; he laid a contribution
 of thirty talents on the inhabitants¹; whether he did
 them any further damage or received them to any kind
 of terms we are not told.

With this addition to his military chest, Himilkôn again
 took to the land, and marched on towards Messana, the
 ships sailing in concert along the coast. It is strange that
 we hear nothing of the Messanian border-fortress of Mylai;
 it may be that its peninsular position allowed him to pass
 by without either attacking or being attacked. After the
 voyage to Lipara we next hear of him as encamping at the
 north-east corner of Sicily, on the low ground of Pelôris,
 by the salt-lakes and the temple of Poseidôn². Messana
 was now very directly threatened. The blow was doubtless
 as sudden as a blow could be which needed so long a voyage
 and march. But the Messanians must have known that
 the Punic force was coming, at any rate after it had
 reached Lipara. But though every man in Messana was
 hostile to Carthage, though no man thought of surrender
 or submission, yet no fit preparation had been made against
 the coming of such an enemy, and men's minds were sore
 perplexed as to the fittest course of action now he had
 come. It is now that we hear that the Messanian horse-

Encamps
 at Pelôris.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 56; Λιπάρας δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἐγκρατὴς γενόμενος, τριάκοντα
 τάλαντα παρὰ τῶν κατοικοῦντων τὴν νῆσον ἐπράξατο.]

[² Ib.; κατεστρατοπέδευσεν ἐπὶ τῆς Πελωρίδος. The distance given from
 Messana—100 stadia—is over the mark.]

men were at Syracuse, and we hear nothing of any message being sent to call them back to the defence of their own city. The walls of Messana too were out of repair¹. This fact carries us back to the vain attempt of the Messanian generals to wage war with Dionysios². The walls can hardly have fallen to decay since the peace which followed that attempt; the mutineers may have had specially good reasons for distrusting the wisdom of the enterprise. At any rate the weak state of the defences and the lack of time to repair them was the thing which most weighed down the hearts of the men of Messana. Some proposed to send the women and children and the most precious things among their moveable goods to the neighbouring cities³; that is, we may suppose, across the strait to Rhêgion. The men, it would seem, were to stay and brave the worst, as Greek had now learned to do towards Phœnician and Phœnician towards Greek. Others, on the strength of an ancient oracle, looked for the best and not for the worst. It had been said in old time that the Carthaginians should carry water in Messana⁴. The interpretation put on this saying was of course that the Carthaginians were to become hewers of wood and drawers of water to Messanian masters. But both parties were united in a strong mind to do valiantly in their city's need⁵.

CHAP. X.
Perplexity
of Messa-
nians.

The first step taken for the defence of Messana was to send a chosen band of the younger men, the flower of the warlike force of the commonwealth, if not to assault, at least to watch, the Punic camp at Pelôris, and to hinder the enemy from advancing further towards the city⁶. In

Defence of
Messana.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 56; *μάλιστα δ' αὐτοὺς εἰς ἀθυμίαν ἤγε τὰ τεῖχη καταπεπω-
κότα.*]

[² See pp. 59, 60.]

[³ Diod. l. c. . . . *εἰς τὰς ἀστυγείτονας πόλεις.*]

[⁴ Ib.; *ἀκούοντές τι παλαιὸν αὐτοῖς εἶναι λόγιον ὅτι δεῖ Καρχηδονίους
ὀδροφορῆσαι κατὰ τὴν πόλιν.*]

[⁵ Ib.]

[⁶ Ib.; *καλύσσοντας τοὺς πολεμίους ἐπιβαίνειν τῆς χώρας.*]

CHAP. X. this Himilkôn saw his opportunity; he could dash down upon Messana with his naval force, while her best defenders

Himilkôn
takes Mes-
sana by
assault.
[B. C. 397.]

were outside the walls. A north wind was blowing, and presently two hundred Punic ships, all in full sail with the favouring breeze, were seen bearing down the strait¹. At earlier stages of our story we have heard of Messanian ships doing good service for the freedom of Syracuse². Now we hear nothing of any attempt at defence by sea; the Carthaginian fleet seems to sail in unhindered by the narrow mouth of the Zanklaian haven. As soon as the Messanian force at or near Pelôris saw what was happening, they hastened back towards the city with all speed; but before they could get there, the work was done³. We must suppose that the ships had taken a land-force on board; for the Carthaginians seem to have invested the city by land as soon as they had command of the harbour. The words literally imply that they surrounded the town⁴; but that is a hard thing to do to Messana on the inland side, and it may be enough to suppose that an assault was made at both ends. But there was nothing that could be called a siege; the ruinous walls were no defence; the enemy made their way through the breaches and got possession of the city⁵. So we are told with a grievous lack of detail and local colouring; when we are told of the various fates of the defenders, we can see that it is Messana that is spoken of. When the barbarians burst in, some were slain valiantly fighting; a vast number made their way through the hills that overhang the city to the various fortresses of the Messanian territory⁶. Some became the prisoners of the

[¹ Diod. xiv. 57.]

[² See Sicily, iii. 40 seqq.]

[³ Diod. xiv. 57.]

[⁴ Ib.; οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι περιστρατοπεδεύσαντες τὴν Μεσσήνην ...]

[⁵ Ib.; διὰ τῶν πεπτακότων τειχῶν εἰσβιασάμενοι τῆς πόλεως ἐκυρίευσαν.]

[⁶ Ib.; ὁ δὲ πολλοὶ ὄχλος, διὰ τῶν παρακειμένων ὄρων ὁρμήσας, εἰς τὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν φρούρια διεσπάρη.]

enemy; some who were cut off on or near the Danklon, to the number of more than two hundred, threw themselves into the sea, hoping, we are told, to save themselves by swimming to the opposite coast. The more part were carried away by the current; but fifty are said to have made their way in safety to the Italian shore¹. Himilkôn led his whole force into the city, which must have afforded less human spoil than he may have reckoned on. The oracle was fulfilled. The Carthaginians, or those whom they brought with them for such purposes, carried water in Messana, but not as captives of the Messanians. Himilkôn's first object was to get possession of the fortresses of the country, beginning doubtless with the predecessors of those which crown the hills above the city². But the places were strong and held by men who made a stout defence³. He turned therefore away from this smaller prey, and gathered his host together for the great object of all, the march upon Syracuse.

CHAP. X.

Successful
resistance
of Messa-
nian fort-
resses.Himilkôn's
march
upon Syra-
cuse.

He had a work to do on the road which led to the foundation of a new Sicilian town, one which has become a favourite resort of travellers in our own day. We have marked his dealings with the Sikels of Cephalœdium on the north coast. In the east also the older people of the land were now again to show themselves. The Sikels of that region had long hated Dionysios, and they had long wished for an occasion of declaring themselves against him⁴. His affected moderation at Henna had clearly been seen through; even the grant of the site of Naxos to its Sikel neighbours had failed to win their hearts. All the neighbouring Sikel communities, with the exception of the single town of Assorus, turned

His
friendly
relations
with
Sikels.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 57.]

[² Ib.; τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησε πορθεῖν τὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν φρούρια.]

[³ Ib.; τούτων δ' ὀχυρῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν εἰς αὐτὰ συμπεφευγόντων γενναίως ἀγωνιζομένων. . .]

[⁴ Ib. xiv. 58.]

CHAP. X. against him. As usual, the newer and less known danger seemed the less dangerous; against Dionysios the Sikels did not shrink from entering into the alliance of Carthage. They had had one day of hope under a leader of their own people; they now looked for another at the hands of the enemy of their enemy. Himilkôn was not a man to let slip so great an opportunity. He saw a means of helping his allies and annoying his enemy, of annoying his enemy the more keenly because he was able to turn his own act against him. By the gift of Dionysios the site of Naxos had again become Sikel ground; but no Sikel city had sprung up either on the flat peninsula where Theoklês had settled or on the heights to which Naxos had looked up. On those heights it suited the purpose of Himilkôn to outdo the gift of Dionysios. The lord of Syracuse had given them lands; the Shophet of Carthage would raise them to the level of the Greek or the Phœnician; he would give them a city to dwell in. It would seem that the Sikels of the immediate neighbourhood were already beginning to occupy the hill of Tauros; but as yet they had no acknowledged leader, and their dwellings were not fenced in with walls¹. Such a beginning Himilkôn was well pleased to encourage. The fortification of the Sikel post, the foundation of the new city of Tauromenion, was his work, the fruit of the Sikel alliance with Carthage. From that day to this the hill-side of Tauros has been occupied by a city of men, girded in by walls which have withstood and yielded to many invaders, and which were to be put to a hard trial while they were yet in the days of infancy. Now or within the space of a few years the hill put on essentially the same face which the most picturesque of the towns of the Sicilian coast keeps to this day. Tauromenion—the new settlers gave that Greek name to their new home because they had made up their minds to abide on Tauros²—the Tabermin of

Himilkôn
settles
Sikels at
Tauromenion.

¹ Diod. xiv. 59. See Appendix IV.

² Ib. See Appendix IV.

the Arab, the Taormina of modern times, arose on the hill-side. The new dwelling-place of the Sikel looked down on the forsaken home of the first Greeks to whom Sikels had had to yield up the soil of their fathers. CHAP. X.

And truly no city upon earth sits on a stronger or more goodly site, or looks forth over a nobler prospect of land and sea. Not sheer above the waves, but with a sandy beach between the wide sea and the mountain's foot, Tauros rises above its bay, its lower mass cloven by steep gullies and projecting points of rock, the heights above broken into a crowd of peaks varying in outline and in loftiness, shifting into endless groups as the eye follows them from various points of land or sea. The town itself must at all times have kept the same feature of a long main street running along a ledge on the mountain side, from which smaller side streets branch off upwards and downwards. Its extent has varied at different times. Its exact bounds in its brief Sikel day it would be hard to trace; in later times, as a flourishing Roman city, it spread far wider than the modern Taormina. The present wall on the side towards the bay is of far later date than the times with which we are concerned, and it has been commonly thought to be of Saracenic work. But on the north side, at a much lower level, may be traced a far more ancient wall. Where that wall is best preserved, we may see two strongly contrasted forms of construction side by side. There is a long piece of many perfect courses of whose workmanship the engineers of Dionysios need hardly have been ashamed. Close by, continuing it in an unbroken line, is a walling of stones of various shapes and sizes thrown roughly together. Our thoughts fly down to the ancient wall at Naxos; but this on the hill-side is a less massive work of smaller stones¹. Lastly, there is the base of an angle-tower, Site of
Tauro-
menion.

Modern
Taormina.

[¹ Since Mr. Freeman's last visit to Taormina the present writer found, beneath a covering of ivy and brushwood, a remarkable fragment of wall

CHAP. X. does also to pull down the wall at points seemingly chosen at random. The most marked single feature in the wall must be, not of Punic but of Roman date. The line of the *Cassaro*—the name still lives—of Marsala¹ must have been partly changed, like that of the High Street of Exeter. The gateway, bearing the significant name of *Porta Nuova*, by which the *Cassaro* opens to the void space that was the open city, stands a little to the right of the spot where lately was a double gate of ancient masonry, clearly marked within and without. And not only was there the double arch in the wall itself; its fellow, the inner arch of the gate-house, was there also. Such a relic as this would make the fortune of a city of Britain or Northern Gaul. In Phœnician Lilybaion it is uncared for, and is left to be destroyed piecemeal, year by year, at the caprice of any to whom destruction is a sport².

Changes
in land
and sea.

At Lilybaion, as well as at the neighbouring Motya, the relations of land and water have changed a good deal. The modern haven of Marsala, with its rich merchandize of Sicilian wine, the haven by which the last deliverer of Sicily made his way into the island, lies on the other side of the western port from the old haven of Lilybaion. In the geography of Polybios, the old one lies on the sea of Sardinia and the new one on the sea of Libya³. The description implies that abiding error as to the shape of Sicily which has been mentioned more than once; but it marks that the two havens lie on different sides of the most western point of the Sicilian mainland. The old one is in truth the southern end of the haven of Motya. It looks out on that low island, and on the yet lower islands—

¹ *Castrum*, κάστρον, *ceaster*, *kasr*, *cassaro*. One is delighted to find a place where the name is allowed to live on. In this matter Marsala has not sunk so low as Palermo and Taormina.

² The double arches were perfect in 1887. In 1889 they had sunk to an impost in one place and the beginning of an arch in another.

[³ See Sicily, i. 271.]

a peninsula in Himilkôn's day—which shelter it. It looks out also to the north-east on the mighty mass of Eryx. To the north-west it looks out on the clearly cut outlines of Aigousa and the neighbouring islands, which Polybios, under the influence of the same error, so strangely places between Lilybaion and Carthage. At the point where the great ditch reached the sea on this side, amidst masses of ruined buildings, early and late, we trace large remains of the north-western wall of Lilybaion. We make out the signs of a sea-gate and of a mole stretching into the sea. And not far off we see the substructure of a small temple rising close above the waters, the house doubtless of one of the sea-faring gods of Canaan. Beyond to the north-east, the larger remains of another mole are clearly seen here and there above the waters; beyond that now is a long spit of land trending northwards, whose end worthily bears the name of *Punta d'alga*. But it is doubtful whether this last is not of later formation. It may be that it was the artificial mole rather than any natural feature, which went far to meet the peninsula stretching towards it from the north. Between them they left but a narrow passage into the joint haven of Motya and Lilybaion¹.

CHAP. X.

Moles and
sea-gate of
Lilybaion.Ancient
haven of
Lilybaion.

The ancient haven of Lilybaion, it will be thus seen, lay outside the town on one side, as the present haven of Marsala lies outside the town on the other side. It must therefore have needed protection to the north-east. It has been suggested that it was defended and joined to the town, after the manner of the Long Walls of Athens, by a wall drawn to the sea at the point called *Portazza*. This is a point which seems to have parted the haven itself from a small bay which then occupied the site of the present

[¹ The εἰσπλους εἰς τὸν λιμένα mentioned above. The sea at the actual entrance to the lagoon of Motya was once deep and the waves beat here with great force. See Polybios, i. 47.]

CHAP. X.
The
ancient
haven of
Lilybaion.

salt-marshes¹. Within the ancient haven, the water is now of the very shallowest. The keel of the boat is apt to touch the bottom, and progress is ever and anon checked by masses of sea-weed. This doubtless represents a state of things which has been coming on for ages, and which has caused the removal of the haven to the other side. For a long way round the point of Lilybaion the sea is comparatively shallow, and made dangerous by hidden rocks². But the haven of Lilybaion, when Lilybaion was chosen to be one of the chief seats of the maritime power of Carthage, must have been deeper than it is now. In any case he who ventures his craft between *Punta d'alga* and the mainland will have a lively impression of the shallows on whose hard navigation Polybios enlarges³. He may fancy that he has in this small Mediterranean inlet learned somewhat of the experiences of Hannôn on the Ocean. He will be better able to appreciate the gallant deeds of Hannibal the

[¹ Schubring, op. cit. p. 73; "Meine vermuthung, es möchte daher durch eine art langer mauern das beispiel der verbindung Athens mit dem Peiræus nachgeahmt worden sein, hat an ort und stelle eine überraschende bestätigung gefunden. Die stadtmauer an der see setzt sich nämlich in nordöstlicher richtung jenseits der *fossa delle navi* fort, läuft wie vorher auf dem felsigen küstenrand bis an die saline des Giuseppe Polleri, wo einst der alte hafendamm sich abzweigte, jetzt aber die meergrazunge (*Punta d'alga*). Die anlage des salzwerkes hat jegliche spur verwischt; doch beginnt die befestigung auf deren östlicher seite wieder und zieht sich am ufferrande des hafens wohl erhalten bis zum thurm *Portazza* hin, dem 'thor,' dessen name bedeutsam ist, und wo auch nach der stadttradition alte anlagen sich befunden haben."]

[² Cf. Polyb. i. 42; ἡσφαλισμένῃ . . . καὶ τενάγῃσιν ἐκ θαλάττης δι' ὧν ἔστιν εἰς τοὺς λιμένας εἰσπλους πολλῆς δεομένης ἐμπειρίας καὶ συνηθείας. So too Verg. *Æn.* iii. 705;

"Et vada dura lego saxis Lilybæia cæcis."

The low promontory on which Lilybaion stood—now Cape Boeo—is in fact continued out to sea as a broad reef of rocks and shoals.]

[³ In 1887 Mr. Freeman, in company with the writer, after circumnavigating the promontory of Lilybaion in a small yacht, tried to enter the lagoon of Motya, but was thwarted by a contrary wind. When near the old mole we put off in a boat in order to land in what was once the harbour of Lilybaion, but the shoals and sea-tang made the task one of great difficulty.]

Rhodian, who knew how to steer his way among shallows, sea-weed, and hostile ships ¹. CHAP. X.

Lilybaion in short was Motya translated from its island ^{Lilybaion and Motya} to a point on the mainland at no great distance. The city and fortress were simply moved from one end of the inlet to the other. Lilybaion took upon itself the duties of Motya. The history of the one city begins where that of the other ends. At Motya we have to look for nothing later, at Lilybaion we have to look for nothing earlier, than the day when Himilkôn decreed that Motya should pass away and that Lilybaion should come in its place. Even during the lifetime of Dionysios, the new city was called on to discharge the calling which it had inherited from the elder one, to act as the Semitic bulwark against Hellas. But this was not yet. For many years the great war between Syracuse and Carthage was carried on in quite other parts of Sicily.

The war had thus far gone distinctly in favour of ^{Himilkôn's expedition to N.E. Sicily.} Carthage. It was a war of Dionysios' own beginning; and, as far as things had gone yet, he had lost all that he had won, and Himilkôn had won back all that he had lost. Dionysios had withdrawn from the region he had himself chosen as the seat of war; and Himilkôn had made that region safer against any future attacks by the foundation of a city and fortress whose value was proved in many later wars. But the Punic commander was by no means disposed to a defensive course only. He would carry the arms, and, if he could, the dominion of Carthage into a part of Sicily which had hitherto seen nothing of either. He had secured the barbarian corner in the north-west; he would go on and win a new barbarian corner in the north-east. His object in the end was of course an ^{Syracuse his ultimate object.} attack on Syracuse; but he would make his way to Syracuse by a new road. He saw that no point in Sicily

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CHAP. I. could be of greater value than Messana. The deep haven
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[³ Sicily, ii. 184.]

[⁴ Sicily, iii. 582.]

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[⁶ Diod. xiv. 56.]

its alliance or its tribute. We hear nothing of any negotiations, of any offer of terms. Himilkôn simply saw what a prize Messana would be in his hands, and he set forth to take possession. CHAP. X.

His starting-point would naturally be Panormos. From thence the fleet and army of Carthage advanced in concert along the north coast of Sicily. If Himilkôn had no thought of offering terms to Messana, it did not suit his policy to deal in the like sort with all the places on the road. He had no mind to tarry, and it suited him better to win the towns over than to take them by force. Two places only are mentioned; towards one of which nothing but the calmest policy could have kept back any Punic commander from dealing out the sternest vengeance. The men of the Himeraian Thermai, now spoken of as men of Himera, were Greeks who had supplanted a Punic settlement designed both as a trophy of Punic victory and as a defence of Punic territory¹. They had by the treaty been recognized as immediate Carthaginian subjects²; and—as no exception is made—it is to be presumed that they, like the other Greek subjects of Carthage, had taken a bloody vengeance on their masters at the moment of Dionysius' declaration of war³. Yet Himilkôn, in his eagerness to strike at Messana, and through Messana at Syracuse, could pass by all this, and could receive the men of Himera to a relation which is spoken of as friendship⁴. That word is vague; but it at least implies a state above that of mere subjection; it would mark the relation of Gela to Carthage rather than that of Selinous⁵. That the men of Cephalœdium were also admitted to friendship is nothing wonderful. Himilkôn was just now acting on a very distinct policy

Himilkôn
starts from
Panormos.

The Himeraian
Thermai
and Cephalœdium
treated
friendly.

[¹ See p. 65.]

[² See Sicily, iii. 580.]

[³ Diod. xiv. 47.]

[⁴ Diod. xiv. 56; *πρὸς μὲν Ἱμεραίους καὶ τοὺς τὸ Κεφαλαΐδιον φρούριον κατοικοῦντας φιλίαν ἐποιήσατο.*]

[⁵ See Sicily, iii. 580, 581.]

CHAP. X. of stirring up the Sikels against the Greeks. We should
 Advance of be glad to hear what action he took towards any of the
 Himilkôn
 on Mes- other Sikel places on the road, and especially how the
 sana. new foundation of Archônidēs fared at his hands. But we
 hear nothing of Halæsa or any other point on the north
 coast eastward of Cephalœdium. The Punic fleet however
 did something in the way of warfare against a Greek city
 for which there must have been some special and unrecorded
 motive. Himilkôn sailed to Lipara; he laid a contribution
 of thirty talents on the inhabitants¹; whether he did
 them any further damage or received them to any kind
 of terms we are not told.

With this addition to his military chest, Himilkôn again
 took to the land, and marched on towards Messana, the
 ships sailing in concert along the coast. It is strange that
 we hear nothing of the Messanian border-fortress of Mylai;
 it may be that its peninsular position allowed him to pass
 by without either attacking or being attacked. After the
 voyage to Lipara we next hear of him as encamping at the
 north-east corner of Sicily, on the low ground of Pelôris,
 by the salt-lakes and the temple of Poseidôn². Messana
 was now very directly threatened. The blow was doubtless
 as sudden as a blow could be which needed so long a voyage
 and march. But the Messanians must have known that
 the Punic force was coming, at any rate after it had
 reached Lipara. But though every man in Messana was
 hostile to Carthage, though no man thought of surrender
 or submission, yet no fit preparation had been made against
 the coming of such an enemy, and men's minds were sore
 perplexed as to the fittest course of action now he had
 come. It is now that we hear that the Messanian horse-

Encamps
 at Pelôris.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 56; Λιπάρας δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἐγκρατὴς γενόμενος, τριάκοντα
 τάλαντα παρὰ τῶν κατοικούντων τὴν νῆσον ἐπράξατο.]

[² Ib.; κατεστρατοπέδευσεν ἐπὶ τῆς Πελωρίδος. The distance given from
 Messana—100 stadia—is over the mark.]

men were at Syracuse, and we hear nothing of any message being sent to call them back to the defence of their own city. The walls of Messana too were out of repair¹. This fact carries us back to the vain attempt of the Messanian generals to wage war with Dionysios². The walls can hardly have fallen to decay since the peace which followed that attempt; the mutineers may have had specially good reasons for distrusting the wisdom of the enterprise. At any rate the weak state of the defences and the lack of time to repair them was the thing which most weighed down the hearts of the men of Messana. Some proposed to send the women and children and the most precious things among their moveable goods to the neighbouring cities³; that is, we may suppose, across the strait to Rhégion. The men, it would seem, were to stay and brave the worst, as Greek had now learned to do towards Phœnician and Phœnician towards Greek. Others, on the strength of an ancient oracle, looked for the best and not for the worst. It had been said in old time that the Carthaginians should carry water in Messana⁴. The interpretation put on this saying was of course that the Carthaginians were to become hewers of wood and drawers of water to Messanian masters. But both parties were united in a strong mind to do valiantly in their city's need⁵.

CHAP. X.
Perplexity
of Messa-
nians.

The first step taken for the defence of Messana was to send a chosen band of the younger men, the flower of the warlike force of the commonwealth, if not to assault, at least to watch, the Punic camp at Pelôris, and to hinder the enemy from advancing further towards the city⁶. In

Defence of
Messana.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 56; *μάλιστα δ' αὐτοὺς εἰς ἀθυμίαν ἤγε τὰ τεῖχη καταπεπρωκότα.*]

[² See pp. 59, 60.]

[³ Diod. l. c. . . . *εἰς τὰς ἀστυγείτονας πόλεις.*]

[⁴ Ib.; *ἀκούοντες τι παλαιὸν αὐτοῖς εἶναι λόγιον ὅτι δεῖ Καρχηδονίους ὑδροφορῆσαι κατὰ τὴν πόλιν.*]

[⁵ Ib.]

[⁶ Ib.; *κλύσοντας τοὺς πολεμίους ἐπιβαίνειν τῆς χώρας.*]

CHAP. X. this Himilkôn saw his opportunity; he could dash down upon Messana with his naval force, while her best defenders were outside the walls. A north wind was blowing, and presently two hundred Punic ships, all in full sail with the favouring breeze, were seen bearing down the strait¹. At earlier stages of our story we have heard of Messanian ships doing good service for the freedom of Syracuse². Now we hear nothing of any attempt at defence by sea; the Carthaginian fleet seems to sail in unhindered by the narrow mouth of the Zanklaian haven. As soon as the Messanian force at or near Pelôris saw what was happening, they hastened back towards the city with all speed; but before they could get there, the work was done³. We must suppose that the ships had taken a land-force on board; for the Carthaginians seem to have invested the city by land as soon as they had command of the harbour. The words literally imply that they surrounded the town⁴; but that is a hard thing to do to Messana on the inland side, and it may be enough to suppose that an assault was made at both ends. But there was nothing that could be called a siege; the ruinous walls were no defence; the enemy made their way through the breaches and got possession of the city⁵. So we are told with a grievous lack of detail and local colouring; when we are told of the various fates of the defenders, we can see that it is Messana that is spoken of. When the barbarians burst in, some were slain valiantly fighting; a vast number made their way through the hills that overhang the city to the various fortresses of the Messanian territory⁶. Some became the prisoners of the

Himilkôn
takes Mes-
sana by
assault.
[B. C. 397.]

[¹ Diod. xiv. 57.]

[² See Sicily, iii. 40 seqq.]

[³ Diod. xiv. 57.]

[⁴ Ib.; οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι περιστρατοπεδεύσαντες τὴν Μεσσήνην ...]

[⁵ Ib.; διὰ τῶν πεπωκότων τειχῶν εἰσβιασάμενοι τῆς πόλεως ἐκυρίευσαν.]

[⁶ Ib.; δὲ δὲ πολλοὶ δόχλος, διὰ τῶν παρακειμένων ὄρων ὁρμήσας, εἰς τὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν φρούρια διεσπάρη.]

enemy; some who were cut off on or near the Danklon, to the number of more than two hundred, threw themselves into the sea, hoping, we are told, to save themselves by swimming to the opposite coast. The more part were carried away by the current; but fifty are said to have made their way in safety to the Italian shore¹. Himilkôn led his whole force into the city, which must have afforded less human spoil than he may have reckoned on. The oracle was fulfilled. The Carthaginians, or those whom they brought with them for such purposes, carried water in Messana, but not as captives of the Messanians. Himilkôn's first object was to get possession of the fortresses of the country, beginning doubtless with the predecessors of those which crown the hills above the city². But the places were strong and held by men who made a stout defence³. He turned therefore away from this smaller prey, and gathered his host together for the great object of all, the march upon Syracuse.

CHAP. X.

Successful resistance of Messanian fortresses.

Himilkôn's march upon Syracuse.

He had a work to do on the road which led to the foundation of a new Sicilian town, one which has become a favourite resort of travellers in our own day. We have marked his dealings with the Sikels of Cephalœdium on the north coast. In the east also the older people of the land were now again to show themselves. The Sikels of that region had long hated Dionysios, and they had long wished for an occasion of declaring themselves against him⁴. His affected moderation at Henna had clearly been seen through; even the grant of the site of Naxos to its Sikel neighbours had failed to win their hearts. All the neighbouring Sikel communities, with the exception of the single town of Assorus, turned

His friendly relations with Sikels.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 57.]

[² Ib.; τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησε πορθεῖν τὰ κατὰ τὴν χῆραν φρούρια.]

[³ Ib.; τοῦτων δ' ὀχυρῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν εἰς αὐτὰ συμπεφυγόντων γενναίων ἀγωνιζομένων. . .]

[⁴ Ib. xiv. 58.]

CHAP. X. against him. As usual, the newer and less known danger seemed the less dangerous ; against Dionysios the Sikels did not shrink from entering into the alliance of Carthage. They had had one day of hope under a leader of their own people ; they now looked for another at the hands of the enemy of their enemy. Himilkôn was not a man to let slip so great an opportunity. He saw a means of helping his allies and annoying his enemy, of annoying his enemy the more keenly because he was able to turn his own act against him. By the gift of Dionysios the site of Naxos had again become Sikel ground ; but no Sikel city had sprung up either on the flat peninsula where Theoklês had settled or on the heights to which Naxos had looked up. On those heights it suited the purpose of Himilkôn to outdo the gift of Dionysios. The lord of Syracuse had given them lands ; the Shophet of Carthage would raise them to the level of the Greek or the Phœnician ; he would give them a city to dwell in. It would seem that the Sikels of the immediate neighbourhood were already beginning to occupy the hill of Tauros ; but as yet they had no acknowledged leader, and their dwellings were not fenced in with walls¹. Such a beginning Himilkôn was well pleased to encourage. The fortification of the Sikel post, the foundation of the new city of Tauromenion, was his work, the fruit of the Sikel alliance with Carthage. From that day to this the hill-side of Tauros has been occupied by a city of men, girded in by walls which have withstood and yielded to many invaders, and which were to be put to a hard trial while they were yet in the days of infancy. Now or within the space of a few years the hill put on essentially the same face which the most picturesque of the towns of the Sicilian coast keeps to this day. Tauromenion—the new settlers gave that Greek name to their new home because they had made up their minds to abide on Tauros²—the Tabermin of

Himilkôn
settles
Sikels at
Tauromenion.

¹ Diod. xiv. 59. See Appendix IV.

² Ib. See Appendix IV.

the Arab, the Taormina of modern times, arose on the hill-
side. The new dwelling-place of the Sikel looked down
on the forsaken home of the first Greeks to whom Sikels
had had to yield up the soil of their fathers. CHAP. X.

And truly no city upon earth sits on a stronger or more
goodly site, or looks forth over a nobler prospect of land
and sea. Not sheer above the waves, but with a sandy
beach between the wide sea and the mountain's foot, Tauros
rises above its bay, its lower mass cloven by steep gullies
and projecting points of rock, the heights above broken into
a crowd of peaks varying in outline and in loftiness, shift-
ing into endless groups as the eye follows them from
various points of land or sea. The town itself must at
all times have kept the same feature of a long main street
running along a ledge on the mountain side, from which
smaller side streets branch off upwards and downwards.
Its extent has varied at different times. Its exact bounds
in its brief Sikel day it would be hard to trace; in later
times, as a flourishing Roman city, it spread far wider
than the modern Taormina. The present wall on the side
towards the bay is of far later date than the times with
which we are concerned, and it has been commonly thought
to be of Saracenic work. But on the north side, at a
much lower level, may be traced a far more ancient wall.
Where that wall is best preserved, we may see two strongly
contrasted forms of construction side by side. There is
a long piece of many perfect courses of whose workman-
ship the engineers of Dionysios need hardly have been
ashamed. Close by, continuing it in an unbroken line, is a
walling of stones of various shapes and sizes thrown roughly
together. Our thoughts fly down to the ancient wall at
Naxos; but this on the hill-side is a less massive work of
smaller stones¹. Lastly, there is the base of an angle-tower,

Site of
Tauro-
menion.

Modern
Taormina.

[¹ Since Mr. Freeman's last visit to Taormina the present writer found, beneath a covering of ivy and brushwood, a remarkable fragment of wall

CHAP. X. of a piece with the rough wall, but built with somewhat
 Walls of greater care and of rectangular stones. In this ruder work
 Tauro- we are tempted to see the witness of the first, the necessarily
 menion. hasty, fortification of Tauromenion, which the Sikel wrought
 at the bidding of the Phœnician. The more finished piece
 is doubtless a rebuilding of the days when Tauromenion
 had become a Greek city. The wall of which they are both
 parts marks a far greater extent for the town than that of
 the present Taormina. Such an extent Tauromenion un-
 doubtedly had in later times, and it may well have been
 so planned out from the first. Later walls, of East-Roman
 or Saracen work, when for two hundred years and more the
 town was so often lost and won by Christendom and by Islam,
 would be far more likely to narrow than to enlarge the
 circuit of the ramparts. But further, the town must have
 its akropolis, and for Tauromenion, as for Leontinoi, though
 in so different a way, nature has provided, not one akropolis
 only, but at least two. The ancient wall must have taken
 in that eastern hill of many points and summits, in a sink-
 ing of which a site was found for the famous theatre, where
 the Roman overlaid the work of the Greek. This is the
 height which men climb to see the sunrise of the Sicilian
 spring¹, or to look on Ætna either sleeping peacefully under

which seems to belong to a much more remote period. It lies just below the Capuchin Monastery, immediately to the right of the path that leads to the castle and the village of Mola. It is of huge, more or less polygonal blocks,—not here of lava as the walls of Naxos below,—but of the native limestone of the hill on which Taormina stands. It is however of the same style and there can be little doubt that it belongs to the same period as the early work of Naxos, and one may infer that long before the foundation of Tauromenion the Naxians had established a castle on the hill of Tauros. It is likely that the earlier foundation became the nucleus of the new, and that this older piece of wall was included in the defences of one of its *Akropoleis*. This tells in favour of the suggestion (see Appendix IV.) that the hill of the theatre was one of the *Akropoleis*.]

[¹ These words are unfortunately no longer true. This, with others of the most interesting and beautiful sites of Taormina, has passed into the possession of an English proprietress, who has barred the access and warned off the civilized portion of mankind in four languages.]

his mantle of snow, or threatening again to pour down the streams which hide the soil of Naxos. At the moment when Tauromenion was founded, he must have been already sending up his pillar of cloud to give warning that the powers of fire were about to take their share in the strife of men¹. This height then, the height of the theatre, standing out from many points in front of the town on the ledge, was one akropolis of Tauromenion². But there was another, steeper and loftier. Not in front of the town, but rather behind it, rising right above its long street, soars a rocky height, hard indeed to scale. Of its two summits the loftier is still crowned by a shattered fortress, which bears the name of the Castle of the Rock. Its lower point, a place of devotion and pilgrimage, is hallowed to Our Lady by the style of Our Lady of the Rock. Here is the second akropolis of Tauromenion. Of one at least of them we shall presently hear in our story.

But the walled town and its two citadels were not all. Further from the dwelling-places of its citizens, far higher again than the Castle of the Rock, with its upper part rising as a sheer precipice, soars a loftier height, too distinct from the town to have been reckoned as an akropolis, but which was doubtless garrisoned as an outpost in time of need. Unlike the Castle of the Rock, this highest point of all is still a dwelling-place of man. A small colony still keeps its home in the hill town of Mola, a home to be reached only by the most sure-footed among men and beasts. Above the town the Castle of Mola again crowns the highest point of all. Even the Castle of the Rock, much more the Castle of Mola, might seem fit rather to be the eyrie of birds of prey than to be a human dwelling-place even of warriors. For a besieger of Tauromenion it was a work to climb to the town itself and to its lower

¹ Diod. xiv. 59. See below, p. 116.

² Diod. xiv. 88; *μία ἀκρόπολις*. See Appendix IV.

CHAP. X. akropolis; but he who reached its ramparts might deem that the sky itself was peopled with his enemies. With defences such as these to watch over the infant settlement, the Sikels of Tauros might well flatter themselves that they should abide on Tauros as long as the mountain itself and the sea beneath it should abide. A new life might seem to be beginning for the long trodden-down Sikel folk.

Defensive
prepara-
tions of
Dionysios.

The lord of Syracuse had his eyes fully open to this important accession to the strength of his enemies, Punic and Sikel. It was a time which called for vigorous action. The fleet of Dionysios was to be strengthened, but, to supply the new ships with crews, he was driven to the extreme measure of giving freedom to many slaves in Syracuse, by which means he manned sixty triremes, in addition to the fleet which he already had of a hundred and twenty¹. He sent to his Lacedæmonian allies for more than a thousand mercenaries, and he went round to see personally to the strengthening and provisioning of all the fortresses of the Syracusan dominions. Among these his foremost care was given to the lately recovered stronghold of Leontinoi. The fortifications of each akropolis were strengthened, and abundance of corn was brought in from the neighbouring plain². Among Syracusan fortresses was now reckoned that Aitna which had once been Sikel Inëssa, prize of the warfare of Ducetius in the earlier day of Sikel hope³. In a new Sikel uprising, that post was likely to be striven for again. Dionysios therefore sought to place so important a stronghold in hands which he could fully trust. Such he thought that he had found

Leontinoi
fortified.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 58.]

[² Ib.; ἐπιμελέστατα δὲ τὰς ἐν Λεοντίνοις ἀκροπόλεις ἐτείχισε, καὶ τὸν ἐκ τῶν πεδίων σίτον εἰς ταύτας συνήθροισεν.]

[³ Sicily, ii. 322.]

in the Campanians whom he had settled at Katana. He persuaded them to leave their new home by the sea, and to occupy the inland Aitna¹. The men whom Dionysios had planted at Katana were of their own free will to make the same move which the men whom Hierôn had planted there had been driven to make against their will. The change could hardly be thought a change for the better; the Campanians were called on to give hostages and to send some of the best soldiers of their body to come and join the tyrant's army at Syracuse². According to a later story which has somewhat of legendary sound, this special care for the outlying fortresses of Syracuse was partly to distract the attention of the enemy in case of invasion, and to lessen the strength of his attack on the city itself³. But it was an obvious precaution to strengthen Leontinoi and Inêssa and every other post on that side of Syracuse. A Punic host had now to be met which was not coming by the way of the African sea or of its coast, but which was marching straight from the north, through the lands which had been Greek, but which Himilkôn and Dionysios between them had so largely made barbarian.

Having made all these preparations, Dionysios set forth at the head of thirty thousand foot and more than three thousand horse, while the fleet of one hundred and eighty ships sailed in concert with them along the shore. The shore was his own at least as far as Katanê. In whose hands that city was now the Campanians were moved to Aitna we are not told. Katanê, as a spot, fills the foremost place in the events which follow; but of any inhabitants of Katanê, citizens, garrison, or any other, we hear nothing. Further north the Sikels were in possession

CHAP. X.

Campanians settled at Aitna.

Dionysios marches to Katanê.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 58.][² Ib. 61.][³ Polyainos, v. 2. 9. According to this story it was part of the plan that the outlying fortresses should surrender easily and thus draw off to themselves Carthaginian garrisons.]

CHAP. X. of forsaken Naxos below and of new-born Tauromenion above. It is clear that both sides had marked the northern Tauros as the spot near which their armies were likely to meet. It was a point which the one side had a special object in attacking and the other a special object in defending. As things turned out, the event of the march was determined at a point south of the northern Tauros; but the narrative is made a little puzzling by the fact that the first halting-place of the Syracusan army was made at that other Tauros which overlooks the sea just to the north of the peninsula of Xiphonia¹. From thence Dionysios went on, fleet and army moving together, with all speed to Katanê².

Dionysios
at Katanê.

Are we, in such a warfare as this, to look on Dionysios, the destroyer of Greek cities, the planter of barbarian settlements on their soil, as worthy to be called a champion of Hellas, even though it is a Punic host that is marching against him? At Motya, with the remnant of Selinous and Himera, of Gela and Akragas, in his train, we can look on him as at least the Hellenic avenger, sent to do to the barbarian as the barbarian had done to the Greek. On his own side of the island, by desolate Naxos, by barbarian Katanê, it is hard to look on him in that light. And yet we are again disposed to do so when we see the next act of his Punic enemy. Dionysios, in the working of a crooked policy, a policy whose shiftings it is not always easy to follow, did not scruple on occasion to sacrifice Greeks to barbarians. But further than this he does not go. Himilkôn, on the other hand, begins his march against the Greeks with the utter destruction of a Greek city, as a solemn symbolic act, to make his hatred towards the Greek name known to all men³. The taking

[¹ Diod. xiv. 58. See Appendix IV.]

[² Ib. xiv. 59.]

[³ Ib.; *ἐναποδειγμένους οὖν τὸ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας μῖσος ἐν τῇ τῶν Μεσσηνίων ἀνυψίῳ.*]

of Messana had not been accompanied by any great slaughter of its people. Himilkôn had not had the opportunity of rivalling the mighty sacrifice to the gods of Canaan which his kinsman Hannibal had done at Himera. But the walls and houses of the city stood ready for him to deal with as he would. Messana might be wiped out from the roll of cities of men, though the mass of the Messanian people had escaped destruction. And so it was. The walls were first broken down and more than broken down, not merely slighted, but rased to the earth¹. The soldiers were then bidden utterly to destroy the houses, to leave neither wood nor tile, but to burn the one with fire, and to grind the other to powder². Of temples and other public buildings we hear nothing, but they were not likely to be spared when so much care was taken to sweep away the private houses. Through the vast numbers of hands that could be set to work, the commands of Himilkôn were obeyed thoroughly and speedily; it could be said, clearly without much exaggeration, that no sign was left where Messana had once stood³. Himilkôn deemed that he had indeed struck a blow at Hellas. He had swept away the one among the Greek cities of Sicily whose position was the choicest of all. And it was a position so far away from any of her allies that he might have a good hope that it might never be restored. In any case it would be a long and toilsome work to call it again into being⁴.

After this solemn rite of havoc, Himilkôn set forth from ruined Messana with the Punic land-force, while Magôn sailed along the shore with the fleet. The place of meeting

[¹ Diod. xiv. 58; 'Ιμίλκων δὲ τῆς Μεσσηνίας τὰ τεῖχη κατασκάψας, προσέταξε τοῖς στρατιώταις καταβαλεῖν τὰς οἰκίας εἰς ἔδαφος, καὶ μήτε κέραμον, μήθ' ὕλην, μήτ' ἄλλο μηδὲν ὑπολιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν κατακαῦσαι, τὰ δὲ συντρίψαι.]

[² Ib.]

[³ Ib.; ἡ πόλις ἀγνωστος ἦν ὅπου πρότερον αὐτὴν οἰκεῖσθαι συνέβαιναν.]

[⁴ Ib.]

CHAP. X. ordered for landmen and shipmen was under the hill of the
 Advance of northern Tauros, now all alive with the new city which was
 Himilkôn. growing up at the bidding of the Punic general. The object
 clearly was to reach that special point before Dionysios could
 get thither. So far they succeeded; but when the fleet and
 the army met before Tauromenion, they had at once to part
 company again. Nothing hindered the fleet from sailing
 on anywhither; but the land-force could no longer continue
 its march, as had been intended, along the coast. The
 powers of nature, the gods of the nether world, sometimes
 the devastators, sometimes the defenders of Sicily, had
 stepped in. *Ætna* was at work. We hear nothing this
 Eruption time of any destruction of cities—men perhaps on both
 of *Ætna*. sides had done enough in that way. But Himilkôn setting
 forth from Tauros, presently found his further direct path
 southwards barred by fields and hills of lava not yet cooled,
 which had just poured forth from the crater of the moun-
 tain, and now covered the whole of the coast of Tauros¹.
 As Dionysios had not shown himself below the eagle's nest
 of his Sikel enemies, it was Himilkôn's object to go forward
 and meet him nearer Syracuse. But with the still living
 fire-flood between him and his enemy, his only way of so
 doing was to make a long and toilsome march all round
 the huge base of the burning mountain. It was his busi-
 ness to make this march with all the speed that might be,
 lest a sea-fight with the Syracusan ships should come on
 while his own fleet and army were parted². His course
 would lead him by the new seat of the Campanians at Aitna,
 and we most likely have the key to a negotiation which is
 recorded a little later. It was equally the object of Diony-

[¹ Diod. xiv. 59; Προσφάτως δὲ πῦρ ἐκραγέντος ἐκ τῆς Αἴτνης μέχρι τῆς θαλάττης, οὐκέτι δυνατόν ἦν τὴν περὶ τὴν στρατῶν συμπάργειν παραπλευούσαις ταῖς ναυσὶν· ἐφθαρμένων γὰρ τῶν παρὰ τὴν θάλατταν τόπων ὑπὸ τοῦ καλουμένου βύρακος, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τὸ περὶ τὴν στρατὸν περιπορεύεσθαι τὸν τῆς Αἴτνης λόφον.]

[² *Ib.*]

sios to bring on a sea-fight, while the land-force of Himilkôn was making its way through the inland regions. He wished to be able to occupy the shore with his troops, as at once an encouragement to the sea-force in a naval action and a means of giving them help and shelter in case of defeat¹. He so far succeeded as to occupy the shore by Katanê and to bring on the sea-fight before Himilkôn had finished his journey round Ætna. He sent Leptinês on with the fleet, charging him to keep his ships together, and not to break his line in the face of the greater numbers of the enemy². For the whole fleet of Magôn numbered no fewer than five hundred ships. Many of them indeed were only transport and merchant-vessels; but they had all been furnished with brazen beaks, so as to be able to take their part in a battle by sea³.

CHAP. X.

The two fleets then met in the waters of Katanê, while the land-force of Dionysios kept the shore. A sea-fight by Katanê is less easy to call up in imagination than a sea-fight by Panormos or Syracuse. For nowhere does the present line of coast so little represent the state of things that was even two hundred and twenty years back. Much that was then water available for naval warfare is now land, land formed by the vast masses of lava which have driven back the sea. Wherever the exact line lay, it was occupied by the Greek land-force, ready at once to encourage the shipmen by their presence and to give such help as they could to such vessels as might need it⁴.

Sea-fight
off Katanê.
[B.C. 397.]

Dionysios himself kept on shore. His brother was the

[¹ Diod. xiv. 59; τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, εἴ τι συμβαίη γενέσθαι πταῖσμα, ταῖς θλιβομένοις ναυσὶν ἐξῆν καταφυγεῖν πρὸς τὸ τῶν περὶ τὸν στρατόπεδον.]

² Ib.; Λεπτινὴν μὲν ἀπέστειλε μετὰ πασῶν τῶν νεῶν, παραγγείλας ἀδρόοις τοῖς σκάφεσι ναυμαχεῖν, καὶ μὴ λύειν τὴν τάξιν, ὅπως μὴ κινδυνεύσωσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἐναντίων.

³ Ib.; σὺν τοῖς ὀγκάσι καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ταῖς ἐπικώποις, οὕσαις χαλκεμβόλοις.

⁴ Ib.

CHAP. X. recognized admiral of Syracuse; yet the fight off Katanê was lost for Greece simply by the admiral neglecting the wise orders of the tyrant¹. Leptinês failed to do as his brother bade him and to keep his ships together. With thirty of the best he sailed far in advance of the main body of his fleet. The first appearance of the Greek ships and of the shore lined with the Greek fighting-men struck fear for a moment into the hearts of the Phœnicians. Some were only kept back from flight to the shore by the thought that by such a course they would only bring on themselves a two-fold attack. By the time Leptinês drew near, such cowardly thoughts had passed away; all the ships of Carthage were in good order and awaiting the enemy with a stout heart². Magôn was thus able to lead his whole force against the thirty ships of Leptinês. Never did valour strive more stoutly against the odds of numbers. The fight at sea took the likeness of a fight by land. There was no place for subtle manœuvres, hardly for the direct charge of beak against beak. Men fought hand to hand; some fell into the sea as they strove to board an enemy's ship, some carried on the fight on the hostile decks³. At last the division of Leptinês, the chosen thirty ships, had to yield to the force of numbers, and escaped into the open sea. The failure of the admiral daunted the hearts of the Greeks and stirred up the spirit of the Phœnicians. The rest of the Greek ships still kept on the fight, but without order⁴. Presently they fled hither and thither, the Carthaginians pursuing and destroying till they had sunk or disabled more than a hundred ships. Then the lighter and smaller vessels were

Naval
victory of
Magôn off
Katanê.

¹ Diod. xiv. 60; Λεπτινῆς . . . οὐκ ἀνάνδρως μὲν ἀβούλως δὲ διεγωνίσατο.

² Ib.; κρίναντες οὖν ναυμαχεῖν, διέταττον τὰς ναῦς καὶ τὸν τῶν πολεμίων ἐπίπλους ἐκαραδόκουν.

³ Ib.; τινὲς μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων ναῦς ἐπιπηδῶντες ἐπιπτον εἰς τὴν θάλατταν, τινὲς δὲ κρατήσαντες τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, ἐν ταῖς τῶν πολεμίων ναυσὶν ἰγώνισοντο.

⁴ Ib.; αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ τῶν νεῶν ἀτάκτως τὸν ἐπίπλους ποιοῦμεναι.

sent to take their place near the shore, and to hinder the crews of the disabled ships from swimming to land. Not a few thus perished near to the shore, under the eyes of their comrades who were unable to give them any help. Two thousand men of the Syracusan fleet thus perished. The navy of Carthage anchored off Katanê. Those Greek ships which had neither escaped nor been sunk were, notwithstanding the neighbourhood of the Greek land-force, drawn on shore, as trophies, we are told, to show the men of Katanê, whoever the men of Katanê were just then, the greatness of the Carthaginian victory¹.

Dionysios had thus seen the naval power of Syracuse, under the command of his own brother, utterly defeated before his own eyes. The land-force had been ranged on the shore specially to help their comrades who were afloat, and they had been able to do nothing. But the hearts of the men who had been thus constrained to stand idly by in the hour of battle did not fail them. The Sikeliot troops, those seemingly who were not Syracusans, called on the tyrant to stop and meet Himilkôn in battle. After the late victory by sea, the barbarians would in no way look for a Greek attack. They might therefore engage the startled enemy at an advantage². Dionysios at first consented. But some of his friends warned him of the danger if Magôn should at once sail against Syracuse; from the waters of Katanê, the long line of the Syracusan hill seen far away on the horizon might seem to beckon to him. An attack on the city by sea in the absence of its land-army might put Syracuse itself into Carthaginian hands. It was in the like sort that Messana had become a prey to the barbarians. Dionysios therefore withdrew his orders for waiting to

¹ Diod. xiv. 60; ὥστε τοῖς Καταναίοις μὴ μόνον ἀκουστὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ θεωρητὸν ποιῆσαι τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ προτερήματος.

[² Ib. xiv. 61.]

CHAP. x. engage Himilkôn and began a march straight for Syracuse.

Defection of Sikeliots. To the men who had called for the bolder course the defence of Syracuse was a matter of less moment than it was to her own master. Yet it was hardly a sound Sikeliot patriotism which led most of those soldiers of Dionysios who were Sikeliots but not Syracusans to forsake his army on the march. For, whatever might be said of the tyranny of Dionysios and of the frequent ambition of Syracuse even when not under a tyranny, still, at that moment, Dionysios was the champion of Greek Sicily and of all Hellas, and no blow to either could be so heavy as for Syracuse to fall into barbarians hands. But to the Greeks who came from other cities than Syracuse the tyrant's change of purpose seemed either simple cowardice or else betrayal of the general cause of Greek Sicily to the special needs of his own city. They largely betook themselves, some to their own cities, others, it is said, to the neighbouring fortresses¹. Dionysios therefore had to march on to Syracuse with a force sensibly lessened.

Land-forces of Himilkôn reach Katanê.

Two days after he set out, Himilkôn came by his round-about road to the shore of Katanê. He was in full possession both by land and sea. He had marched round the lava and the source of the lava, and nothing now stood in his way to keep him from pressing on against Syracuse both by sea and land. But he did not hurry; he gave some rest to both branches of his force. The ships were all drawn up on shore, and he gave his land-army a few days' rest after their toilsome march. Those days he employed in sending an embassy to the Campanians at Ætna, calling on them to forsake the alliance of Dionysios and to accept that of Carthage. He bade them remember that their countrymen at Entella were zealous on the Carthaginian side, and he painted the Greeks as the common

[¹ Diod. xiv. 61; *οἱ μὲν εἰς τὰς ἰδίαις πατρίδας, οἱ δ' εἰς τὰ ἐγγὺς τῶν φρουρίων ἀπεχώρησαν.*]

enemies of all other nations¹. The Campanians hearkened, and were strongly inclined to come over to the Carthaginian side. But they remembered their hostages in the hands of Dionysios and their comrades in his service, and they abode in the Syracusan alliance². CHAP. X.

The darkest of all times for Hellenic Sicily seemed now to have come. Till the present war, till the present campaign, the eastern side of the island, the side which looked towards Greece, the side on which Greeks had first found themselves a home, had been free from Phœnician attack. On that side at least no barbarian enemy was ever dreaded save the old inhabitants of the land who were fast ceasing to be barbarians, and their kinsfolk from Italy whom the Syracusan tyrant had brought into Sicily as defenders of his power. The old Hamilkar, the more recent Hannibal, had wrought their will on more distant parts of the island, on Himera on the north, on Selinous, Akragas, and Gela on the side looking towards their own continent. But now the men of the East, settled in the West, challenged and overcome in their western strongholds by European invasion, were advancing against the eastern cities with terrible force. Phœnician loss at Eryx and Motya had been more than revenged by Hellenic loss at Messana and at Katanê, by the defeat of the navy of Syracuse in the Katanaian waters. The enemy was on his steady march towards Syracuse herself. One small gleam of hope alone there was; in the fidelity of the barbarians settled at the foot of Ætna. Dionysios, feeling the danger, but not cast down by it, sought for help in every quarter. A chosen envoy, the tyrant's own kinsman Polyxenos, was sent to the Greek cities of Italy, to the old ally at Sparta, to the ever-ready

Syracuse in
imminent
danger.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 61; καὶ καθόλου δὲ τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος ἀπεδείκνυε πολλέ-
μον ὑπάρχον τῶν ἄλλων ἔθνῶν.]

[² Ib.]

CHAP. X. metropolis at Corinth, praying, in the name of common
 Appeal of Hellenic brotherhood, that they would not suffer Hellenic
 Dionysios cities to be overthrown by the barbarian, or stand by
 to Corinth. and see Hellenic life utterly swept away from the soil
 of Sicily¹. And with these powerful appeals to loftier
 motives, Dionysios knew well how to mingle those meaner
 inducements of which he had a wide experience. The
 Hellenic champion was also the bountiful paymaster of all
 stout soldiers, Greek or barbarian, who would draw sword
 in his service; the wealth of Syracuse was not yet ex-
 hausted; the tyrant sent his officers into Peloponnêsos with
 orders to gather all the mercenaries that they could, and to
 spare no cost in so doing². But before an ally or a
 hireling could come from Greece or from Italy, Syracuse
 looked out on a sight such as she had not seen since
 Dêmôsthenês and Eurymedôn came in all the pride of war
 to cheer up for a moment the failing hopes of the host of
 Nikias. The Great Harbour again saw the entrance of an
 Cartha- enemy's fleet, and this time an enemy flushed with victory
 ginian fleet enters the Great Har- over the naval power of Syracuse. Two thousand Punic
 bour of bour of vessels sailed without let or hindrance between Plêmmyrion
 Syracuse. and the southern point of Ortygia. First came Himilkôn
 with his two hundred and eight war-ships, all in goodly
 array, their oars beating the water in perfect measure, each
 ship adorned with the rich spoils of so many Hellenic cities
 and of the fleet of Syracuse herself. The transports fol-
 lowed; ranged close together, the Great Harbour, great as
 it was, was filled with them; all things were hidden by
 the dense mass of sails that the navy of Carthage opened
 to the breeze³. The vast fleet presently lay at anchor,

[¹ Diod. xiv. 62; *μη περιδεῖν τὰς ἐν Σικελίᾳ πόλεις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄρδην ἀναιρουμένας.*]

[² Ib.; *ἐπεμψε δὲ καὶ ξενολόγους εἰς Πελοπόννησον μετὰ πολλῶν χρημάτων, ἐντελόμενος ὡς πλείστους ἀθροίζειν στρατιώτας, μὴ φειδομένους τῶν μισθῶν.*]

[³ Ib.; *συνέβαινε τὸν λιμένα τῶν Συρακουσίων, καίπερ ὄντα μέγαν, ἐμπεφράχθαι μὲν τοῖς σκάφεσι συγκαλύπτεσθαι δὲ σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τοῖς ἱστίοις.*]

carrying dismay by its presence to every heart in Syracuse ¹. CHAP. X.
 Almost at the same moment, so well had the Punic general laid his plans, the land-force come in sight from the other side. That must mean from the side of Katanê; the army must have marched beneath the new-made wall of Dionysios and have compassed the western end of the long hill of Epipolai, while the fleet was sailing along the shore of Achradina and Ortygia. Again, within less than twenty years, the banks of Anapos saw the encampment of a besieging enemy, and this time not a Greek but a barbarian enemy, the bitterest foe of Syracuse and of all Hellas. Carthaginians encamped on banks of Anapos.
 The old camping-ground of the Athenians again became the camping-ground of the Carthaginian ², but with one memorable difference. The devout Nikias had feared to draw on himself the wrath of Zeus and had forborne the great military advantage of taking the Olympieion within his line of defence. To Himilkôn Zeus and all the gods of Hellas were as nothing; the profanation and overthrow of their sanctuaries was an acceptable offering to Baalim and Ashtaroth; and, when we look on the venerable columns which still mark the spot, we may be thankful that he was satisfied with profanation and did not level the ancient temple with the ground. But he pitched his tent within Himilkôn's tent in the Olympieion.
 the sacred precinct, if not within the very temple itself ³. Here on the higher ground of Polichna, on its northern side, were the head-quarters of the general; to fix the exact extent of the encampment of the vast and motley host, three hundred thousand foot—so our numbers stand—and three thousand horse, was less easy. Our data are some-

[¹ Diod. xiv. 62.]

[² From the distance from Syracuse given—twelve stadia (Diod. l. c.)—it appears that the main body of the Carthaginians encamped beyond the Anapos, which, according to Plutarch (Dion, 27), was ten stadia distant from the walls of Syracuse (cf. Holm, G. S. ii. 436, and see Appendix V.)]

[³ Diod. xiv. 62; Ἰμίλκων κατεσκήνωσεν ἐν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς νεφί; and cf. xiv. 76, ποιησάμενος σπηνὴν ἐν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἱερῇ.]

CHAP. X. what vague¹. The camp seems to be spoken of as something distinct from the head-quarters of the general; but the two were of course in close connexion. The Carthaginians, we are told, encamped on the same ground as the Athenians; but such a description would be satisfied if any part of one camp coincided with any part of the other. And it must not be forgotten that the Athenians occupied two sites at different stages of their warfare. Part at least of the camp was on a low and marshy ground; but there is low and marshy ground on more than one side of Polichna. The camp again was twelve stadia from the city; but all such measurements are somewhat uncertain, and we are not told from what point of the city to what point of the camp the measurement is made, or whether it is made in a right line or along any road. But the chief requirements seem to be met by giving the camp an extent which leaves the north-west corner of Polichna, including the temple, as outside the actual camp, while it stretches to the north a little beyond the Anapos, and reaches the sea to the south at about the middle of the bay of Daskôn. Such a position takes in both higher and lower ground, and some of it marshy enough. It would thus roughly coincide with the first camp of the Athenians, but would stretch further to the north. That the general should find comfortable quarters for himself, perhaps for all the native Carthaginians in the army, while the mass of the host were left to fare as they might in the swamp, was characteristic of Punic warfare. The myriads of Himilkôn were mainly mercenaries gathered from every quarter; of the lives of such troops the generals of Carthage were ever reckless, and never thought of the tender care which Nikias showed towards the free citizens and allies of Athens. Still Syracuse was now threatened by land and sea, by such a host as had never before come beneath her walls. She

[¹ See Appendix V.]

might well look for worse than the fate of Selinous, of Himera, and of Akragas; it was not now an army and a general of a past generation that had to be avenged; it was the fresh blood of the slain of Motya that cried for vengeance against the men and the gods of Hellas. CHAP. X.

Himilkôn began his work with a solemn display of his force on both elements. All the myriads of his land-army were drawn out in battle array before the walls of Syracuse, the new southern wall of Epipolai, the hardly finished works of the reigning ruler. A hundred of his best ships sailed forth and beset the island on both sides, making their way into the Lesser Harbour as well as the Greater ¹. Syracuse was to be made to confess that Carthage was the mightier power, alike by sea and by land ². The land-force called on the men of the besieged city to come forth and fight. None answered, and the host marched back to the camp. No assault was attempted; Himilkôn sought another means of enriching his own men and striking fear into the men of Syracuse. For thirty days a pitiless ravaging of the whole land went on. He then advanced further; he occupied the region which our historian calls the *proasteion* of Achradina—the *forbury*, to transfer a local word from some English town ³. This must be much the same region as that which sometime back was spoken of by its later name of Neapolis ⁴, the district, still unwalled, which lay west of Gelôn's wall of Achradina and south of the wall of Temenitês and the new wall of Epipolai ⁵. Here Himilkôn did one deed which, in the belief of every devout Greek, destroyed all his hopes, up to that moment so brilliant, of success against Syracuse. Somewhere in this unprotected

Military and naval demonstration against Syracuse.

Syracusan territory ravaged.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 62.]

[² Ib.; *ὅπως καταπλήξῃται τοὺς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ συναναγκάσῃ συγχωρεῖν ἡττοῦσι εἶναι καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν.*]

[³ Ib. 63; *κατελάβετο δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς προάστειον.*]

[⁴ See p. 21.]

[⁵ See p. 56, and note 1.]

CHAP. X. region, somewhere on the lower terrace of Fusco and Galera, stood the temple—perhaps the twin-temples—which Gelôn had built to the patron-goddesses of Hellenic Sicily, Dêmêtêr and the Korê. The Punic general had wrought one act of sacrilege by encamping in the sacred precinct of Zeus; he went on to one yet darker by plundering the temples of The Goddesses. In counting up his misdeeds, the irreverence towards Zeus is not left out, but it is the robbery of The Goddesses which is specially dwelled on¹. The vengeance for this crime, the special curse of sacrilege, now began to fall upon Himilkôn and his host. The great manifestation of divine wrath came a little later; but there were signs already. From that moment the hitherto unbroken success of Himilkôn began to fail him. Dionysios took heart; he led out his men to sallies and skirmishes, in which the Syracusans often had the better. But the wicked flee when no man pursueth; oftentimes in the night-season was the Punic camp disturbed by sounds and rumours of visionary enemies; men ran to their arms and formed for battle, as if besiegers had been breaking down the defences of the camp, and lo there were none². Hitherto those defences had been only a trench and palisade; but now, to secure himself at least against bodily enemies, Himilkôn surrounded his camp with a regular wall³. But in so doing he found an occasion of sinning yet more. The circuit of his fortified camp took in many tombs of the Syracusan dead, and among them the most venerated tomb of all, and the one on which a patriotic Carthaginian would look with the bitterest feelings. Hannibal had avenged the wrongs of his own house on the men of Himera, the death of Hamilkar had been atoned for in a mighty offering to the gods of Carthage. But Himilkôn could do yet more. Before him, within the line traced out for his camp, rose in

Temple of
Dêmêtêr
and the
Korê plun-
dered by
Himilkôn.

The
Goddesses
avenged.

[¹ Cf. Diod. xiv. 63 and 77.]

[² Diod. xiv. 63.]

[³ Ib.]

all its pride the tomb of the victor of Himera, the stately pile which Syracuse had reared to the honour of her second founder Gelôn. The tomb of Gelôn, along with the tomb of his wife Damareta, was now swept away by the barbarians. The towers which surrounded it were left to be the prey of a later tyrant. For better defence of his position, and specially of his fleet, Himilkôn now built three forts, one on Plêmmyrion, one, the fort of Daskôn, in the middle of the harbour, the point surely which divides the two bays, the point which parts the flat shore to the north from the cliffs to the south. It must have stood on the narrow ridge of higher ground between the salt-works and the sea. The third, that of Polichna, was to guard his own immediate head-quarters; it rose hard by the holy place of Zeus, perhaps within the very precinct, at any rate on one or other of the brows above the hollow road that crosses the hill¹. By this time Himilkôn had found out that the siege was likely to be a long one; he stored up corn and wine and all needful things in his three forts, and he sent forth merchant ships to Africa and to Sardinia to bring in yet further supplies of corn and provisions of all kinds for the host before Syracuse.

CHAP. X.
Destruction of
Gelôn's
tomb.

Forts built
on Plêmmyrion.

Meanwhile Polyxenos had not been idle on his mission to Italy and Peloponnêsos. From the allies of Syracuse in those lands, he had gathered together thirty ships of war, under the command of the Lacedæmonian Pharakidas².

Arrival of
Pelopon-
nêesian
contingent.

[¹ Diodôros (l. c.) simply says of this fort that it was *κατὰ τὸν νεῶν τοῦ Διός*. For the position of the forts see Appendix V.]

² Diod. xiv. 63. [From Polyainos (ii. 11) we learn that Pharakidas on his way to Syracuse took nine Carthaginian triremes. He manned them with his own men, and the Carthaginian vessels on the watch off Syracuse, seeing as they thought their own squadron returning, let Pharakidas enter the harbour with his ships unopposed. Cp. Frontin, i. 4. 12, where the number of the captured vessels is given as ten. Pharakidas, as Beloch has shown (Rhein. Mus. xxxiv. 124), is in all probability the Pharakas of Xenophon (Hell. iii. 2. 12) and Theopompos (218 Müller) who was Spartan Nauarch in 397. From this he infers that this was the real date of the

CHAP. X. His coming was presently followed by a remarkable episode in the war. Dionysios and his brother Leptinês sailed forth with some ships of war, to act as a convoy to vessels bringing provisions to the besieged city. The Syracusans are described as being thereby left to themselves¹; but some one must have been left in military command, whether Pharakidas or any other. Whoever he was, he was vigorous enough in action by sea. A Punic corn-ship was seen entering the harbour. Five Syracusan ships were at once manned and put to sea, and the prize was brought in to the city. Forty Punic ships then sailed forth, to be met by the whole number of Syracusan ships that were still in the docks and to suffer defeat at their hands. Twenty ships were taken by the Greeks and four sunk. Among the former, we are told, was the admiral's ship; but if Magôn, who afterwards plays a great part in the story, had become the prisoner of Syracuse, we should surely have heard of it more distinctly². The victorious Syracusans—we are not told their numbers—sailed straight to the Punic naval station, by Daskôn we may conceive, and challenged the whole armada of Carthage to come forth and strive with them on the waters. The Carthaginians kept still, and the Syracusans sailed to the city with their prizes.

Naval
victory of
Syracusans.

This picture of naval warfare in the Great Harbour, clear enough as to the main facts, but lacking the living power to call up the scene before us, makes us feel the loss of the great master who was our guide only twenty years before to warfare on the same waters. We long yet more for his siege of Syracuse, and by the same reasoning the capture of Motya falls in the year 398.]

¹ Diod. xiv. 64; μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὁ Διονύσιος μὲν καὶ Λεπτίνης μετὰ μακρῶν νεῶν ἀγορὰν βουλούμενοι παρακομίσαι . . . οἱ δὲ Συρακοῦσιοι καθ' αὐτοὺς τε γενόμενοι καὶ κατὰ τύχην ἰδόντες σιτηγὸν πλοῖον προσφερόμενον. Something has clearly dropped out after παρακομίσαι, but most likely only a word or two, the verb to Διονύσιος καὶ Λεπτίνης.

² Ib.; τῆς τε στρατηγίδος νεὸς ἐκυρίευσαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰκοσι καὶ τέτταρας διέφθειραν.

guidance when we come to what we should have hardly looked for, the report of the debates in a Syracusan assembly summoned by Dionysios. It was preceded by less regular gatherings. The people of Syracuse, hating the tyrant, began to compare his many defects, above all his late defeat before Katanê, with the victory which they had themselves won in his absence¹. Men came together and stirred one another up. They would no longer be the slaves of Dionysios. The time for deliverance was come. Hitherto they had been without arms; now they had arms in their hands and might defy him². While men's minds were in this state, Dionysios came back, and, as the story runs, he gathered a regular assembly of the Syracusan people; he made a speech to them, praising their late exploits, and bidding them be of good cheer, for he pledged himself to put a speedy end to the war³. He was about to declare the assembly dissolved, when an unexpected turn was given to the proceedings by the rising of an opposition-speaker. Theodôros, one of the equestrian order of Syracuse, a man of renown and energy, dared to address the assembly in a long harangue against Dionysios and his tyranny⁴.

CHAP. I.

Debates in
Syracusan
assembly.Speech of
Theodôros.

A speech like this is not like a speech in Thucydides. When he is our reporter, if we do not hear the actual words of Hermokratês or Athênagoras, we may well hear some echo of them; at the very worst we hear such arguments as the most observant of contemporaries looked on as likely for them to have used. Here we are listening to a mere rhetorical exercise, possibly the invention of Diodôros him-

¹ Diod. xiv. 64; *διαλογιζόμενοι τὸν μὲν Διονύσιον πλεονάκεις ἡττημένον, αὐτοὺς δὲ χωρὶς ἐκείνου νενικηκότας Καρχηδονίους, φρονήματος ἐπληροῦντο.*

² *Ib.*; *τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνον ἦσαν ἀφανλισμένοι, τότε δὲ διὰ τὸν πόλεμον τῶν ὅπλων ἦσαν κύριοι.*

³ *Ib.*; *συναγαγὼν ἐκκλησίαν ἐπήγει τοὺς Συρακούσιους καὶ παρεκάλει θαρρεῖν ἐπαγγελλόμενος ταχέως καταλύσειν τὸν πόλεμον.*

⁴ *Ib.*; *ἤδη δ' αὐτοῦ μέλλοντος διαλύειν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἀναστὰς Θεόδωρος ὁ Συρακούσιος, ἐν τοῖς ἱππεύσιν εὐδοκίμων καὶ δοκῶν εἶναι πρακτικὸς, ἀπετόλμησε περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τοιοῦτους χρῆσασθαι λόγοις.*

CHAP. X. self, far more likely to be the work of Timaios or some one
 Speech of else nearer to the time. Of a real speech delivered by
 Theodôros. Theodôros or any one else we are not likely to have the faintest echo. We are not so near to listening to a real orator, as when Tacitus, professing to report the famous speech of Claudius, really does report its general argument, though not only the words, but the particular illustrations chosen, are the historian's own¹. Our only chance is that, among the ordinary common-places of a speech on so well-worn a subject as freedom against tyranny, we may light on a few scraps implying local knowledge or handing on local traditions. And one or two such perhaps there are in the alleged speech of Theodôros. All the evil deeds that Dionysios had done, all the good deeds that he had failed to do, all the mischief that he had allowed the Carthaginians to do, all this is of course put forth in the strongest light. He had driven out the people of Naxos and Katanê, and had handed over Katanê to the Campanians; the orator fails to tell us in whose hands Katanê was at the exact moment of the battle. He had slain and banished citizens of Syracuse itself, he had filled the city with strangers and emancipated slaves and mingled folk, and had given to them the wives of the banished citizens. All this is obvious; in any harangue against Dionysios these counts must find their place. But in the account which the accuser gives of the war which was still waging, there are one or two points which are worth some notice, and which may perhaps point to a narrative of some of its events different from that which the historian himself has given us.

The war itself is attributed, most likely with reason, to Dionysios' fear of revolts against his tyranny. Any scruples that he had, says the orator, about breaking his oath to the

[¹ The speech itself is preserved on a brazen tablet at Lyons and is printed in Brun's *Fontes Iuris Romani*, p. 156. Tacitus' report comes *Ann.* xl. c. 24.]

Carthaginians were less strong than his fears of the few elements of freedom that were left in the Sikeliot communities¹. Yet we may be sure that the most popular king or magistrate would not have lost credit among his people by breaking such a treaty as that by which Dionysios had bound himself. The account of the western campaign is clearly unjust. We may wonder that Dionysios made less advantage than we should have looked for out of his great victory²; but there can be no ground of any showing for charging him with fleeing from Motya without seeing the face of an enemy³. Tyrant as he was who wrought it, the taking of Motya must ever count as one of the great exploits of war between Greek and barbarian. But when we come to the battle of Katanê, we find some touches which really sound as if Diodōros, in reporting or improving the speech, followed a different version from Diodōros telling the story in his own person. In the tale as told by the latter, we heard nothing about the weather; it was perhaps not wholly clear why the Punic ships betook themselves to the shore when it was in possession of the Greeks⁴. Here we are told that they were driven to the shore by a violent storm. Dionysios is blamed, first, for allowing the sea-fight to take place when it did⁵, and secondly, after

CHAP. X.
Speech of
Theodōros.

¹ Such, I suppose, is the meaning of the words in Diod. xiv. 68; οὐ γὰρ οὕτως εὐλαβεῖτο λῦσαι τὰς συνθήκας παρὰ τοὺς ἄρκους ὥς ἐφοβεῖτο τὰ παραλειμμένα συστήματα τῶν Σικελιωτῶν. Strictly speaking, Messana was the only independent Sikeliot community left, and σύστημα should mean a federation. But the words are doubtless meant to take in those everywhere who wished for the overthrow of the tyranny.

² See above, p. 85.

³ Diod. xiv. 66; ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ Μοτύης διὰ πάσης τῆς νήσου φυγὼν, συγέλειπεν ἑαυτὸν ἐν τοῖς τειχεῶν, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς πολίτας θρασυώμενος, τοὺς δὲ πολεμίους οὐδὲ κατ' ὅμιν ἰδεῖν ὑπομένων. He is contrasted with Gelon.

⁴ See above, p. 118.

⁵ Diod. xiv. 68; τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον ἐν τῇ Καταναίων αἰγυλῇ διεγωνίσαστο, παρεῖς πρὸς τῇ πόλει τὴν μάχην συστήσασθαι πρὸς τὸ τοὺς ἐλαττωμένους καταφεύγειν εἰς τοὺς οἰκίους λιμένας. We must remember that the Καταναίων αἰγυλός is wholly different from what it was then.

CHAP. X. the battle, for not attacking them with his whole force by land¹. Had he so done, it is said, they would either have been utterly destroyed by the Greeks or else have been driven to put to sea to be destroyed by the tempest².

The debate
in the
assembly.

But the real interest of the scene does not lie in anything that was said, or supposed to be said, by Theodôros or any other speaker. What is instructive is the picture of a Syracusan assembly held at the summons, seemingly under the presidency³, of Dionysios. The mere gathering of such a body, much more the freedom of speech allowed to its members, are so unlike the received pictures of a city under a tyranny that we can hardly fancy that they are sheer invention; they must surely come from some genuine tradition. Dionysios acts and speaks as a magistrate of the commonwealth; but he has his spearmen within call, ready to do the tyrant's bidding as soon as he shall find it needful to act as a tyrant. He allows the debate to go on as long as it is merely debate. And the debate soon takes a remarkable turn. The people, stirred up by the harangue of Theodôros, turn to the allies⁴. They hope that the men

¹ Diod. xiv. 68; μετὰ δὲ τὴν ναυμαχίαν μεγάλων πνευμάτων ἐπιγενομένων καὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀναγκασθέντων νεωλεῆσαι τὸν στόλον, καιρὸν εἶχε τοῦ νικᾶν κάλλιστον. One does not know how much of all this may lurk in the words of c. 60; τὰ δ' ὑπηρετικὰ παρὰ τὸν αἰγιαλὸν καταστήσαντες: but in that account they are in no way hindered by any storm.

² Ib. 68; τὸ μὲν γὰρ πεζὸν στράτευμα τῶν πολεμίων οὐκ ἠκατηντηκὸς ἦν, τὸ δὲ μέγεθος τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐπὶ τὸν αἰγιαλὸν αὐτοῖς τὰς ναῦς ἐξέβραττε. Τότε συνεπιθεμένων ἡμῶν περὶ πάντων ἡναγκάσθησαν ὡς ἀποβαίνοντες ἀλίσκεσθαι βρόδῳ, ἢ πρὸς τὰ κύματα βιαζόμενοι τὸν αἰγιαλὸν πληρῶσαι ναυαγίων. These last words are oddly like those in c. 60; πᾶς ὁ τόπος ἐγγεμε νεκρῶν καὶ ναυαγίων. But the process is different in the two accounts.

³ According to the analogy of most Greek assemblies, Dionysios, if στρατηγός, whether αὐτοκράτωρ or not, would not be the formal chairman of the assembly. (See Hist. Fed. Gov. i. 296, 338; new Ed. 231, 264.) But he might practically summon (συναγαγόν) and adjourn (δέλυνε). One might use nearly the same words of our Leader of the House, and something like it is said of Periklēs; Thuc. ii. 65.

⁴ Diod. xiv. 70; οἱ μὲν Συρακούσιοι μετέωροι ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγένοντο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους ἀπέβλεπον.

from Old Greece will be on their side. They hope above all that the Spartan admiral in command of them will be a captain over them in winning their freedom¹. Pharakidas went to the *béma*. To the utter disappointment of his Syracusan hearers, he told them that he had no orders from Sparta to overthrow the dominion of Dionysios. His commission bade him help the Syracusans and Dionysios against the Carthaginians². It was somewhat strange to expect an officer sent in answer to a demand of Dionysios to turn and act against him, and Pharakidas might have forestalled the pithy saying about swopping horses while crossing a stream. But the Syracusans doubtless hoped, however vainly, to find in the Spartan that genuine hatred of tyranny in any case which had led the Megarians to sentence Thrasydaios to death³. When Pharakidas ended his speech, the Syracusans stirred not; but they loudly cursed the Spartan traitor and his countrymen⁴. Dionysios feared an outbreak. He felt that the time was come to appeal openly to the last argument of tyrants. He gathered his mercenaries round him. No force was needed; he was able to dismiss the assembly quietly⁵. Was it dissolved by the presiding magistrates or an expression of the will of Dionysios? Or did the assembly dissolve of itself when it was seen that the tyrant was ready to use force, if need called for it? These are questions to which we should gladly have answers; but we have none.

CHAP. X.

Pharakidas
supports
Dionysios.Dionysios
dissolves
the assembly.

¹ Diod. xiv. 70; πάντες προσεδόκων ἀρχηγὸν εἶσεσθαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας.

² Ib.; δ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸν τύραννον ἔχων οἰκείως, ἔφησεν αὐτὸν ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἀπεστάλθαι Συρακούσις καὶ Διονυσίῳ συμμαχεῖν πρὸς Καρχηδονίους, ἀλλ' οὐ Διονυσίου τὴν ἀρχὴν καταλύειν. This was doubtless strictly true. On the formula, compare the dedication of Hieron in vol. ii. p. 251, and the words of the treaty, Sicily, iii. 579.

³ See vol. ii. p. 298.

⁴ Diod. xiv. 70; οἱ δὲ Συρακούσιοι καταπληγέντες τὴν ἡσυχίαν εἶχον, πολλὰ τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις καταρώνενοι.

⁵ Ib.; οἱ μὲν μισθοφόροι συνέδραμον πρὸς τὸν Διονυσίον . . . δ δὲ Διονύσιος τότε μὲν ἐγένετο περίφοβος καὶ διέλυσε τὴν ἐκκλησίαν.

CHAP. X.

Popular
demeanour
adopted by
Dionysios.

Outbreak
of pesti-
lence in
Cartha-
ginian
camp.

The power of Dionysios, so near for a moment to utter overthrow, had been saved a second time by the interposition of a Spartan ally¹. But he had learned a lesson. He saw that he was hated of all men in Syracuse, save his own stranger mercenaries, and that, if he was endured, it was simply because the barbarian was hated with a still deeper hatred. He saw too that the hatred of the citizens was a feeling which even the tyrant in his castle, with his foreign guards around him, could not afford wholly to despise. He fell back again therefore on the same popular mood which he had showed when building the wall of Epipolai. He showed himself familiarly among the people; to some he gave gifts; others he bade to his own table. Meanwhile the wrath of the gods was falling heavily on the sacrilegious besiegers. The heavenly powers thought it no scorn to work through natural causes. A large part of the army was encamped in the low marshy ground. That ground is ever unhealthy in the heat of summer, and that summer was one of special heat. Encamped, it would seem, without any proper shelter, they felt every extreme. Before daybreak their bodies were chilled by the morning's cold; at noon the crowds packed closely together were stifled by the mid-day heat². Pestilence broke out and swept away the besiegers faster than the arms of Syracuse could do. First it smote the African troops; we should be glad to know the exact spot of their encampment. But they, the native subjects of Carthage, would claim yet less heed than the strangers hired from Gaul and Spain. For a while the dead were buried³; but presently men died so fast—those who looked after the

¹ Diodoros himself makes the remark (u. s.), καὶ γὰρ τὸ πρότερον Ἀρέτης ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος, ἀντιλαμβανομένων αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας, ἐγένετο προδότης, καὶ τότε Φαρακίδας ἐγένετο ταῖς ὁρμαῖς τῶν Συρακουσίων.

[² Diod. xiv. 70; πρῶτον μὲν, πρὶν ἥλιον ἀνατεῖλαι, διὰ τὴν ψυχρότητα τὴν ἐκ τῆς αὔρας τῶν ὑδάτων, φρίκη κατέειχε τὰ σώματα· κατὰ δὲ τὴν μεσημβρίαν ἡ θερμότης ἐπινιγεν ὥς ἂν τοσοῦτου πλῆθους ἐν στενῇ τόπῳ συνεθροισμένου.]

[³ Ib. 71; τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐθαπτον τοὺς τετελευτηκότας.]

sick dying among the rest—that funeral rites were no longer to be had, and the stench of the dead bodies was added to the malaria of the marsh. A minute description of the symptoms is given, surely from the contemporary history of Philistos, which may be well compared with the more famous description of the plague of Athens¹.

And now comes one of those moments in the tyrant's long career in which we almost forget that he was a tyrant. We cannot keep back some sympathy for the Hellenic champion when waging his war with the barbarian in Western Sicily; we can give it more unreservedly to the daring and skilful captain fighting for the Hellenic city against barbarian besiegers. And yet, even in this his highest character, Dionysios is a tyrant still; he cannot work even the deliverance of Syracuse without doing a tyrant's crimes in the very thick of what in another man we should call a patriotic struggle. Yet how Dionysios and his people—for once we can speak of him as we might of a lawful king—smote the huge host of Himilkôn on their own soil is a stirring tale of gallant enterprise. The

Dionysios
takes the
offensive.

[¹ Diod. l. c. The symptoms were, first catarrh (*κατάρρους*), then swellings about the throat (*περὶ τὸν τράχηλον οἰδήματα*). To these in a short time succeeded fever, pains of the spinal nerves (*περὶ τὴν μίχυν νεύρων πόνοι*), heaviness of the legs, dysentery, and pustules (*φλύκταιναι*) over the whole body. Some were seized with paroxysms of insanity and wandered about the camp. Death occurred on the fifth or sixth day. Yet, though some of the symptoms as recorded by Diodôros present a certain likeness to those of the Athenian plague—as for instance the *φλύκταιναι*—the course and character of the disease were different. The Athenian plague was part of a great wave of epidemic disease that had swept down on Europe from Æthiopia, by way of Egypt and Persia (Thuc. ii. 48). The outbreak in the Carthaginian camp was, as far as we can see, of local origin, and the symptoms as described show that it was simply a bad form of malarial fever. The celebrated passage of Thucydides seems none the less however to have been in the mind of the original writer of the account preserved by Diodôros—in all probability Philistos, who as we know from Dion. Halic. (v), set before him Thucydides as his model (cf. Volquardsen, *Quellen &c. bei Diodor.* xi-xvi. 107).]

CHAP. X. first blow had been dealt by the gods; man had only to follow; and man, in the person of the lord of Syracuse, followed well and wisely. Now that the enemy was visibly weakened by the divine stroke, Dionysios planned a joint attack by sea and land on the Carthaginian camp. Eighty ships were manned under two commanders, his brother Leptinês, not less trusted because of his defeat, and the Spartan Pharakidas, whom he had to thank that he still held his power. They were to sail and attack the Punic ships in the bay of Daskôn. For himself he chose the work of an attack on the camp from the land side. That his attack might be sudden, he had chosen a moonless night and a roundabout path by which none could look for him. He marched across the low ground, but not by the nearer and more usual path of the Helorine road leading straight to Polichna from the north. He made his way round by the temple of Kyana, which stood on the high ground not far from his famous fountain, and so drew near to the quarters of Himilkôn from the west. He marched by night, but it was not a night attack that he designed. It was daybreak when he drew near to the camp of the astonished besiegers. His plan was a subtle one, on one side a bloody and a treacherous one, a plan which could never have come into the head of a general whose army consisted wholly of his own citizens. For the direct attack from the west he told off the horsemen and a thousand of his mercenaries¹. But this attack was, as regarded the enemy, a mere feint; its object was at once to draw off their attention from more serious operations, and to relieve himself of soldiers whom he could not trust. The thousand who were to climb the small ascent of the hill that looks out on the windings of Kyana were a body of mutinous and disorderly men, who were destined for the fate of Uriah. The orders of the horsemen were, as soon

Dionysios
plans
assault on
Punic
camp by
sea and
land.

Deliber-
ately
sacrifices
untrust-
worthy
mercena-
ries.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 72.]

as the thousand were well engaged with the defenders of the camp, to withdraw in seeming flight; the mercenaries were to be smitten and die; the real services of the horsemen themselves were to be done elsewhere. The horsemen, one may suppose, were still men of good Syracusan families, and we have heard of them hitherto as the strongest enemies of the tyranny. Yet they did not scruple to carry out the treacherous command of the tyrant. We may well believe that, while they hated Dionysios, they hated his mercenaries yet more, and in marching against the barbarians even the tyrant's orders were to be obeyed. The assault on the west side began; the Carthaginians came to the rescue; the horsemen turned away; the thousand were left and presently cut to pieces. This side of the camp, it will be remembered, where no attack had been looked for, was not defended by a fort. The scheme of Dionysios, besides getting rid of his mutineers, was to draw the attention of the Carthaginians away from the real attacks which were to be made on the two forts of Polichna and Daskôn. For the last work the horsemen sped swiftly eastward; they were to act in concert with a chosen detachment of triremes who were to sail at break of day¹. Dionysios himself led the attack on the fort on Polichna hard by the temple; that is, he was to mount the hill by the usual road, the hollow way that led over Polichna to Helôros. Meanwhile the defenders of the camp were thrown into confusion by the very suddenness of their victory over an enemy whom they had not looked for; they came as fast as they could from the slaughter of the thousand, but in too disorderly a guise to give any effectual help to the points that were really threatened². The whole scheme succeeded. Dionysios carried the fort on Polichna

CHAP. X.
Deceptive
onslaught
on the
west

masks real
attack on
east.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 72.]

[² Ib.; τῶν βαρβάρων διὰ τὸ παράδοξον καταπεληγμένων καὶ παραβοηθούντων τεταραγμένων.]

CHAP. X. by storm ; he was now on the hill, and he began to besiege
 Capture of that part of the camp which lay on the high ground. The
 forts. horsemen and triremes too luckily met at the appointed moment, and their joint efforts carried the fort on Daskôn. A mighty shout from the Syracusan camp announced the capture of the forts to friend and foe, and struck fear into the hearts of the barbarians. These fears were soon made yet keener as the whole fleet of Syracuse sailed forth to support the few triremes which had led the way¹. The two greatest navies of the world—for Syracuse under Dionysios must come before Athens—were to struggle for life and death in the space, narrow for such a strife, of the Great Harbour of Syracuse.

Sea-victory of Syra-
 cusans in
 bay of
 Daskôn. A struggle it hardly was. The Carthaginian army, frightened and bewildered at so many attacks on so many sides, had first rushed confusedly to withstand the assault of Dionysios and his infantry on the camp. But when they saw the Syracusan fleet come forth, they turned towards the new danger. In the bay of Daskôn were Punic ships of all kinds and in all cases. Triremes and transports lay at anchor ; forty ships of five banks of oars—Nikias and Demosthenés had commanded none such—were drawn up on the shore². The first thought was to put out to sea with the triremes and meet the enemy. Men rushed to the shore and crowded into the ships ; but they were too late. Before the Carthaginian ship was even manned, much more before its rowers could take their places and trim their oars in order, the Syracusans were upon them. There was no chance of meeting prow to prow in equal fight ; the Greek ship, coming on with its full power of oars, easily drove its beak into the side of the Carthaginian trireme not yet

[¹ Diod. xiv. 72.]

[² Ib. xiv. 73. If we are to believe (see p. 62) that Dionysios was the first to build pentekonters, the Carthaginians had been quick to follow his example.]

ready for defence. Some sank to the bottom at a single well-directed blow; others were in the confusion pierced by several beaks at once, and became mere wrecks with their timbers shivered into atoms¹. The noise of the cracking planks sounded loud, as the best triremes of Carthage were broken asunder². On such ships as still supplied a foothold the Syracusans, stirred up by success to greater success, leaped with eager speed, each man striving to board before his fellows. The amazed barbarians, not yet formed in any order, were slaughtered without mercy. Next came the share of the Syracusan land-force; the horsemen had come already; the foot followed—they could leave their siege when there was no one to defend—Dionysios himself rode round to Daskôn to join them³. They found a ready prey in the pentekonters drawn up on shore. Hard by them were transports at anchor, and still a few triremes which perhaps no one had tried to put to sea. Fire was the weapon; it was first applied to the pentekonters; they were presently all ablaze, the flames rising high, and spreading far and wide. A strong wind was blowing, and the fire next reached the transports. The men who were on board them swam to shore; the cables that held the anchors were burned; the burning ships, left to themselves, were carried wildly to and fro by the wind, with the flames curling on high around their masts. From the walls of Syracuse men looked on as on a living tragedy acted before their eyes⁴. Vengeance had indeed lighted on the ungodly. In the excitement of the moment, it seemed no earthly fire that did the deed; the thunderbolts of Zeus had fallen to destroy the sacrilegious barbarians

CHAP. X.

Destruction of Carthaginian fleet.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 72; αἱ δὲ πλείοσιν ἐμβολαῖς ἀναρρήττουσαι τὰς συγγεγομφομένας σανίδας, δειρὴν ἐκπλήξιν τοῖς ἀντιταττομένοις παρείχοντο.]

[² Ib.; πάντα δὲ τῶν ἐροχυστάτων νεῶν θρανομένων αἱ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐμβόλων ἀναρρηγνόμεναι λακίδες ἐξάισιον ἐποιούντο ψόφον.]

[³ Ib. 73.]

[⁴ Ib.; τοῖς δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως θεατρικὴν συνίβαινε γίνεσθαι τὴν θέαν.]

CHAP. X. who had recked not of his holy places nor of those of the
Destruction of Car- Guardian Goddesses of the land¹.
thaginian
fleet.

This vivid picture, it must be remembered, comes, beyond all doubt, from a contemporary, an eye-witness, and more than an eye-witness. We read the tale as it seemed to one of the foremost actors in the work. If Philistos was not himself entrusted with any special command, we may be sure that on that day he was not far from the side of Dionysios. And on that day he may have thought with pride of that other day when he held out his purse to help the young and daring demagogue in his defiance of all rules of procedure. For on that day the people of Syracuse gathered round their tyrant, as they might have gathered round Gelôn or Hermokratês, or round Athênagoras or Dioklês had they been men of war like Dionysios. Men fought at his bidding and without his bidding. The men of military age, shipmen and landsmen, horse and foot, were smiting down the enemy at his side or giving the navy of the enemy to the flames. But when those who were left in the city heard the shouts of victory from Syracusan tongues and saw the fires of Syracuse burning up the ships of Carthage, they too longed to have a share in the work. Lads who felt already the strength of years to come, old men from whom the strength of years past had not wholly died away², rushed to the harbour. The Syracusan ships of war were busy by the shore of Daskôn; but there were merchant-ships and other vessels at anchor. The zealous youths and elders manned them with all speed, and hastened across the friendly waters to the spot where their countrymen were still doing the work on which the gods of Greece had sent them. They had no fighting to do; they had only to come upon the spoil. Some of the Punic ships, forsaken

[¹ Diod. xiv. 73; καὶ τοῖς δὲ ἀσέβειαν κεραυνωθείσι φαίνεσθαι παραπλήσιαν τὴν ἀπώλειαν τῶν βαρβάρων.]

[² Ib. xiv. 74.]

by their shipmen, were still unhurt; others, though damaged by the fire, still contained something to reward a search among their wrecks¹. The spoil was carried off; the still serviceable vessels were towed in triumph into the docks of Syracuse. The city was still not empty; there were still those left who could look on and could rejoice. Houses were left to slaves alone; women and children, and doubtless old men too feeble to take share in the toils of their fellows, crowded the walls, and gazed on what was doing. Some raised their hands to heaven in thanksgiving to the gods; some pointed the moral of the scene before them, and told how the gods had visibly avenged themselves on the robbers of their temples. For the sight seemed as if the gods themselves had gone forth to battle², as Punic hulls still were blazing, as the flames were still curling round Punic masts, as the shores of the Great Harbour still echoed to the victorious shout of Greece, to the confused and motley cries of barbarians dying or flying or crowded together without order or hope of help. Syracuse was saved; but there was still work to do; the camp was still not taken; the day of toil and triumph had still to be followed by a watchful night. That night was not spent by Dionysios in his castle in the island; he had pitched him a camp hard by the ancient temple in Polichna, and from thence he designed to carry out whatever had still to be done to sweep away the camp of the barbarian and the barbarians themselves from the soil of Syracuse³.

Setting aside his treacherous dealing with the thousand mercenaries, the chosen general of a free democracy could not have done more on that day than Dionysios the tyrant had done. If he had fought for himself, he had fought

[¹ Diod. xiv. 74.]

[² Ib.; ἐφαίνετο γὰρ διὰ μακροῦ θεομαχίᾳ παραλήσιος ἡ θία.]

[³ Ib.; Διονύσιος ἐπεστρατοπέδενσε τοῖς βαρβάροις πρὸς τῷ τοῦ Διὸς ἱερῷ παρεμβολὴν ποιησάμενος.]

CHAP. X. also for his city and his people, and his people, if they fought for themselves, had fought well for him also. But the tyrant was a tyrant still; the greatest victory of Hellas over barbarians since the day of Salamis and Himera fourscore and four years back was stained by treachery at its ending as it had been at its beginning. Himilkôn knew that his only hope lay in Dionysios himself. The tyrant, we are told, and Himilkôn may have made the same surmise, did not wish the victory to be too thorough; he did not wish the power of Carthage to be altogether crippled; if the people of Syracuse were released from all fear from without—he might have added, if they had no longer need of him as their defender—they might again take to plans for the recovery of their freedom¹. But the Syracusans and their allies from Old Greece and Italy were in no such frame of mind; their one wish was to go on with the work which they had begun, to smite the barbarian once and for ever². A secret interchange of ideas followed between Himilkôn and Dionysios, of which the mass of the two armies knew nothing. The Punic general asked the tyrant's leave to take away to Africa all that was left of his army on giving up to Dionysios three hundred talents which he had in the camp. Dionysios modified the terms. On the payment of the three hundred talents Himilkôn might sail away secretly by night—he could not promise a safe voyage by day—taking with him such part of his army as were citizens of Carthage. The allies and mercenaries must be left behind to their fate. The policy of this proposal is obvious; something like it had been done by Dêmôsthênês thirty years before when the Peloponnesians forsook their allies at Olpai³. Dionysios would clearly

Treason-
able com-
pact be-
tween
Dionysios
and Himil-
kôn.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 75; οὐ βουλόμενος τελείως ἀπολέσθαι τὴν τῶν Καρχηδονίων δύναμιν, ὅπως οἱ Συρακούσιοι διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τούτων φόβον, μηδέποτε σχολῇ λαβῶσιν ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας. Cf. p. 90.]

[² Ib.]

[³ Thuc. iii. 109.]

gain less by the slaughter or bondage of Himilkôn and his fellow-citizens, than he would by letting it be known through all Sicily that the Carthaginians were capable of looking after themselves only and leaving, not only their mercenaries, but their allies to any chance that might befall them.

It was agreed that the Carthaginians should depart on the fourth night, and Dionysios, instead of further attacks on the camp, led back his forces into the city. Everything was veiled in secrecy; it was by night that Himilkôn brought or sent the money in full tale to the

CHAP. X.
Himilkôn
and Car-
thaginian
citizens
allowed to
escape.

hoard of Dionysios in the island, and on the appointed night, having manned forty triremes, set forth accompanied by all the Carthaginians in the army. Carthage was so sparing of the blood of her own citizens, who, save on a few special occasions, seemed to have served only as officers, that one almost wonders that so many ships were needed. The fleet sailed forth and passed the mouth of the Great Harbour. But even at night forty triremes could not set sail quite unnoticed; the plash of their oars alone would reveal them to some wakeful ears. None were more watchful than those who had come from the metropolis of Syracuse to save the noblest colony of their own city. The Corinthians, knowing nothing of the secret treaty, came to tell Dionysios that the enemy was escaping. He could not openly refuse to act upon their information; but he took care not to act vigorously. He gave orders that the army should be called out; but he purposely lost time in summoning his officers¹. The gallant men of Corinth, eager in the cause on which they had come, could not brook the delays of the tyrant. They set sail without orders, striving among themselves which should be foremost; they overtook some of the Carthaginian ships that lagged behind, and with an unlooked-for charge of their beaks sent them to the bottom. The rest doubtless escaped; Himilkôn at all events found

[¹ Diod. xiv. 75; κατὰ σχολὴν τοῖς ἡγεμόνας ἀνδροφόροις.]

CHAP. X. his way to Carthage. To keep up perhaps a show of energy, as well as to carry out his own special purposes, Dionysios again led out his army against the Carthaginian camp, where now only mercenaries were left. The Sikels who had taken the Carthaginian side had already decamped; they knew the roads to the inland parts of the island, and got them away each man to his own home¹. Warned by their escape, or possibly conniving at it, Dionysios ordered the roads to be watched, lest any of the mercenaries should attempt to follow their example.

Rout and
slaughter
of the
Punic mer-
cenaries.

He then attacked the camp by night. Forsaken by their commander and his officers, forsaken by their allies in the country, disheartened by defeat, and startled again by the tyrant's sudden move in the dark, the motley crowd of barbarians who were left lost all heart and tried to flee. If it be true that 150,000 dead bodies—one half of the whole army—were left unburied, one wonders that they had not gone away long before. They tried to escape by this road and that; but they were everywhere met by the Syracusan guards and many were taken prisoners. The rest threw down their arms and prayed only that their lives might be spared. One detachment only showed a higher spirit. The born soldiers of Spain kept to their arms in good order, and sent a herald to Dionysios proposing peace and alliance. The tyrant knew the value of such men as they; a truce was made and an agreement come to, and the warriors of the western peninsula were enrolled among the mercenaries of the lord of Syracuse. They served him in later wars, and were sent by him into Peloponnêsos to support the cause of Sparta against her Greek enemies². It was not the last time that

Iberians
taken into
Dionysios'
pay.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 75; *οἱ δὲ συμμαχοῦντες τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις Σικελοὶ, φθάσαντες τοὺς Συρακουσίους, ἔφυγον διὰ τοῦ μεσογείου, καὶ σχεδὸν πάντες διεσώθησαν εἰς τὰς πατρίδας.*]

[² Xenophôn, Hellen. vii. 1. 20-28; Diod. xv. 70.]

Spaniards have passed from Sicily to work deeds of arms on the soil and on the waters of Greece¹. The rest of the mercenaries, who did not know so well as the Iberians the advantage of keeping up a strong heart, were made prisoners and seemingly sold as slaves. The camp and all that was left in it he gave over to his own soldiers to plunder. The siege and the war was over, and Syracuse was saved.

The most speaking monument of this great Hellenic victory was set up, not in Syracuse or in any other Greek city, but in Carthage itself. On the Carthaginian defeat there followed a struggle in Africa which may pass as a foreshadowing of the great war with the mercenaries which followed the first Punic war with Rome. This time the revolted seem to have been, not the mere mercenaries hired from all parts, but the allies and subjects of Carthage in Africa. Both they and the mercenaries were, as Dionysios had meant them to be, stirred to great wrath by the way in which Himilkôn had betrayed his whole army, save the native Carthaginians only. They rose against the ruling city, a mingled body of Phœnicians and Africans, their numbers being further swelled by not a few slaves, whether their own or runaways from Carthage itself². A host of two hundred thousand held the open country; they occupied the threatening post of Tunês, and made Carthage a besieged city³. In this strait the conscience of the commonwealth was smitten. The votaries of the gods of Canaan were brought to confess that the gods of Hellas could do something. Their late discomfiture in Sicily, their present

[¹ In 1571 Messina was the starting-point of the Spanish and allied fleet under Don John of Austria for the expedition against the Turks which ended in the great victory of Lepanto.]

[² Diod. xiv. 77; ταχὺ δ' οὐ μόνον ἐλευθέρων ἀλλὰ καὶ δούλων συντρέχοντων.]

[³ Ib.; καταλαβόμενοι δὲ Τύννητα . . . τειχῆρεις τοὺς Φοίνικας συνείχον.]

CHAP. X. distress in Africa, were clearly the divine judgement for the sacrilege which they had wrought against the protecting deities of Syracuse. Zeus, as before, is not spoken of. It was the specially Sicilian powers, Dêmêtêr and the Korê, who had undergone the wrong and who now dealt out the vengeance. Hitherto those Aryan goddesses had received no worship in Semitic Carthage¹. A stately temple was now built to them. Some of the most honourable citizens of

Expiatory
cult of
Dêmêtêr
and the
Korê insti-
tuted at
Carthage.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 77. This view is not in agreement with Mr. Freeman's remark in Sicily, vol. ii. 210, referring to the treaty concluded in 480 B.C. between Gelôn and Carthage after the war of Himera; "One of the clauses of the treaty bound the Carthaginians to build two temples in which the stones on which the treaty was graven should be laid up (Diod. xi. 26). These could not fail to be temples to Greek deities; we may say almost with certainty that they were temples to the Goddesses of Sicily, the special patronesses of Gelôn and his house, Dêmêtêr and the Korê." Among the errata however to the same volume, p. xviii, Mr. Freeman notices the discrepancy between this and the later notice of Diodôros according to which the worship of "the Goddesses" at Carthage introduced about 396 is represented as something quite new. He considers therefore that "the foreign rites may have been disused and forgotten between the two times." On this later devotion of the Carthaginians to the cult of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê the coins of Carthage herself and those struck for her mercenaries and dependencies in Sicily supply a most striking commentary. This solemn propitiation of the Sicilian Goddesses by Carthage and the impulse thus given to their cult in the Punic world have been reasonably brought into connexion with the appearance at some time after this date of a whole series of Siculo-Punic tetradrachms, in which, with the aid no doubt of Greek engravers, there is reproduced the fine head of Persephonê as she is seen on the Syracusan medallions from the hands of the artist Euainetos. (See Ludwig Müller, Num. de l'ancienne Afrique, ii. 110, 111; De Sauley, Acad. des Inscriptions, T. xv. pt. ii. 53, 54; A. J. Evans, Syr. Medallions, &c., 106 seqq.) In other cases it is the Mother-Goddess that is represented with a wreath of ripened corn in place of the green barley spray seen in the Daughter's tresses. Of the two this type was preferred by Carthage itself, and became the unvarying obverse type of her coinage. It is to be observed however, as illustrating the character of this engrafted cult, that both the Dêmêtêr and the Korê of Carthaginian and Siculo-Punic monetary art are at times associated with the symbols of Ashtoreth, with whom their myths had much in common. If I am right (op. cit. 101, 102) in supposing that some early Carthaginian gold coins with the head of Dêmêtêr date from the Sicilian expedition of 405 B.C., it is evident that the Sicilian Mother-Goddess was known to the Carthaginians before the introduction of the special expiatory cult. But

Carthage were chosen to be their priests; they were worshipped in their new house according to the most correct Greek ritual; the best qualified among the Greek sojourners in Carthage had been prayed to undertake the missionary work of teaching the new servants of the goddesses how their favour might best be won¹. Hellas and her gods thus won a religious victory; the Phœnician conscience now felt itself clear from sins which had been so splendidly atoned for; and the men of Carthage fitted out their ships and went forth with higher hopes to subdue their rebels. Nor did the Goddesses of Sicily fail their new proselytes. The motley host of revolters had no acknowledged generals; each chief of a band claimed the first place for himself and his own followers². Some were won over by the gold of Carthage; others held out till provisions failed them; the Carthaginian ships meanwhile brought in abundant stores from Sardinia. Before long the rebels were scattered every man to his own home, and Carthage was for a while delivered from a danger to which her constitution and policy laid her open at any moment.

CHAP. X.

It does not appear that this first war between Dionysios and Carthage was ended by any formal treaty. But the defeat of Himilkôn before Syracuse secured a state of things which practically lasted unchanged for four years. The Carthaginian power, in its old Phœnician strongholds, remained unbroken. Panormos and Solous had not been touched; Lilybaion had taken the place of Motya. But the Carthaginian power, as a power ruling over Greeks, came for a

Carthaginian possessions in Sicily again confined to the west. [B.C. 397.]

this does not affect the main fact that Dêmêtêr and Korê first became the prevailing Carthaginian coin-types in the first half of the fourth century B.C., in great measure, no doubt, as a consequence of that expiatory cult.]

[¹ Diod. xiv. 77; καὶ μετὰ πάσης σεμνότητος τὰς θεὰς ἱδρυσάμενοι, τὰς θεοίας τοῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔθεσιν ἐποίουν, καὶ τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς ὄντων Ἑλλήνων τοὺς χαμεστάτους ἐπιλέξαντες, ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν ἔταξαν.]

[² Ib.]

CHAP. X. while to an end. The Greek cities which had come under Sikeliot Carthaginian dominion or supremacy had set themselves free as the very first act of the war. And free, as far as Carthage was concerned, they remained. We have already seen that Himilkôn found it expedient to treat one of them friendly¹, and we shall presently hear another spoken of in a way which implies perfect independence of Carthage. But the story implies dependence on Dionysios, or perhaps complete submission to his dominion. At a somewhat later stage Akragas drove out the partisans of Dionysios and asserted its own freedom². This points to the relation which the war established between the lord of Syracuse and the Greek cities which had been delivered from the barbarian. It looks as if he ruled, not as an avowed master, but by means of local parties acting in his interest. But it shows that Dionysios was none the less practically lord of all the Sikeliot cities. He was very far from being ruler of all Sicily; but he had come nearer to being so than any man had done before him. In the different shapes of direct dominion, acknowledged supremacy, and practical influence, he had all Greek Sicily and a large part of barbarian Sicily at his command. Between him and the great barbarian power which he had failed to dislodge from north-western Sicily there was no acknowledged relation. There was a tacit understanding that Carthage and Syracuse were to leave one another alone for a season.

§ 3. *From the First to the Second Punic War of Dionysios.*

B.C. 396-392.

At this stage of the shifting relations between the lord of Syracuse and the Phœnician enemy, the question cannot fail to present itself why he allowed those relations to stay as they were at the moment. When he had just struck

[¹ Therma; see p. 103.]

[² Diod. xiv. 88.]

such a blow at Carthage as he had dealt on the soil and on the waters of Syracuse, when Carthage was still barely recovering from plagues both in Africa and before Syracuse, while in Africa she was occupied and weakened by the revolt of her allies and mercenaries, and while in Sicily she was discredited by her treacherous dealings with them, why did he not choose what seems so favourable a time for another great attack on the Phœnician possessions in the west¹? The question came up when we saw the comparatively feeble course of Dionysios in the second campaign of the war as compared with the mighty energy shown in the taking of Motya². It comes up yet more forcibly now. It may simply be that his first campaign had taught him that such distant conquests were both hard to win and hard to keep³, and that he did not deem it wise to provoke Carthage to the uttermost, lest she should in the end prove too strong for him⁴. This line of thought might have come into the mind either of a lawful king or of a lawful magistrate; there is the further question whether Dionysios, in his character of tyrant, had not his personal reasons for not wishing to press the enemy too hard⁵. There is a strange story of an oracle which said that he would die whenever he overcame those who were stronger than himself⁶. This, it is said, he understood of the Carthaginians, and therefore in all his wars he willingly sought defeat, lest he should by success bring about the fulfilment of the soothsayer's words⁷.

CHAP. X.
Policy of
Dionysios
towards
Carthage.

¹ This is well put by Holm, G. S. li. 132. His use of the word *Krenassug* shows a feeling of the wider œcumenical bearings of the case.

² See above, p. 90.

³ See above, p. 91.

⁴ See Holm, u. s.

⁵ See above, pp. 90, 142.

⁶ Diod. xv. 74; *ἔχων παρὰ θεῶν λόγιον τότε τελευτήσειν ὅταν τῶν κρείττονων περιγίνηται.*

⁷ *Ib.*; *τὸν χρησμὸν ἀνέφερεν ἐπὶ τοὺς Καρχηδόνιους, ὑπολαμβάνων τοῦτους κρείττους αὐτοῦ εἶναι. διὰ καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς πλεονάκεις πεπολεμηκὸς εἰλῶθαι κατὰ τὰς νίκας ὑποφεύγειν καὶ ἐκουσίως ἡττᾶσθαι, ἵνα μὴ δόξῃ τῶν ἰσχυροτέρων γεγονέναι κρείττων.* We shall of course come in due time to the true explanation of the parable.

CHAP. X. This story misconceives and exaggerates matters a good deal; but it points to a belief that Dionysios could have done more against Carthage than he did. Of one thing we may be certain. Dionysios was no doubt willing enough to be the champion of Hellas; but he had no mind to be champion of Hellas in any shape which was likely to put the lordship of Syracuse and the neighbour lands in jeopardy.

Difficulties
of Dionysios' position.

We must further remember that Dionysios' own position was at that moment a somewhat difficult one. The victorious lord of Syracuse was himself in somewhat the same case as the enemies over whom he had won his victory. He too had to deal with discontented mercenaries, with discontented allies and injured enemies, and with the elder folk of the land. These last had now no such good national hopes as they had had in the days of Ducetius; but each Sikel town, as the hellenizing process brought it nearer to the level of a Greek town, became a greater difficulty in the path of the man who was striving to spread his lordship over Greeks and Sikels alike. Among these various elements, the first move came from the mercenaries. We have already seen how deeply some of them had been suspected by the tyrant, and how he had dealt with those whom he suspected¹. He now felt that the whole body was ill-disposed towards him. His first step was to arrest their commander, the Lacedæmonian Aristotelês². The whole body, ten thousand in number, now came together in arms, fiercely demanding their pay, possibly threatening Dionysios himself with death³. But we shall not lightly believe that the tyrant won them over by an appeal to their pity, that he came out to them in sordid dress and with dust on his head, bidding them deal with him as they thought good⁴. In the more credible version he tells them that Aris-

¹ See above, p. 136.

[² Diod. xiv. 78.]

[³ Ib.]

⁴ This, with the threat of death (*δρμησαν οὐ μισθοφόροι κτείναι*), comes

totalés, whose particular offences are not described, should be sent to Spárta to be judged by the tribunals of his own city. To the rest he made a splendid offer. He would give them the town of Leontinoi, with its fruitful plain. The gift was accepted as full payment for all demands¹.

CHAP. X.

Suspected
mercenaries settled
at Leontinoi.

Another of the strangely mingled communities characteristic of this time was thus set up. Greeks and barbarians—for there must have been both classes among the mercenaries of Dionysios—were set down to live side by side in a Sikeliot city which had seen ups and downs enough already. One specially asks whether the Spaniards who showed so stout a heart at the end of the Punic siege² now settled down as citizens of Leontinoi. How did they adapt themselves to a life which must have been at least superficially Greek? The new Leontine community was of course meant to stand in some relation of dependent alliance to Dionysios; its citizens would be ready to serve in his wars; but they would no longer be quartered in Syracuse as part of his immediate household troops to act at a moment's notice. But a tyrant must always have some force in that character; it was the distinguishing badge of tyranny that the ruler could never trust himself to his own citizens. Dionysios therefore, having got rid of one body of mercenaries, presently hired another. And

from a strange story in Polyainos, v. 2. 1, evidently patched up from several sources. The mercenaries surround the house of Dionysios, *τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ*, an odd description of the castle in Ortygia. Then he comes out, *ἐσθῆτα ἐλευγὴν λαβὼν καὶ τῆς κόμης κόβειν καταχέμενος, παρέχων αὐτὸν ἱκετόν ὡς βούλουτο χρῆσθαι*. One seems to see some dim confusion with the return of Gelón from Himera. They let him go—*δίδωον ἀφῆκον*. But they remain in his service. He takes them to Leontinoi and has them surrounded and shot down by the other troops. This suggests all manner of stories. The tale is perhaps hardly worth taking notice of, but it seems meant to come at this stage. And Leontinoi comes both in this and the more likely version, though in such different ways.

¹ If any one is anxious to reconcile two opposite stories, he can take them to Leontinoi under this promise, and then have them shot.

² See above, p. 144.

CHAP. X. to them, together with the slaves whom he had lately set free, he looked as the mainstay of his power ¹.

Movements
among
Sicilian
Greeks.

Stirs next began to arise among those large bodies of Sicilian Greeks whom the events of the late war, and specially the destroying acts of Dionysios himself, had made homeless. The exiles of Naxos and Katanê were still without any certain dwelling-place. In whatever hands Katanê may have been just then, it had certainly not been given back to its own former citizens². The Messanians too who had escaped from Himilkôn were in the like case. All these were wandering about the land, loudly setting forth their demands to be settled somewhere, best of all to

Messana
rebuilt by
Dionysios.

be settled in their old homes. As for ruined Messana, Dionysios undertook to build and people it afresh. But it was not to be peopled with those who had fled from Himilkôn, but with men who would be more distinctly dependent on himself, men whose settlement on Sicilian ground would be wholly his own gift. He gathered colonists from Italy and from Old Greece. He planted at Messana a thousand settlers from his favourite Lokroi and four thousand from Medma³. He planted there also a body of men who might seem to have a special call to settle in a city which had exchanged its ancient name for theirs. The Messanians of Peloponnêsos, whom Athens had planted at Naupaktos and Zakynthos, had again become homeless after the fall of the city which had given them shelter. Six hundred of these wanderers were now

Peopled
with set-
tlers from
Lokroi and
Medma,

and by
Messanians
of Pelopon-
nêsos.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 78; *τούτοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἡλευθερωμένοις οὐκέτις ἐνέπιστευσε τὴν ἀρχήν.*]

[² That Katanê was still inhabited appears from Diod. xiv. 60. See p. 119.]

[³ Cluver's conjecture *Μεδμαίους* for the unknown *Μεδμναίους* of the MSS. is obviously correct. (Cf. Holm, G. S. ii. 426; Bunbury, in Smith's Dict. of Geogr., s. v.) Medma or Mesma (both forms appear on its coins) was a colony of the Epizephyrian Lokrians; and its name seems to be preserved by the little river Mesima that flows into the sea near Nicotera in Calabria.]

given a place by Dionysios in his restored Sicilian Messana. CHAP. X.
 But Dionysios was the friend of Sparta, and Spartan hatred Spartan
 followed the Messanians of Peloponnêsos wherever they intervention
 went. The tyrant found that he had displeased his most against
 powerful friends by the favour which he had shown to men Mess-
 whom they had so deeply wronged and whom they there- nians of
 fore so bitterly hated¹. But, to his credit be it said, he Pelopon-
 did not forsake those whom he had once taken under his nêsos.
 protection. He yielded to Spartan jealousy so far as that
 the enemies of Sparta should not be set to dwell in so
 commanding a position as the city on the strait, whose
 name too was a constant reminder of memories which
 Sparta loved not. Dionysios therefore found for his Mes- They are
 sanian colonists a dwelling in a less prominent part of his settled by
 own island, and he thereby called a new Greek city into Dionysios
 being. On the north coast of Sicily stood the Sikel town at his new
 of Abacœnum². We are not told whether Dionysios had foundation
 any special quarrel with its people, or whether it was of Tynda-
 simply held that any Sikel possession was fair game for ria.
 Greeks. In any case he settled his colonists on a site [B.C. 395.]
 within the Abacœnian territory. That territory was dis-
 membered, according to the pleasure of the lord of Syra-
 cuse, in favour of the Messanian wanderers who found
 themselves settled in yet another home.

We have now come to all but the last foundation of a
 Greek city on Sicilian soil. The destroyer of Naxos showed
 himself as a creator at Tyndaris. Old Peloponnesian
 memories, reverence for the Great Twin Brethren of their
 old land, caused the Peloponnesian wanderers to give that
 name to their new settlement. Near the shore of the bay
 which lies westward of the *chersonêsos* of Mylai, a lofty
 isolated hill, throwing out more than one bold spur in
 advance, rises proudly, on one side over the sea, on another
 over the lower but still lofty ground which parts it from

[¹ Diod. xiv. 78.]

[² See Sicily, i. 145.]

CHAP. X. the inland mountains. Here Dionysios planted his new city, not on the shore like Ducetius, not on an almost inaccessible site like Archônidês, but still on a site which gives Tyndaris a very distinct place among cities set on hills. There the fortifier of Epipolai again fenced in a height with all the engineering skill of his age. And a large part of his work still abides to speak for itself. Two steep and lofty spurs jutting out towards the sea were not taken within the fortified circuit. On the seaward side, where only a broad beach lies between the water and the foot of the hill, the wall may be traced, though only in slight remains, at a point a considerable way down the slope. On the landward side, where the hill is steeper, a much larger part of the wall may be followed along the edge of the rocky cliffs. The eastern point of the hill is crowned by the church of Our Lady of Tindaro, representing doubtless some chief temple of the city, perhaps the house of the Great Twin Brethren themselves. Just below the church, on the landward side, is a projection of the hill, which, though by no means its highest point, must have practically served as the akropolis of Tyndaris. The shape of the height has given the walls that crown it the shape of the polygonal shell-keeps of mediæval times; we seem at Tyndaris to be looking up to the castle-walls of Cardiff or Lincoln or Norwich. But the engineers of Dionysios had further devices still. It seems plain that, under the shadow of this *quasi*-akropolis, a covered way led up to one of the gates of the town. The wall, strengthened by square towers at regular intervals, built of uncemented rectangular blocks, is fully worthy of the great military inventor of his day. The strong city above had its haven below, well sheltered by one of the seaward spurs of the height on which it stands¹.

[¹ There is also a sandy tongue running eastward from the northern promontory which probably formed an arm of the original haven, now,

Events showed that the foundation of Dionysios was wisely planned. The city flourished from the beginning. The first six hundred settlers welcomed new-comers, and before long Tyndaris was a city that numbered over five thousand citizens¹. The site is now empty, save for the church and its attached buildings and a few other houses, hardly amounting to a village. But Tyndaris remained, at least down to the plunderings of Verres, a city of wealth and renown, which played its part in the wars of Rome and Carthage². And of the later days of Tyndaris we have some considerable remains. The Greek theatre has been modified by Roman hands, and the Roman has nowhere left a worthier monument of the building art than the bold and massive arches of the building known as the gymnasium³. It must have altogether changed the character except for a few pools and shallows, entirely silted up. The access to the city above from the harbour must always have been tedious, as the site can only be approached from the seaside by a path which zigzags up a steep ascent of 600 feet. On the eastern side, where the wall is now very imperfectly preserved and the cliffs are steepest, must have taken place the catastrophe described by Pliny (ii. 92), but his statement that half Tyndaris was swallowed up by the sea is obviously an exaggeration. From the line of the existing fragments of wall, it is evident that no very considerable part of the ancient site can have been carried away by landslips. It is possible however that part of the sandy flats and shallows below were covered at one time by a lower town which was invaded by the sea.]

[¹ Diod. xiv. 78.]

[² For the history of Tyndaris see Bunbury (Smith's Dict. of Geogr., s.v.). In the first Punic War it was dependent on Carthage, but subsequently, in 254 B. C., expelled the Punic garrison. Cicero, Verr. iii. 43, calls it "*nobilissimam civitatem*." Its great art-treasure, a statue of Hermès, formerly carried off by the Carthaginians and restored by Scipio Africanus in return for naval assistance rendered to him, was seized by Verres (Cicero, Verr. iv. 39-42).]

[³ Earlier Sicilian antiquaries, e.g. Francesco Ferrara, called this building "*il Ginnasio*." Serradifalco, *Antichità di Sicilia*, v. 55, is more cautious. In exploring the site I was struck by the fact that this fine building with its archways and triple gangway lies on a line of cross wall which apparently represents the barrier between the Agora and Akropolis of Tyndaris. It looks as if, in part at least, it had served as a stately portal between the two—a Temple Bar of Roman Tyndaris.]

CHAP. I. of a long line of coast where the Greek had not settled at all and where the Sikel had rarely risked himself upon the edge of the waters, when Tyndaris arose to supply in some sort the blotting-out of Himera from the tale of the cities of Hellas, to atone in some sort for the sweeping away of Naxos at the bidding of its founder. He who had overthrown the oldest of Sikeliot cities had called the youngest into being on a site which was new ground for Hellas.

Hostility of Rhégion. The work of Dionysios at Messana and Tyndaris not unnaturally alarmed his enemies at Rhégion. The restoration of Messana, as a city under the dominion or influence of the Syracusan tyrant, they looked on as directly threatening to themselves. They sought therefore to turn his own policy against himself. Dionysios had set up a place of shelter for homeless exiles; the men of Rhégion would do the like for other exiles whom Dionysios himself had made homeless and who could be fully trusted to act zealously against him. They too chose for their work a site on the northern coast; but they could hardly be said, like the founder of Tyndaris, to enlarge Hellas by a new city. Yet they did in some sort design the foundation of a new Greek community by cutting off a piece of Messanian territory and planting it with new inhabitants. The site which they chose was evidently suggested by Dionysios' choice of Tyndaris. The two are near neighbours, looking forth on each other, neighbours who might be almost said to be natural rivals. In the view from the hill of Tyndaris, along with the inland mountains and the isles of Aiolos, a prominent object is the *chersonésoi* of Mylai, the western outpost of the Messanian territory. Tyndaris is no less a prominent object from the *chersonésoi* of Mylai. Between them lies the bold curve of the great bay which seems designed as the battle-field of mighty fleets. There Gaius Duilius first smote the Carthaginian on his own

The Rhé-
gines found
Mylai.

element¹; there Marcus Agrippa wrested the prize from the younger Pompeius for the younger Cæsar². The two points which thus keep watch over one another were both at this moment under the dominion or influence of Dionysios. But his enemies of Rhêgion determined to wrest one of the two posts from his power, and to people it with the men who had most reason to hate him. On the lofty height, the new-built walls, of Tyndaris they did not dare to risk an assault. But they marked Mylai as a city of refuge for the enemies of Tyndaris and its founder. By the side of Tyndaris it seems a lowly spot. From that height it looks almost like a greater Thapsos seen from Epipolai. The flat isthmus is hardly seen; even the rocky peninsula, with its akropolis and its central hill, looks low indeed beside either the islands or the hills of the mainland. But the site of the old Mylai, the rocky hill crowned by the castle of Milazzo, the castle which played a memorable part in the last deliverance of Sicily, was no contemptible post of strength. That post the Rhêgine enemies of Dionysios were now able to occupy. They drove out such of his new Messanians as occupied Mylai, and gave the place fresh inhabitants. They collected all whom they could find of the men whom Dionysios had made homeless, the wanderers from Naxos and Katanê, and planted them on the peninsula of Mylai as a new settlement³.

CHAP. X.

Exiled citizens of Naxos and Katanê settled by Rhêgines at Mylai.

Was Mylai, in its new state, designed to form a separate community distinct from Messina? That question was perhaps left to be settled by the course of events. The Rhêgines at any rate designed something more than the dismemberment of the Messanian territory; they hoped for the conquest of Messina itself. They gathered their forces, and they found a Syracusan enemy of Dionysios to

[¹ Polyb. i. 23.]

[² Appian, B. C. v. 95-109, 115-122; Dion Cass. xlix. 2-11; Vell. Paterc. ii. 79; Suet. Aug. 16.]

[³ Diod. xiv. 87.]

CHAP. X. command them. This was Helôris, described as a man of high military repute, who had been driven into exile by the tyrant¹. We are tempted to see in him that Helôris, spoken of as the adopted father of Dionysios, who had shown himself a wise and daring counsellor at the moment of the tyrant's greatest need². He who sent Philistos into

Rhêgines
under
Helôris
besiege
restored
Messana.

banishment might do the like by Helôris. Under the command of their Syracusan general, the Rhêgines laid siege to the restored Messana of Dionysios. Their approach was evidently by land—perhaps straight from the settlement of Mylai. For we read that Helôris attacked the akropolis of Messana, where the great modern fort on the hill-side rises above the lower town by the sea³. The Messanians—the last settlers had already taken the name—were ready to defend themselves, and they were strengthened by a

Rhêgines
defeated
and Mylai
taken.

body of mercenaries sent by their founder⁴. A battle followed, in which the Rhêgine besiegers were defeated with the loss of five hundred men. The victorious Messanians at once marched against the new settlement at Mylai. They took the town; Mylai and Tyndaris were not to look out on each other as hostile posts; both were to be strongholds of the dominion or influence of Dionysios. Mylai must have surrendered on terms, for the Naxians, and doubtless the Katanaïans with them, were allowed to go their ways⁵. Driven from their new home, they were again left to wander whither they might, seeking shelter here and there, chiefly among the Sikel enemies of Dionysios⁶.

This dismemberment of the territory of Abacænnum, whatever was its immediate occasion, was only part of a general plan of warfare designed by Dionysios against the indepen-

[¹ Compare Diod. xiv. 87, and 90, 103, 104.]

[² See p. 19.]

[³ Diod. xiv. 87.]

[⁴ Ib.]

[⁵ Ib.; τοὺς οἰκισθέντας ἐν αὐτῇ Ναξίους ὑποσπόνδους ἀφήκαν.]

[⁶ Ib.; εἰς τε Σικελοὺς καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἀπελθόντες, ἄλλοι κατ' ἄλλους τόπους κατήκησαν.]

dent Sikels. The advance of adopted Greek life in their towns CHAP. X. is here marked in a curious way. Hitherto we have heard Sikel campaign of Dionysios. of Sikel kings and princes; Ducetius and Archônides were no republican magistrates. But still less were they tyrants. But now the Sikel towns, having been so far Hellenized as to develop commonwealths after the Greek fashion, had in some cases gone a step further. They had, after the Greek fashion, after the specially Sikeliot fashion, fallen under the power of tyrants. Dionysios now set forth on a great Sikel campaign, in which he took some towns by arms and some by treason, and made treaties with the rulers of others. Smeneos¹ and Morgantina were taken by force. By the He takes Morgantina. taking of Morgantina, first conquest of Ducetius, Dionysios advanced his frontier in the character of lord of Katané rather than in that of lord of Syracuse. But other gains followed which might pass for swift steps towards the position of a lord of all Sicily. The founder of Tyndaris had already established his power on the north coast, and it must have been a gain indeed when the yet stronger hill Cephalœdium. of Cephalœdium was put into his hands by some traitor. Under the dominion of Dionysios that whole coast was fast passing from the Sikel to the Greek. But what are we to make of a perfectly casual notice which implies that the extension of his power at this time was not made wholly at the cost of Sikels? We read, without detail and without Solous. remark, that among the towns which were now betrayed to Dionysios was Phœnician Solous. One whose power now reached from Messana to Cephalœdium most likely stood in some relation to the town which had grown up as a representative of fallen Himera, and from Thermai it would be natural to go on to Solous. But at any other moment Solous could assuredly not have been won without a Punic war. It is just possible that at this particular moment,

[¹ So the MSS. of Diodôros, xiv. 78, but as no such place is known, Dindorf has with some probability suggested *Μέγαστρον*.]

CHAP. x. when Carthage was so weakened by her wars in Sicily and Africa, she may have sat calmly by while some faithless mercenary allowed the ass laden with gold to toil up to the city of the rock. The fact stands recorded, and we can at most suspect some mistake. And the third town taken by treason seems strangely joined with the others. The list runs : "Cephalœdium, Solous, Henna¹." Thus the sacred city on the height, the home of the Goddesses, where the tyrant had once shown himself, if not as a friend, yet not altogether as an enemy, passed into his hands by the act of some traitor among its own people. Assuredly no colony of Syracuse in the beginning, it now passed for a while under the power of Syracuse or of her master.

Henna
taken by
Dionysios.

Treaties
with
Agyris of
Agyrium
and Dâmôn
of Centu-
ripa.

Henna, we may believe, was by this time practically a Greek town. It was doubtless a commonwealth. Dionysios himself had first encouraged a tyranny there, and then had overthrown it². But in some other Sikel towns the tyrant of Syracuse had to deal with fellow-tyrants. The name is distinctly given to the ruler of Agyrium, Agyris, who seems to bear the name of his city, like Hyblôn at Hybla and Gelôn at Gela. An equivalent description is given to the ruler of Centuripa, Dâmôn; his name is Greek and Doric³. With both these rulers Dionysios made treaties. It might often better suit his purpose to support a tyrant who would feel himself his dependant and would practically act as his lieutenant, rather than to bring the town formally under his own dominion. This policy was afterwards largely followed by the Macedonian kings, and we may be sure that Dionysios thoroughly understood its advantages. In the case of Agyrium and its tyrant Agyris they were clear indeed. The lord of Agyrium might be a dangerous enemy, and he would be a valuable ally. Agyris is spoken of as

[¹ Diod. xiv. 78.]

[² See pp. 31, 32.]

[³ Diod. xiv. 78; *Δάμωνος τὸν δυναστεύοντα Κεντοριπίαν.*]

the most powerful tyrant in Sicily after Dionysios himself¹. CHAP. X.
 We may mark how the two rulers are spoken of together as members of the same class, without any hint at the distinction between Greek and Sikel. And we take in the prosperity and power to which some of these inland Sikel towns had grown when we read the description of a place which now seems out of all ordinary tracks, which we have seen far away on its peaked hill in the outlook from other heights, but which we have had to give up the hope of ever reaching. In the days of Dionysios the holy city of Hêraklês and Iolaos must have been in the thick of the Sicilian world. In Agyrium Agyris ruled over a strong and populous city which numbered no less than twenty thousand citizens². The proportion of slaves and strangers would doubtless be far less in Agyrium than it was in Akragas; but such a number as this, or a number a good deal smaller, would mark Agyrium as a city whose friendship the master of Syracuse himself could not afford to make light of. Agyris was also master of many fortresses in the neighbourhood of his city, and he had a rich hoard in the akropolis of Agyrium. He was moreover a tyrant in every sense of the word; his hoard was filled by the spoils of the richest men of his city whom he had put to death³. Of the lord of Centuripa we have no such details; our guide is a man of Agyrium and not of Centuripa. But it may be, to judge from the milder title given to him⁴, that his rule was less lawless and bloody than that of his fellow at Agyrium.

Both these Sikel tyrants then Dionysios had every motive to win over peacefully to his alliance. It is more remark-

[¹ Diod. xiv. 95; οὗτος δὲ τῶν τότε τυράννων τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ μεγίστην εἶχε δύναμιν μετὰ Διονυσίῳ.]

[² Ib.]

[³ Ib.; ἦν δὲ καὶ εἰς τοῦτο τὸ πλῆθος ἐν τῇ πόλει συνηθροισμένον χρημάτων πολλῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν παράθεσις, ἣν Ἀγυρίς ἤθερόκει, πεφονευκῶς τοὺς εὐπορωτάτους τῶν πολιτῶν.]

[⁴ Ib. 78; τὸν δυναστεύοντα.]

CHAP. X. able when we hear at the same time of his making treaties with the people of three Sikel towns where no lord is spoken of. These we may therefore suppose to have been free commonwealths. We may be pretty sure either that Dionysios looked for a stout resistance from them, or else that he had some other special motive which led him to

Dionysios
makes
treaty with
Herbita

forego any attempt at their complete subjugation. He made a treaty with Herbita, where the second Archônides, the founder of Halæsa, had lately ruled, not as a tyrant but as a lawful prince¹. In the darkness of internal Sikel history, this looks as if he and his dynasty had passed away—whether as that of a Tarquin or as that of a Kodros—and as if Herbita was now enjoying the early days of republican freedom. If so, it must have needed some very strong motive to make Dionysios in such a case cease from troubling. He made another treaty with another

and
Assorus.

people towards whom he had every motive, if not of gratitude, at least of policy, to show every favour. These were the citizens of Assôros, the one Sikel town which had not joined in the general movement against him some years earlier². A large inland Sikel region was thus allowed to keep a certain measure of freedom; its people were the allies of Dionysios and not his subjects. Still they were watched, not only from Syracuse and his other possessions on the east side of Sicily, but also from the posts which he had gained on the north coast of the island and in its innermost centre, at Cephalædium namely and at Henna.

Makes
peace with
Herbessus.

But when we read, under another formula, that Dionysios made peace with the people of Herbessus³, we are tempted to think of another meaning. It may be that an attempt at the direct annexation of a Sikel town so much nearer to Syracuse than any of the others just spoken of had to be put off in the face of events, more distant in place, but

[¹ See p. 33.]

[² See p. 107.]

[³ Diod. xiv. 78; πρὸς Ἑρβησσίους εἰρήνην ἐποιήσατο.]

which touched the personal feelings of Dionysios far more keenly. CHAP. X.

It would seem that it was while the tyrant was thus personally warring and negotiating with the various Sikel powers that the events took place in north-eastern Sicily which were described a little while back. The Rhegines, the people of all others most hateful to the soul of Dionysios, had been befriending his enemies and attacking his friends, and they had been beaten back without any share in the success falling to the lot of himself personally¹. He now wished to show himself face to face to these presumptuous enemies, and to have his vengeance on them². But again Greek and Sikel politics could not be kept asunder. In a war with Rhêgion a Sikel enemy stood in the way whom, even apart from a war with Rhêgion, Dionysios had every motive to wish to get rid of. The new Sikel commonwealth planted by Himilkôn in its mountain home on Tauros was beginning to play its part in the affairs of Sicily. From Syracuse to Rhêgion the most obvious course by sea and land lay beneath the feet of Sikel Tauromenion. Without giving its settlers credit for making war on a great scale, they would have no lack of opportunity for annoying armies, perhaps fleets also, on their passage³. The tyrant made up his mind to deal with the nearer enemy first⁴, and an expedition to bring Tauromenion under his power was decreed in the counsels of Dionysios.

Dionysios
meditates
vengeance
on Rhê-
gion.

He resolves
to reduce
Tauro-
menion.

We have sometimes wondered at the way in which, in Sicilian and in Greek warfare generally, the winter season is constantly spoken of as of itself putting a stop to all

[¹ See p. 158.]

[² Diod. xiv. 87.]

³ Ib.; Διονύσιος, τῶν περὶ τὸν πορθμὸν αὐτῷ τόπων κατεσκευασμένων φίλων, διανοεῖτο μὲν ἐπὶ Ῥήγιον στρατιὰν ἀγειν, παρηνωχλεῖτο δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν Ταυρομένιον κατειληφότων Σικελῶν.

⁴ Ib.; Διὸ περ κρίνας συμφέρειν τούτοις ἐπιθέσθαι πρώτοις.

CHAP. X. warfare. But with the great improver of the military art the time when kings go forth to battle was not bounded by those seasons in which warfare was deemed less plentiful in hardship. Dionysios bought his mercenaries dear; they had the spoil of cities as the prize of their toil; he could therefore demand services from them which the citizen-soldiers both of Athens and Syracuse were beginning to shrink from. The day was passed when Sôkrates and his fellow-soldiers endured the winter's siege at Potidaia; but the Campanians and Iberians by whom the Sicilian warfare was now waged were still ready for such toilsome works.

Dionysios
devotes the
winter to
siege of
Tauro-
menion.

Dionysios did not shrink from devoting the winter to the siege of Tauromenion, so far as Tauromenion could be said to be besieged. He pitched his camp on the side towards the forsaken site of Naxos, and thence carried on his leaguer of the mountain-city. He deemed, we are told, that the siege would not be a long one, that the Sikels, if pressed by warfare or hunger, would soon forsake their lofty dwelling-place, a dwelling-place where they had been settled but yesterday, and for which they could have no traditional attachment¹. Nothing, as a rule, is less valuable than the surmises of our narrators, specially when they write some ages after, as to the thoughts and motives of princes and generals. But we may be sure that we are here not listening to the compiler of Agyrium in the days of Augustus, not even to the banished of Tauromenion in the days of Agathoklês, but to the statesman and soldier of Syracuse who as yet shared the inmost counsels of her master. It is Philistos, and none other, who gives us this vivid picture of the workings of the tyrant's mind and of the feelings of the people with whom the tyrant had to deal. Dionysios had clearly not reckoned on the strength of purpose in a long oppressed nationality which has at last again lifted

Calcula-
tions of
Dionysios
recorded by
Philistos.

¹ Diod. xiv. 87; προσεκάρτερι τῇ πολιορκίᾳ τὸν χειμῶνα, νομίζον τοὺς Σικελοὺς ἐκλείπειν τὸν λόφον, διὰ τὸ μὴ πάσαι κατακκημένα.

up its head among mankind. The Sikels of Tauromenion had indeed no immediate tie to Tauromenion, as to a native and ancestral city; but Tauromenion looked down on the ground where Naxos once had stood. They had heard of old time and their fathers had told them how that was the spot where the Greek had first begun to encroach upon the Sikel. The spot which had been the firstfruits of Greek invasion had more lately become the firstfruits of the new-born life of the Sikel; it was theirs by the gift of the very man who now came against them. They had won back the soil of their forefathers; they would not move from the lofty dwelling-place which commanded it¹. If Dionysios was to win Tauromenion, he must win it only by a struggle in which every man of Tauromenion would be ready to fight to the death.

CHAP. X.

If the Sikels of Tauromenion had fully nerved their hearts for the defence, Dionysios had no less fully made up his mind to become master of their stubborn stronghold. It was now the winter solstice, and the snow was thick on the upper heights of Tauros², as it may sometimes, even in more genial seasons of the year, be seen from Tauros itself lying thick on the hills of the oldest Italy. While the ground was thus covered, the Sikels, in one at least of the fortresses of Tauromenion, kept a watch less strict than should have been kept when such an enemy was threatening them³. The fact of their heedlessness reached

Assault
on Tauro-
menion.

¹ This most remarkable setting forth of Sikel feeling stands thus (c. 88) in formal opposition to the mistaken belief of Dionysios; *οἱ δὲ Σικελοὶ παρὰ τῶν πατέρων ἐκ παλαιοῦ παρεληφότες, οἷ τὰ μέρη ταῦτα τῆς γῆσου Σικελῶν κατεχόντων, Ἕλληνες πρῶτως καταπλεύσαντες ἐκτίσαν μὲν Νάξον, ἐξέβαλον δ' ἐκτὸς τοῦ τόπου τοὺς τότε κατοικοῦντας Σικελούς, διδὲ δὴ φάσκοντες πατρίαν ἀνακτήσασθαι χώραν, καὶ περὶ αὐν εἰς τοὺς ἑαυτῶν προγόνους ἐξήμαρτον Ἕλληνες ἀμύνεσθαι δικαίως ἐφιλοτιμοῦντο κατασχεῖν τὸν λόφον.* We must imagine Britons of the time of Egberht living within sight of Ebbesfleet.

² Diod. xiv. 88; *ἔτυχον μὲν οὖσαι τροπαὶ χειμεριναί, καὶ διὰ τοὺς ἐπιγενομένους χειμῶνας ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν τόπος πλήρης ἦν χιόνος.*

³ *Ib.*; *Διονύσιος τοὺς Σικελούς, διὰ τὴν ὀχρότητα καὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ*

CHAP. X. the watchful ear of the tyrant, and he planned an attack
 Night assault on compared to which the famous night attack of the Athenians
 Tauro- on the Epipolai of Syracuse sounds like child's-play. On
 menion. a moonless and stormy night Dionysios led out his forces
 to the assault of the heights of Tauromenion¹. The
 whiteness of the snow was their only help against utter
 darkness; but the paths, rough at best, were deeply clogged
 with its fall; the intense cold touched the eyesight of
 Dionysios himself and covered his face with wounds². Yet
 he and his followers pressed on with a stout heart; their
 first assault was seemingly directed against the lower
 height, the hill on which the famous theatre arose in after-
 days. "They took one akropolis³;" and from that strong-
 hold Dionysios was enabled to make a successful dash on
 the town itself, and to lead his troops within it⁴. The
 news that the enemy was actually within their gates
 aroused the men of Tauromenion from their slumbers.
 They gathered fast in the town itself, and helpers doubt-
 less sped down from the Castle, perhaps from the loftier
 height of Mola⁵. The lord of Syracuse and his soldiers
 were surrounded in the dead of the night, in a strange
 town, by a force evidently greater than their own. Six
 hundred were killed on the spot; the more part, the tyrant
 himself among them, were driven over the cliffs between
 the town and the sea. They rolled or scrambled down how
 they might, and most of them lost their armour on the

One akro-
 polis taken.

Repulse of
 Dionysios.

τείχους βαθυμούντας περὶ τὴν κατὰ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν φυλακὴν εὐράν. See Appendix IV.

¹ Diod. xiv. 88; ὥρμησε νυκτὸς ἀσελήνου καὶ χειμέριον πρὸς τοὺς ἀνατάτω τόπους. See Appendix IV.

² Ib.; πολλὰ δὲ κακοπαθήσας διὰ τε τὴν τῶν κρημνῶν δυσχέριαν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῆς χιόνος . . . καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον ἐξήλασε καὶ τὰς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐβλάψε διὰ τὸ ψῦχος.

³ Ib.; μᾶς μὲν ἀκροπόλεως ἐκυρίευσεν. See Appendix IV.

⁴ Ib.; μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰς τὸ ἕτερον μέρος παρεσκευασθὲν, εἰσέγαγε τὴν δύναμιν εἰς τὴν πόλιν. See Appendix IV.

⁵ See Appendix IV.

way. Dionysios was taken up with the breath barely left in his body. But he had the honour—it is surely his right-hand man who tells the tale—of being the only man in his company who came down from scaling the heights of Tauromenion still wearing his breast-plate¹. CHAP. I.

Tauromenion was thus saved from the attack of the Syracusan tyrant to be still for a very short time a centre of renewed Sikel nationality. The discomfiture of Dionysios not only put off his attack on Rhégion for some while, but stirred up all his other enemies to take action against him. But the two names that are first mentioned raise some difficulty. We are told that the people of Akragas and of Messana, after this mishap of Dionysios, drove out his partisans and asserted their freedom². Akragas had thrown off the supremacy of Carthage at the beginning of the first Punic war of Dionysios³. That must practically have meant that it passed from the supremacy of Carthage to the supremacy, if not to the direct dominion, of Dionysios. It was only in human nature that those who had won the inch should wish for the ell, that those who had exchanged a barbarian for a Greek master should next wish to be without any master at all. And it was further in Akragantine nature to loathe any superiority on the part of Syracuse in any shape. How far any Sikeliot state could, as things stood then, expect to keep perfect independence, alike of Dionysios and of Carthage, is another matter. The statement about Messana is more puzzling. Revolt of Akragas and Messana.

¹ Diod. u. s.; ἐξέώσθησαν οἱ μετὰ τοῦ Διονυσίου καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ φυγῇ, τυπτόμενοι εἰς τὸν θώρακα, περικυλισθῆ, καὶ παρ' ὀλίγον συνελήφθη ζῶν . . . ἀπέβαλον δὲ τὰς πανοπλίας οἱ πλείστοι, καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ ὁ Διονύσιος μόνον τὸν θώρακα διέσωσε. In the somewhat similar case of the Athenians who fell and leaped from Epipolai (Thuc. vii. 44, 45, see Sicily, iii. 316), it is not the loss of the breast-plate that we hear of, but of the shield, which is more intelligible.

[² Diod. xiv. 88.]

[³ See p. 65.]

CHAP. X. were so common in Greek cities, they were so specially common in Messana above other Greek cities, that it may be that those whom Dionysios had himself planted in Messana thus soon turned against him. Still it is hard to believe in such a change at this particular moment; for directly afterwards we hear of Messana again, and we hear of it in a way which implies that it was friendly to Dionysios. One is tempted to see some mistake in the text—possibly some confusion in the compiler—but it is dangerous to try to set it right by guess-work¹.

§ 4. *The Second Punic War of Dionysios.*

B.C. 392.

Expedition
of Magôn
against
Messana.

We now, quite suddenly, without any hint or preparation, find ourselves in the midst of another Punic war.

[Magôn, who commanded the] Carthaginian forces in Sicily, thought the opportunity a good one to attempt to win increased influence for Carthage in the island, and to win it in a manner unusual with Punic commanders. He took to showing every sort of consideration to the Sicilian cities which were under Carthaginian rule; he welcomed those who were driven into exile by Dionysios; he made alliances with the Sikel enemies of the tyrant². Thus strengthened by the accession of native allies, he set out on an expedition against Messana, and encamped on the road near Abacænum. That Sikel town had been shorn of part of its territory for his foundation at Tyndaris; it had therefore gladly entered the Punic alliance³. There is a certain interest

[¹ Grote (c. lxxxiii. note) remarks; "I cannot but think that Diodorus has here inadvertently placed the word *Μεσσηνίοι* instead of a name belonging to some other community—what community we cannot tell." Holm (G. S. ii. 438) suggests *Καμαρναῖοι*.]

[² Diod. xiv. 90; *ἐποίησάτο δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πλείστον τῶν Σικελῶν συμμαχίας*.]

[³ *Ib.* Cp. p. 153.]

in this campaign, waged by a Punic general in quite a new character. We hear nothing of any reinforcements being sent from Africa; Magôn makes war, it would seem, at the head of the forces of the Carthaginian possessions in Sicily, and of any natives of the island, Greek or Sikel, that would join him. But against such a combination as this the lord of Syracuse proved the stronger. Dionysios came in person, CHAP. X. gave battle to Magôn, and defeated him with the loss of eight hundred men¹. This number shows how different a kind of army this must have been from those which Carthage was accustomed to gather from every land of the barbarians of the West. Carthage, simply as a Sicilian power, was weaker than Syracuse under such a leader as Dionysios. Magôn defeated by Dionysios.

The unsuccessful expedition of Magôn against Messana seems to have called Carthage back to her more usual way of carrying on Sicilian warfare. The depression which had followed the overthrow before Syracuse had now passed away. The defeat at Abacænum had not seriously weakened the Carthaginian power, while it would be felt as a call to greater exertions. An army of the usual kind, numbering eighty thousand, was got together from Africa and Sardinia. This time there is no mention of Spain; but the barbarians of Italy are specially spoken of². Carthage, like her general, had taken to milder ways. Magôn, instead of being crucified for his defeat, was put in command of the greater force which was now sent over to Sicily. Thus strengthened, he set forth on a march among the Sikel towns in the inland parts of the island. He won over, we are told, many cities by revolt from Dionysios³. It would have been no great trouble to give their names; but we get no detail till the Punic general reached the territory of Agyrium. There the local interest of our guide Fresh Carthaginian expedition under Magôn.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 90.]

[² Diod. xiv. 95; τῶν ἐξ Ἰταλίας βαρβάρων.]

[³ Ib.]

CHAP. X. is kindled, and he minutely fixes the site of Magôn's camp by the river Chrysas, near the road that leads to Morgantina¹. Agyris, the powerful tyrant of Agyrium, was a firm ally of Dionysios, and no persuasion of Magôn could win him over to the Carthaginian side. Magôn was therefore minded to press on further, specially as he had heard that the lord of Syracuse was himself on his march to meet him. So he was, at the head of such a force as he could get together at the moment, a force of twenty thousand, Syracusan and mercenary. Marching inland, he drew near to the host of Magôn before it had advanced any great distance beyond Agyrium. He then first sent messages to Agyris, and then entered Agyrium in person with a small party. He called on Agyris to abide in his alliance and to fight manfully for the common cause². It was the common cause of tyrants; but it was also the cause of Sicilian independence. For the dominion of Carthage, however established, over any Sikel or Sikeliot town would have been far harder to shake off than the lordship either of Agyris or of Dionysios. More immediate arguments were not wanting. Dionysios promised Agyris a large increase of territory as the reward of vigorous help in the present need³. Thus appealed to, the Sikel tyrant first furnished his Greek brother with corn and all that his army needed, and then joined his camp with his whole force. Magôn had now to cope with the two greatest native powers of Sicily, Greek and barbarian.

Agyris of
Agyrium
helps
Dionysios.

In point of numbers the Punic host no doubt still outdid the combined power of Syracuse and Agyrium. But it was encamped in an enemy's country, and it was hard work

[¹ Diod. xiv. 95; κατεστρατοῦνδυσεν ἐν τῇ τῶν Ἀγυρναίων χώρα παρὰ τὸν Χρύσαν ποταμὸν, ἐγγὺς τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς φερομένης εἰς Μοργαντῖναν. This passage is valuable for the light it throws on the whereabouts of Morgantina. The Chrysas is the modern Dittaino.]

[² Ib.; ἔπεισε τὸν Ἀγύριν συμμαχεῖσθαι γησίῳς.]

[³ Ib.]

to get provisions. For the men of Agyrum naturally CHAP. X. knew every inch of their own land; they could lie in ambush at every turn, and cut off every party that set forth from the Punic camp in search of food¹. By these means the Carthaginian army was slowly wasting away. Dionysios deemed it the wiser course to go on with this gradual process of destruction rather than to risk a pitched battle. What follows in our one narrative is strange. The Syracusans called on Dionysios to lead them at once against the barbarians. When he refused, they left his camp; he then called the slaves to freedom². The last words, it is to be supposed, mean that he armed the slaves who accompanied the horsemen and heavy-armed on a campaign. But who were the deserters? Are we by the word Syracusans to understand the force of Dionysios in general or the Syracusans as distinguished from the mercenaries? If the citizens are meant, it is somewhat strange that they could desert so easily, under the eyes both of the mercenaries and of the forces of Agyris. In an earlier case where Dionysios refuses to attack the enemy and the refusal is followed by desertion, the malecontents are neither Syracusans nor mercenaries, but the soldiers from other Sikeliot cities³. But then the Syracusans and the other Greeks had distinctly different interests, which does not seem to be the case now. And anyhow it is strange that Magôn did not choose the time for an attack when the Greek and Sikel army was weakened by the loss of a considerable part of its strength. It is even more strange when we read that Magôn comes to terms with Dionysios. the Carthaginians—whether Magôn is meant or any special commission from Carthage—chose that moment to ask for peace. Strangest of all is it to hear that Dionysios then

[¹ Diod. xiv. 96.]

[² Ib.; 'Ο δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εὐλαβούμενος ἐπ' ἐλευθερίαν ἐκάλει τοὺς οὐκείτους.]

[³ See pp. 119, 120.]

CHAP. X. gave the slaves back to their masters, the masters who had just forsaken him¹. There must be some mistake or other in the story as it is told us; but we have no means of setting it right. But the confusion of the narrative is no reason for doubting the reality of the peace which ended this strange campaign of Agyrium. Its terms were doubtless, like the terms of other treaties, graven on the stone to speak for themselves.

Terms of
the new
peace with
Carthage.

Those terms are well worth comparing with the terms of the earlier treaty concluded between Dionysios and Carthage². In both the great powers sat, with the usual calmness of great powers, to portion out the territory and the souls of all the lesser powers without asking their consent. The new treaty, it is said, was grounded upon the old one, and re-enacted or assumed its provisions, except when new clauses were formally brought in. Yet it must have contained several such clauses which do not appear in the wretchedly meagre account which is all that we have. According to that, the only new provision was that the Sikels, and one set of Sikels in particular, should be subject to Dionysios³. But this alone would mark the difference between the present treaty and the older one. The older treaty is one dictated to Dionysios by Carthage; the present treaty is one dictated to Carthage by Dionysios. The lord of Syracuse had grown not a little in power in the twelve years between the two. The first treaty provided that certain parts of Sicily, Greek and barbarian, should remain under the dominion or supremacy of Carthage. It provided that certain other parts, Greek and

[¹ Diod. xiv. 96; ἀναπομπήμους τοῖς κυρίοις ἐποίησε (τοὺς οἰκέτας).]

[² Sicily, iii. 579 seqq. In 397 no formal treaty had been concluded; see p. 147.]

³ Diod. xiv. 96; ἦσαν δ' αἱ συνθήκαι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παραλήσαιαι ταῖς πρότερον, Σικελοὺς δὲ δεῖν ὑπὸ Διονύσιον τετάχθαι, καὶ παραλαβεῖν αὐτὸν τὸ Ταυρομένιον.

barbarian, should be independent. It guaranteed nothing to Dionysios, except his dominion in his own city. Leontinoi, Messana, and all the Sikel communities were guaranteed against him¹. In our meagre report, the chief feature of the new treaty is that it guarantees the independence of nobody. As for the Sikels, instead of their independence being guaranteed against Dionysios, it is his dominion over them which is guaranteed. But it is absolutely inconceivable that the treaty contained no other clauses. It must have said something about the Greek towns whose condition had been so greatly changed since the first treaty. By that treaty Kamarina, Gela, Akragas, Selinous, the new Himera, were all put under Carthage in one shape or another². They were now all, perhaps formally independent, but certainly under the practical power of Dionysios. That treaty guaranteed the independence of Leontinoi. Leontinoi was now occupied by the mercenaries of Dionysios. It guaranteed the independence of Messana. Since then Messana had been destroyed by Himilkôn and restored by Dionysios. The treaty must assuredly have contained clauses which in some way recognized the existing state of things on these points³. We wish further to know whether the treaty provided anything about Solous, which was said to have passed into the hands of Dionysios. If we could be sure that its name did not occur, that would be no small argument against the truth of its surrender⁴. Pity indeed it is that we have not its very words as they were graven on the stone. We should then know how the Syracusan state was

CHAP. X.

Meagre-
ness of
details.

¹ See Sicily, iii. 582.

² See Sicily, iii. 580, 581.

³ The thought does suggest itself whether the first Punic war was really ended by a treaty providing for all these points which Diodôros forgot to record at all. This is quite possible, and it would make the present passage quite clear. But it is just as likely that Diodôros, having his head just now full of Tauromenion and the Sikels, copied only what concerned them. Only why did he not mention his own Agyrium?

⁴ See above, p. 159.

CHAP. X. described in a diplomatic act of the time of Dionysios, and we should know some other things as well.

Sikels
subject to
Dionysios.

The Sikels then were to be subject to Dionysios. One is inclined to ask whether no exception was made in favour of the lord of Agyrium. His services in the late war had been great; did he gain the increase of territory which Dionysios had promised him? Perhaps these points were left for the two tyrants to settle between themselves without Carthaginian intervention. Nor do we hear anything special about the foundation of Archônides at Halæsa, nor about Cephalædium which Himilkôn had once taken into his friendship. But that one Sikel commonwealth which had come into being during the wars between Carthage and Dionysios, the one which had been called into being by a Carthaginian commander, as an ally of Carthage and a check upon her enemies, was cruelly betrayed. A special clause of the treaty authorized Dionysios to take possession of Tauromenion.

Dionysios
occupies
Tauromenion.

After the conclusion of the treaty, Magôn sailed back to Carthage. Dionysios did not delay in carrying out the last clause, which guaranteed to him the possession of the mountain-city where he had undergone that utter discomfort which had given the signal for the war which had just ended. It is provoking, after the vigorous description which we have not long ago read of the tyrant's failure at Tauromenion, to be told now without a single detail, without the faintest explanation of means and circumstances, that Dionysios now took possession of the town. The Sikels of Tauromenion, when Dionysios came against them before, had the alliance of Carthage to look to; now they were left to their own resources. Still we should at least like to know whether the tyrant marched up by the steep sides of Tauros and entered in by the gate of Tauromenion without a blow being struck against him. What we do know is his treatment of the place when he

had possession of it. The word went forth that those who had boasted that they had come to abide on Tauros¹ should abide on it no longer. Most, seemingly not all, of the Sikel inhabitants were driven out. In their stead Dionysios placed there a body of his mercenaries, those who were deemed fittest to hold such a post². Are we to believe that some of the Sikel inhabitants endured to dwell on in their conquered city on condition of entering the tyrant's service along with the new-comer? At any rate Tauromenion now ceased to be a distinctly Sikel community, the home of a nationality distinctly hostile to that of Hellas. But it did not as yet distinctly become Greek. It was not a national but a military settlement, a settlement of the mercenaries of Dionysios, who might be Greek, Sikel, Iberian, Campanian, anything else. Indeed, notwithstanding the romantic interest of the Sikel revival, we must allow that the foundation of Tauromenion, in this specially Sikel character, as a post of Sikels against Sikeliots, was out of place in the days of Dionysios. The decree had gone forth that the Sikel was to live and flourish, but that he was to live and flourish only by becoming a Greek. Tauromenion therefore, the embodiment of Sikel hostility to the Greek, was not fated to abide in its Sikel character. It was no gain truly in itself when the Sikel colonists of Himilkôn were displaced to make way for the motley hirelings of Dionysios, strangers many of them both to the soil of Sicily and to the life of Hellas. Still the conquest of Tauromenion by Dionysios was in some sort its admission into the Greek world. We hear nothing more of the town during the rest of his reign; in the time of his son another change of

CHAP. X.
Mercen-
aries
planted
at Tauro-
menion
in place
of Sikels.

¹ See above, p. 108, and Appendix IV.

² Diod. u. s.; μετὰ δὲ τὰς συνθήκας, Μάγων μὲν ἀπέπλευσε, Διονύσιος δὲ παραλαβὼν τὸ Ταυρομένιον, τοὺς μὲν πλείστους τῶν ἐκεῖ Σικελῶν ἐξέβαλε, τῶν δ' ἰδίων μισθοφόρων τοὺς ἐπιτηδειοτάτους ἐπιλέξας κατήκισε. This is all. Yet surely Diodoros had books before him which could have told us more.

CHAP. X. inhabitants was in store for it which was to make it more purely Greek.

§ 5. *From the Second to the Third Punic War of Dionysios.*

B. C. 392-383.

Dionysios
turns
against
Rhégion.

With this great strengthening of the power of the Syracusan tyrant in his own island the nature of his power, and the whole character of his history, begins to change.

As yet Dionysios wished to avoid any direct warfare with the Italiot League¹. It would come sooner or later; but his object was to secure for himself, before it began, a safe foothold on Italian soil. The position of Rhégion, the key and bulwark of Italy on the Sicilian side², the defeat which he had already undergone at the hands of its citizens, all marked out the city on the Italian side of the strait as the

His private
grudge
against
Rhéginés.

first object of his attack. [Moreover he harboured against Rhégion a grudge of a more personal nature. Some years earlier than this, when seeking support on every side against his Punic foes, he had asked a wife of the Rhéginés. They however had refused him his request, adding, it was said, the gibe that he might, if he pleased, take the hangman's daughter. He had then turned to Lokroi, where they gave him Doris, the daughter of one of the leading citizens³.]

¹ Diod. xiv. 100; *τὴν μὲν κατ' ἐκείνους [τοὺς κατ' Ἰταλίαν Ἕλληνας] κοινὴν στρατείαν εἰς ἕτερον καιρὸν ἀνεβάλετο.*

² *Ib.*; *κρίνας συμφέρειν ἐπιχειρεῖν πρώτῃ τῇ τῶν Ῥηγίων πόλει διὰ τὸ πολεμητήριον αὐτὴν εἶναι τῆς Ἰταλίας.*

[³ Diod. xiv. 44; Plut., *Dion.*, 3; and compare *Ælian*, V. H. xii. 47, and xiii. 10. For the answer of the Rhéginés see Diod. xiv. 107 (*φασὶ τοὺς Ῥηγίους ἀποκριθῆναι δημοσίᾳ τοῖς πρέσβεσιν ὡς μόνῃν αὐτῷ συγχωρῆσαι γαμεῖν τὴν τοῦ δημίου θυγατέρα*). According to Plutarch (*Timoleôn*, 6), Dionysios also met with a rebuff from Aristeidés at Lokroi. On the same day he also married Aristomaché the daughter of his friend Hipparinos at Syracuse (Diod. xiv. 44; Plut., *Dion.*, 3; *Æl.* V. H. xii. 47). Mr. Freeman remarks on this (*Story of Sicily*, 165); "For a man to have two wives at once was utterly against all Greek custom. But Dionysios kept them both; he had children by both, and treated them with equal honour."]

He set forth from Syracuse, not indeed at the head of such an army as he had led against Motya, but with a power which was great according to the older standard of Greek warfare. He commanded twenty thousand footmen, a thousand horsemen, and a hundred and twenty ships. With these he did not sail straight to Rhêgion, but made the friendly soil of Lokroi the base of his attack. From thence his fleet sailed along the coast, doubling the cape [of Hêraklê] and turning northward into the strait¹. Meanwhile with his land-force he set forth from the border of Lokroi and Rhêgion, and marched against Rhêgion, plundering and burning as he went. The whole force by land and sea now began the siege of the city; the Italian side of the strait was lined with the invading forces of Sicily². But the Italiot League was not wanting to its threatened ally. As soon as the landing of Dionysios was made, sixty confederate triremes were sent forth from Krotôn to the help of Rhêgion. Dionysios, with fifty of his ships, sailed to meet them while they were still making their way up the strait. The Italiots, though their force was greater, feared to meet the Syracusan vessels, and fled to the shore. Dionysios followed and began to make prizes of the Italiot ships and to tow them off. We hear of no resistance on the part of their crews, who must have escaped to land. But the spot, not otherwise defined, must have been near Rhêgion; for the whole Rhêgine force came forth to help. One party succeeded in dragging all the ships on shore, while another, by a constant shower of missiles, kept the ships of Dionysios off³. A storm came to their further help. Seven of the Syracusan ships were

CHAP. X.
Expedition
against
Rhêgion.
B.C. 391.

Dionysios
makes
Lokroi
his base.

Rhêgion
besieged.

Naval dis-
comfiture
of Diony-
sios.

¹ The course is marked in the words of Diôdoros, xiv. 100; *συμπαρέπλευσε δὲ καὶ ὁ στόλος ἐπὶ θάτερα μέρη τῆς θαλάττης*.

² Diod. xiv. 100; *πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει περὶ τὸν πορθμὸν κατεστρατοπέδευσε*.

³ Ib.; *συνδύσας ἀπέστα τὰς παρορμούσας ἐν τῇ γῇ. κινδυνευουσῶν δὲ τῶν ἐξήκοντα τριήρων ἀλῶναι, Ἑγγίνοι πανδημὶ παρβοήθησαν, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς τῷ πλήθει τῶν βελῶν ἀνείρξαν τὸν Διονύσιον*. It seems clear that the seamen of the sixty confederate ships were also on shore.

CHAP. X. dashed ashore; their crews, amounting to fifteen hundred men, were partly drowned, partly taken alive by the Rhegines¹. Dionysios himself, in his own quinquereme, soaring above the smaller vessels around him, fled to the opposite coast. The storm pressed heavily on him and the waves dashed over even the lofty sides of his ship². It was not till about midnight that he found himself in the safer waters sheltered by the Zanklon of Messana.

Dionysios
returns to
Syracuse.

Rhégion was thus rescued a second time; the energy of her own citizens was favoured by the active help of the powers of nature. Not only were the Italiot ships and men saved from Dionysios; but the winter was coming on, and the tyrant withdrew from his Italian expedition altogether. That is, he did not strike another blow till next year. But he was active in another way. Dionysios was ready to be at any moment, as suited his purpose, either the champion of Hellas or her betrayer. This time the latter character was more convenient. Before he left the neighbourhood of the strait, he formed an alliance with the Lucanian enemies of the Italiot cities³. Its terms evidently were that the barbarians should act against them by land and the fleet of Dionysios by sea. Just as after the taking of Motya, Leptinés was left in command of the Syracusan fleet, while the tyrant himself went back to his capital⁴.

Alliance
with Luca-
nians.

¹ Diod. xiv. 100; τούτων ἅμα ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐκβρασθέντων ἐπὶ τὴν Ῥηγίην, οἱ Ῥηγίνοι πολλοὺς τῶν ναυτῶν ἐζώρησαν.

² Ib.; πολλάκις παρ' ὀλίγον ἐλθὼν ὑποβρύχιος.

³ Ib.; οὗτος μὲν πρὸς Λευκανοὺς συμμαχίαν ποιησάμενος ἀπήγαγε τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς Συρακοῦσας. That this means only the land-force is plain from what follows.

⁴ Ib. 102; ἦν δὲ ὁ στόλος ὁ προσπλέων Διονυσίου τοῦ τυράννου, καὶ ναύαρχος ὑπῆρχεν αὐτῷ Λεπτίνης ὁ ἀδελφός, ἀπεσταλμένος τοῖς Λευκανοῖς ἐπὶ βοήθειαν. This comes a little later, but within the winter of B. C. 390-389. It is much more likely that Leptinés was left behind than that he was sent out a second time.

The barbarians did not fail to carry out their share of the agreement with the tyrant. A Lucanian invasion of the territory of Thourioi followed while it was still winter¹. Messages were sent to the other Italiot cities, asking help according to the treaty. The generals of the several commonwealths did not loiter on an errand in which their lives were at stake. The forces of the other towns were making ready to march; but the Thourians, in their self-confidence and perhaps wishing to win the credit of some exploit done single-handed, would not wait for the coming of the main body of their allies². An army of 14,000 foot and a thousand horse entered the Lucanian territory, territory much of which had once been Greek. Within it lay the flourishing town of Laos, once the representative of Sybaris, then the scene of the greatest blow which had been dealt to Hellas in those regions³, now a dwelling-place and stronghold of the barbarians. Perhaps the recovery of Laos was the direct object of the enterprise from the beginning; at any rate it became so as soon as the invading Thourians tasted the first sweets of success. The Lucanians seem to have formed their plans with skill worthy of the Samnites or of the Romans. They withdrew into their own land and offered no opposition to the entry of the invaders⁴. The Greeks attacked a border fortress whose name is not given; they stormed it and won a rich booty. The prize was, as our guide says, a bait thrown in

CHAP. X.

B.C. 390.

Lucanians

invade ter-

ritory of

Thourioi.

Thourians

invade

Lucania.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 101. It is now that Diodóros gives the terms of the treaty by which the Hellenic Cities of Italy had bound themselves to come to the assistance of any one of them that was attacked by the Lucanians.]

² Ib.; *προξεναστάτες ταῖς ὀρμαῖς, καὶ τὸ τῶν συμμάχων πλῆθος οὐκ ἀναμείναντες, ἀνέβησαν ἐπὶ τοὺς Λευκανοὺς*. This seems to imply that some part of the allies had already come.

³ Ib. It should be noticed that Laos is brought in only through an emendation of the text. But in the sentence *βουλόμενοι λαὸν καὶ πόλιν εὐδαίμονα πολιορκῆσαι*, it seems quite safe to read *Λᾶον πόλιν* for *λαὸν καὶ πόλιν*. The transcriber had not heard of the town of Laos.

⁴ Ib.; *ἀπεχώρησαν εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν χώραν*.

CHAP. X.
Thourians
march on
Laos.

their way to lead them to destruction¹. Puffed up with their success, they now at least marched directly on Laos.

Their road lay through a plain hemmed in by lofty and steep rocks on every side. They found the pass barred by a Lucanian force; crowds of barbarians showed themselves on every height. Surprised and disheartened by the sight, the Greeks found themselves suddenly attacked by the barbarians as they came down from the hills. Thirty thousand Lucanian footmen and four thousand horsemen was a force which far outnumbered the invading army of Thourioi.

Defeated
by Luca-
nians.

A battle followed in the plain; the Lucanian orders were to spare none²; ten thousand Greeks were said to have fallen. Of the rest, some contrived to escape to a hill that overlooked the western sea; another party, seeing ships of war sailing near the coast, took them for those of their Rhégine allies. They threw themselves into the sea, and swam to the ships³. But the ships were not of Rhégion, but of Syracuse; the Thourians found themselves on board the fleet of Dionysios, under the command of his brother Leptinês. To have sold them as slaves, or even to have put them to death, would have been no astonishing incident of Greek warfare. But Leptinês was a man of nobler mould than his brother, and was under the influence of pan-hellenic feelings in which his brother had no share. He was sent to give help to the Lucanians⁴. He would doubtless, as admiral of Syracuse, have zealously carried on any ordinary operation of naval warfare against an Italiot fleet. But he would do no wrong to suppliants; he would not slay or enslave fellow Greeks whom a strange accident had placed in his power; he would seize the opportunity that was given him for trying to bring about a peace.

Leptinês
receives
Thourian
refugees
kindly.

¹ Diod. xiv. 101; πολλῆς ἀφελείας κυρεύσαντες, καθαιρεὶ δέλεαρ ἔλαβον τῆς ταυτῶν ἀπωλείας.

² Ib. 102; παρήγγελλον γὰρ οἱ Λευκανοὶ μηδένα ζωγρεῖν.

³ Ib.; συνέφυγον εἰς τὴν θάλατταν καὶ διενήχοντο ἐπὶ τὰς τριήρεις.

⁴ Ib.; ἀπεσταλμένος τοῖς Λευκανοῖς ἐπὶ βοήθειαν.

Leptinæs accordingly received the swimmers kindly; he then went on shore, and persuaded his Lucanian allies to consent to what our guide calls a peace with the confederate Italiots¹, but which is more likely to have been a temporary military convention. Its terms are not quite easy to understand. "He persuaded the Lucanians to take a *mina* of silver for each of their captives; they were in number above a thousand; and he pledged his own credit for payment²." Now it would not seem that there were at that moment any prisoners, strictly speaking, in the hands of the Lucanians. The orders given to the Lucanian army were to make no prisoners; nor will the name strictly apply to the fugitives who had sought shelter on board the Syracusan ships, and still less to those who had escaped to the hill, and of whom we hear no more. Their numbers and those of the swimmers together would be much more than a thousand. Those who occupied the hill must have escaped by some path or other, likely enough under the terms of the convention. The thousand who were ransomed would be the swimmers. The Lucanians were likely to demand that Leptinæs should either give them up to his allies or himself deal with them as prisoners. Instead of so doing he purchased their freedom at the cost of a thousand *minæ*.

The generous act of Leptinæs won him the greatest admiration and thankfulness from all the Italiot Greeks. But it by no means suited the purposes of his brother and master at Syracuse, and it awakened his heavy displeasure³. Nor from the side of Dionysios can we wonder at this. Looking at Dionysios as a lawful sovereign, or indeed as

CHAP. X.
Leptinæs
ransoms
Thourian
refugees.

Displea-
sure of
Dionysios.

¹ Diod. xiv. 102; διαλλάξας τοὺς Ἰταλιώτας τοῖς Λευκανοῖς, ἔπεισεν εἰρήνην ποιήσασθαι. And directly after, συντεθεικὼς τὸν πόλεμον.

² Ib.; ἔπεισε τοὺς Λευκανοὺς ὑπὲρ ἐκάστου τῶν αἰχμαλώτων λαβεῖν ἀργυρίου μνᾶν· οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὑπὲρ τοὺς χιλίους· γενόμενος δὲ τῶν χρημάτων ἐγγυητής, κ.τ.λ.

³ Diodóros says expressly, μεγάλης ἀποδοχῆς ἔτυχε παρὰ τοῖς Ἰταλιώταις, συμφερόντος αὐτῷ, οὐ λυσিতেλῶς δὲ Διονυσίῳ συντεθεικὼς τὸν πόλεμον.

CHAP. X. *stratēgos autokratōr* of the Syracusan commonwealth, Leptinēs had certainly exceeded his powers. His commission was to help the Lucanians; instead of which he had brought about a peace, or at least an armistice, greatly to the advantage of the Italiots. Dionysios had hoped, through his alliance with the Lucanians, to make himself master of all Greek Italy. The act of Leptinēs, stepping in to rob the Lucanians, and thereby Dionysios, of the advantage of a great success, had altogether thwarted his plans¹. It is not wonderful that the tyrant deprived a brother who was in truth too good for his purposes of his post of admiral, and gave it to his other brother Thearidēs². The act of Leptinēs had stopped all further operations in Italy for that year. With the beginning of the military season of the next year, he would himself go forth to battle.

Leptinēs
replaced by
Thearidēs
as admiral.

B.C. 389.

Campaign
of Dionysios
against
Italiot
League.

Up to this time the direct warfare of Dionysios had been against Rhêgion only. He was the friend of the Lucanians only because they had come to his help against the Italiot confederates; but he was the enemy of the Italiot confederates only because they had come to the help of Rhêgion. His present campaign was to be directly against the League as a body³. Granting his position of hostility towards Rhêgion, the action of the League had given him a *casus belli* which was convenient for one who was seeking for either dominion or influence in Italy. This time then he set forth from Syracuse, but not for an attack on Rhêgion as his first object. Twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse marched by land; forty ships of war and three hundred vessels laden with provisions sailed in concert with

¹ Diod. xiv. 102; ἤλπιζε γὰρ ὁ Διονύσιος, τῶν Ἰταλιωτῶν πολεμούντων πρὸς Λευκανοὺς, ἐπελθὼν βλάβος ἐν κρατῆσαι τῶν κατ' Ἰταλίαν πραγμάτων, ἀποελυμένον διὰ τηλικούτου πολέμου, δυσχερῶς ἐν περιγενέσθαι.

² Ib.

³ Ib. 103; Διονύσιος ὁ τῶν Συρακουσίαν δυνάστης φανερώς ἐαυτὸν ἀναδείξας ἐπὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν στρατευόμενον. This surely in distinction from the language used at the beginning of cap. 100.

them along the east coast of Sicily. On the fifth day the combined force reached Messina. Thearidēs was now to act for the first time in his new command. News was brought that ten Rhêgine ships were afloat somewhere in the neighbourhood of the isles of Lipara¹. Dionysios sent his brother after them with thirty ships. Thearidēs lighted on them at some opportune point not more clearly described², and brought the whole ten ships with their crews into the haven of Messina. The captives were left as prisoners in the hands of the Messanians³.

This success was a good omen to begin with; but the main object of Dionysios was to make the Italiot cities feel his power more nearly. Kaulônia was chosen as the first to be attacked. It was the nearest town on the eastern coast, the first lying north of friendly Lokroi, whose territory gave him a good base of operations. Dionysios made his attack on Kaulônia; we hear no details except that he besieged the town all round, that is, we may suppose, by land and sea, and that he brought up his engines, and made many assaults on the walls⁴. But we get no such picture of their action as we got in the tale of the siege of Motya. It is plain however that the men of Kaulônia must have held out for some while, as there was time for a good deal of both diplomatic and military action while the siege was going on.

As soon as Dionysios was known to have crossed into Italy, the cities of the Italiot League began to take their

¹ Diod. xiv. 103; πεπυσμένοι γὰρ ἦν δέκα ναὺς τῶν Ῥηγίων περὶ ἐκείνους τοὺς τόπους οὖσας. One would like to have some account of their errand. Was it hostile or friendly?

² Ib.; καταλαβὼν τὴν Ῥηγίων δεκαναῖαν ἐν τισιν εὐθέτοις τόποις. Does this odd phrase mean that these ten ships formed the whole Rhêgine navy?

³ Ib.; τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους εἰς δεσμὰ καταθέμενος τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις ἔδωκε φυλάττειν. We seem not to hear of them again.

⁴ Ib.; περιεστρατοπέδευσε τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς προσερείσας, πυκνὰ προσβολὰς ἐποιεῖτο.

CHAP. X.
Krotôn
takes the
lead
against
Dionysios.

Helôris
made com-
mander-in-
chief of
Italiot
League.

measures to withstand him. Krotôn was the centre of action. A greater city than Kaulônia and the nearest to it to the north, its own turn might be looked for to come next. Moreover Krotôn was specially stirred up against the tyrant by the presence of many Syracusan exiles in the city. To Krotôn then the other cities of the League entrusted the management of the war, and seemingly put their own contingents under Krotoniat command¹. We should be well pleased to know the names of the cities concerned; but that is refused to us. One thing is plain, that the Krotoniats showed great discretion in the choice of a general. The chances of jealousy among the confederate towns were greatly lessened when the command of the whole force, Krotoniat and allied, was put into the hands of the banished Syracusan Helôris, by whose skill, as general of Rhêgion, Dionysios had been driven away from the city which he defended. To his military gifts and to his hatred of the tyrant all fully trusted as making him the fittest man to lead the confederate force to the relief of Kaulônia². As soon therefore as that force was gathered at Krotôn, fifteen thousand foot and two thousand horse—there is no mention of any naval force—Helôris set out on his march. The siege was going on; it was clearly a toilsome and dangerous business. Helôris looked for the advantage of attacking men who were already beginning to be worn out by the enterprise on which they were engaged³.

¹ Diod. xiv. 103; οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν Ἕλληνες, ὡς ἐπύθοντο τὰς τοῦ Διονυσίου δυνάμεις περαιουμένας τὸν διείργοντα πορθμὸν, καὶ αὐτοὶ στρατόπεδα συνήθροισαν. τῆς δὲ τῶν Κροτωνιατῶν πόλεως μάλιστα πολυουχλουμένης, καὶ πλείστους ἐχούσης Συρακουσίους φυγάδας, τοῦτοις τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τοῦ πολέμου παρέδωκαν.

² Ib.; οὗτοι δὲ πεφευγὼς Διονύσιον καὶ δοκῶν τόλμαν ἔχειν ἐμπρακτον, πιστότατα πρὸς τὸν τύραννον πολεμήσειν διὰ τὸ μῶσος ὑπέληπτο. See above, p. 158. Diodôros might almost seem to have forgotten what he had already recorded.

³ Ib.; ὅμα ἐνόμizen ἐπιφανείς λύσειν τὴν πολιορκίαν, ὅμα δὲ καταπεποιημένοι τοὺς πολεμίους ὑπὸ τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν προσβολῶν διαγωνισθῆναι.

The Italiot army was on its march and had reached the stream of Elleporos between Krotôn and Kaulônia¹, when Dionysios, busy in besieging the latter town, led forth his force to meet them. He had pitched his camp at an unnamed point when he heard from his spies that the Italiots were encamped at a distance of forty stadia. Helôris, on the other hand, who seems to have known nothing of the movements of Dionysios, set forth the next morning at the head of a band of five hundred picked men in advance of his main force². Presently he met the army of Dionysios ready for battle and determined to bring on an engagement at once³. The attack began. Helôris, startled at this unexpected meeting with the enemy, sent some chosen friends to quicken the march of the rest of his army, and meanwhile bore up as well as he could with his small company against the far greater numbers of Dionysios⁴. They bore up manfully; the orders of Helôris were obeyed; the rest of the Italiot army, hearing of the danger of their general and their comrades, hastened at a quick pace to their support⁵. But their speed disordered them; they came up in small parties, while the Sikeliot army kept its line in good order⁶. And they came only to find Helôris and the more part of his company already slain after a valiant resistance⁷. Still they fought as well as they

CHAP. X.
 Battle of
 the Elle-
 poros.

Helôris
 slain.

¹ It is τὸν Ἑλωρον ποταμὸν in the manuscripts of Diodôros, clearly from confusion with the name of Ἑλωρις just after. We may safely read Ἑλλέπορος from Polybios, i. 6.

² Diod. xiv. 104; Ἑλωρις μετὰ τῶν ἀρίστων πεντακοσίων προηγέτο τῆς δυνάμεως. One would fancy that the other Syracusan exiles would be in this company.

³ Ib.; ἄφνω προσεμάχετο, καὶ διεσκευασμένην ἔχων τὴν δύναμιν, ἀνοχὴν οὐδ' ἡττινοῦν ἐβίδου τοῖς πολεμίοις.

⁴ Ib.; αὐτὸς μὲν μεθ' ἃν εἶχεν ὑπέστη τοῖς ἐπιφερομένοις, τῶν δὲ φίλων τινὰς ἀπέστειλεν ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, ἐπιστεῦσαι τὰ πλεῆθη παρακελεύομενος.

⁵ Ib.; δρομαῖοι παρήσαν ἐπὶ τὴν βοήθειαν.

⁶ Ib.; τῶν δ' Ἰταλιωτῶν σποράδην διὰ τὴν σπουδὴν ἐκβοηθούτων, οἱ Σικελιώται τὰς τάξεις διαφυλάττοντες, ῥαδίᾳ τῶν πολεμίων περιεγίνοντο. The name Σικελιώται here takes in the whole mingled force of Dionysios.

⁷ Ib.; ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος ἀθρόα τῇ δυνάμει περικυθεῖς, τὸν θ' Ἑλωρον καὶ τοῖς

CHAP. X.
Defeat of
Italians on
Elleporos.
B.C. 389.

could; but, disheartened by the loss of their general, coming up without order in parties which hindered one another's action¹, they were no match for Dionysios and his trained mercenaries. They lost heart, gave way, and fled. Many were slain in the fight and in the pursuit; but the mass of the defeated army, numbering more than ten thousand men, found a place of temporary shelter on an isolated hill. Its steepness made it a good defence against any direct assaults of the enemy; but it was waterless and therefore impossible to hold against any long blockade².

Fugitives
surround-
ed.

On this natural akropolis the Italiot fugitives passed the night, carefully watched by Dionysios and his army from below. The tyrant himself kept on his arms all night, diligently keeping the sentinels to their duty³. At day-break a herald came down from the hill with a message for the lord of Syracuse. The heat and the lack of water had told on the endurance of the besieged, and they proposed to the tyrant that they should be allowed to depart on the payment of ransom⁴. According to custom in such cases, some of their number would have been left in the hands of Dionysios as hostages for payment. The tyrant is described as lifted up by his success beyond the bounds of moderation⁵; but the real motive for his conduct

μετ' αὐτοῦ γενναίως ἀγωνισαμένους σχεδὸν πάντας ἀνείλε. This comes before the extract in the last note. Helóris was clearly killed before the rest of the Italiot army came up, and one would think that the new-comers must have known this as soon as they came up. But in the actual order of Diodóros' sentences, it would seem that they did not find out his death till they had fought some time and were beginning to give way. The words *ὡς τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τελευτὴν ἐπύθοντο* do not come till then.

¹ Diod. xiv. 104; διὰ τὸν θόρυβον ἀλλήλοις ἐμπέτοντες ἡλαττοῦντο μεγάλας.

² Ib. 105: κατέφυγε τὸ πλῆθος ἐπὶ τινα λόφον, ἐρυμὸν ὅσα πρὸς τὴν πολιορκίαν, ἀνδρὸν δὲ καὶ δυνάμενον βαδίας ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων φυλάττεσθαι.

³ Ib.; Διονύσιος περιστρατοπεδεύσας τὴν τε ἡμέραν ἐκείνην καὶ τὴν νύκτα διεγρύπνησεν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις, ἐπιμελῶς ταῖς φυλακαῖς χρῆσάμενος.

⁴ Ib.; ἐπικηρυκευσαμένων αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸν Διονύσιον, καὶ παρακαλοῦντων λύτρα πρᾶξασθαι. They are constrained διὰ τὸ καῦμα καὶ τὴν ἀνδρίαν.

⁵ Ib.; οὐ μέτρος ἐν τοῖς εὐημερήμασι γενόμενος.

seems to have been the wish to make an imposing display of his power, and not of his power only. He refused the proposed terms, and demanded that the defenders of the hill should lay down their arms and surrender at discretion¹. For this they were not yet ready; worn out and distressed as they were, their endurance still lasted several hours. They knew not what might be their lot at the hands of such an enemy; many precedents would suggest death or slavery as the only alternatives². At last, at the eighth hour of the day, their spirits gave way; the needs of the body were too strong for them. They made the unconditional surrender, and came down from the hill, looking for the worst³. We already have a touch from an eye-witness—Philistos was not yet banished—when we read how Dionysios stood with a rod in his hand, and numbered his captives to the tale of more than a myriad⁴. Their fate was not what they looked for. They were not slaughtered or enslaved; they were not even, as they had themselves proposed, put to ransom. The whole body were allowed to go away unhurt, each man to his own city⁵.

CHAP. X.

Fugitives
surrender
at dis-
cretion.

Clemency
of Dio-
nysios.

This act of Dionysios stands out as one of the most memorable in Greek history. When the citizens of opposing commonwealths did not scruple to slay or enslave their fellow Greeks by thousands, the tyrant dreaded and hated throughout the Greek world treats his prisoners with an excess of generosity which might seem to put him, for the

¹ Diod. xiv. 105; προσέταττεν ἀποθέσθαι τὰ ὅπλα καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐγχεῖν τῇ κρατούντι.

² Ib.; ἐπὶ τῆς φυσικῆς ἀνάγκης κατεβαροῦντο, παρέδωκαν αὐτοὺς περὶ δγδόην ὥραν.

³ Ib.; πάντων αὐτοῦ ὑποπτεύνοντων τὸ θημῶδες.

⁴ Ib.; Διονύσιος δὲ λαβὼν βάβδον καὶ πῆξας ἐπὶ τοῦ λόφου ἡρίθμει τοὺς καταβαίνοντας αἰχμαλῶτους, ὅτας πλείους τῶν μυρίων.

⁵ Ib.; τοῖσιν αὖτις ἐφάνη πάντων ἐπιεικέστατος. τοὺς γὰρ αἰχμαλῶτους ἀφῆκεν αὐτεξουσίου χωρὶς λύτρων.

CHAP. X. Politic clemency of Dionysios to Italiots.

moment at least, on a level with Kallikratidas¹. The act is the more unexpected when we compare it with the displeasure which he had shown towards his brother Leptinês after an act of mercy of nearly the same kind². But there is no real inconsistency in the action of Dionysios in the two cases. While giving him whatever credit may justly belong to him for what was certainly an act of unusual mercy, we cannot give the tyrant credit for those feelings either of general humanity or of Panhellenic sympathy by which we may fairly believe that his brother was stirred. Dionysios, we must remember, was, after all, not a tyrant of the worst type. He could be frightfully cruel when a cruel deed either suited his policy or gratified his passion. How deeply passion did influence the acts of Dionysios we see both by his friendship for Lokroi and his hatred towards Rhêgion, both which feelings he certainly carried beyond the bounds of any deliberate policy. But at no time does he appear as one of those oppressors to whom a massacre was a kind of sport. The men whom Leptinês spared were Rhêgines, men of the city which Dionysios most hated; but it does not follow that his hatred would have gone so far as to condemn them to indiscriminate slaughter. The fault of Leptinês in the eyes of his brother was not that he had spared the suppliants, but that he had, without his master's authority, made engagements with the cities of the suppliants which were against his master's interests. With the men whom Dionysios now had at his mercy he had no temptation to special harshness. If mercy was likely to serve his policy, no passion stood in the way of mercy. The Italiot captives were ordinary enemies in war, not objects of any special hatred. Had Helôris and the other Syracusan exiles fallen alive into

¹ Xen. Hell. i. 6, 14, 15. Cf. Grote, ch. lxiv. To me Dionysios seems to be equally Dionysios alike in his mercy and in his cruelty.

² See above, pp. 180, 181.

the hands of Dionysios, their fate might have been different. But Helôris had died in battle, and we may be tempted to think that the other exiles were among the five hundred who died around him. As for the men actually in his power, Dionysios had no temptation to slaughter them. He had a strong temptation to fill his coffers by selling them or putting them to ransom. But he might well think that their price would be of less value to him than the effect in his favour on the minds of the Italiots generally, if he could gain credit for an act of unexpected, almost unparalleled generosity. He reckoned the cost, and he held the advantage to lie on the side of mercy. And the event showed that he judged rightly.

We are not surprised to hear that this act of generosity, whatever were its motives, was looked on as the best deed of the life of Dionysios¹, that he received universal applause, and that golden crowns were voted to him by those whom he had spared and by the commonwealths from which they came². It is harder to find out what commonwealths these were, and what was the immediate political result of the clemency of Dionysios. We are told that he made treaties with most of the cities, leaving them independent³. It is clear from what immediately follows that he made no treaty with Rhégion, nor yet with Kaulônia or Hippônion. But we hear of no action of his against either Krotôn or Thourioi for a good while to come. The army which he had defeated and spared must have largely, perhaps chiefly, consisted of Krotoniats, and the Thourians—unless they held themselves bound by the agreement with Leptinês⁴—are likely to have sent what help they could.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 105.]

[² Ib.]

[³ Ib.; πρὸς τὰς πλείστας τῶν πόλεων εἰρήνην συνθέμενος ἀφήκεν αὐτονομους.]

[⁴ See p. 181.]

CHAP. X. The treaty would therefore seem to have been a treaty with Krotôn, perhaps with Thourioi and some other towns unnamed. Such a course would thoroughly suit the purposes of Dionysios. It broke up the Italiot League and isolated its members, and it made a good reputation for Dionysios among some of its cities. But there was no general peace. Against Rhêgion the wrath of Dionysios did not slacken for a moment, nor had he any thought of giving up the siege of Kaulônia, the town which Helôris and the Krotoniats had come specially to relieve.

Italiot
League
broken up.

Rhêgines
purchase
peace by
surrender
of fleet.

Kaulônia
taken.
Lokroi
aggran-
dized.

* "The Rhêgines finding themselves without allies sent Dionysios a humble message praying for mercy. The siege of Kaulônia was still going on, and he could put off his action against Rhêgion. He spared them for the present, on condition of their giving up all their ships, seventy in number, and putting a hundred hostages into his hands¹. Then he went on to finish the siege of Kaulônia. Here again his different ways of treating different people comes out strongly. He had no special spite against Kaulônia; it simply stood in the way of his plans. So, when he took the town, he destroyed it, and gave its territory to his beloved Lokrians. The citizens he carried to Syracuse, and not only gave them citizenship, but an exemption from taxes for five years². The next year he did the like to

* These paragraphs are quoted from the author's Sicily, Phœnician, Greek, and Roman (Story of the Nations Series), pp. 187 seqq.

[¹ They also paid Dionysios three hundred talents (Diod. xiv. 106).]

[² Τοὺς μὲν ἐνοικοῦντας ἐν Συρακούσαις μετέθηκε καὶ πολιτείαν δοὺς πέντε ἔτη συνεχώρησεν ἀτελεῖς εἶναι (Diod. xiv. 106). As no account is given of any fresh siege, Kaulônia now appears to have fallen without a struggle. The coinage of Kaulônia definitely ceases from this time, but a small town seems to have existed on the spot (cf. Plut. Diôn, xxvi) till it in turn was destroyed by Campanian mercenaries in Pyrrhos' time (Pausanias, vi. 3. 13). According to Strabo (vi. i. 10) its inhabitants then founded a new Kaulonia in Sicily.]

the town of Hippônion, its land, and people¹. Only we do not hear of the exemption from taxes. The men of Hippônion had not endured so long a siege as the men of Kaulônia.

“ But all this was simply the beginning of what Dionysios had most of all at heart, his attack on Rhégion. But, as he had so lately made a treaty with Rhégion, he had to find some excuse for renewing the war. He still had the hostages whom the Rhegines had given ; so they were greatly in his power. He first asked them for provisions for his army, promising to send back an equal store from Syracuse, whither he professed to be going. He seemingly hoped that they would refuse, so that he might treat the refusal as a hostile act. They did give him provisions for some days ; but, as Dionysios, pleading sickness and other excuses, stayed in their neighbourhood instead of going to Syracuse, they presently stopped the supply. This he affected to treat as a wrong done by the Rhegines ; to put himself wholly in the right, he first gave back the hostages, and then besieged the town. The siege of Rhégion was one of the greatest of Dionysios’ acts of warfare². He had to use all his forces ; for the Rhegines, under their general Phytôn, made a most valiant defence, holding out against all attacks under every possible disadvantage for more than ten months. They had no ships, no allies, and their stock of provisions had been lessened by what they had given Dionysios. The tyrant tried to bribe Phytôn to betray the

CHAP. X.
Hippônion
taken.

Pretext
found to
renew at-
tack on
Rhégion.

Siege of
Rhégion.

[¹ Diod. xiv. 107. Ten years later Hippônion was restored by the Carthaginians ; Diod. xv. 24.]

[² For the siege of Rhégion see Diod. xiv. 108, 111, and compare Front. iii. 4. 3 ; Philostrate. Vit. Apoll. 7. 2, and Aristot. Œc. ii. 20.]

CHAP. X. city, as the generals of several other cities had done. But the general of Rhêgion stayed firm in his duty. Dionysios, on his part, took his full share in the work, and was once so badly wounded by a spear that his life was for a while despaired of. At last, under sheer stress of hunger, when many had died for lack of food and the rest had lost all strength, the valiant men of Rhêgion were driven to surrender at discretion. Dionysios had gained one of the great objects of his life; he was master of the city which he most hated. And now he showed in a more notable way than ever what manner of man he was. In one way he was really less harsh than many other conquerors had been. It was not very wonderful in Greek warfare to slaughter all the men and sell all the women and children of a captured town. Dionysios made no general massacre. He sent all the people of Rhêgion to Syracuse, not indeed to be made citizens like those of Kaulônia. Those who could pay a certain ransom were let go; those who could not were sold¹. But it was not usual in Greek warfare to put any man to death with torture and mockery. But now Dionysios seemed to gather his whole hatred of the Rhêgines into the person of their brave general who had refused his bribes. He exposed Phytôn in mockery on one of his loftiest war-engines; then he told him that he had just drowned his son. And Phytôn answered that his son

Surrender of Rhêgion.

Fate of Rhêgines.

Cruel treatment of their General Phytôn.

[¹ Aristotle (Ec. ii. 20) gives a blacker version of Dionysios' treatment of the Rhêgians; ῥηγῶν τε καταλάβαν, ἐκκλησίαν συναγαγὼν εἶπε διότι δικαίως μὲν ἂν ξανδραποδισθεῖεν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, νῦν μὲντοι τὰ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἀνηλωμένα χρήματα κομσάμενος καὶ ὑπὲρ ἐκάστου σώματος τρεῖς μῶας ἀφήσειν αὐτούς· οἱ δὲ ῥηγῖνοι, ὅσα ποτ' ἦν αὐτοῖς ἀποκεκρυμμένα ἐμφανῇ ἐποίουν καὶ οἱ ἀποροι παρὰ τῶν εὐπορωτέρων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ξένων δανειζόμενοι ἐπύρισαν ἃ ἐκέλευε χρήματα· λαβὼν δὲ ταῦτα παρ' αὐτῶν τὰ τε σώματα πάντα οὐδὲν ἤττον ἀπέδοτο, τὰ τε σκεύη δὲ τότε ἦν ἀποκεκρυμμένα ἐμφανῇ ἅπαντα ἔλαβεν.]

was luckier than his father by one day. Then he caused CHAP. X.
Phytôn to be led through the whole army with scourging and insult of every kind. At last Dionysios' own soldiers began to murmur at his cruelty, and he had Phytôn and all his kinsfolk drowned. He appears to have destroyed the town of Rhégion and to have given its lands, like those of the other cities that he took, to the Lokrians.

"It was a memorable year for Greece and for Europe B.C. 387.
in which Dionysios, by the taking of Rhégion, made himself, beyond all doubt, the chief power, not only in Sicily, but in Greek Italy also. It was the year of the Peace of Antalkidas.
Peace of Antalkidas, which established for a while the power of Sparta in Old Greece and gave over the Greeks of Asia to the dominion of the Persian. [Three years before Rome taken by Gauls.
this Rome had been] taken by the Gauls. The presence B.C. 390.
of these last barbarians in various parts of Italy supplied Dionysios with the means of hiring Gaulish mercenaries¹. Some of these, as well as Iberians, he sent at a later time, with other troops, to the help of his Spartan allies in the wars of Old Greece. The Peace of Antalkidas supplied patriotic orators with the opportunity of painting Hellas as enslaved at both ends, in the East under the Persian and in the West under Dionysios. So spoke the Athenian Isokratês; so, with more effect, spoke Lysias, once envoy to Dionysios, at the Olympic festival next after the Peace of Antalkidas (B.C. 384). To that festival Dionysios sent a splendid embassy². Lysias called on the assembled Greeks

[¹ It was now, according to Justin (xx. 5), that the Gaulish tribes then overrunning central Italy made a formal treaty of friendship and alliance with Dionysios. See Supplement I, p. 219.]

[² For the embassy of Dionysios to Olympia see Diod. xiv. 109 and xv. 7

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CHAP. X. city, as the generals of several other cities had done. But the general of Rhêgion stayed firm in his duty. Dionysios, on his part, took his full share in the work, and was once so badly wounded by a spear that his life was for a while despaired of. At last, under sheer stress of hunger, when many had died for lack of food and the rest had lost all strength, the valiant men of Rhêgion were driven to surrender at discretion. Dionysios had gained one of the great objects of his life; he was master of the city which he most hated. And now he showed in a more notable way than ever what manner of man he was. In one way he was really less harsh than many other conquerors had been. It was not very wonderful in Greek warfare to slaughter all the men and sell all the women and children of a captured town. Dionysios made no general massacre. He sent all the people of Rhêgion to Syracuse, not indeed to be made citizens like those of Kaulônia. Those who could pay a certain ransom were let go; those who could not were sold¹. But it was not usual in Greek warfare to put any man to death with torture and mockery. But now Dionysios seemed to gather his whole hatred of the Rhêgines into the person of their brave general who had refused his bribes. He exposed Phytôn in mockery on one of his loftiest war-engines; then he told him that he had just drowned his son. And Phytôn answered that his son

Surrender of Rhêgion.

Fate of Rhêgines.

Cruel treatment of their General Phytôn.

[¹ Aristotle (*Ec.* ii. 20) gives a blacker version of Dionysios' treatment of the Rhegians; 'Ρήγιόν τε καταλαβών, ἐκκλησίαν συναγαγὼν εἶπε διότι δίκαιός μὲν ἂν ἐξανδραποδισθεῖεν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, νῦν μὲντοι τὰ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἀνηλωμένα χρήματα κομισάμενος καὶ ὑπὲρ ἐκάστου σώματος τρεῖς μῶς ἀφήσειν αὐτούς· οἱ δὲ 'Ρηγίνοι, ὅσα ποτ' ἦν αὐτοῖς ἀποκεκρυμμένα ἐμφανῇ ἐποίουν καὶ οἱ ἄποροι παρὰ τῶν εὐπορωτέρων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ξένων δανειζόμενοι ἐπόρισαν ἃ ἐκέλευε χρήματα· λαβὼν δὲ ταῦτα παρ' αὐτῶν τὰ τε σώματα πάντα οὐδὲν ἤττον ἀπέδοτο, τὰ τε σκεύη ἃ τότε ἦν ἀποκεκρυμμένα ἐμφανῇ ἅπαντα ἔλαβεν.]

was luckier than his father by one day. Then he caused CHAP. I.
Phytôn to be led through the whole army with scourging
and insult of every kind. At last Dionysios' own soldiers
began to murmur at his cruelty, and he had Phytôn and
all his kinsfolk drowned. He appears to have destroyed
the town of Rhêgion and to have given its lands, like those
of the other cities that he took, to the Lokrians.

"It was a memorable year for Greece and for Europe B.C. 387.
in which Dionysios, by the taking of Rhêgion, made
himself, beyond all doubt, the chief power, not only in
Sicily, but in Greek Italy also. It was the year of the Peace of
Antalki-
das.
Peace of Antalkidas, which established for a while the
power of Sparta in Old Greece and gave over the Greeks of
Asia to the dominion of the Persian. [Three years before Rome
taken by
Gauls.
B.C. 390.
this Rome had been] taken by the Gauls. The presence
of these last barbarians in various parts of Italy supplied
Dionysios with the means of hiring Gaulish mercenaries¹.
Some of these, as well as Iberians, he sent at a later time,
with other troops, to the help of his Spartan allies in the
wars of Old Greece. The Peace of Antalkidas supplied
patriotic orators with the opportunity of painting Hellas
as enslaved at both ends, in the East under the Persian and
in the West under Dionysios. So spoke the Athenian
Isokratês; so, with more effect, spoke Lysias, once envoy
to Dionysios, at the Olympic festival next after the Peace
of Antalkidas (B.C. 384). To that festival Dionysios sent a
splendid embassy². Lysias called on the assembled Greeks

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CHAP. X. "But however hated Dionysios might be both at home and abroad, he was still strong both at home and abroad.

His next field of enterprise was the coasts and islands of the Hadriatic. Here the city of Ankôn or Ancona on the Italian coast was planted by Syracusan exiles trying to escape from his power. Other colonies in those seas he

Syracusan settlement at Ancona. Colonies of Dionysios on Illyrian coasts and islands. of Paros, with his help, planted settlements on the islands of Pharos and Issa, and he himself founded Lissos on the

Alliance with Molottian prince. Illyrian coast¹. He then formed alliance with some of the Illyrians and with a banished prince of Molottis named Alketas. Him he was able to restore; but he failed in a

Designs on Delphian treasures. scheme of making his way into Greece on this side, and even, it is said, robbing the Delphian temple². This was too much even for his friends the Spartans, and a Lacedæmonian force checked all further advance. He next took

Attack on Etruscans. up the old Syracusan quarrel with the Etruscans. For a war against them it was easy to find an excuse in their constant piracies. His real object seems to have been to plunder the rich temple of Agylla³ on the west coast

his enforced seclusion in the quarries to write his *Κύκλωψ* ἢ *Γαλάτεια*, in which Dionysios played the part of the *Kyklôps*, he himself of *Odysseus*, (v. Athén. i. 11).]

[¹ For the Adriatic colonies of Dionysios, one of the most important undertakings of his reign, see Supplement II, p. 220, seqq. Issa seems to have been a purely Syracusan colony. Reasons are given, pp. 223 seqq., for believing that Lissos was never colonized by Dionysios. The statement rests on what was probably a confusion of Diodôros between it and Issa.]

[² The geographical difficulties in the way of a raid on Delphi from the Molottian side are so great that Holm (op. cit. ii. pp. 135, 441) considers it certain that Diodôros in relating this enterprise (xv. 13) confused Delphi with Dodôna. Yet it is hardly likely that Illyrians and Epeirots would have joined Dionysios in plundering their own great sanctuary.]

[³ Diod. xv. 14. The temple was situated at Pyrgoi, the port of Agylla or Cære. According to Strabo (v. 2. 8) it was dedicated to Eleithyia,

of Italy, whence he carried off spoil in money, slaves, and other things to the value of fifteen hundred talents. Even at Syracuse he did not fear to plunder the temples; from the Olympieion he carried off the golden robe of the statue of Zeus, saying in mockery that such a garment was too hot in summer and too cold in winter¹.”

CHAP. X.
Temple of
Agylā
plundered.

§ 6. *The Third Punic War of Dionysios.*

B. C. 383-[378²].

* “The Etruscan campaign might perhaps win back for Dionysios some credit both at home and abroad as a Hellenic champion against the barbarians. He would get more still when, in the year 383, he began another Punic war. At no time in our story do we more lament the lack of a contemporary narrative. Dionysios took advantage of the disaffection towards Carthage felt by some of her dependencies to contract alliances with them. We are not told what cities are meant; some, we may suppose, of the Carthaginian dependencies in Sicily, perhaps the Elymian towns. Carthage, on the other hand, sent, for the first time, a force into Italy to act along with the tyrant’s enemies there. A campaign followed, the geography of

Third
Punic war.

according to Ælian (V. H. i. 20) to Apollo and Leukothea. Strabo connects this raid with a Corsican expedition of Dionysios.]

[Æl. V. H. i. 20. So too he robbed an image of Aaklêpios of its golden beard, remarking “that it was not seemly that the son should wear a beard while the father (Apollo) was beardless.” He regularly took possession of the gold and silver Victories and wreaths in the outstretched hands of divinities; since why did the Gods hold them out if not to present them to men? For other sacrilegious acts of Dionysios see Holm, G. S. ii. 149 and 449.]

[² Beloch, *Impero di Dionisio* (6 and 7, note 1), gives some good reasons for supposing that peace was not concluded till 378.]

* Story of Sicily, pp. 192, 193.

CHAP. X.
Third
Punic war
of Dio-
nysios.
B.C. 383-
378.

Peace with
Carthage.
[B.C. 378.]

which is hopeless¹. Dionysios first won a great battle in which the Shophet Magôn was killed². The Carthaginians then asked for peace; Dionysios refused it except on condition of Carthage withdrawing altogether from Sicily and paying the costs of the war³. Such terms needed the consent of the home government of Carthage. A truce was made; while it lasted, the new Carthaginian commander, the son of Magôn, made every preparation for a new struggle. In a second battle⁴ Dionysios was defeated and his brother Leptinês killed; the slaughter was among the greatest that Greeks ever underwent at the hands of barbarians. Envoys now came from Carthage with full powers. The terms of peace were now quite the opposite to what Dionysios had proposed just before. He had to pay a thousand talents, and to make the Halykos the boundary between his dominions and those of Carthage⁵. That is

[¹ See Diodôros, xv. 15-17. The two great battles took place somewhere in the neighbourhood of Panormos. The result of the Carthaginian diversion on the Italian side was the restoration of Hippônion.]

[² The place where the first battle was fought is called by Diodôros (xv. 15. 3) Kabala (Κάβαλα). The Carthaginians are said to have lost over 10,000 in killed and 5,000 prisoners, and the remainder took refuge, like the Italiots (p. 186), on a steep and waterless hill.]

[³ Diod. xv. 15; 'Ο δὲ Διονύσιος ἀπεφώνητο μίαν αὐτοῖς εἶναι σύλλυσιν ἐν ἐγγυρήσῳ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν πόλεων καὶ τὰ θανατηδέντα χρήματα κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐκτίσασιν.]

[⁴ The second battle, in which the Greeks lost 14,000 killed, was fought at a place called Kronion, mentioned by Polyainos (v. 10) as a town that gave shelter to Himilkôn when hard pressed by Dionysios' commanders—perhaps a confusion with the present occasion. The Carthaginians (Diod. xv. 17) returned with their spoils to Panormos, whence we may infer that it lay in that neighbourhood. The name recalls the hill of Kronos above Olympia, and as Kronos was worshipped at Himera, his head appearing on some coins of that city (cf. Imhoof-Blumer, Berl. Blätter, v. 44), Holm (G. S. ii. 443) has suggested that it was Monte Calogero between Himera and Therme. But from the fact that it was inhabited it can hardly have been, as Holm supposes (p. 142), the λόφος ἀνυδρον παντελῶς spoken of above (Diod. xv. 15).]

[⁵ Diod. xv. 17. 5; 'Ἀσμένως δὲ τοῦ τυράννου προσδεξαμένου τοὺς λόγους,

to say, he gave up to Carthage Selinous and its territory and part of the territory of Akragas." CHAP. I.

The treaty by which the third war between Carthage and Dionysios was brought to an end was indeed a falling back from that which had ended the second Punic war nine years before. It was a small matter that the tyrant personally became a tributary to the barbarian, that a thousand talents had to pass from the hoard of Syracuse to the hoard of Carthage. A far heavier blow than this was struck at Hellas and at Europe. Whatever Dionysios had done, he had been at least the means of freeing the Greeks of the northern and southern coasts of Sicily from that Phœnician bondage into which, it must be allowed, it was partly through his fault that they had fallen. The campaign of Motya, if it had failed to keep Motya for Hellas, had restored Hellenic life, if not Hellenic freedom, along the whole south coast of Sicily. Mazaros was again the boundary of Greek and Phœnician. By the new treaty the borders of Hellas, the borders of European life, fell back. So far as Dionysios acted in the matter by his own will, he must take his place alongside of the men who betrayed Parga in the days of our fathers, of the men who betrayed Macedonia before our own eyes. By the new treaty Selinous and its territory, and the western part of the territory of Akragas, were surrendered to the dominion of Carthage. Barbarian rule was advanced from the Mazaros to the Halykos, the stream which long remained the boundary of Greek and Phœnician on the south-western coast. Selinous and its Thermai thus passed to Carthage, and, with them, a point which from this time becomes of far greater moment in Sicilian history than it had ever been before.

[B.C. 378.]
Carthage
recovers
Halykos
frontier.

ἐγένοντο διαλύσεις ὥστε ἔχειν ἀμφοτέρους ἂν πρότερον ὑπῆρχον κύριοι· ἐξαιρετον δ' ἔλαβον οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι τὴν τῶν Σελινουντίων πόλιν τε καὶ χώραν καὶ τῆς Ἀκραγαντίνης μέχρι τοῦ Ἀλύκου καλουμένου ποταμοῦ· ἔτισε δὲ Διονύσιος τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις τέλαντα χίλια.]

CHAP. X. That Minôa which had become Hêrakleia, whose Greek fame is greater in legend than in history¹, now became, in barbarian hands, one of the most important military posts in the island. *Ras Melkart* from henceforth ranks as a Carthaginian possession alongside of the three older strongholds of the West². On the north coast, the fate of the other Thermai, the new Himera, is not recorded in our meagre abstract of the treaty; but, as it appears as a Carthaginian possession in the days of Timoleôn³, we may safely set this down as the time when it sank from the friendly relation into which it had entered when the needs of Himilkôn called for gentleness⁴. At the same time our one glimpse of the inner life of Thermai under Punic rule shows us that the cities did not cease to have Greek inhabitants. Their exact relation to the ruling city it might be hard to fix. *Ras Melkart* perhaps stood alone as a new Phœnician colony on Greek soil, charged with the duty of watching over the Greek subjects of Carthage on the southern coast, as Panormos and Solous were still ready to do on the northern. The barbarian corner had spread beyond a corner. On the south coast Akragas, shorn of a large part of her territory, was now a border city of Hellas. On the north coast there could hardly have been a strictly Hellenic post west of Dionysios' own Tyndaris. Of the new Sikel settlements on that coast, practically no doubt more Greek than Sikel, we hear nothing. But they were doubtless, in some shape or other, under the dominion or influence of Dionysios.

Akras
Greek bor-
der-city.

Hellas was thus cut short. The question may of course be raised, whether the rule of the barbarian was any worse bondage than the rule of the tyrant. Where the liberal

[¹ See Sicily, i. 430, 496, 497; ii. 96, 97, 479-481.]

[² Lilybaion, Panormos and Solous. For *Ras Melkart*, see below, p. 250, and note 4.]

[³ Diod. xix. 2. Agathoklés was born at Thermai, then under Carthaginian rule.]

[⁴ Diod. xiv. 56.]

policy of Magôn¹ was carried out, it most likely was not. CHAP. I.
 And even before Magôn Greeks of their own free will Tolerant
policy of
Magôn.
 had left the dominions of Dionysios for the dominions of Carthage². The subject lands of Greece, tossed to and fro from one master to another, if they rejoiced when the Venetian drove out the Turk, sometimes also rejoiced when the Turk drove out the Venetian. But the Venetian was a stranger as well as the Turk; if a Christian, he was a Christian of another creed. Under a wise Carthaginian administration the Greeks of Selinous and Thermai might be personally as well off as the subjects of Dionysios. But Yoke of
Dionysios
and Car-
thage com-
pared.
 the wrong done to national life was the same as if they had been cut off from a commonwealth which owned Hermokratês or Timoleôn as its leader. Selinous ceased to be a member of the Hellenic body; Syracuse remained part of it. Within the realm of Dionysios, if men served a tyrant, the tyrant was at least their countryman, and there were a thousand more hopes of better days under the rule of Dionysios than there were under the rule of Carthage. The power of Carthage might be deemed immortal; the power of Dionysios was, at the outside, not likely to last longer than his own life-time. And so it was in the end. The Halykos long remained the boundary; Selinous passed away for ever; but Akragas, Gela, and Kamarina still have their place in our story. Akragas, above all, again lives something like its old life, if on a much smaller scale. Ras Melkart was not the last city to be founded on the south coast of Sicily. A tyrant or king of Akragas was one day to give it a Greek fellow.

[¹ Diod. xv. 15.]

[² This is given by Diodôros (xiv. 41) as one of the reasons which weighed with Dionysios in undertaking his first Punic War; 'Ορῶν δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τινὲς εἰς τὴν ἐπικράτειαν τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀποτρέχοντας τὰς τε πόλεις καὶ τὰς κτήσεις κομιζομένους, ἐνόμιζε τῆς πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους εἰρήνης μενούσης πολλοὺς τῶν ὑφ' αὐτὸν ταπτομένων βουλήσασθαι κοινωνεῖν τῆς ἐκείνων ἀποστάσεως, ἐὰν δὲ πόλεμος γένηται πάντας τοὺς καταδεδουλωμένους ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίων ἀποστήσασθαι πρὸς αὐτόν.]

CHAP. X.

§ 7. *From the Third to the Last Punic War of Dionysios.*

B. C. [378]—368.

Cartha-
ginian
campaign
in Italy.

* "Of the last sixteen years of Dionysios' reign we know next to nothing. But we can see that about the year 379 both he and the Carthaginians were warring in Italy¹. They were seeking to set up again some of the towns which he had destroyed; but they had to give up the attempt² and go back to Africa on account of a plague and the revolt of their subjects. On the other hand, Dionysios took Krotôn³, which had escaped him in his earlier campaign, and robbed the temple of the Lakinian Hêra of a precious robe, which he, oddly enough, sold to the Carthaginians for a huge sum⁴. There is also a story how he

Dionysios
takes
Krôton.

* Story of Sicily, pp. 193, 194.

[¹ Diod. xv. 24.]

[² According to Diodôros (xv. 24. 1), the Carthaginians did succeed in restoring Hippônion (Vibona); *Καρχηδόνιοι, στρατεύσαντες εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, τοῖς μὲν Ἰσπανιάταις ἐκπεπωκόσιν ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος ἀποκατέστησαν τὴν πόλιν καὶ πάντας τοὺς πεφευγότες συναγαγόντες πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτῶν ἐποιήσαντο.*]

[³ Diodôros is silent about this capture—an astounding omission, which surely indicates a serious lacuna in his history. On the other hand, Livy (xxiv. 6) mentions the seizure of the Akropolis of Krotôn by Dionysios, but does not tell us the date; "Arx Crotonis una parte imminens mari altera vergente in agrum, situ tantum naturali quondam munita, postea et muro cincta est qua per avaras rupes ab Dionysio Siciliae tyranno per dolum fuerat capta." According to Dionysios of Halikarnassos (xx. 7) Dionysios was master of Krotôn for twelve years. Holm (G. S. ii. 134) thinks it therefore probable that the capture of Krotôn took place in 379 B. C.,—twelve years that is before Dionysios' death,—and this opinion has been followed in the text. A considerable break is now perceptible in the Krotoniate coinage (see Head, *Historia Numorum*, p. 82). At this time Dionysios appears to have made an unsuccessful attempt on Thourioi. His fleet of 300 vessels however was utterly destroyed by a northern gale, whereupon the Thourians conferred their citizenship, with a house and allotment, on Boreas (*Ælian*, V. H. xii. 61).]

[⁴ The price paid was 120 talents (*Athen.* xii. 541. 6, who cites *Aristotle*). This *himation* had been originally presented to the temple by the Sybarite Alkisthenês.]

planned the building of a wall across the narrowest point of the south-western peninsula¹. This was, he said, to keep out the Lucanians; but the Greeks north of the proposed wall saw that it was meant only to strengthen his own power in

CHAP. X.

Projected wall across Isthmus of Squillace.

[¹ Strabo, vi. i. 10; μετὰ δὲ Κανλωνίαν Σκυλλήτιον . . . ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς πόλεως καὶ ὁ κόλπος Σκυλλητικὸς ἀνέμασται, ποιῶν τὸν εἰρημένον ἰσθμὸν πρὸς τὸν Ἰππωνιάτην κόλπον. ἐπεχειρήσει δὲ ὁ Διονύσιος καὶ διατεχνίσει τὸν ἰσθμὸν στρατεύσας ἐπὶ Λευκανοῦς, λόγῳ μὲν ὥς ἀσφάλειαν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκτὸς βαρβάρων τοῖς ἐντὸς ἰσθμοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς λύσαι τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινοῦσαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων βουλόμενος ὥστ' ἄρχειν ἀδελῶς τῶν ἐντὸς· ἀλλ' ἐκώλυσαν οἱ ἐκτὸς ἀσελθόντες. The site of Skyllétion, the Roman Scylladium, is not, as generally supposed, the modern Squillace, but, as I have shown (cf. Hodgkin, Letters of Cassiodorus, 68 seqq.), is still marked by the extensive ruins of an ancient city at Roccella del Vescovo di Squillace. It overlooks at a short distance the mouth of the Corace, where was no doubt its port, the Castrum Hannibalis of Pliny (v. infra). But the ruins at Roccella are those of a great and populous city with more than one distinct quarter, one of the largest amphitheatres in Italy and a fine Christian Basilica *fuori le mura*—the rival of the greatest buildings of the kind at Ravenna or Thessalonica. The distance, as the crow flies, between the two seas at this point is thirty-two kilometers, or about twenty miles. The natural crossing-line of the isthmus is however formed by the course of the Corace and Amato and an intervening watershed, which at its lowest point, about three miles to the S. W. of Tiriolo, sinks to 230 meters. By this route the distance from sea to sea would be about forty kilometers, or 25 miles, and Pliny's statement (iii. 15) that Dionysios had intended to cut through the peninsula has been taken to mean that he sought to cut a canal from sea to sea, utilizing as far as possible the existing water-ways. ("Dein sinus Scyllaceus et Scylladium, Scylletium Atheniensibus cum conderent dictum, quem locum occurrens Terinæus sinus peninsulam efficit et in ea portus qui vocatur Castrum Heroulis, nusquam angustiore Italia: xx m. passuum latitudo est. Itaque Dionysius Major interdisam eo loco adiciere Siciliæ voluit.") Pliny's language however does not necessarily imply more than a ditch accompanying the wall. So in 1743 (Lenormant, Grande Grèce, iii. 23), on the occasion of the great plague at Reggio and Messina, O'Mahony, the Vicar-General of Calabria for Charles III, cut a ditch, lined by a palisade, from sea to sea at the narrowest point of the isthmus for the purposes of a sanitary cordon. Whilst exploring the site of Scylladium, I observed on the land side an ancient road-line marked by a trenchlike gap between two hills which had evidently formed a principal entrance to the city and pointed directly towards Tiriolo the natural crossing-point of the isthmus. This ancient road and cutting may afford a clue to the line of Dionysios' projected wall.]

CHAP. X. Italy. After this we hear nothing of his doings in Sicily or Italy for about eleven years.

Dionysios
and Sparta.

"In Old Greece meanwhile, where, from the year B. C. 369 onwards, Athens and Sparta were allies against Thebes, we hear more than once of his sending barbarian mercenaries, Gaulish and Iberian, to help the Spartans¹. And now (369-367) we find two Attic inscriptions recording the relations of the Athenian democracy with the tyrant².

[¹ See Holm, op. cit. ii. 136 seqq. The first help given by Dionysios to the Spartans was in 387 B. C., when the fleet, consisting of twenty Syracusan or Italiote vessels under Polyxenos, met the Spartan envoy Antalkidas (who was then returning from Susa with the Persian treaty) at Abydos. This seasonable support decided the Athenians, Thebans, and the other members of the anti-Spartan alliance to accept the Peace of Antalkidas (Xen. Hell. v. 1. 26-28). In 373 again, the revival of the Athenian power, marked by the appearance of an Athenian fleet in Ionian waters, and, above all, the defection of Korkyra from the Spartan alliance, seriously imperilled the Adriatic schemes of Dionysios. Accordingly we find him joining Sparta in an attempt to recover the island, which however ended in the defeat of the Syracusan squadron and the capture of nine vessels (Diod. xv. 45-47; Xen. Hell. vi. 2. 33-36). For the third time Dionysios appeared as champion of the Spartan cause in 369, by dispatching an expedition, in which 200 Kelts and Iberians took part, for the relief of Corinth, then besieged by Epameinondas (Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 20-22; Diod. xv. 70), and in the succeeding year helped them to the "tearless victory" in Peloponnese (Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 28-32; Diod. xv. 72; Plut. Ages. 33.)

[² For the inscriptions see Köhler, C. I. A. ii. 8, 51, 52; E. L. Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, Nos. 71, 84 and 88. There are three inscriptions in all. The first two (Hicks, op. cit. 71 and 84) are purely honorary. The first, of 393 B. C., was found in the Theatre of Dionysos on a stêlé surmounted by a relief representing Athena giving her hand to a personified figure of Sicily holding a torch (Schöne, Gr. Reliefs, t. vii. 49 and i. 24). It contains part of a *ψήφισμα* in honour of Dionysios and his Court moved by the dithyrambic poet Kinésias. The second inscription is of B. C. 368, and contains a *προβούλευμα* of the Athenian Boulé referring to Dionysios' proposals in furtherance of the Peace Congress at Delphi to which he had sent envoys. It praises Dionysios for upholding the Peace of Antalkidas (*τῇ βασιλείᾳ ἐλήνῃ*), and grants him and his sons golden crowns and the freedom of the city. The third inscription (Hicks, 88) is of 368-367 B. C., and consists of a decree of the Dêmos in honour of Dionysios, in which are inserted the terms of a treaty concluded with him. It

All manner of honours are voted to him and his sons, and in the second an alliance is concluded between Athens and 'the ruler of Sicily,' without any mention whatever of the people of Syracuse. Each is to help the other in case of attack by any enemy. It is some little comfort to think who the enemies of Dionysios at that moment were."

CHAP. I.
Honorary decrees to
Dionysios
at Athens.

§ 8. *The Last Punic War of Dionysios.*

B. C. 368.

"For, just at the end of his reign, he renewed the greatest exploit of his earlier days, the invasion of the Phœnician possessions in Western Sicily¹. An excuse for a new Punic war could be easily found in real or alleged Carthaginian

mentions that on the side of Athens, besides the Boulé, certain officers, doubtless the Stratēgoi and others, swear to observe the treaty. The oath on the other side is taken by Dionysios, but after his name there are some unfortunate lacunae which prevent us from knowing what Syracusan bodies and officials took the oath with him. The passage stands;

ὁμῶσα

[εἰ δὲ Διὸς] νύσιον καὶ τοῦ[ς

[. . . . τ]ων Συρακοσίων[ων

[.]άρχους, &c.

In the last line Kirchhoff (Philologus, xii. 573) has restored *φρουράρχους*, with which Beloch (Impero di Dionisio: Memorie dei Lincei, 1881, 235) agrees. The Phourarchs were the second in rank amongst the tyrant's lieutenants (after the Nauarch), and acted as commandants in his chief strongholds, beginning with the Akropolis of Syracuse (op. cit. p. 230). Yet how commandants of the various strongholds could have taken the oath at Syracuse, as we may suppose, is not so clear. Both this and the preceding Athenian inscriptions describe Dionysios as τὸν Σικελίας ἄρχοντα. See Supplement I. p. 211 seqq. Beloch (op. cit. p. 235) supposes that in the original copy of the treaty (of which this is only an extract inserted in an honorary decree) the name of the eponymous Syracusan magistrate would have stood beside that of the Athenian Archôn, and that the name of the Syracusan People on whose behalf Dionysios nominally acted (cf. his coinage) must have also appeared.]

[¹ For the last Carthaginian war of Dionysios see Diod. xv. 75.]

CHAP. X. encroachments on the dominions of Dionysios¹. In such a
 Last Punic war as this he knew that Greek feeling, in and out of Sicily,
 war of Dionysios. would go with him. Carthage was believed to be, as so
 B.C. 368. often happened, deeply weakened by the usual causes, pestilence and the revolt of her African subjects²."

This last campaign of Dionysios led him into the same regions of Sicily in which he had won his brilliant momentary successes against Carthage seven-and-twenty years before. He set forth with thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse, and three hundred triremes put to sea to join him in the waters of Western Sicily. His course is set before us in a very few words. Selinous and Entella—the coupling is singular—were soon won over by him. In his earlier expedition the Campanians of Entella had been among those who withstood him most stoutly³. But he had now to deal with another generation which had grown up under wholly different surroundings from those of the valiant freebooters. He then began to ravage the lands of Eryx, and he got possession of the mountain city, whether by force, persuasion, or treason, we are not told. By whatever means, it was a strange destiny for a man to become twice in his life master of the Mount of Ashtoreth.

But what follows teaches us how much the topography of Western Sicily had changed since the first expedition of Dionysios. He had before besieged Motya; he now besieges Lilybaion. The new city has thoroughly taken the place of the old. And we now begin to hear of a famous haven, which we have not heard of before, the haven of

[¹ The pretext alleged (Diod. xv. 73. 1) was that the Phœnicians of the Carthaginian Dominion in Sicily (τοὺς κατὰ τὴν ἐπικράτειαν Φοίνικας) had made incursions into Dionysios' territory.]

[² Diod. xv. 73. 1; διὰ τε τὴν γεγενημένην παρ' αὐτοῖς λοιμικὴν νόσον καὶ τὴν ἀπόστασιν τῶν Λιβύων.]

[³ See p. 71.]

Eryx¹. By this time at least the advantages of the site CHAP. X. which was to be so famous in later wars were fully seen. The haven of Motya is no more heard of; the haven of Lilybaion and the haven of Eryx are now the centres of all operations by sea. The haven of Lilybaion is indeed in some sort the haven of Motya under another name; but Drepanon
the haven
of Eryx. the haven of Eryx is altogether new. The haven of Eryx is no other than the western fellow of Zanklê on the strait; it is the *Drepanon* or *Sickle*, the modern Trapani. We know it only by this Greek name, the translation possibly of some Phœnician equivalent. We say Phœnician; for Elymian nomenclature, whatever its character, was likely to be by this time a thing of the past. It is clear that the haven of Eryx and Eryx itself are now fully under Carthaginian supremacy; the haven, we may be sure, was, for all naval purposes, an actual Carthaginian possession². Its importance as a haven has lasted to this day along with its name. And we must remember that, at this time and ages later, the narrow tongue of land on which stands Trapani stretched much further into the sea than it now does, and that, just as at Motya, points which now survive only as island rocks were then part of the main peninsula. With the mount of Eryx the haven of Eryx had doubtless passed into the hands of Dionysios, and it must have formed his naval head-quarters for his siege of Lilybaion.

Of the first of the many sieges of the new stronghold we have nothing recorded but its ill success. All that we hear Siege of
Lilybaion
raised. of the acts of Dionysios before Lilybaion is that, "as there were many soldiers within it, he raised the siege³." The new walls and the vast ditches had clearly stood the fortress

[¹ Diod. xv. 73; τὸν τῶν Ἐρυκίνων λιμένα.]

[² See Sicily, i. 281.]

[³ Diod. xv. 73; πολλῶν δ' ὄντων ἐν αὐτῷ στρατιωτῶν τὴν πολιορκίαν ἔλυσεν.]

CHAP. X. of Himilkôn in good stead; but it is grievous to have no means of comparing the attack of Dionysios on ancient Motya with his attack on new Lilybaion. The lord of Syracuse was clearly beginning to weary of the war, a war into which he could hardly be expected to throw all the energy of his younger days. He listened to a false report, most likely cunningly spread abroad by the Carthaginians themselves, of a fire in the haven of the warships of Carthage, by which—so he was told or so he inferred—the whole Punic navy was destroyed¹. One would have thought that this was the very moment to press the siege of Lilybaion; but the inference attributed to Dionysios is that, if Carthage was thus weakened, it was needless to keep the whole of his own vast armada afloat². He sent a hundred and thirty triremes, the best in the fleet, into the haven of Eryx; the rest were ordered to sail back to Syracuse. The Carthaginian commander, whose name is not given, was as ready to seize an opportunity as Himilkôn had been in times past.

Sea-victory
of Cartha-
ginians at
Drepanon.

Beyond all expectation, he was presently at sea with two hundred ships. He made a dash on the Syracusan fleet at Drepanon, and carried off the greater part of the hundred and thirty triremes, whose captains and crews were not looking for any attack³. Here was a heavy blow, and the failure of the siege of Lilybaion must have lessened the credit of the Syracusan arms. Yet the campaign had given to Dionysios some substantial gain, if he could only hope to keep conquests at such a distance. He had won Selinous, Entella, the mount of Eryx; the haven he had gained and lost again. Of Segesta this time we hear nothing. As winter came on, both sides agreed to a truce; but the

[¹ Diod. xv. 73.]

[² Ib.; τῶν ἰδίων τριήρων ἑκατὸν μὲν καὶ τριάκοντα τὰς ἀρίστας ἀπέστειλεν εἰς τὸν τῶν Ἑρκύνων λιμένα, τὰς δ' ἄλλας ἀπάσας ἐξέπεμψε εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας.]

[³ Ib.]

tyrant of Syracuse was not destined to renew the war with the next spring. CHAP. X.

* "Before long a treaty was again made between Syracuse and Carthage. We are not told its terms; but as Selinous, when we next hear of it, appears as a Carthaginian possession, the Syracusan conquests were most likely given back to Carthage. Fresh
peace with
Carthage.

"But it was not the elder Dionysios who made the treaty. We have come to the end of the reign and life of a man who had done such great things and had so largely changed the face of the world of his day. In the year 367 Dionysios the tyrant died, after a reign of thirty-eight years. The cause of his death is said to have been a strange one. It was now for the first time that a tragedy of his was thought worthy of the first prize at Athens¹. The news was brought to him with all speed. His delight was unbounded; he sacrificed to the gods, and indulged in an excess of wine which was unusual with him. A fever followed, and he died². His career had been indeed a wonderful one. He had destroyed the freedom of his native city, but he had made it both the greatest city and Death of
Dionysios.
B.C. 367.

* Story of Sicily, pp. 195, 196.

[¹ See p. 194, note.]

[² Diod. xv. 74. He is said there to have died from overdrinking on the occasion of his victory. In Justin (xx. 5) "insidiis suorum interficitur." Plutarch (Dion 6) following Timaios, says, that when Dionysios was in a hopeless state Dion tried to use his influence in favour of the tyrant's children by his Syracusan wife Aristomachê, who was Dion's sister. But the doctors, who favoured the interests of the younger Dionysios, his son by the Lokrian and his appointed successor, gave the old man a sleeping draught of such a kind that he passed from unconsciousness to death; *θανάτῳ συνάφαντες τὸν ὕπνον*. A sleeping draught had been asked for by Dionysios, who himself had practised medicine. Cf. *Æl. V. H. xi. 11*; *περὶ τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἐσπούδασε καὶ αὐτὸς, καὶ ἰάτρῳ καὶ ἔτεμνε καὶ ἔκαε καὶ τὰ λοιπά.*]

CHAP. X. the greatest power of Europe. No man had won greater
The reign successes over the barbarian enemies of Greece ; but no man
of Dio- had done more to destroy Greek cities, and to plant bar-
nysios. barians in his own island. With his great gifts, he might,
as a lawful king or as the leader of a free people, have
made himself the most illustrious name in all Greek
history. As it was, he was a tyrant ; he reigned as such,
and he was remembered as such. All that we can say for
him is that worse tyrants came after him. His reign was
unusually long for a tyrant, and he was able to leave his
power to his son. He himself had said that he was able to
reign so long, because he had abstained from wanton out-
rages against particular persons. His reign marks an
He heralds æra in the history of Greece and of the world. He began
Macedo- a state of things which the Macedonian kings continued.
nian æra. It is well to note that when Dionysios died, Philip son of
Amyntas was already fifteen years old, and that eight years
later he won for himself the Macedonian kingdom."

[SUPPLEMENT I.

(By the Editor.)

THE MONARCHY OF DIONYSIOS.

With a Map of his Dominions.

DIONYSIOS had been named στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ by the Syracusan Assembly (ἐκκλησία) at the time of the Carthaginian Invasion of 405 B.C. (see Diodóros, xiii. 94; *Sicily*, vol. iii. 552, 553), and the precedent of Gelón had been publicly invoked by the proposers of the decree. In the only existing official documents, however, of contemporary date in which Dionysios is spoken of, the Athenian honorary decrees, one of them recording the alliance concluded between him and Athens, he is always called Σικελίας ἀρχων. (C. I. A., ii. 8, 51, 52; Hicks, *Gr. Hist. Inscriptions*, 71, 84, 88; cf. note, p. 204.) Beloch (*Impero di Dionisio*, 19 seqq., *Memorie dei Lincei*, 1881), with reference to this, goes so far as to maintain that Dionysios solemnly laid down his powers as Stratêgos Autokratôr, and that the new office of Archôn was then specially created for him (*op. cit.* 19; "Bastava di creare una magistratura nuova, conferita a vita, e la cui competenza corrispondesse all' incirca a quella del collegio dei 15 strategi dei tempi repubblicani. Rivestito di questa competenza, e col modesto nome di arconte (ἀρχων), Dionisio poteva esser sicuro che la direzione degli affari non gli sarebbe sfuggita di mano"). But this is pure supposition, in support of which there is no evidence whatever. (See, too, Holm, *Jahresbericht über d. Fortsch. d. klass. Alterthumswissenschaft*, 1881, 148 seqq.)

The Athenian inscriptions may be certainly taken to show that a more or less vague use of the name Archôn was found serviceable by Dionysios. So too, according to Plutarch (*Diôn*, xii), we find Diôn hoping by Plato's influence to remove the despotic

elements from the tyranny of the younger Dionysios, and make of him a law-abiding magistrate or "Archôn." (Ἠλπίζε μὲν γὰρ, ὥς ἔοικε, διὰ Πλάτωνος παραγενομένου τὸ δεσποτικὸν καὶ λίαν ἄκρατον ἀφελὼν τῆς τυραννίδος ἐμμελῆ τινα καὶ νόμιμον ἄρχοντα τὸν Διονύσιον καταστήσειν.) But the very phrase used in the Athenian decrees, —Σικελίας ἄρχων,—precludes us from citing them as evidence for the creation of a new magistracy at Syracuse.

Dionysios
conserv-
ative of
existing
forms.

Nor would such a formal innovation have been at all consistent with what we know of Dionysios' governmental system. It was clearly his aim to interfere as little as possible with existing constitutional forms. He has, in fact, summed up his policy himself in the pithy injunction τοὺς μὲν παῖδας ἀστραγάλους τοὺς δ' ἄνδρας ἔρκοις ἐξαπατᾶν (Plut. *De Fort. Al.* 1. 9). It was not for want of oaths that Syracuse lost her liberties. And why should Dionysios go out of his way to create a new office when the constitution already supplied him with one which he had only to make perpetual? Στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ was an existing title, and the powers conferred by it went far to satisfy the tyrant's ambition. It was that which Gelôn had borne, and there can be little doubt that it was in this capacity that the authority of Dionysios was recognized by successive Syracusan Assemblies. It was the precedent of Gelôn, as Diôn reminded Dionysios, that had enabled him to assume the *tyrannis* (Plut. *Diôn*, v).

The "Archôn of Sicily" a successor of Ducetius.

The wider title Σικελίας ἄρχων rather suggests that it was intended to cover the more personal authority won by Dionysios himself outside Syracuse. To a large extent, it must be remembered, he ruled as conqueror of the Sikel lands embraced in the former realm of Ducetius. At Naxos, indeed, we find him handing back to the Sikels the site of the first Greek colony in the island, and at conquered Motya he employed them as his garrison (Diod. xiv. 53). There is moreover a certain amount of evidence to show that the Greek title of Archôn had made way amongst the native elements of Sicily. Mr. Freeman (*Sicily*, ii. 381) remarks of Archônides, the Sikel prince of Herbita and the contemporary and ally of Ducetius; "He would seem to be the Hellenic Archôn while his yoke-fellow is the Sikel or Latin Dux." Among the Sikans too we hear of an Archôn of Ouessa (Polyainos, v. 1. 4). Thus the superior personal title which Dionysios found it convenient to affect in his dealings with foreign powers may well represent his claim to stand forth as much as the successor of

Ducetius as of Gelôn. At the same time the territorial style avoided invidious distinctions between *Συκελοί* and *Συκελιώται*.

At Syracuse itself, however, the title by which Dionysios claimed the allegiance of the citizens was undoubtedly *Στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ*. The term *Ἄρχων*, so far as it was used with reference to the civic government there, was in fact only a vaguer synonym for *Stratêgos*. And when Plutarch (*Diôn*, 29), speaking of the twenty colleagues who were elected to serve with Diôn and Megaklês,—the two *Stratêgoi Autokratores*,—calls them *συνάρχοντας*, we may venture to translate the phrase “fellow *Stratêgoi*.” In c. 39 he directly calls the *Stratêgoi* “*Archôns*.”

Of the ostensibly constitutional procedure which, when it suited his purpose, Dionysios could observe among his own citizens there is more than one piece of evidence. In 398 having completed his preparations for his great war against Carthage, he first summoned an Assembly and harangued it in due form in favour of his project (Diod. xiv. 45; [*Διονύσιος*] *συνήγαγεν εἰς ἐκκλησίαν καὶ παρεκάλει τοὺς Συρακοσίους πόλεμον ἐξενεγκεῖν πρὸς Καρχηδونیους*, . . . οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πολλοὺς λόγους πρὸς ταύτην τὴν προαίρεσιν διαλεχθεὶς ταχὺ συγκαταίνους ἔλαβε τοὺς Συρακοσίους). It was only after obtaining a formal decree from the Assembly that he sent a declaration of war to the Senate of Carthage (Diod. xiv. 47; *Διονύσιος δ' ἐξέπεμψεν εἰς Καρχηδόνα κήρυκα δοὺς ἐπιστολὴν πρὸς τὴν γερουσίαν· ἐν ταύτῃ δὲ γεγραμμένον ἦν, ὅτι Συρακοσίοις δεδογμένον εἴη πολεμεῖν πρὸς Καρχηδونیους, εἰὰν μὴ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων ἐκχωρήσωσι*). At a later Assembly (Diod. xiv. 64–70) Dionysios was able to overawe his opponents by the presence of his mercenaries, and to exercise his right of dissolution. In his financial needs, as we learn from Aristotle (*Ἔκον.* ii. 2. 20), he also made a point of summoning and formally consulting the *Ekklêsia*. It was not even without their formal *ψήφισμα* that he put his tin coinage into circulation (see Supplement III, p. 236).

So, too, on his father's death, the first act of the younger Dionysios, though he took care also to be acclaimed by the army (Justin, xxi. 1), was to summon an Assembly and to exhort the citizens to continue to himself the good-will that had, as it were, been handed down to him from his father (Diod. xv. 74; *Ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος ὁ νεώτερος διαδεξάμενος τὴν τυραννίδα, πρῶτον τὰ πλήθη συναγαγὼν εἰς ἐκκλησίαν παρεκάλεσε τοῖς οἰκείοις λόγοις τηρεῖν τὴν πατροπαράδοτον πρὸς αὐτὸν εὐνοίαν*). It is to be observed in this connexion

At Sy-
racuse
always
Stratêgos
Auto-
kratôr.

Constitu-
tional
procedure
observed
by Dio-
nysios.

His son's
accession
confirmed
by As-
sembly.

Ekklesiā
and Boula
at Syra-
cuse.

that the name of the popular Assembly at Syracuse always appears in our authorities as ἐκκλησία, otherwise we should expect, as in other Doric cities, ἀλία. That the Senate was known as Βουλὰ appears from an inscription of the last days of Syracusan independence (C. I. G. 5367; Beloch, *op. cit.* 18), though there is no direct evidence of its earlier existence. (See Holm, *Jahresbericht, ꝑc. d. klass. Alt.* 1881, p. 183.) Like the Ekklesiā the Βουλὰ or something answering to it may also have been nominally consulted by Dionysios, though the fact is not recorded, and it might not in practice be distinguishable from that Council of Friends with which both he and his successor consulted on critical occasions (Diod. xiv. 8; Plut. *Didn.* vi).

Dionysios'
body-
guard.

The most characteristic institution of Dionysios' *tyrannis*,—the body-guard of six hundred, accorded to him by the irregular Assembly at Leontinoi in 405 (Diod. xiii. 95),—may in some respects be regarded as only a reorganization of the picked body of six hundred hoplites which earlier *Stratēgoi* had at their disposal (cf. Beloch, *op. cit.* 21). The practical Presidency of the Chamber, the conduct of foreign affairs, the administration of the Treasury, all devolved on Dionysios in virtue of his *Stratēgia*. In the case of appointments he had only to extend existing rights of his office. Principal among the officers nominated by the tyrant who now come to the fore is the Nauarch (ναύαρχος) or high Admiral of the fleet. Before Dionysios' time (cf. Diod. xiii. 61) there seem to have been several ναύαρχοι. Now, however, as in the case of the *Stratēgia*, the office was limited to a single commander, always chosen from the members of the tyrant's family. It was first conferred by Dionysios on his brother Leptinēs, afterwards, on account of his conduct in the Italian expedition, taken away from him and transferred to his other brother Thearidas (Diod. xiv. 102; [Λεπτίνη] μὲν ἀπέλλαξε τῆς ναυαρχίας, Θεαρίδην δὲ τὸν ἕτερον ἀδελφὸν ἡγεμόνα τοῦ στόλου κατέστησε). In 387 B. C. again the brother-in-law of the two former Nauarchs, Polyxenos, appears to have held the post (Xen. *Hell.* v. 1. 26). Under Dionysios II. Philistos, the husband of Leptinēs' daughter, succeeds to the post (Diod. xvi. 11 and 16), but in this instance he is given the title of *Stratēgos*, the only occasion on which this title appears attached to a citizen of Syracuse under the Dionysian dynasty (see Beloch, *op. cit.* 22). Opposed to him is Herakleidēs, who had been chosen Nauarch by the Assembly of the Syracusans

Office of
Nauarch.

Confined
to tyrant's
family.

liberated by Diôn. Although carried out under republican forms this election throws great light on the importance of the office. Diôn, hearing of the appointment, got the Syracusans to rescind their vote on the ground that he could no longer remain Autokratôr if the command of the fleet was given to another (Plut. *Diôn*, xxxiii; οὐκέτι γὰρ αὐτοκράτωρ μένειν, ἂν ἄλλος ἡγήται τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν). Afterwards, however, he had Herakleidês nominated to the post on his own motion, and granted the same bodyguard as himself.

After the *Nauarch* the *Phrourarchs* or Commandants take a Phrour-
chief place among Dionysios' officers. To them was entrusted archs.
the safekeeping of the chief strongholds of his dominions, and first in importance among them was naturally the *Phrourarch* of the Akropolis of Syracuse itself. This post, we are told, was occupied for many years by Philistos (Plut. *Diôn*, 11; Φίλιστος . . . τὴν ἄκραν διεφύλαξε φρουραρχῶν ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον). On the conquest of Motya and other cities a *Phrourarch* was left in command of the Syracusan garrison (see Beloch, *op. cit.* p. 23). In Dionysios' Adriatic colony of Issa ("Lissos," see Supplement ii. p. 223 seq.), on the other hand, we read of an *Eparch* appointed by Dionysios (Diod. xv. 14) who had numerous triremes at his disposal; Dôrikos, the commander left behind him at Syracuse at the time of the expedition against Herbessus, also bore this title (Diod. xiv. 7).

The Syracusan dominions were divided into three main cate- Syracusan
gories; (1) The old Syracusan territories including a large part dominions
of the former realm of Ducetius. (2) The military colonies such divided
as Hadranum, Inessa, Leontinoi, Messana, and apparently Issa, into three
where the authority of Dionysios was represented by Phrourarchs classes.
or Eparchs; to which may be added the Carthaginian and other Military
towns captured from the enemy and garrisoned in the tyrant's colonies.
name like Motya (for the time being), and Solous taken from the Carthaginians, Henna, Morgantia, Mensenum, Cephalœdium, and others from the Sikels, or Krotôn on the Italian side (Livy, xxiv. 3).
(3) The allied cities,—*συμμαχιδὲς πόλεις*,—such as what remained Allied
of Akragas, Gela, Kamarina, and Selinous on the south-west, cities.
Therma and the new foundation of Tyndaris on the northern coast, some Sikel communities like Agyrium under its tyrant Agyris, Centuripa under Damôn, Herbita and Assoros (Diod. xiv. 78), and above all the Italian Lokroi, aggrandized by Dionysios' favour

Aggrand-
izement of
Lokroi.

into a considerable territorial power including in its dominions Skyllétion, Kaulônia, and Hippónion (Diod. xiv. 106, 107). Of the respective relations in which the colonies and allied cities stood to Syracuse we know little. It is a significant fact, however, that in none, not even the most privileged, do we find any silver coinage belonging to this period. The older Syracusan colonies, to judge by the inscriptions of Akrai, possessed only minor magistrates of their own.


Monarchy
of Dio-
nysios
compared
with
Roman
Empire.
He
strength-
ens Italic
element
in Sicily.

The military basis and sham constitutionalism of Dionysios' government suggest more than one comparison with the Roman Empire. In nothing is this more conspicuous than in the system of military colonies which he set on foot, as well as in their cosmopolitan character. He made free use of whatever served his turn whether Greek or barbarian, but as the mainstay of his empire he seems to have deliberately preferred non-Hellenic elements. As pointed out in the text, his "settlement of Italian mercenaries in the island foreshadows and prepares the way for the subjugation of Sicily, first of all lands out of Italy, by an Italian power." According to the author of the letters that bear Plato's name (Ep. viii. p. 353 F) the Oscan was already threatening to supersede the Greek language in the island. At Katanê and Leontinoi Dionysios planted Campanian and other mercenaries; his colony of Messana he largely peopled, if not with Italians, at any rate with Italiots. The site of Naxos he handed over to the Italic element in Sicily, the native Sikels. Nor must it be forgotten that among the mercenaries promiscuously set down by him within what once had been Hellenic walls were Gauls, Iberians, and Ligurians. At Syracuse itself we find him enlarging the franchise quite in the imperial style, and enrolling among the "new citizens" liberated slaves (Diod. xiv. 7). Ortygia itself was in the hands of his mercenaries. As a result of his government it is recorded that most of the cities that had escaped destruction were occupied by heterogeneous barbarians and disbanded soldiers (Plut. *Timoleôn*, 1; *ai δὲ πλείους πόλεις ὑπὸ βαρβάρων μαγάνων καὶ στρατιωτῶν ἀμίσθων κατειχοντο*).

Dis-Hel-
lenization
of Sicily.

Divine
attributes
assumed by
Dionysios.

There is even some evidence that Dionysios anticipated both Roman Emperors and the later Greek princes in taking to himself divine attributes (see Holm, *Gesch. Siciliens*, ii. 459). According to Diôn Chrysostomos (Or. 37 *Corinthiaca*, ed. Dindorf. 298, 299), the Syracusans being in want of money, owing to their prolonged



wars with the Carthaginians and "other barbarians of Sicily and Dionysios Italy," melted down all the statues of their tyrants except those of ^{I. represented as} the elder Dionysios, which were fashioned in the form of Dionysos ^{Dionysos.} (πλὴν ἄρα τοῦ Διονυσίου τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου τῶν τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ Διονύσου περικείμενων). It is probable that those who erected the statues of Dionysios thus deified also reared altars to his honour, as the cities of Greece were already doing to his contemporary Lysander. The irreligious cast of Dionysios' mind would certainly not have prevented him from availing himself of an imperial cult if it served his purpose. In the assumption of divine attributes he ^{Dionysios II. a "son of Apollo."} was followed by his son, who proclaimed himself a son of Apollo (Plut. *De Fort. Alex.* ii. 5) in the boastful line ;

Δαρίδος ἐκ μητρὸς Φοίβου κοινώμασι βλαστάν.

So, too, we find the younger Dionysios naming his son *Apollōkratēs*, and his Rhêgine colony *Phoibia*. In the days of the Syracusan kings traces of the same deification are not wanting, and Philistis, queen of Hierôn II., appears on coins in the guise of *Dēmêtêr* or her daughter.

The geographical extension of the dominions of Dionysios can ^{Geographical extension of Dionysios' dominions.} best be understood from the annexed Map. It represents the possessions and dependencies of Dionysios as they existed in 379 B.C. In that year he had, by the capture of Krotôn, achieved his most brilliant conquest (after Rhêgion) on the Italian side, nor, accepting Beloch's conclusions (*op. cit.* pp. 6 and 7, note 1), was it till the succeeding year that he was forced by his defeat at Kronion (see p. 198) to cede his westernmost conquests up to the Halykos to the Carthaginians. He still held,—on any showing till 383 B.C.,—what remained of Selinous, Solous, and the Himeraian Therma, and the borders of his dominions stretched from the Mazaros to the Krathis. Within these limits the cities and communities not held in direct subjection were certainly in a position of dependent alliance. His new colony of Messana gave him the command of the straits; Rhêgion, on the other side, though dismantled, seems neither to have been utterly destroyed as stated by Strabo (vi. 1. 6), nor its site handed over to the Lokrians as suggested in the text (cf. Grote, c. lxxxiii), for Dionysios himself is recorded to have built a palace there (Pliny, xii. 7; cf. Beloch, *op. cit.* p. 8), and its value as an Italian outpost of the dynasty was further acknowledged by his son planting there his colony

Italian
possessions
of Dionysios.

of Phoibia (Strabo, *loc. cit.*). Beyond this the greater part of the toe of Italy was in the possession of the favoured Lokrian allies and dependents, to whom Dionysios had handed over the territories of Kaulônia, Skyllêtion, and Hippônion. On the other hand, the garrisoning of the Akropolis of Krotôn shows that Dionysios held the extensive dominions and dependencies of that great city under his direct government. Our informant fails us at this point, but it is safe to believe that Pandosia, Terina, and the other Krotôniate plantations stretching to the Tyrrhene sea followed the fortunes of the mother-city so far as to acknowledge the suzerainty of Dionysios. Between the Sicilian tyrant and the Lucanians fresh from the conquest of Laos and Poseidônia, they could not stand alone.

Members
of Italiot
League
dependent
allies.

The Ἀρχὼν Σικελίας thus included in his dominions, besides the greater part of the Island, a large slice of the older Sikel land on the Italian side of the straits. To a certain extent he may be said to have anticipated the arrangement of a much later date and to have founded before its time a realm of "the two Sicilies." Pliny indeed (iii. 15), when speaking of his projected wall from sea to sea across the Isthmus of Squillace, uses the significant words—"*intercisam (peninsulam) eo loco adicere Siciliae voluit.*"

Alliances
with
Lucanians.

Beyond the eastern frontier of this continuous territory, the remaining members of the Italiot League, at the head of them the Tarantines (see Holm, *G. S.* ii. 134; and cf. Athên. xv. 700 d; Strabo, vi. 1. 8), had no choice but to accept Dionysios' hegemony and remained in close alliance with his successor. The warlike Lucanians were his allies, and the Iapygians and Messapians, in whose country lay the two harbours of Brundisium (Βρεντέσιον) and Hydruntum,—afterwards the most famous crossing-points to the Greek lands beyond,—seem to have followed the same example (see Suppl. II, p. 228). To judge by the colonies founded by his son on the Apulian coast and their personal superintendence by the younger Dionysios (Diod. xvi. 5 and 10; see Suppl. II, p. 228), Apulia too came within the sphere of Syracusan influence,—a strange foreshadowing of the days of Norman Counts and Kings.

Apulians.

South
Illyrians,
and Molot-
tian king.

On the opposite shore alliances had been concluded with the southern Illyrians, and the Molottis under king Alketas might be regarded as a protected State. The keys of the Adriatic were thus in Dionysios' hands, and he took care to cement his dominions in the gulf by his plantations at Pharos, Issa, Adria, and perhaps

other sites on the Illyrian and east Italian shores (see Suppl. II, pp. 228, 229),—a policy continued by his successor. Adriatic colonies.

Over and above all this, an ominous notice, supplied by Justin (xx. 5), shows that Dionysios could reckon on the armed support of the greatest barbarian land-power of the peninsula. The Gauls, fresh from the burning of Rome, had despatched envoys to Dionysios, then warring in Italy, with the offer of their "friendship and alliance," which the tyrant gladly accepted. He might employ them either in the van of his armies or against the rear of his enemies ("gentem suam inter hostes eius positam esse, magnoque usui ei futuram, vel in acie bellanti vel de tergo intentis in proelium hostibus"). This formal alliance of the invading Gaulish tribes must be taken to mean something more than the casual employment of bands of Gaulish mercenaries. It opened out, indeed, unlimited possibilities of future aggrandisement in southern and even central Italy. Later on,—in 349 B.C.,—we read (Livy, vii. 25, 26) of a Greek fleet, apparently despatched by the younger Dionysios, coöperating with the Gauls on the coasts of Latium, and extending its ravages to the mouth of the Tiber. Alliance with Gauls in Italy.

It is unfortunate that Diodôros, our chief authority for the reign of Dionysios, becomes extremely defective during the period marked by the greatest extension of his rule and influence on the Italian side. The capture of Krotôn for instance (see p. 202, note 3), an event of the first importance, is not even mentioned by the Sicilian historian. But the solid nature of Dionysios' Italian dominion is proved by the extent of the authority which his degenerate successor continued to exercise from the Straits of Messina to the Adriatic. The centre of gravity of the Dionysian dynasty finally shifted from Syracuse to Lokroi.] Solid nature of Dionysios' Italian dominion.

[SUPPLEMENT II.]

(By the Editor.)

THE ADRIATIC COLONIES OF DIONYSIOS.

DESIGNS OF
DIONYSIOS
ON OLD
GREECE.

THE planting by Dionysios of Syracusan colonies on the coasts and islands of the Adriatic is unquestionably one of the most interesting episodes of his reign. Looked at from one point of view, it was the necessary corollary of his scheme for securing the transit-route from Italy to Greece proper, in the affairs of which he was constantly intervening, and whither,—reversing the designs of the Molottian Alexander and Pyrrhos,—he clearly hoped in time to extend his supremacy. But, over and above these more purely political aims, the Adriatic plantations of Dionysios must before all else be regarded as part of a deliberate and far-reaching commercial policy about which we have too little information.

THE
ANCIENT
ADRIATIC
TRADE-
ROUTE.

OLD COURSE
OF AMBER
TRADE.

AN important trade-route between the East Mediterranean countries and the far North had from very early times followed the eastern shores of the Adriatic, where the long chain of islands and sheltering fiords were very favourable to the enterprise of primitive navigation. The most ancient starting-point of the sea-route of which we have any historical record was Adria, near the mouth of one of the channels of the Po, from whose early importance the sea itself took the name of the Adriatic. The Baltic amber-trade, which from about the beginning of the first millennium before our æra had for the most part superseded the earlier commerce with Jutland and the North-Sea strand, seems to have followed this route, and the Greek legends which connected the source of the amber supply with the Eridanos and the shores of Adria have been reasonably connected with this ancient trade-route. (See Genthe, *Ueber den Etruskischen Tauschhandel nach dem Norden*, 1874 ed., pp. 103, 104.) The legends of Kadmos that have attached themselves to so many sites on the Illyrian coast attest the part which the Phœnicians took

in this commerce. In early days, if we may judge from the account given by Herodotus (iv. 33) of the transport of the Hyperborean gifts to the temple of Dêlos, the products of this trade-line reached the Dôdônaïans, "first of the Greeks," through barbarian intermediaries. At a later date Corinth and her colonies followed in the Phœnician wake.

Commercial relations of Greece with East Adriatic coasts.

It is true that, whether owing to the violent interruption of continental trade-lines or simply to a change in Greek fashion, amber itself ceased for some centuries to be an important item in Adriatic commerce, and the flourishing times of its import in the Mediterranean countries did not revive till the days of the Roman Empire, when Aquileia had succeeded Adria as the chief emporium of the Gulf. But the trade-route still had its importance to the Greeks. The products of the plains of the Po, of the Alps and the lands beyond, of the Illyrian wilds,—the slaves and cattle, the hides and wool and other raw materials,—now no doubt, as in later times, still made their way by this Adriatic line. On the other hand, the discoveries of Greek bronzes and pottery on various sites on the Dalmatian, Istrian, and Venetian coasts, in the passes of the Alps, the Salzkammergut and Southern Bavaria, Württemberg, Switzerland, and even the Rhine valley, stand in direct relation to this old Adriatic line, and show that the barbarian tribes were learning to value the refined productions of Greek art. It was Korkyra, the daughter of Corinth, who first reaped the full harvest of this trade, and at Apollonia, Dyrrhachion, and finally in Black Korkyra (now Curzola, Old Slav. *Karkar*) found fresh stepping-stones towards the head of the Gulf. Taras also took a leading part, and the evidences of Magna Græcian imports are very marked on the ancient sites of the Dalmatian and Istrian coasts, and even in the lands beyond the Alps. (See *Archæologia*, 1890, p. 30.) From the numbers of Attic vases found at Adria, Felsina (Bologna), and elsewhere in the country about the mouths of the Po, it would further appear that Athens too took a direct share in this Adriatic commerce. At a later period indeed (325 B.C., cf. Genthe, *op. cit.* 104) the Athenians themselves contemplated planting an Adriatic colony for the protection of their trade in those waters.

Colonies of Korkyra.

Tarantine and Athenian enterprise.

It was on this artery of commerce that Dionysios now laid hands in the most methodical manner. According to the account of Diodôros (xv. 13) his object was simply to secure his communi-

Dionysios seizes Adriatic trade-route.

Adriatic
policy of
Dionysios.

cations with Epeiros on which he had designs of his own. Rather, we should be inclined to regard it as part of his general scheme for securing control of the Gulf, with which the possession of the transit-route between Italy and Greece was necessarily bound up. For the would-be lord of the Adriatic two measures were before all things needful. One was the establishment of a chain of convenient stations along the eastern coast; the other was to secure the alliance of one or more of the more powerful communities of the Illyrian mainland. It was with this latter object in view that in after ages we find Venice constantly allying herself with Slavonic Krals and Byzantine Despots of the East Adriatic *terra firma*, and there can be little doubt that Dionysios' alliance with the South Illyrian clans and his attempt to turn the Molottis into a protected State were in the main directed towards securing a stronger grasp on the mouth of the Adriatic. So too at a later date (see p. 204, note 1) we read of him despatching a naval expedition to rescue Korkyra from the hands of Athens, still the most dangerous maritime competitor of Syracuse on that side.

Points of
vantage on
Illyrian
coast
necessary
to Adriatic
dominion.

But the formation of isolated alliances on the Illyrian mainland was not by itself sufficient to secure Adriatic dominion. With the fiords and islands of the Illyrian shores still to a large extent in unchecked possession of piratic tribes, the navigation of Ionian waters was unsafe. The occupation of points of vantage on the Illyrian coasts and islands has been from time immemorial a necessary measure of police for any civilized power engaged in those waters. Witness the later experience of the Macedonian kings, the long struggles of Rome with the Illyrians from Queen Teuta's days onwards, of Venice with the Narentines and Uskoks.

Colony of
Pharos.

In carrying out his schemes in this direction Dionysios found a welcome ally. The Parians had about the same time, in obedience, it is said, to an oracle (Diod. xv. 13. 4), planted the colony of Pharos on the isle of Lesina, which in the Slavonic form of *Hear* still preserves its ancient name. Dionysios from the first seems to have assumed a kind of partnership in this enterprise, and a combined attack of the Illyrian mainlanders soon gave him the opportunity of playing the part of protector to the new settlers. This help was forthcoming from a colony which he had already established on his own behalf on the same coast, and in whose haven his "Eparch" had collected a naval force sufficient to deal

a crushing blow at the armada of small craft mustered by the Dionysios' colony of barbarians (Diod. xv. 14). The two passages of Diodóros (xv. 13. 3; 14. 2) however which give the name of "Lissos" to Issa (Lissa). Dionysios' foundation have led to much misunderstanding, and there are good reasons for regarding this as simply due to a confusion with the island settlement of Issa,—now Lissa,—the Syracusan colonization of which is vouched for by other evidence. Issa moreover stands in a close geographical relation to Pharos, being separated from it only by a few miles of sea, whereas Lissos, the modern Alessio (Albanian Lesh), is sufficiently remote.

It is certainly difficult to see with what object Dionysios could have planted a colony at Lissos at all. Holm indeed (*Geoch. Siciliens*, ii. 135) brings the occupation of Lissos by Dionysios into relation with the assistance rendered by him to Alketas of Molottis. But it was too far north to be useful, as Aulôn or Apollônia might have been, for a Molottian campaign. Moreover, Diodóros in two passages (xv. 13. 4; 14. 2) brings the alleged foundation of Lissos into direct relation with that of Pharos. It must be borne in mind that the chief value of any Adriatic settlement to the Syracusan tyrant lay in the advantage it offered to his shipping. In this respect Issa is supreme. But Lissos, on its height above the mouth of the Drin, could never have been a good naval station. Its port—the Nymphæum of Cæsar (*Bell. Civ.* iii. 26), now S. Giovanni di Medua—is a mere anchorage, exposed to the *scirocco*, as Cæsar himself had occasion to observe, and as those whose bark has been driven on that inhospitable shore are not likely to forget. The river itself is only navigable for a short distance, and that for ships of small burden. Neither is there anything in the later history of Lissos or its existing monuments that can be taken to confirm the view that it ever was a colony of Syracuse. The akropolis of Lissos, or Akrolissos,—the citadel of modern Alessio,—which I have had occasion to explore, contains remains of polygonal or so-called "Cyclopean" walls of a type known elsewhere on the Illyrian coast (see Von Hahn, *Albanesische Studien*, p. 122), but no traces are to be found of Hellenic masonry such as was employed by Dionysios' builders. The only known coin of Lissos, a small bronze piece with the inscription ΔΙΣΣΙΩΤΑΝ struck about the beginning of the second century B.C., shows rather Epeiroi than Syracusan traditions (see Numismatic Chronicle, 1880; *Recent*

Discoveries of Illyrian Coins, p. 271 seqq.; the obverse is a head of Artemis with her quiver, misinterpreted *loc. cit.* owing to the bad state of the coin; the reverse is a thunderbolt). Down to 211, when Philip V. of Macedon captured its rock citadel, Lissos seems to have remained an Illyrian stronghold.

Issa (Lissa)
key of
Adriatic.

The claim of Issa to have been the scene of one of Dionysios' Adriatic plantations rests on the most obvious geographical as well as historical grounds. From its central position the island of Lissa has been long recognized by maritime powers as the key of the Adriatic. With Ravenna and Pola, it was a principal station of the Roman fleet in these waters. In after ages Venice, called on to cope with the barbarous Narentines who had revived the piratic traditions of the old Illyrian tribes, made Lissa one of its earliest prizes. At a later date the same considerations that had influenced his predecessors moved Captain Hoste, who commanded the English squadron sent to oppose Napoleon's admiral in Adriatic waters, to make Lissa his principal station. It was off Lissa that he gained his brilliant victory over the French fleet, as a consequence of which, from 1812 to 1815 the island passed formally under English government, and in the days of the "Continental System" became as much an outpost of our commerce as of our naval power. In more recent times (A.D. 1866) Lissa has looked on at the first struggle for Adriatic dominion between the fleet of its Austrian possessor and that of new-born Italy.

Issean
plantations
on Illyrian
mainland.

To those who know the coast, the open sea to be traversed, and the exposed roadstead at the mouth of the Drin, the idea that such ready help as was accorded to the Pharians could have come from Lissos, or that Lissos would have been a gathering-point for any naval expedition, seems in the highest degree improbable. On the other hand, Skylax speaks of Issa as the site of a Greek city, expressly linking it with Pharos (23; νέος Φάρος νήσος Ἑλληνίδες καὶ Ἴσση νήσος καὶ πόλεις Ἑλληνίδες αὐταί), and Skymnos (v. 414, 415), after significantly citing Timaios for the assertion that the neighbouring Hylloi were barbarized Hellenes, adds;

νήσος κατ' αὐτοὺς δ' ἔστιν Ἴσση λεγομένη
Συρακοσίαν ἔχουσα τὴν ἀποικίαν.

The statement moreover of Strabo (vii. 5. 5) that Tragurion (Traù) was a colony of the Isseans (Ἰσσιῶν κτῖσμα), and the further notice of Polybios (xxxi. 18) that both that city and Epetion were part of their government (μετ' αὐτῶν ταττομένης), finds its complement

in Pliny, iii. 22. 141, who places in the same neighbourhood the town "Siculi" (the true reading, and not "Sicum," cf. Mommsen, C. I. L. iii. p. 305). Both he and Ptolemy (ii. 16) also speak of "Siculôtæ" in near connexion with the Naresii who occupied the Narenta valley.

The probability that Diodôros confounded Lissos with Issa has been already suggested by C. Muller (Skylax, *Geographi Minores*, 30), and this view is accepted by Beloch (*L'impero Siciliano di Dionisio* 9, *Memorie dei Lincei*, 1881). Grotefend's suggestion (*Zur Geogr. u. Gesch. von Alt-Italien*, iv. 45) that Lissos was the true foundation and that Issa was attributed by Skymnos to Syracuse by confusion with the mainland town seems altogether "preposterous and perverse."

On Greek inscriptions found at Issa it is perhaps a noteworthy fact that the name of Dionysios more than once occurs (cf. C. I. G., 1835,—where the name appears alone and in solitary prominence at the head of others to which patronymics are attached;—*Bull. di Corr. Arch.*, 1857, 45; *Bull. di Arch. e Storia Dalmata*, 1885, 29). The autonomous coinage of Issa reaches back into the first half of the fourth century B.C., and the earliest coin-types betray by their style their Syracusan parentage. (See Imhoof Blumer, *Num. Zeitschr.*, 1884, 258.) They exhibit a dolphin beside a youthful head, apparently of a mythical founder, whose name is supplied by the accompanying inscription IONIOΣ. It appears from a fragment of Theopompos preserved by Strabo (vii. 617) that the name of 'Ιόνιος was in some special way connected with Issa (*ἦκειν ἀπὸ ἀνδρὸς ἡγησαμένου τῶν τόπων ἐξ Ἰσσης* [Ἰσσης codd.]), and from the Scholiast to Apollonius Rhodius (iv. 508) we gather that he was the Eponymic founder of the original Illyrian settlement on the island, perhaps of that at Pharos as well. From the absence, indeed, of the civic name, and from the wide extension given to the name IONIOΣ,—including as it did the whole gulf,—we may infer that this was a federal currency in which both Issa and Pharos shared. The later coins of Issa, struck in its own name, show on the reverse a goat, an obvious symbol of alliance with the sister colony, upon whose coin-types the goat simply reproduces the monetary badge of the mother city Paros;

Δραχμαὶ καὶ Πάραι τῶν ἑπίσημα τράγος.

On the other hand, the laureate head of Zeus that appears on the obverse of the Pharian pieces (some of them overstruck on coins

reading IONIOΣ) is in all probability taken from the head of Zeus Eleutherios on fourth-century bronze coins of Syracuse.

The Venetian Adria colonized by Dionysios.

Diodôros does not expressly mention the name of any other city planted on these shores by Dionysios, but he speaks in a general way of his founding more than one city "in the Adriatic" (xv. 13; Διονύσιος . . . ἔγνω κατὰ τὸν Ἀδρίαν πόλεις οἰκίσειν). But the *Etymologicum Magnum* contains the direct statement (s.v. Ἀδρίας); Διονύσιος Σικελίας τύραννος δὲ πρότερον ἐπὶ τῇ . . . Ὀλυμπίადι πόλιν ἔκτισεν Ἀδρίαν ἐν τῷ Ἰωνικῷ κόλπῳ, ἀφ' ἧς καὶ τὸ πέλαγος Ἀδρίας καλεῖται. (So too Tzetzes—*ad Lycophr.*, 650 seqq.—and cf. Justin, I. 9.) By some this foundation has been referred to the southern Hatria (now Atri) in Picenum (e.g. Müller, *Etrusker*, i. 140, ed. Deecke), and Mr. Freeman, when drawing up a map indicating Dionysios' possessions, adopted this view. But both its existing remains and its geographical position in relation to early trade-lines of the Gulf clearly point to the northern Adria, the original name-giver

Not Hatria in Picenum.

of the Adriatic, as the more probable site of a Greek colony. The Hatria of Picenum stood away from the sea, and can show no antiquity compared to that of the Venetian town. Its coins, struck after the Roman conquest of 289 B.C., display a Latin epigraphy and a somewhat rude Italic art. The Adria of the Veneto, on the other hand, must in very early times have been an emporium of Greek trade. The numerous fragments of Greek painted vases discovered on the spot and collected in the local Museum (see especially R. Schoene, *Museo Bocchi*) show that in the sixth and fifth centuries before our æra a lively intercourse existed between Adria and Athens, of which the further course may be traced in the cemeteries of Etruscan Bologna. The *graffiti* on these vases, moreover, show that already by the middle of the fifth century there must have been Greek merchants resident in this ancient emporium (Schoene, *op. cit.* p. xii). Secure on its island-site, girt by its marshes and its seven lagoons, traversed by its canals, Adria was in more ways than one the true forerunner of the later Queen of the Adriatic. Not only was it the northern point of embarkation for the early merchandise that found its way down the Po valley and through the Alpine passes, but it offered just such a safe footing on the borders of the barbarian world as was habitually sought by the first Greek colonists on distant shores.

Site and remains of Adria.

But there are, besides, two definite reasons which lead us to

identify the Adria that Dionysios is said to have colonized with the Venetian port. According to Plutarch (*Diōn*, 11, cf. Holm, *op. cit.*, ii. p. 141), Philistos, when banished by Dionysios I., betook himself to friends on the Adriatic,—*εἰς τὸν Ἀδριαν*, the same form of words as that used by Diodōros, xv. 13, in describing Dionysios' colonization. It was on this coast, in fact, that he profited by his enforced leisure to write his Histories. Later on, when in favour with Dionysios II., we find Philistos acting as Syracusan admiral in the Adriatic (Diod. xvi. 11. 3; Plutarch, *Diōn*, xxv, xxxv). Now, from a passage of Pliny (H. N. iii. 20; ^{Canals of Philistos at Adria.} cf. Holm, *op. cit.* ii. p. 441) mentioning the *fossiones Philistinas* in the neighbourhood of the Venetian Adria it would appear that some of its canals were actually due to Philistos. Moreover, a ^{Relations of Dionysios with Veneti.} notice of Strabo (vi. 1. 4) affords valuable evidence that the elder Dionysios had direct relations with the Veneti at the head of the Adriatic. It was from here that he procured his race-horses, and though the Venetian breed was already not unknown, its great celebrity throughout Greece was said to date from Dionysios' time (Strabo, v. 1. 4; καὶ Διονύσιος, ὁ τῆς Ζικελίας τύραννος, ἐντεῦθεν (sc. ἐξ Ἑνεῶν) τὸ ἵπποτρόφιον συνεστήσατο τῶν ἀθλητῶν ἵππων, ὥστε καὶ ὄνομα ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλήσι γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑνετικῆς πωλείας καὶ πολὺν χρόνον εὐδοκιμῆσαι τὸ γένος). The connexion of the Keltic Boii with Adria (Steph. Byz. s. v., cf. Hesych. s. v.) further suggests that this may have been one of the sources whence Dionysios drew his Gaulish mercenaries.

Adria was the natural terminus of the maritime trade-route down the Adriatic, and it may be reasonably asked why Dionysios should have taken the trouble to colonize a half-way station like Issa if he did not at the same time secure a foothold at the head of the Gulf?

The old Adriatic line of maritime trade lay, as already pointed out, along the island-guarded eastern coast, and the central ^{Land-route from Felsina to Taras.} channels of this route were secured by Dionysios' plantation at Issa and the sister colony of Pharos. The opposite Italian coast from Ancona to Brundisium being exposed and comparatively harbourless was little fitted for the coasting course of early navigation. The important line of traffic on this side was the land-route from Felsina (Bologna) to Taras (Taranto) which Dionysios had less occasion to hold. But ports like that of Brundisium always had their importance, and from the fact that Philistos when lying in

Relations
with Iapy-
gians.
Cities
founded in
Apulia by
Dionysios
II.

wait for Diôn made use of the Iapygian harbours (Plut. Diôn, xxv) it is probable that this and other tribes of the heel of Italy had enrolled themselves amongst the allies of Dionysios I. We are further told by Diodôros (xvi. 5, and cf. xvi. 10) that the younger Dionysios founded two cities in Apulia to secure the passage of the Ionian straits, then infested by pirates (κατὰ δὲ τὴν Ἀπουλίαν δύο πόλεις ἔκτισε, βουλόμενος ἀσφαλῆ τοῖς πλείουσι τὸν Ἴόνιον πόρον ποιῆσαι· οἱ γὰρ τὴν παραθαλαττίαν οἰκούντες βάρβαροι ληστρίσι πολλαῖς πλείοντες ἄπλουν τοῖς ἐμπόροις παρεσκεύαζον πᾶσαν τὴν περὶ τὸν Ἀδρίαν θάλατταν). At a later date we find Agathoklēs supplying the Iapygians and Peuketians with piratical vessels to prey on their Greek neighbours (Diod. xxi. 4; cf. *Horsemen of Tarentum*, p. 137). Holm (*op. cit.* ii. 158) considers that the colonies of Dionysios II. played a very important part in the Hellenization of Apulia, which made great progress in the fourth century B.C. He seeks a record of Dionysios' plantation in the free horse on the coins of Arpi and Salapia,—a type common to Syracuse and the Campanians of Sicily,—and would in the same way explain the appearance of the Syracusan type of Persephonē (taken from the "Medallions" of Euānetos) on the didrachms of Arpi, though this latter seems to be rather directly due to Agathokleian influence. There are reasonable grounds for supposing that the incorporation of Apulia in their Sicilian empire was the ultimate aim of the Dionysian dynasty. Syracuse was to have anticipated Palermo.

Was Nu-
mana a
colony of
Dionysios?

Numana (Νούμανα) in Picenum has been sometimes reckoned among the Adriatic colonies of the elder Dionysios, but this is very doubtful. The only evidence on which the assertion has been made is the statement of Pliny (iii. 18) that it was founded by the "Siculi," and this has been taken to mean the Sikeliote Greeks of Dionysios. But there were traditions of aboriginal *Siculi* in Central and even Northern Italy at a very early date, as for instance in Latium and Liguria, and Pliny here, as elsewhere, is certainly referring to these (see too Holm, *op. cit.*, ii. p. 441). Thus in the succeeding chapter (iii. 19) he mentions that the Siculi and Liburni held many regions of the country beyond Ancona, then included in Gallia Togata, and adds, "Umbri eos expulere, hos Etruria, hanc Galli."

What value Numana could have had to Dionysios it is difficult to see. The port of Ancona however, in the *ἀγκών* or "bent arm"

between two promontories, must have always played an important part in Adriatic navigation. It is in fact the nearest and most convenient crossing-point from the Illyrian island-chain. As such it must have been marked by the Syracusan merchantmen, and though not mentioned amongst the colonies of Dionysios, he seems at least to have been the indirect cause of its becoming a Syracusan settlement. Strabo (v. 4. 2) in enumerating the towns of Picenum calls Ankôn,—the “*Dorica Ancon*” of Juvenal (iv. 40),—“a Greek city founded by Syracusans who had fled from the tyranny of Dionysios.” Müller (*Etrusker*, ed. Deecke, i. 140) considers Strabo’s account a perversion due to hatred of the tyrant; and the Syracusan occupation of Ancona certainly looks as if it had been part of Dionysios’ far-reaching plans of Adriatic dominion.]

[SUPPLEMENT III.]

(*By the Editor.*)

THE FINANCE AND COINAGE OF THE ELDER DIONYSIOS.

Financial embarrassments of Dionysios. BOTH direct historical tradition and the evidence of numismatics point to the fact that Dionysios, in spite of the commanding position that he achieved, was continually in financial difficulties. To understand this state of affairs it is before all things necessary to remember the circumstances amidst which the tyrant first came to the fore. The rapid growth of Syracuse itself must not make us forget for a moment that the new Syracusan power rose amidst the ruins of the flourishing Greek communities of Sicily, partly, it may be added, on their ashes. Akragas, once the rival of Syracuse itself in wealth and grandeur, Himera and Selinous in the West, Messana on the East had been utterly overthrown by the Carthaginian, Naxos and Katanê by Dionysios himself. Gela and Kamarina lived on as shadows of themselves. Leontinoi was absorbed in the ruling city. The capture of Motya by Dionysios, though its political value was transient, must have wrought lasting injury to Sicilian commerce as a whole. On the Italian side the ravages of the Lucanians in one direction, and the ruthless destruction of Greek cities by Dionysios himself on the other, had produced a similar effect. Lokroi, hitherto of subordinate commercial importance, was indeed aggrandized, but Kaulônia, if we may judge by its coinage a much richer city, was overthrown; so was the still more important emporium of Rhêgion, and the fall of Krotôn followed. The capture of Poseidônia and Laos by the Lucanians not only wiped out two flourishing centres of Greek industry, but placed the land-line of commerce between the Ionian and Tyrrhene seas—opened up three centuries before by Sybaris—in barbarian hands. The methodical seizure of the Adriatic trade-route by Dionysios may have been a partial set-off against the prevailing

Wide-spread ruin in Sicily and S. Italy.

Effects of Lucanian conquests.

commercial depression, but its fruits could not be gathered in at once.

On the other hand, the continual wars in which Dionysios was engaged, the colossal development that he gave to the Syracusan navy, his elaborate equipments and artillery, his vast schemes of fortification, such as that actually carried out on the 'Island' and Epipolæ and the still greater undertaking left unfinished on the isthmus of Squillace, the market-halls and public buildings with which he embellished his capital, his palace at Rhégion, the gorgeous *Theories* with which, as on the memorable occasion at Olympia, he sought to dazzle the rest of Greece,—all these and other exercises of his power and ambition brought with them a vast and continuous outlay. But above all, Dionysios' wholesale employment of mercenaries on a Carthaginian or Asiatic scale needed a constant supply of ready money. For many purposes indeed forced or slave labour and the financial tricks, about which so many anecdotes have been preserved, might serve his purpose. But the mercenaries, at least, must be paid in hard cash,—the Greeks and Campanians in current coin; the Gauls and Iberians at any rate in precious metals.

Extravagant expenditure of Dionysios.

Pecuniary demands of his mercenaries.

That Dionysios succeeded in amassing from one source or another vast hoards we know. In 402, especially, when intent on his great schemes for the armament and fortification of Syracuse and the development of his navy, we find him attracting by his high offers of pay the best engineers and artisans of the day from every part of Greece and Italy, and encouraging the inventors of new engines of destruction by numerous gifts and prizes (Diod. xiv. 41, 42). The elaborate costliness of the arms then made to suit the customs of the various nations enrolled among his mercenary bands gives us some measure of the expenses thus incurred. Yet even after this,—as we should have supposed,—exhaustive effort, which included the walling-round of Epipolæ and the building of the biggest war-galleys, —the Pentekonteres,—that the ancient world had yet known, we find him, on the occasion of the Carthaginian invasion of 397, with a sufficient reserve in his coffers to spend large sums in enrolling Peloponnesian mercenaries (Diod. xiv. 62; *ἔπεμψε δὲ καὶ ξηρολόγους εἰς Πελοπόννησον μετὰ πολλῶν χρημάτων ἐντεϊλάμενος ὡς πλείστους ἀβροῖζειν στρατιώτας μὴ φειδομένους τῶν μισθῶν*).

Outlay on armament and fortification of Syracuse;

on naval construction.

What facilities, then, had Dionysios for drawing such supplies? The wholesale confiscation at Syracuse itself, the plunder of Naxos,

Various
sources of
supply.

Katanê, and other Greek or Sikel cities might supply him for a while, as, later, the sack of Motya. But, except when he found such opportunities for actual plunder, there was little left for him in Sicily on which to draw. The bulk of the Sikeliot cities had already been overthrown by the Carthaginian. The condition of Sicily and a large part of Greek Italy was, as we have seen, ruinous, and the mere aggregation of transplanted citizens of other towns within the walls of Syracuse could not counterbalance the annihilation of centre after centre of former wealth and industry. Dionysios in short had been living on his capital, and when the sources of plunder which had been open to him during the earlier years of his reign were once exhausted he must inevitably have been reduced to great financial straits. Even the 300 talents paid him by Himilkôn (Diod. xiv. 75) as the price of the safe withdrawal of the Carthaginians after their defeat of 397 could have at best afforded a temporary relief.

That the extravagant expenditure required by his government coupled with the exhaustion of supplies produced, at least during the later period of his reign, their inevitable effect we have more than one piece of evidence.

Plunder of
Motya and
sale of
citizens.

The hard measure meted out to Greek cities by Dionysios was no doubt largely prompted by his fiscal necessities. At Motya this took another form, and was shown by the tyrant's anxiety to stop the slaughter of the inhabitants that he might be able to secure their price in the slave market, in addition to the vast loot of gold and silver taken there (Diod. xiv. 53; *Διονύσιος δὲ βουλόμενος ἐξανδραποδίσσασθαι τὴν πόλιν ὅπως ἀθροισθῇ χρήματα . . . ἀνέιργε τοὺς στρατιώτας τοῦ φονεῖν τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους*). By the date of his capture of Rhêgion his necessities had probably increased, and according to Aristotle (*Ækon*. ii. 20. 7) he succeeded by a shameless device in securing the value of his human spoil twice over. First he made the citizens ransom themselves at the price of three *minas* a head¹, a usual prisoner's ransom (see Boeckh, *Staatshaushaltung*, 1886 ed. i. 89). Next, having thus extracted their hidden hoards he nevertheless proceeded after the receipt of the money to sell the wretched citizens as slaves.

Extortion
from Rhê-
gines.

Another aspect of the desperate financial straits in which Dionysios was continually finding himself is to be found in his repeated robberies of the temples and images of the Gods, of which

¹ Diodôros (xiv. 111) makes it a single *mîsa*.

instances have been given above (see p. 197, and note). He paid for an Italian expedition by plundering the temple of the Lakinian Héra; one motive at least of his intervention in Illyria and Epeiros was to secure half-barbaric allies to anticipate the Gauls in a raid on the temple of Delphi. To indemnify himself for the failure of this adventure, and to secure the sinews of war for a new campaign against the Carthaginians, he made his piratical descent on the shrine of Pyrgoi. Golden robes and tables of offering, plate and jewellery, the golden parts of chryselephantine images, the wreaths and Victories of precious metal in the hands of Gods,—nothing came amiss to his melting-pot, and sacrilegious plunder became to Dionysios a regular source of revenue.

It cannot then surprise us when we find that in dealing with his own subjects, Dionysios resorted to severe taxation and extraordinary fiscal expedients. For ordinary revenue it is probable (see Holm, *Gesch. Siciliens*, ii. 145) that, like later Syracusan sovereigns, he took to himself the custom's dues and the tithes of the crops. He introduced a cattle-tax, which weighed so heavily on owners that they preferred to slaughter their beasts wholesale. Dionysios therefore limited the number slaughtered to the day's demand of the meat market. The cattle-owners preferred to sacrifice their beasts to the Gods, on which the tyrant forbade the sacrifice of female animals (Arist. *Ekonom.* ii. 20. 5). As another means for securing ready money he made himself official guardian of all orphans, and confiscated the incomings of the estates thus usurped till such time as his wards came of age (Arist. *op. cit.* ii. 2. 6; *πάλιν τε δεηθείς χρημάτων ἐκέλευσεν ἀπογράφασθαι χρήματα πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅσοι οἰκοὶ εἰσιν ὀρφανικοὶ ἀπογραφάμενων δὲ ἄλλων τὰ τούτων χρήματα ἀπεχρᾶτο ἕως ἕκαστος εἰς ἡλικίαν ἔλθοι*). This example was imitated by Agathoklēs (Diod. xx. 4). Dionysios also levied ship-money in his own name, but he first levied the desired tax in a tentative way as if to establish a kind of constitutional precedent. Summoning the Assembly he informed them that a city was about to be handed over to him, but that money was needed for the purpose (Arist. *op. cit.* ii. 20. 2; *Τριῆρεις τε ναυπηγεῖσθαι μέλλων ἴδδει ὅτι δεήσειτο χρημάτων. Ἐκκλησίαν οὖν συναγαγὼν ἔφη πόλιν αὐτῷ τινὰ προδίδασθαι εἰς ἣν δεῖσθαι χρημάτων, ἥξειον τε αὐτῷ τοὺς πολίτας εἰσενέγκαι δύο στατήρας ἕκαστον*). The money was brought, but Dionysios, after letting a few days pass, as if to show that the affair had fallen through, returned their contributions to the citizens. But needing the

Plunder of temples.

Fiscal expedients resorted to.

Ship-money levied.

money to build his triremes all the same he again levied the tax, this time apparently in his own name. The citizens paid the money with readiness, thinking it would be again returned, but this time Dionysios kept it for his ship-building. He also levied extraordinary war-taxes. On one occasion the citizens refused to pay on the plea that their funds were exhausted. Dionysios accepted their plea, and at once gave orders that his own household possessions should be sold to supply the required sum. The Syracusans, we are told, not seeing the snare set for them, bought up the tyrant's goods. The money was paid, but the purchases were claimed with it (Arist. *op. cit.* ii. 20. 4; ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν τιμὴν κατέβαλον, ἐκέλευσε τὸ σκεῦος ἀναφέρειν ἕκαστον ὃ ἡγόρασεν).

Heavy taxation of Syracusans. The weight of Dionysios' taxation may be judged from Aristotle's statement that in five years the citizens paid him the whole of their capital,—in other words, that they paid him at the rate of twenty per cent. per annum (*Pol.* v. 9. 5; καὶ ἡ εἰσφορὰ τῶν τελῶν οἷον ἐν Συρακούσαις ἐν πέντε γὰρ ἔτεσιν ἐπὶ Διονυσίου τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν εἰσεννοχέαι συνέβαινεν). The same exactions continued under his successor, and when Diôn entered Syracuse he found the citizens had not the money, even if they had had the will, to pay his faithful band of Peloponnesian mercenaries (Diod. xvi. 17; χρημάτων σπανίζουσης τῆς πόλεως).

Financial necessities of Dionysios react on coinage. In view of the universal ruin, the great expenditure of Dionysios, and the desperate financial expedients to which he had recourse, it is natural to suppose that the tyrant's necessities would have left their mark on the Syracusan coinage.

That as a matter of fact this was the case we have more than one direct piece of historical evidence. By numismatists, indeed, the reign of Dionysios has been generally supposed to have been the most brilliant and prolific period of the Syracusan coinage (cf. Head, *Coinage of Syracuse*, p. 20), and from one point of view this conclusion may seem natural enough. For, as regards the precious metals, the coinage of Syracuse had now become the only coinage for the whole of Greek Sicily, and even for the toe of Italy. The other great cities of this region had been either wiped out or reduced to a subject condition, and the coinage of the once prolific mints of Akragas and Gela, Selinous and Himera, of Messana, Naxos, Katanê and Kamarina, breaks off suddenly about the end of the fifth century, only to be partially renewed in inferior metal at a later time. The coinage of Lokroi had not yet begun;

Rhêgion had temporarily at least ceased to exist as a city; so had Kaulônia; Krotôn itself was in Dionysios' hands.

The Syracusan coinage thus stood alone. And in a way this solitary ascendancy of the Syracusan mint worthily asserted itself in the beauty and splendour of the coins themselves. The new issue of gold pieces of the superior value of fifty and one hundred *litras*, though it had begun during the years that immediately succeeded the Athenian siege, and before the seizure of the Tyranny by Dionysios, continued at least during the earlier period of his reign. There are good grounds for believing that the silver fifty-litra pieces or dekadrachms, the revived *Damareteia*, were originally struck on the institution of the Assinarian Games (see A. J. Evans, *Syracusan Medallions*, &c., p. 141 seqq., and *Sicily*, vol. iii. p. 719 seqq.), but it is to the time of Dionysios that the finest of those executed by the famous monetary artist, Euænetos, must in all probability be referred (see Pl. I. fig. 1).

These magnificent pieces seem to have been in such repute among the mercenary bands employed on either side in Sicily that, on a reduced scale, they served as models for the later Carthaginian 'camp-coinage' in the Island. Their imitation by Peloponnesian cities like Messênê and Pheneos is also perhaps not unconnected with the large sums expended by Dionysios in the hire of Peloponnesian mercenaries (Diod. xiv. 62, &c.), and the same tribute to the medallic work of his great artist Euænetos at Knôsos and Phæræ may contain a hint of the employment of Cretan bowmen and Thessalian slingers. But though the hirelings of Dionysios continued to be paid in part at least with his fine *pentêkontalitra*, there is the clearest evidence that the tyrant's hoards were for the most part composed not of the new minted Syracusan pieces but either of the earlier civic issues or of imported foreign coins.

The present writer has shown (*op. cit.*) in some detail, and from a variety of converging evidence, that the prolific tetradrachm coinage of Syracuse suddenly breaks off about the end of the fifth century. It may indeed be confidently stated, extraordinary as the phenomenon may appear, that no tetradrachms or silver pieces of smaller denomination are known of this period as late in style as the *pentêkontalitra* of Euænetos, which seem to have formed the sole silver coinage of Dionysios during a great part of his reign. In the great hoards of this period that from time to time

Syracusan gold-pieces.

The silver deka-drachms or "medallions" by Euænetos.

Used as models by Carthaginians and Greeks.

Interruption of ordinary silver issues.

have come to light on Sicilian soil, freshly struck *pentékontalitra* or "medallions" have been found in association with Syracusan tetradrachms of earlier style, and showing traces of wear, though newly coined *pegasi* of Corinth and her colonies and brilliant tetradrachms of the Carthaginian camp-coinage accompanied the same deposits. Dionysios, it will be seen, extorted from his subjects the hoards that they had laid by in happier times and, having no motive to recoin what was current money, used it for his own purposes.

But, apart from this, his supply of bullion was not more than sufficient for the coinage of his great *pentékontalitra*, and it is doubtful whether, during the last years of his reign, even this issue was continued. The activity of his great engraver Euænetos cannot with any probability be brought down later than 385 B.C., nor would his dies have lasted for many years after that date.

Alleged tin
coinage of
Dionysios.

But this cessation of the fine tetradrachm series about 400 B.C. throws a new light on some notices preserved by Aristotle and Julius Pollux as to Dionysios' monetary expedients. We learn from these sources (Arist. *Œkon.* ii. 20, and Pollux, ix. 79) that, being in want of money (*οὐκ εὐροπῶν ἀπυρροῦ*) and having levied a forced loan for the construction and equipment of his fleet,—this, no doubt, refers to his colossal armament of 402 B.C.,—he repaid it by forcing on his creditors tin coins of the nominal value of four *drachmæ*, but which in reality were only worth one. This distinct statement that Dionysios struck debased "tetradrachms" of tin or base metal affords an explanation of the fact that the series of Syracusan silver tetradrachms now breaks off. Although none of their tin or debased metal substitutes are now known to exist, a recent discovery has now revealed the existence of a debased imitation of a silver dekadrachm or "medallion" belonging to this period, and in all probability executed by Dionysios' orders. The piece in question is of bronze, which has originally been washed over with tin, and the coin, so far from being an inferior imitation of the work of the great monetary artist who then had charge of the Syracusan Mint, seems to be from a die specially executed for the purpose by the hand of Euænetos himself. A slight variation is perceptible in detail, but the style is that of the master, and warrants us in supposing that this debased coinage was officially issued by the Syracusan Mint in obedience to the tyrant's orders. (See my *New Lights on the Monetary Frauds of Dionysios*, Num. Chron. 1894.)

Discovery
of debased
deka-
drachm.

Another monetary expedient of Dionysios is recorded, about which numismatic evidence has been hitherto lacking. Aristotle (*Ekon.* ii. 20) says that, having on another occasion borrowed money from the citizens, he countermarked the coins in such a way as to double their legal value, and repaid his debt in the newly stamped coins, every drachm of silver thus standing for two.

From another notice of Aristotle it appears probable that it was in Dionysios' time that the old Sicilian talent of twenty-four *noummoi* was reduced to twelve (Poll. ix. 87; τὸ μόντοι Σικελικὸν τάλαντον ἐλάχιστον ἴσχυεν, τὸ μὲν ἀρχαῖον, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης λέγει, τέτταρας καὶ εἴκοσι τοὺς νοῦμμους, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον δώδεκα, δύνασθαι δὲ τὸν νοῦμμον τρία ἡμοβάλια). This passage has given rise to very various interpretations. Mommsen (*Gesch. des röm. Münzwesens*, 50; ed. Blacas, i. 103) on the strength of Pollux' assertion that the *noummos* was equivalent to one and a half obol, assumes that the Sicilian *noummos* was identical with the *litra* which Pollux elsewhere (ix. 80) equates with the Æginetan obol¹ (= one and a half Attic obol). But inasmuch as the Sicilian talent is known, both from Diodōros (xi. 26) and the great Tauromenitan Inscriptions (C. I. G. 5640, 5641), to have contained 120 *litræ*, Mommsen concludes that Aristotle's "old Sicilian talent" of twenty-four *noummoi* had been preceded by an earlier talent of 120 *noummoi*: and that therefore a reduction of the talent to one-fifth had already taken place. Finally, he brings Aristotle's reference to the reduction of the tetradrachms by Dionysios to one quarter of their value by his issue of base metal coins into direct relation with this reduction of the talent. In this he is followed by Hultsch (*Gr. u. röm. Metrologie*, 663), Head (*Coins of Syracuse*, 13), and others.

But, as Holm justly points out (*Gesch. Siciliens*, ii. 445), the two passages in Pollux, ix. 79 and ix. 87, refer to quite different transactions, and the coinage of "tin" tetradrachms one-fourth the value of the silver can in any case have nothing to do with a supposed reduction of the silver talent to a fifth of its former value. To suppose that by the "old Sicilian talent" Aristotle could have simply meant a greatly reduced talent which only lasted a few years of Dionysios' reign, is to place an altogether

¹ In itself an inaccurate statement, as a Sicilian *litra* = one and a fifth Attic obol.

Reduction
of Sicilian
talent.

unwarrantable construction on his words. We have simply to deal with a reduction of the old talent by one-half, namely, from twenty-four to twelve *noummoi*, and it is only the statement that the *noummos* and *litra* were identical that is at fault. The Sicilian talent, as we know from other sources, originally contained twenty-four *drachmæ*, and it is preferable to conclude that the *noummos* of Syracuse was in Aristotle's time a drachma.

The statement of Pollux and Aristotle, then, amounts to this, that whereas the Sicilian talent had hitherto contained twenty-four *drachmæ*, it was now reduced to twelve, or to one-half its former value. But we know from the great Tauromenitan inscriptions that for purposes of reckoning this reduced talent continued to be divided into 120 *litræ* of account. A *drachma* therefore contained ten *litræ* of account, though it still represented only five silver *litræ*. (See Num. Chron. 1894, *New Lights*, &c.)

Coincides
with
doubling
value of
drachma.

This reduction of the Sicilian talent, which there is every reason to refer to Dionysios, though it has nothing to do with his debased tetradrachm coinage, corresponds very closely with the monetary expedient already referred to by which the nominal value of every *drachma* was doubled. The reduction of the talent to half its former value would, as we have seen, have had precisely this effect. And in view of this coincidence of cause and effect it seems possible to attach a new meaning to Aristotle's statement that Dionysios, having stamped the coin in a certain way, repaid his creditors in coin every *drachma* of which had acquired the fictitious value of two *drachmæ*. For we have seen that the coinage of Syracusan tetradrachms had been stopped by Dionysios, and that as a consequence of this the Corinthian staters of ten *litræ*—each equivalent to an Attic didrachm—became the almost exclusive currency of Syracuse and Greek Sicily. Supposing, then, that Dionysios had borrowed money of the old Syracusan stamp, and after reducing the value of the talent by one-half had repaid his creditors in imported *pegasi* which, though only didrachms, now had the same legal value as was formerly possessed by tetradrachms, a very slight perversion of the transaction would explain Aristotle's statement. And, in the absence of any countermarked Syracusan coins of this period, such as Aristotle's words, taken literally, seem to imply, we are almost bound to look for some such explanation. *Pegasi*, however, do not seem to have been struck by the Syracusan mint itself till Diôn's time (see *Syr. Meds.* 157).]

CHAPTER XI.

THE DELIVERERS.

B.C. 367-317¹.

*“**T**HE great power of the elder Dionysios, the greatest power, as it is emphatically said, in Europe², now passed to the weaker hands of his son. The father had done great things, even if they were largely evil things. He had changed the old face of Sicily, and had thereby gone far towards changing the face of the whole Greek world. He had given Syracuse, as the capital of a ruler, a position such as Athens herself had hardly held as a commonwealth bearing rule over other commonwealths. He had done greater things against barbarians in their own land than any Greek leader had done before him. Yet, besides the loss of political freedom in his own and other cities, he had on the whole done more against the Greek nation than for it. In his very first dealings he had helped the Carthaginians to win more than he could ever win back from them. In Sicily itself he had destroyed some Greek cities and peopled others with

Situation on the death of the elder Dionysios.

Career of Dionysios prejudicial to Greek nation.

¹ From Story of Sicily, 197; “Our chief authorities now are still the narrative of Diodoros and Plutarch’s Lives of Diôn and Timoleôn. Plutarch is commonly the fuller. There are also Latin lives of both by Cornelius Nepos. Something may be learned from the letters attributed to Plato, with the cautions already given.”

* From Story of Sicily, p. 197 seqq.

² Diod. xvi. 9; *μεγίστην δυναστείαν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην*.

CHAP. XI. barbarians. He had sacrificed several Italiot towns to the advancement of one, and he had decidedly helped towards barbarian advance in Italy. It is only in his most distant enterprises, in his comparatively obscure Hadriatic colonies, that he at all enlarged the borders of Hellas. His career tended, on the whole, to a great lessening, not only of Sicilian freedom, but of Sicilian prosperity. From his time the Sicilian and Italian Greeks began to find that they could not stand alone. The main feature of the times that followed, for about a hundred years beginning with the reign of his son, is the constant intercourse between Old Greece and the Greeks of Italy and Sicily. That intercourse takes a new shape. The Greeks of Italy and Sicily are ever sending to Old Greece for help against domestic tyrants, against barbarian enemies, or against both together. A succession of deliverers go forth, some of them to do great things. But we shall presently have to distinguish between the republican leader who goes out simply to deliver, and the prince who does indeed work deliverance, but who thinks that he has a right to reign over those whom he delivers.

Dionysios I. leaves Sicilian and Italian Greeks weaker.

Intervention of Old Greece now constantly sought.

Succession of deliverers.

Feeble character of Dionysios II.

“The history of the younger Dionysios illustrates the nature of the Greek tyrannies in many ways. As in many other cases, what the father won the son lost. The tyrant’s son, born, as the phrase is, in the purple, was commonly a weaker man than his father. And the elder Dionysios, in his extreme jealousy of everybody, had kept his son shut up in his palace, and allowed him no share in political or military affairs ¹. He was not without ability or with-

[¹ The young Dionysios seems to have amused himself in his seclusion with turner’s and carpenter’s work, making little carts and lamps, tables

out tendencies to good; but he was in every way weaker than his father. Not having his father's strength of purpose, he was easily impressed both for good and for evil. He was less cruel, because less determined, than his father, but, for the same reason, he fell into the vices from which his father was free. It is a characteristic story that the old Dionysios found his son in an intrigue with another man's wife. He rebuked his son, and asked if he had ever heard of his doing anything of that kind. 'No; but then your father was not tyrant.' 'And your son never will be tyrant, if you do such things¹.' The new tyrant could be base too in other ways on occasion. He was the son of his father's Lokrian wife Dôris, and was about twenty-five years old at his accession. He was acknowledged, perhaps as general with full powers, by some kind of vote of an assembly which had no will of its own². He then gave his father a splendid funeral and a tomb, contrary to Greek practice, in the Island³. The elder Dionysios, at the time of his death, was at

CHAP. XI.
Elder and
younger
Dionysios
contrasted.

Accession
of Dionysios II.
ratified by
assembly.

and chairs. (Plut. Diôn, ix; 'Ο πατήρ δεδοικὼς μὴ φρονήματος μεταλαβὼν καὶ συγγενόμενος νοῦν ἔχουσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐπιβουλεύσειεν αὐτῷ καὶ παρέλοιτο τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἐφρούρει κατὰκλειστον οἶκος, δι' ἐρημίαν ὁμίλιας ἐτέρας καὶ ἀπειρία πραγμάτων, ὥς φασιν, ἀμάξια καὶ λυχνίας καὶ δίφρους ξυλίνους καὶ τραπέζας τεκταίνοντες. It is characteristic of his mechanical bent that his chief recorded monument at Syracuse was a lofty sundial (see below, p. 261).]

[¹ Plut. Reg. et Imperat. Apophth.; Εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ νεανίσκου, Σὺ γὰρ οὐκ εἶχες πατέρα τύραννον, Οὐδὲ σὺ, εἶπεν, υἱὸν ἔξεις, ἐὰν μὴ παύσῃ ταῦτα ποιῶν.]

[² Diod. xv. 74; 'Ο δὲ Διονύσιος ὁ νεώτερος διαδεξάμενος τὴν τυραννίδα πρῶτον τὰ πλήθη συναγαγὼν εἰς ἐκκλησίαν παρεκάλει τοὺς οἰκείους λόγους τηρεῖν τὴν πατροπαράδοτον πρὸς αὐτὸν εὐνοίαν. This summoning of the Ecclesia shows that certain constitutional forms were still observed under the Tyrannis (see Supplement I. p. 213).]

[³ Ib.; ἐπειτα τὸν πατέρα μεγαλοπρεπῶς θάψας κατὰ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, πρὸς ταῖς βασιλείαις καλουμέναις πύλαις, ἡσφαλίσατο τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν.]

CHAP. XI. war with both Carthaginians and Lucanians. The new Peace con- tyrant presently made peace with both¹. The Halykos cluded with Car- again became the frontier between his power and that of thage and Lucanians. Carthage. In Italy he is said to have founded two new towns on the coast of Apulia². Otherwise he simply kept his father's dominion, without extending it or doing anything memorable in any way.

§ 1. *Διόν.*

Advisers
of Diony-
sios II.

“Under a tyranny, above all where the tyrant is weak and needs guidance, family and personal relations, marriages, and the power of men whom we may call ministers, become of importance, just as they do among lawful princes. Two men specially stand out during the reign of the younger Dionysios. The historian Philistos, who had had so great a hand in setting up the power of his father, was recalled from exile, either at the beginning of his reign

The
historian
Philistos.

[¹ Diod. xvi. 5; Διονύσιος ὁ τῶν Συρακοσίων τύραννος ὁ νεώτερος . . . ἀπρακ-
τος ἂν καὶ πολλὸ τοῦ πατρὸς καταδείκτερος, προσεποιεῖτο διὰ τὴν ἀπραγίαν
εἰρηνικὸς εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τὸν τρόπον. Διόπερ πρὸς Καρχηδονίους διαδεδεγ-
μένος τὸν πόλεμον, πρὸς τε τοὺτους εἰρήνην συνέθετο καὶ πρὸς Λευκανοὺς,
ὁμοίως διαπολεμήσας ἀργῶς ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον, καὶ ταῖς τελευταίαις μάχαις ἐπὶ
τοῦ προτερήματος γενόμενος, ἀσμένως πρὸς αὐτοὺς κατελύσατο τὸν πόλεμον.
On the question of peace with Carthage Dionysios, according to Plutarch
(*Diôn*, vi), consulted a council of his friends. On this occasion *Diôn*
had proposed to carry the Carthaginian war into Africa. J. Zenzes (*De
Dionysio Minore Syracusanorum tyranno*, 15, n. 6, cf. Holm, op. cit. ii.
452) gives reasons for supposing that the Punic, like the Lucanian war,
dragged on awhile. Plutarch (*Diôn*, xiv) refers to a continued state of
war with Carthage, and (in c. xvi) a war is again mentioned, but with
whom is not stated. Zenzes thinks that the Punic war continued to
364 B. C.]

² [See Supplement II. p. 228. A still more important colonial undertaking, however, of the younger Dionysios, was his partial restoration of Rhêgion under the name of Phoibia (Strabo, vi. 1; μέρος τι τοῦ κτίσματος ἀναλαβὼν Φοιβίαν ἐκάλεσεν).]

or somewhat later¹. He was now an old man, but he was still vigorous, and he was attached to the system of the elder tyrant. The other was Diôn, the brother of Dionysios' Syracusan wife Aristomachê. His father, Hipparinos, had had a hand in setting up the tyranny. Aristomachê had two sons, much younger than Dionysios, and two daughters, Sôphrosynê and Aretê—mark the tyrant's choice of names for his children—who were married, the one to her half-brother Dionysios, the other to her uncle Diôn. It was only marriage with a sister by the mother's side which was a sin against Greek feelings. Diôn was enriched and favoured by the elder tyrant, and was largely employed by him in public affairs, specially in embassies to Carthage². He was an able man and a good soldier, stern and haughty in manner, yet capable of winning influence, strict in life, and with a tendency to philosophical speculations. He had had a hand in bringing Plato to Sicily in the days of the elder Dionysios. Now that the younger tyrant had succeeded and he himself stood high in his confidence, he hoped to work great things by the help of his favourite philosophy. He had no thought of restoring the old democratic constitution, which was by no means according to Platonic notions. But he wished to make Dionysios rule well instead of ill, and even to turn him from a tyrant into something like a

Diôn's
Platonic
notions of
government.

[¹ Plut. Diôn, xi; οἱ δὲ τῷ Δίῳ πολέμοις, φοβούμενοι τὴν τοῦ Διονυσίου μεταβολήν, ἔπεισαν αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς φυγῆς μεταπέμπεσθαι Φίλιστον, ἄνδρα καὶ πεπαιδευμένον περὶ λόγους καὶ τυραννικῶν ἡθῶν ἐμπειρότατον, ὡς ἀντίταγμα πρὸς Πλάτωνα καὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἐκείνον ἔχοντες. Philistos was with friends on the Adriatic (see p. 227) writing his history.]

[² Ib. v; Οὐ μὲν ὅ γε Δίῳ ἔλαττον εἶχε παρὰ τῷ Διονυσίῳ τιμὴς ἢ πίστεως ἀλλὰ πρεσβείας τε τὰς μεγίστας διόκει καὶ πεμπόμενος πρὸς Καρχηδονίους ἐθαυμάσθη διαφερόντως.]

CHAP. XI. constitutional king¹. To this end he persuaded Plato to come again to Syracuse, to act as a kind of spiritual adviser to the tyrant². Not much good was likely to come of this. Plato was a speculator on constitutions, but he had no practical knowledge of affairs. Dionysios listened to the philosopher for a while with pleasure; geometry became fashionable at his court; he talked of making reforms and even of giving up the tyranny³.

Plato at
the court
of Diony-
sios II.

[¹ Plut. Diôn, x; γενόμενος βασιλεὺς ἐκ τυράννου. xii; "ἤλπιζε μὲν γὰρ (ὁ Δίων) ὡς ἔοικε διὰ Πλάτωνα παραγενομένου τὸ δεσποτικὸν καὶ λίαν ἄκρατον ἀφελὼν τῆς τυραννίδος ἐμμελῆ τινα καὶ νόμιμον ἀρχοντα τὸν Διονύσιον καταστήσειν· εἰ δὲ ἀντιβαίνει καὶ μὴ μαλάσσοιτο, καταλύσας ἐκείνον ἐγνώκει τὴν πολιτείαν ἀποδίδοναι Συρακοσίοις, οὐκ ἐπαινῶν μὲν δημοκρατίαν, πάντως δὲ βελτίω τυραννίδος ἡγούμενος τοῖς διαμαρτάνουσιν ὑγαινοῦσης ἀριστοκρατίας. Dionysios is reported to have been so far carried away by Diôn's recommendations that he himself declared his intention of turning his *tyrannis* into "a limited kingship" (τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀντὶ τυραννίδος εἰς βασιλείαν μεταστήσαντα, Plat. Ep. iii. 315 E. Cf. Grote, ch. lxxxiv). Another excellent but hardly realizable design with which Diôn had inspired him was to "re-plant the dis-hellenized cities of Sicily" (l. c. τὰς Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἰκίζειν). Plato however, when he came, said that Dionysios must do his schooling first, and the oratorical conclusion is that his fine projects came to nothing. But this is not strictly true. He did re-colonize Rhégion as well as plant Greek foundations on the Apulian coast.]

[² Holm (*Gesch. Siciliens*, ii. 159 and 453) cites an apposite passage in Plato's writings (Legg. iv. 709, 710) which goes far to explain the motives and hopes with which the Philosopher answered Dionysios' invitation. The best chance, he says, for a badly governed state to be set right is in the case of one under a young tyrant of good parts (τυραννουμένην μοι δοτε τὴν πόλιν, τύραννος δ' ἔστω νέος καὶ μῆμον καὶ εὐμαθὴς καὶ ἀνδρείος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὲς φύσει) if good fortune shall bring to such a tyrant a worthy lawgiver (εὐτυχῆς, πρόσθε, μὴ κατ' ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τὸ γενέσθαι τε ἐπ' αὐτοῦ νομοθέτην ἄξιον ἐπαινοῦ καὶ τινα τύχην εἰς ταῦτ' ἀγαγεῖν αὐτῷ).]

[³ Plut. Diôn, xiii; Φορὰ δὲ τις ἦν ἐπὶ λόγους καὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἀπάντων καὶ τὸ τυραννεῖν, ὥς φασι, κοινορτὸς ὑπὸ πλῆθους τῶν γεωμετρούντων κατεῖχεν. Ἡμερῶν δὲ ὀλίγων διαγενομένων θυσία μὲν ἦν πάτριος ἐν τοῖς τυραννεῖσι τοῦ δὲ κήρυκος, ὥσπερ εἰώθει κατευξαμένου διαμένειν τὴν τυραννίδα ἀσάλευτον πολλοὺς χρόνους, ὁ Διονύσιος λέγεται παρεστῶς "Οὐ πάντῃ" φάναι "καταρώμενος ἡμῖν." Cf. Nepos, Dion. 3. Plato on his arrival had been conveyed from the landing-place in the state chariot, Dionysios accompanying him on a mule and proceeding to offer a sacrifice of thanksgiving (Plut. l. c.; Ælian, V. H. iv. 18).]

But nothing was really done. Philistos and his party pressed Dionysios on the other side, and set him against Diôn. The peace with Carthage was not yet settled, and Diôn was charged with treasonable dealings with the enemy¹. He was accordingly suddenly sent away from Sicily², but was allowed to receive the income of his property. His wife Aretê, the half-sister of the tyrant, and his young son Hipparinos, remained at Syracuse.

"Dionysios meanwhile kept up a strange kind of friendship for Plato. He was jealous that the philosopher thought more of Diôn than he did of Dionysios³. He

[¹ Plut. Diôn, xiv. It was suggested that Diôn sought by Plato's persuasions to compass the voluntary abdication of Dionysios in order that the Tyrannis should descend to one or other of Diôn's own nephews,—the children of Dionysios the Elder by his sister Aristomachê (cf. Plut. Diôn, vi; and see p. 209, n. 2). "Formerly all the forces of Athens, both by land and sea, had not prevailed against Syracuse, and was now a single Sophist to induce Dionysios to dismiss his 10,000 life-guards (*δορυφόρων*) and turn his back on his 400 triremes, his 10,000 horsemen, and many times that number of hoplites! and this for him to seek for the *summum bonum* (*τὸ σιωπώμενον ἀγαθόν*) in the Academy and find bliss by means of geometry!" But what finally turned the scale with Dionysios was an intercepted secret letter from Diôn to the Carthaginian Shophetim advising them when they wished to discuss terms of peace with Dionysios not to act without his privity (*μὴ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἐντευξίν, ὥς πάντα θεησόμενοις ἀμεταπύτων ἔσ' αὐτοῦ*). Diôn's experiences as Syracusan ambassador at Carthage under the old Dionysios gave him of course special advantages for this negotiation. His letter to the Shophetim may have been inspired by the most patriotic motives.]

[² The accounts as to Diôn's expulsion vary. According to Plutarch (Diôn, xiv) he was sent off on a small vessel (*δεκάτιον*) to Italy. So too Plat. Ep. vii. 329; *σμηκρὸν εἰς πλοῖον ἐμβιβάσας, ἐξέβαλεν ἀτίμως*. According to Diodôros (xvi. 6), Dionysios had resolved to execute Diôn, who therefore fled to the Peloponnese. Cornelius Nepos (Dion. iv) on the other hand states that Dionysios put a trireme at Diôn's disposal and ordered him to sail to Corinth, giving as a reason, "*se id utriusque facere causa, ne cum inter se timerent, alteruter alterum preoccuparet.*"

[³ Plut. Diôn, xvi; *ἡράσθη τυραννικὸν ἔρωτα, μόνος ἐξῶν ὑπὸ Πλάτωνα ἀντερᾶσθαι καὶ θαυμάζεσθαι μάλιστα πάντων, ἵτοιμος ὅν ἐπιτρέπειν τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὴν τυραννίδα μὴ προτιμῶντι τὴν πρὸς Δίωνα φιλίαν τῆς πρὸς αὐτόν.*]

CHAP. XI. kept him for a while at Syracuse, and even persuaded him to pay him a second visit. But nothing came of it. Dionysios at last seized Diôn's property and divided it among his own friends. This was during Plato's second visit; after that Plato was very glad to get away¹. Presently the tyrant took on him to give the wife of Diôn to another man named Timokratês, and he took pains to lead her young son into vice. He also banished one of his chief officers, named Hêrakleidês, who then passed for a friend of Diôn's. The tyranny in short was getting worse and worse.

Confisca-
tion of
Dion's
property.
Departure
of Plato.

Diôn
in Old
Greece.

"All this happened during the first seven years of the reign of the younger Dionysios (B. C. 367-360). Meanwhile Diôn visited several parts of Old Greece, and was everywhere received with honour. At Sparta he received a most special honour, being admitted to full Spartan citizenship, a gift which was most rarely bestowed on any stranger². At Athens he made the acquaintance of Kallippos, one of Plato's followers; indeed he made friends everywhere. He began to plan schemes for upsetting the tyranny of Dionysios, and he met with encouragement in many quarters. Hêrakleidês too was planning for the same object; but he and Diôn did not agree, and each followed his own course. It is certain that no good came of the friendship of Kallippos; as for the rivalry of Hêrakleidês, it is only fair to remember that we have the story only as it was told by the friends of Diôn. At any rate Diôn was ready for his enterprise

Plots
against
Diony-
sios II.

[¹ Plut. Diôn, xix, xx.]

[² Ib. xvii; Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Σπαρτιάτην αὐτὸν ἐποίησαντο τῆς Διονυσίου καταφρονήσαντες ὀργῆς, καίπερ αὐτοῖς τότε προθύμως ἐπὶ τοῖς Θηβαίοις συμμαχοῦντος.]

before Hêrakleidês was. He had gradually raised a small force of mercenaries and volunteers¹; but of Syracusan exiles, of whom there are said to have been as many as a thousand seeking shelter in different parts of Greece, he could get only twenty-five or thirty to join him. At last, in the summer of the year B. C. 357, ten years after the death of the old Dionysios, he set forth on his errand of deliverance. His force was so small that all could be carried in five merchant-ships²."

CHAP. XI.

Dion sets
sail to
deliver
Syracuse.
B. C. 357.

[¹ Plut. Diôn, xxii. Amongst the recruits were some philosophers, the Cypriot Eudêmos, Timônidês the Leukadian, Miltas of Thessaly *ἀνδρα μάντιν καὶ μετεωρηκότα τῆς ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ διατριβῆς*. Diôn collected his mercenaries at Corinth (Diod. xvi. 6), where the cause of Syracusan liberty was popular. According to Diodôros (xvi. 9. 5) he brought with him 1,000 mercenaries,—according to Plutarch, loc. cit., less than 800,—and he carried with him besides full armour for 5,000 hoplites (*πανοπλίᾳ πεντακισχίλις*). Ælian (V. H. iv. 8) raises the number of mercenaries to 2,000; Aristotle (Rhet. ad Al. 9) to 3,000. Zakynthos was the starting-point of the expedition. Before setting sail Diôn made a solemn sacrifice to the Zakynthian Apollo at the head of his troops in full armour, and afterwards gave a banquet in the Stadion with such a display of gold and silver cups and tables as to impress the beholders with a sense of his resources (*θαυμάζοντας ἀργυρῶν καὶ χρυσῶν ἐπιπωμαίων καὶ τραπεζῶν ὑπερβάλλουσιν ἱκανικὸν πλοῦτον λαμπρότητα*, Plut. op. cit. xxiii). Diôn's name appears on the contemporary coins of Zakynthos (see Gius. Romano, *Sopra alcune monete*, &c., and P. Gardner, Num. Chron. 1885, 95, 96), from which we may infer that he had been made a magistrate of that city.]

[² Plut. Diôn, xxv; *τοὺς δὲ στρατιώτας τοὺς Δίονος ἐξεδέξαντο στρογγύλαι δύο ναῦς, τρίτον δὲ πλοῖον οὐ μέγα καὶ δύο τριακόντοροι παρηκολούθουν*. Diodôros (xvi. 6 and 9) speaks of only two vessels—*φορηγγοὺς δύο ναῦς*. Never before, he remarks (xvi. 9), was such a mighty power,—“the greatest power of Europe,”—attacked with such small means. He reckons the forces of Dionysios at 400 war-ships (*ναῦς μακρὰς*), 100,000 infantry, and 10,000 cavalry. There were stores, he adds, and money in proportion; the tyrant had swarms of able-bodied allies to draw upon, and the city to be attacked was “the greatest of Greek cities,” with harbours and docks and well-appointed and impregnable citadels (*πόλιν μὲν μεγίστην τῶν Ἑλληνίδων, λιμένας δὲ καὶ νέωρια καὶ κατεσκευασμένους ἀεροπόλους ἀναλώτους*). Ælian (vi. 12) gives us some further particulars as to the forces at the disposal of the Younger Dionysios. He reckons the ships, as Diodôros and Plutarch, at 400 (*ἐξήρεις καὶ πεντήρεις*), the foot-soldiers at 100,000, the horsemen at 9,000. There were equipments (*σκεύη*) for 500

CHAP. XI. The five ships which carried the deliverer and his com-
 Expedition panions now set sail from Zakynthos. The usual course
 of Diôn. of Greek seamanship was not to be followed. The usual
 path, the coasting voyage along the coast of Korkyra and
 southern Italy, was blocked by the fleet of Philistos, who
 was watching for them off the Iapygian shore¹. For once
 the open sea was to be the road from Zakynthos to Sicily.
 Twelve days of rowing under a gentle wind brought them
 on the thirteenth to the south-eastern corner of the island;
 the skill of the pilot Prôtos had brought them straight to
 Reaches Pachynos, whatever may be the exact spot which we are to
 Pachynos. understand under that name². By this course, so bold in
 the eyes of Greek navigators, they escaped all danger from
 Dionysios and his ships in their Italian station; they had
 reached Sicily while they were still looked for on the
 coast of Iapygia.

So far the work had been done successfully. In the
 eyes of the professional sailor, it was, as far as his own
 craft was concerned, done altogether. The counsel of Prô-
 tos was to land at once; he seems to have thought that
 any further progress by sea would be northward, along the
 coast from Pachynos to Syracuse³. What was in his mind
 was doubtless a sudden entrance into the Great Harbour, a
 scheme not wholly hopeless while the tyrant's fleet was
 engaged in Italy. But he warned Diôn that such a course
 would be dangerous on other grounds. If they did not

ships besides, 1,250,000 bushels (100 myriad Sicilian *μέδιμοι*) of corn, and
 an arsenal full of shields, swords (*μαχαίραις*), spears, greaves, breastplates,
 and catapults.]

[¹ Plat. Diôn, xiv; ἐν Ἰαπυγίᾳ ναυλοῦντα. The phrase shows that
 he made use of one or other of the two chief harbours of this part of the
 coast, Brentesion (Brindisi) or Hydrous (Otranto). This may be taken
 as an indication that the Iapygians and their kin were on terms of alliance
 with Dionysios (see above, p. 228).]

[² Ib. See Sicily, i. 64; "The real Pachynos seems to lie on the east
 coast of Sicily by the modern Porto Palo."]

[³ Plat. Diôn, xiv.]

take advantage of the landing-place of Pachynos, the ships might be scattered, and, at that season of the year, they might have to wait many nights and days at sea before a south wind came to carry them to Syracuse. Diôn might have had to tarry like Agamemnôn at Aulis, like William at Saint Valery, and that on the sea itself and not on a friendly shore. CHAP. XL.

But the purpose of Diôn was neither to dash by sea upon Syracuse nor to begin his land march at a point so near to the city which was held by the enemy¹. Like Gylippos, his call was to go further westward, to stir up all Greek Sicily to the work of deliverance, to give time for the kindling of patriotic feelings, perhaps for the beginning of patriotic movements, in Syracuse itself, and to march on the city at the head, if not of a Syracusan, at least of a Sikeliot force. His orders accordingly were to sail onwards along the southern coast of the island. Diôn's resolution to land in Western Sicily.

The skill of Prôtos in his own craft was presently shown. With the rising of Arcturus came a strong north wind, with heavy rain and thunder and lightning². The ships were driven away from the coast of Sicily by the violence of the storm. They found themselves off a rocky and harbourless coast, where they had much ado to keep themselves from being dashed to pieces³. The land was unknown; presently the storm ceased, and they learned from a vessel with which they fell in that they were near the coast of Africa, by the island of Kerkina at the head of the Great Syrtis⁴. They were not the first men who had set out from Greece on an His ships driven to Africa.

[¹ Plut. Diôn, xxv; τὴν ἐγγὺς τῶν πολεμίων ἀπόβασιν δεδιώς . . .]

[² Ib.]

[³ Ib.; μικρὸν δεῖσαντες ἐκρυφῆναι καὶ συντρίβηται περὶ τὰς πέτρας ἐβιάζοντο πρὸς κοττὸν παραφερόμενοι μολὶς . . .]

[⁴ Now Karkenah. In the same way the Peloponnesians sent to the relief of the Syracusans (Sicily, iii. 318, 319) had been carried from Tainaron to the coast of Kyrênê, and finally made their way to Selinous from the Carthaginian port of Neapolis.]

CHAP. XI. errand of deliverance for Syracuse, and had made an African voyage against their wills. But Diôn and his companions had no call and no opportunity to tarry even for the object of helping Libyan Greeks against barbarian besiegers. A south wind presently blew, not one of that strength with which Boreas had driven them out of their course, but enough, when they had plucked up spirit to believe that the wind was really in their favour, to bring them in five days to Sicilian soil ¹.

Diôn's
ships reach
Hêrakleia
Minôa.

The spot of the Sicilian coast which they reached was, in the state in which they found it, a commentary on the history of Sicily during the last fifty years. Minôa or Hêrakleia, foundation of Minôs, as the native historian does not fail to remind us ²; was, when the great Carthaginian invasion began, an outpost of Greek Akragas. The result of that invasion had made it a possession of Carthage. The first Punic war of Dionysios had won it back for Hellas; the ill luck of the third had given it back to Canaan. The treaty at the beginning of the reign of the younger Dionysios had acknowledged the Carthaginian claim to the lands west of Halykos. Keeping the mouth of the border-stream, Ras Melkart ³ was an important outpost of Carthaginian power, coining moneys which do not scorn to imitate the workmanship of the Greek, but whose legends in the Semitic tongue proclaim what Hêraklêis it was whose name the town still bore on Greek lips ⁴. The officer in command was

[¹ Plut. Diôn, xxv; καὶ θέοντες εὐλαφρῶς περπταῖοι κατὰ Μίνφραν ὁρμίσαντο, πολισμῆτιον ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ τῆς Καρχηδονίων ἐπικρατείας.]

[² Diod. xvi. 9.]

[³ See Sicily, i. 430, 497; ii. 96, 97; 479-481.]

[⁴ The coins (tetradrachms) bear the legend ΡΑΣ ΜΕΛΚΑΡΤ = Ras Melkart (B. M. Cat. Sicily, 251, seqq.; Head, Hist. Num. 124). They were mostly copied from the Syracusan Pentékontalitra by the artist Eusebetos, presenting on the obverse the head of Persephonê (see Syr. Med. 25, 107). The abundant issue of these pieces from about this date onwards shows the important part played by Ras Melkart in the Sicilian Dominion of Carthage.]

himself a Greek, Synalos or Paralos by name, one who, CHAP. XI.
 like men of our own day, had sold himself to the service of
 the barbarian, but who was bound to Diôn by personal ties
 of friendship and hospitality¹. Diôn's embassies to Car-
 thage must have given him the opportunity of forming
 many connexions of the kind. Diôn was naturally not
 looked for at Ras Melkart, and Synalos strove to hinder
 the landing of strangers who might be dangerous. Diôn, Landing
of Diôn.
 on the other hand, knew where he was and in whose
 government. He could not keep his men back from
 forcing a landing; but for his friend's sake he forbade
 any slaughter. But the force of Synalos was driven back
 into the town and the town itself was taken. The two Friendly
relations
with Car-
thaginian
governor.
 commanders exchanged friendly greetings; Diôn gave back
 the town to Synalos, and Synalos caused the troops of
 Diôn to be hospitably received and supplied with all that
 they needed².

The stay of Diôn and his following at Hêracleia was
 short; it was there that they heard a piece of news which
 cheered them not a little for their enterprise. The departure
 of Dionysios and his eighty ships to Italy seemed as if it
 had happened expressly to forward their purposes³. Every
 man who came with Diôn felt the happy chance as a call
 to immediate action. When their commander bade them
 wait a while to recover their strength after their long toiling
 on the sea, they bade him not to lose the favourable moment,
 but to lead them at once to Syracuse⁴. At once they made
 ready for a swift march; all their stuff, all the arms that
 they had brought with them beyond the actual harness of
 the men on march, they left with the friendly commander
 of Hêracleia, who engaged to send them after them as he

[¹ Plut. Diôn, xxv; "Ἐτυχε δὲ παρὰν ὁ Καρχηδόνιος ὄρχων Σύναλος ἐν τῇ χωρίῳ ἔντος ἐν καὶ φίλος Δίωνος. In Diodoros (xvi. 9) he appears as "Paralos."]

[² Plut. Diôn, l. c.]

[³ Ib.]

[⁴ Ib. xxvi.]

CHAP. XI. found opportunity¹. We may believe that in this Synalos was not acting wholly out of personal friendship for Diôn. The interests of Carthage were, for the moment at least, certainly on the side of the deliverer. The experience of the last century showed that a Syracusan commonwealth was by no means so dangerous to Carthage or to any other neighbour as a Syracusan tyranny. The deliverance of Syracuse was likely to lead to the break-up of the great dominion of Dionysios, and no event could be more eagerly wished for by Carthage than that.

Diôn's
force leaves
Hérakleia.

Akragan-
tine and
other
recruits.

The deliverers of Syracuse now set forth from their Punic resting-place. The stream of Halykos crossed, they were on Greek ground, on ground which was at least under the supremacy, if not under the direct government, of Dionysios. We should like to hear something a little clearer of the state of Akragas at that moment. From every Greek territory that Diôn passed through on his march he drew volunteers to his standard. In his passage through the land of Akragas his force was strengthened by the accession of two hundred horsemen. But it is said expressly that they were furnished by those who inhabited or occupied the outpost of Eknomos, the furthest point of Akragantine territory towards Gela². It is not likely to imply any difference of feeling between the city of Akragas and the rest of the Akragantine land. It may imply that the city was more carefully kept under the hand of the tyrant than the out-

[¹ Plut. Diôn, xxvi; Ἀποσκευασάμενος τὰ περιόντα τῶν ὅπλων καὶ τῶν φορτίων ἐκεῖ καὶ τοῦ Συνάλου δεηθεὶς ὅταν ἡ καιρὸς ἀποστείλαι πρὸς αὐτόν . . . According to Diodôros (xvi. 9) he left behind 5,000 panoplies with the governor of Hérakleia Minôa, charging him to send them on in wagons. They are sent on in c. 29.]

[² Plut. Diôn, xxvi; πορευομένην δ' αὐτῇ πρῶτον μὲν Ἀκραγαντίνων προσεχώρησαν ἰσπεὶ διακόσιοι τῶν περὶ τὸ Ἐκνομον οἰκούντων. Cf. Diod. xvi. 9. In Agathoklés' time (Diod. xix. 104) Eknomos was reckoned as lying in Gelôan territory. In 280 B.C. Phintias, tyrant of Akragas, transplanted the citizens of Gela to a new city named after him on this spot. It is now Licata.]

lying districts; now that the whole coast eastward was CHAP. XI.
 under the power of one master, Eknomos must have lost its
 importance as a border-fortress. Just now at least it was
 not needed in that character. Gela was of the same mind
 as Akragas; so was Kamarina, nearer to the seat of tyranny. Recruits
from Gela
and Kama-
rina.
 All poured forth their volunteers to join the army of the
 deliverer¹. The days of a hundred years back had come
 again. Men of all races were as zealous to put down Dio-
 nysios as their forefathers had been to put down Thrasy-
 boulos². As in the days of Ducetius, Sikels came to their Sikel
volunteers..
 help as well as Greeks; and a march which began at
 Akragas began far enough to the west to draw Sikan
 helpers also. When we read³ of further succour of men from
 Messana and even from Italy, we may well be sure that
 they came, but their coming must have been at a somewhat
 later stage. In any case the power of Dionysios was
 threatened by a general union of men of all the European
 races of Sicily. And Carthage too—for we must suppose
 that the Greek commander of Ras Melkart knew the mind
 of his masters—was ready to give precious help to the
 cause.

It was not an easy moment for Timokratês, left as he Timokratês
Governor
of Syra-
cuse
 was to bear the whole burthen of the defence, when the
 man whose domestic life he had most deeply wronged was
 marching against him at the head, rumour might well
 say, of the forces of all Sicily. He had to send the news sends
news to
Dionysios.
 to his master. Things had changed since the days of
 Nikias, when a written dispatch was something unusual,
 something which needed the voice of the living messenger

[¹ Diod. xvi. 9; ἐν παρόδῳ δὲ τοῖς Ἀκραγαντίνοις καὶ Γελίοις καὶ τινὰς τῶν τῆν μεσόγειον οἰκοῦντων Σικανῶν τε καὶ Σικελῶν, ἔτι δὲ Καμαρινάιους πείσας συνελθεῖν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις. The MSS. have καὶ Μαδυνάιους for Καμαρινάιους. The Kamarinaians, however, are mentioned by Plutarch (Diôn, xxvii) as joining the others.]

[² See Sicily, ii. 306, 307.]

[³ Diod. xvi. 9.]

CHAP. XI. to enforce it¹. Not only did Timokratês tell his story in the form of a written letter, but without the letter the messenger felt himself to be helpless. The bearer of the document sailed to Rhêgion or its site², and then set forth by land for Kaulônia in search of Dionysios³. That was one of the towns which his father had destroyed; as it again acted a part in history at a later time, it had most likely already sprung up afresh, more likely as a Lokrian outpost than as an independent city⁴. But neither the messenger nor the letter ever reached Kaulônia. The story went that they were hindered by a strange accident indeed. On the road he fell in with a friend who was carrying part of the flesh of a newly sacrificed victim. He gave part of the flesh to the messenger, who walked on with this addition to his baggage. Night came on; after a while weariness caused him to lie down to rest in a wood by the roadside. Meat and letters were seemingly in the same bag. Their bearer slept. A wolf was drawn to the spot by the smell of the meat, and carried off the letter also⁵. The messenger feared to appear before the tyrant without his credentials; instead of going on to Kaulônia, he turned away from his errand, and sought refuge where he might find it.

Mishap of
Timokratês'
messenger.

Difficult
position
of Timo-
kratês.

Dionysios was thus left to hear of the advance of Diôn by common fame, without the help of official dispatches. Timokratês meanwhile did what he could to keep down the expected movements of the Syracusan people. He tried in vain by persuasion to keep them back from revolt; but the beauties of tyranny were enlarged on in vain to

[¹ Plut. Diôn, xxvi; Τιμοκράτης . . . ἐπέμπει κατὰ τάχος ἀγγελον τῷ Διονυσίῳ γράμματα κομίζοντα περὶ τῆς Δίονος ἀφίξεως. See Sicily, iii. 263, seqq.]

[² Plut. l. c.; Διεπλεύσας εἰς Ἰταλίαν καὶ τὴν Ἑγγίην διελθὼν . . .]

[³ Ib.; ἐπειγόμενος εἰς Καυλωνίαν πρὸς Διονύσιον . . .]

[⁴ See p. 190, and note 2.]

[⁵ Plut. Diôn, xxvi. As it stands it is a very pretty story.]

thankless ears¹. He had to rely on the surer means of keeping his mercenaries ready to act at any moment². Under this pressure the people kept themselves from any open disturbance till Diön was quite close to the city³; but many contrived to make their way to join Diön on the Syracusan frontier, and he was joined by not a few of the inhabitants of the Syracusan districts which he passed through. He had struck inland from Kamarina, and the next point where we distinctly hear of him is at the old Syracusan outpost of Akrai⁴. By this time the recruits who had joined him on the way had reached the number of five thousand; but, owing partly to the measures lately taken by Dionysios, many were unarmed or armed but poorly⁵.

At this stage, or perhaps at an earlier one, he contrived, more luckily than Timokratês in his correspondence with Dionysios, to spread abroad a rumour which reached the ears of the soldiers of the tyrant who guarded Epipolai, who guarded above all the strong castle with which the elder Dionysios had crowned its western point. There were Campanians from the settlements which the elder Dionysios had planted at Ætna and Leontinoi⁶; Diön, men told them, meant first of all to march against those towns. The Campanians believed; they forsook their post, and went off to the defence of their own dwellings⁷. It would seem that Timokratês himself, either believing the report or trying to restrain the soldiers from desertion,

[¹ Diod. xvi. 10.]

[² Ib.]

[³ Ib.]

[⁴ Plut. Diön, xxvii.]

[⁵ Ib.; ἀπισμένοι φαύλος ἐκ τοῦ προστυχόντος ἀνεπλήρου τῇ προθυμίᾳ τὴν τῆς παρασκευῆς ἔνδειαν. Cf. Diod. xvi. 10.]

[⁶ See pp. 112, 113.]

[⁷ Plut. l. c.; οἱ δὲ μετὰ Τιμοκράτους τὰς Ἐπιπόλεις φυλάσσοντες Λεοντῖνοι καὶ Καμπανοὶ λόγον ψευδῆ προσπέμφαντος εἰς αὐτοὺς τοῦ Δίωνος ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις πρῶτον τρέπεται τὰς ἐκείνων, ἀπολιπόντες ἄρχοντο τὸν Τιμοκράτην τοῖς οἰκείοις βοηθήσαντες.]

CHAP. XI. was at this time on Epipolai; he was at any rate not within Ortygia¹.

This movement of the Campanians was no small gain to Diôn. It left so much of Syracuse as stood on the mainland without defenders on behalf of Dionysios, and it left those who held the Island for him without a commander. Both Diôn on his march and his friends within the city—that is pretty well the whole population of Syracuse—were thus able to act as they pleased. He was able to enter the city without resistance, and the last stage of his march wore the air of a religious procession rather than that of a warlike entry.

Diôn's
night-
march
from
Akrai.

The news that the Campanians had left Epipolai was brought to Diôn while he was encamped at the foot of the hill of Akrai². It was night, but the favourable moment was not to be lost, and he called his followers to an immediate march. That march took him over part of the same ground which had been, fifty-six years before, crossed by the retreating host of Nikias and Démosthenês in their first attempt to reach the Sikel hills. The latter part of his course would coincide with the modern road from Syracuse to Florida. At daybreak of the third morning after his landing at Hêrakteia³ his force came down from the low hills to the passage of the Anapos which the Athenians had forced from the left bank in the teeth of Syracusan defenders on the right⁴. But now the bank on the side of Syracuse stood undefended; the deliverers could advance without hindrance on their errand.

Reaches
the ford
of the
Anapos.

They reached the stream at the moment when the sun rose from the waters between Sicily and Greece, lighting up the Island which they had to deliver and the long hill which

[¹ Plut. Diôn, xxviii; Τιμοκράτης δὲ συμμίζει τοὺς φρουροὺς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν μὴ θυγηθεῖς . . .]

[² Op. cit. xxvii; περὶ τὰς Ἀκρας (Μάκρας MSS.) στρατοπεδεύοντα.]

[³ Ib.]

[⁴ Sicily, iii. 374.]

might be said to be delivered already. Diôn, with the CHAP. XI. sacrificial wreath on his head, with the attendant prophets around him, went through the fitting religious ceremonies. He prayed, he offered victims, to the local god of the river, Diôn's so famed in Syracusan legend, and to the god of day who sacrifice to the Anapros. so happily revealed himself at this stirring moment. The prophets, by the rules of their art, were able to say that the sacrificial signs were favourable, and that Diôn might march on to victory¹. At this saying an enthusiasm at once religious and patriotic seized on the whole army, citizens and strangers. All would have full communion in the devotions of their general; each man wove himself such a wreath as he could at the moment, and they marched on as an armed procession, warriors and worshippers at once². Not a few were but feebly armed; but in the high-strung feelings of the moment men deemed that zeal would make up for the lack of weapons. At the bidding of the general, they went on at a quick step, amid shouts of joy, and words passing from man to man, each calling on his fellow to strive for freedom³.

But perfect order was kept. In front marched Diôn himself in brilliant armour; on one side of him marched his brother Megaklês; on the other his Athenian comrade Kallippos, fresh from the speculations of the Academy and the worship of the powers common to Attica and Sicily⁴. The wreaths were still on their Triumphal advance on Syracuse.

[¹ Plutarch, Diôn, xxvii; ἐσφαγιάζετο πρὸς τὸν ποταμόν, ἀνατέλλοντι τῷ ἡλίῳ προσευχόμενος· ἔμα δ' οἱ μάντις παρὰ τῶν θεῶν νίκην ἔφαζον αὐτῷ.]

[² Ib.]

[³ Ib.; ὥστε κινήσαντες τοῦ Δίανος δρόμῳ χωρεῖν μετὰ χαρᾶς καὶ βοῆς ἀλλήλους παρακαλοῦντας ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.]

[⁴ Plutarch (Diôn, liv) speaking of Kallippos says; ὃν φησιν ὁ Πλάτων οὐκ ἀπὸ παιδείας, ἀλλ' ἐκ μυσταγωγῶν καὶ τῆς περιτρεχούσης ἑταυρείας γινώσκον αὐτῷ γενέσθαι καὶ συνηθῆ. In c. lvi we find him when suspected of treason taking the most solemn oath in the Syracusan sanctuary of the Nether Goddesses (τὸ τῶν Θεσμοφόρων τέμενος). See below, p. 285.]

CHAP. XI. brows, as on the brows of the whole army¹. Next after them came a band who were in a special manner the brethren of Diôn in his toils and in their reward, those few, thirty only, of all whom the tyrants had driven into banishment, who had dared to cast in their lot with the deliverer². But was it a dim foreshadowing of evil to come that that deliverer was attended by something like the tyrant's spearmen? Or may we think of the true comrades, the *Hetairoi*, the *Gesidas*, who fought around the heroes of old, when we read that Diôn and his special friends were followed by a select hundred of the Peloponnesian troops picked out as the general's special guard³? After them followed the rest of the army, led in array by their captains⁴. From the Syracusan hill, now clear of enemies, the citizens, already half delivered, looked down on the men who marched along the rock below. An army was drawing near to their gates, but an army which seemed in their eyes to be holding a solemn and holy pomp in honour of the powers of Freedom and Democracy who were being brought back to the rescued city after a banishment of forty-eight years⁵.

Diôn's
body-
guard.

Rising of
Syracu-
sans.

The moment the news of the approach of Diôn had reached the city, all Syracuse rose except the fettered Island. In every other quarter the adamantine chains

[¹ Plut. Diôn, xxvii.]

[² Diod. xvi. 10; in Plut. Diôn, xxii, their number is given as twenty-five.]

[³ Plut. Diôn, xxviii; τῶν δὲ λίαν ἑκατὸν μὲν εἶποντο φύλακες περὶ τὸν Δίωνα.]

[⁴ According to Diodóros (xvi. 10) the number of these had by now been swollen to 50,000. When he lay before Syracuse the number was 20,000 (xvi. 9). Plutarch (op. cit. xxvii), whose object is to dwell on the moral triumph of his hero, reduces the number of those who entered to 5,000 recruits in addition to the small band of 800 with which he had landed.]

[⁵ Plut. Diôn, xxviii; θεωμένων τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ δεχομένων ὥστερ ἱερὰν τινα καὶ θεοπρεπὴ πομπὴν ἐλευθερίας καὶ δημοκρατίας δι' ἐτῶν ὀκτὼ καὶ τετταράκοντα κατιούσης εἰς τὴν πόλιν.]

were broken. The guardians of Epipolai were gone; the guardians of Ortygia kept within their defences; the other mercenaries of the tyrant who had quarters elsewhere than in the two strongholds or whom chance might have led into other parts of the city were at once set upon by the delivered citizens. They were too few to keep down the multitude; but with soldierly instincts they contrived to form, and to withdraw to Epipolai, to hold its fortress for their master¹. Timokratês, at whatever exact point he found himself, wished in vain to reach the Island and continue its defence. But he was cut off by the press, and had to seek only for his personal safety. He mounted a horse, and rode away, doubtless by the northern road towards Leontinoi and Katanê. On the way he spread the most terror-striking tales about Diôn and his army, lest men should charge him with having forsaken his post in the presence of a slight danger². Anyhow he had forsaken it, and he had yielded it less to the soldiers of Diôn than to the revolted people of Syracuse. The mercenaries of the tyrant were left without a general. They held as they could the two fortified ends of the city, the Island which might pass for one great fortress and the lesser fortress on the neck of Euryâlos. All between was free.

CHAP. XI.

The tyrant's forces withdraw to Epipolai.

Flight of Timokratês.

Syracuse free.

An Athenian poet said that a people which had just won its freedom was given to be harsh in mood³. There were those in Syracuse with whom none was disposed to deal gently. Dionysios had his spies like Hierôn, and the names that had been invented for them in the days of the earlier tyrant had come again into use⁴. The enraged people

[¹ Cf. Diod. xvi. 10, 11, and Plut. Diôn, xxix.]

[² Plut. Diôn, xxviii; *ὅτι μὴ δοκοῖη μέτρον τι δέσας ἀποβεβλημένοι τὴν πόλιν.*]

[³ *τραχέες γὰρ μέντοι δῆμος ἐκφυγὼν κακὰ.* Æsch. Theb. 1044.]

[⁴ Plut. Diôn, xxviii; *συνήρπάζον τοὺς καλουμένους προσαγωγίδας.* Elsewhere (De Curios. xvi) Plutarch calls them *προσαγωγεῖς*, and says that

CHAP. XI.
Spies
beaten to
death.

Diôn en-
ters by
Temenitid
gate.

seized on the spies and eavesdroppers who had carried to the tyrants the words that each man spoke in his inner chamber and beat them to death without mercy¹. It would have been well if the feast of Freedom and Democracy had been kept clean from all illegal vengeance; but unlaw ever begets unlaw. The more honourable citizens who had no share in such excesses, put on their holiday garb, and went to meet the deliverer at the gate². It was by the gate of Achradina that Hermokratês and Dionysios had made their way into Syracuse; but in the enlarged city of the tyrants that gate was no longer in the outer circuit of the walls. It was at a new gate in the new wall of the elder Dionysios, a gate which took the name of Temenitês from the new quarter called after the holy precinct of Apollôn³, that the chief men of Syracuse stood ready to welcome the champions of Syracuse, the wreathed votaries of her gods. The gate stood open for the deliverer and his army to march in. Without a blow struck, without a voice raised against him, Diôn again stood on the soil of his native city.

The storm of delight at his entrance was wild. But the object of Diôn was to give as soon as possible a legal character to his acts. He first bade a herald announce by sound of trumpet that Diôn and Megaklês were come to put down the tyrant and to free the Syracusans and all the other Sikeliots from the tyranny⁴. The first act

they were employed by both Dionysioi. Their name implies that they were something more than mere spies, and that they rather answer to the *agents provocateurs* of the continental police system. From Aristotle (Pol. v. 9. 3) it appears that Hierôn I. had already employed female agents of the same kind—*ποταγωγίδες*—a "Cytherean cohort." (Cf. Th. Lau, *Leben Dion's*, 62.)

[¹ Plut. Diôn, xxviii; οἳτοι μὲν οὖν πρῶτοι δίκη ἐδίδουσαν ἐπὶ τῶν προσ-
τυγχάνοντων ἀποτυμπανίζουσαι.] [² Ib.]

[³ Ib. xxix; κατὰ τὰς Τεμενίτιδας πύλας. For the Temenos or Temenitis, see Sicily, ii. 42, 43.]

[⁴ Plut. l. c.]

of the restored commonwealth was to be the holding of an assembly of the Syracusan people in their accustomed place, in the wide *agora* on the flat ground of the Lower Achradina¹. CHAP. XI.

As they passed to the spot men crowded to either side of his path with victims and tables and cups; they poured out their drink-offerings, and hailed their deliverer as a god with prayers and vows². Through such a rejoicing crowd he made his way to the lofty sundial of Dionysios that stood in front of the five gates which shut in the hostile Island³. On this *béma* Diôn mounted and spoke to the multitude around him as to the assembly of the Syracusan people that day restored to the exercise of their lawful rights⁴. It was a Convention Parliament, not summoned in any regular form by any regular magistrate, and it would have been hard to say who had and who had not votes according to laws which had slept for eight-and-forty years. But when the work was to set free, not only Syracuse but all Greek Sicily, no one could grudge the presence, even under arms, of the men from other cities who had joined Diôn on his march, or of the men from the older Greek lands who had jeopardized their lives in the cause of Sicily. As in the assemblies of the days of the tyrants, the people of Syracuse voted in the presence of armed strangers, but this time the strangers were not enemies but protectors. From his lofty place, in his shining harness, with his wreath upon his brow, Diôn harangued the people. They were now free; let them cleave to their freedom and strive for it. To that end they

[¹ Plut. Diôn, xxix.]

[² Ib.; τῶν Συρακοσίων ἱερεῖα καὶ τραπέζας καὶ κρατήρας ἱστάντων, καὶ καθ' οὓς γένοιτο προχύτας τε βαλλόντων καὶ προστρεπομένων ὥσπερ θεὸν κατευχαῖς.]

[³ Ib.; Ἦν δ' ὑπὸ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ τὰ πετάφυλα, Διονυσίου κατασκευάσαντος ἡλιοτρόπιον καταφανὲς καὶ βήλδον.]

[⁴ Ib.; ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ προβάς ἐδημηγόρησε καὶ παρώρμησε τοὺς πολλὰς ἀντιχεσθαι τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ.]

CHAP. XI.
Diôn and
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Twenty
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must choose leaders. With one voice the rejoicing assembly named Diôn and Megaklês as generals with full powers¹. That was the office by the abuse of which the elder Dionysios had risen to the tyranny and under the name of which he had striven to disguise the fact of tyranny. Diôn, at this stage of his career, shrank from accepting so invidious a power alone or in partnership with a single colleague. Others, he said, must be joined with them in command. Rushing into the other extreme, the assembly named twenty others as generals²; in the days before the Athenian invasion Syracuse had not got beyond fifteen³. The number fixed on was one singularly ill suited for peaceful debate, and yet more unsuited, one would think, for military command. Ten of the twenty were chosen from among the thirty comrades of Diôn in his exile and return⁴. One would be glad to know the special qualifications of the other ten. But for the present, we may be sure, Diôn was the soul of everything, and the will of this large military college was his will.

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CHAP. XI.

Return of
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"Never had any man enjoyed such a run of good luck as Diôn up to this time. It was now that his difficulties began. It was always easy to raise suspicion against Diôn on account of his long connexion with the house of the tyrants. And in truth, notwithstanding his popular bearing on the day of his entry, it may be doubted whether Diôn at any time really thought of restoring freedom to Syracuse in the sense in which most Syracusans would understand freedom. He had not lived in a democracy; he and his friend Plato seem to have dreamed all manner of impossible constitutions. There should be a king with limited powers, or perhaps more than one king, after the manner of Sparta. In short the Syracusans wished to rule themselves, like any other free Greek city; Diôn wished to rule them himself or with a few colleagues. He wished no doubt to rule them justly and well; but still to rule them. His haughty manner too helped before long to make him personally unpopular. We hear casually that he had a body-guard, like a tyrant¹.

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Unsuccessful onslaught on Diôn's wall.

Dionysios rouses popular suspicion against Diôn.

"Dionysios now sent letters to Diôn from his wife and sister whom he still kept in the Island. These Diôn read out to the assembly. But one letter was headed 'From Hipparinos to his father²;' this the people told him to keep to himself; it was too private to be opened publicly. But Diôn opened and read it aloud. And it proved not to be from his son, but from the tyrant. Dionysios called on Diôn to remember their old friendship, and not to serve an ungrateful people³. He did not wish to rule any longer himself; he would willingly give up his power to Diôn. If Diôn refused this, he would do dreadful things to his sister and wife and son.

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CHAP. XI. win back Leontinoi which had revolted from Dionysios.
 Sea-victory of Hêrakkleidês over Philistos. He next met Hêrakkleidês in a sea-fight¹. Some of the crews of the tyrant's ships must have joined the patriots; otherwise Hêrakkleidês could not have had sixty ships to face the same number which Philistos commanded. The

Cruel death of Philistos. The Syracusans had the better, and Philistos, after doing his best for his master, was taken alive. To the disgrace of the delivered commonwealth, the old man was put to death with insult, and his body was dragged into the streets and thrown into the stone-quarries².

Renewed intrigues of Dionysios against Diôn. "With the death of Philistos Dionysios began to lose heart; but he still went on with his tricks to discredit Diôn. The victory had naturally made Hêrakkleidês the favourite. Dionysios now sent another message to Diôn, offering to give up the Island on condition of being allowed to withdraw safely to Italy and to keep the profits of a large private estate in the Syracusan territory³. Diôn again told the tyrant to make his proposal to the people and not to him. At the same time he counselled the assembly to accept the terms⁴. But the people hoped to

hundred horsemen to Syracuse, and with another more numerous body of horsemen and 2,000 infantry made his attempt on Leontinoi.]

[¹ For the sea-fight, see Diod. xvi. 16, and a reference in Plut. Diôn, 35. Philistos had sixty ships; Hêrakkleidês not less.]

[² According to Diodôros (xvi. 16), Philistos killed himself rather than fall into the enemies' hands. Plutarch (Diôn, 35), though hostile to Philistos, says that he was treated *ἀνὰς καὶ βαρβαρικῶς*. He quotes Ephoros for the statement that he killed himself, but prefers the account of Timônidéas, a follower of Diôn and eye-witness of what had occurred, who wrote an account to the philosopher Speusippos, describing how Philistos' trireme was driven on shore, how he was taken alive, stripped, pelted with mud, beheaded, and dragged by his lame leg through Achradina to the quarries.]

[³ Plut. Diôn, 37. The district was called Gyarta, and lay away from the sea in the interior of the Syracusan territory.]

[⁴ Diod. xvi. 17.]

take the tyrant alive, and refused to hearken. Dionysios CHAP. XI.
Dionysios
escapes
from the
Island. now thought mainly of his own personal safety. He contrived to escape by sea, taking with him most of his treasures and furniture, but leaving the best of his mercenaries still in the Island under the command of his son Apollokratês, who must have been young for such a trust¹. This rather discredited Hêrakteidês, as men said that he ought to have kept better watch. And the story goes that he was thereby stirred up to make yet further attacks on Diôn, setting on men to propose measures which Diôn had to withstand. At last he was able to carry a vote by which Diôn was deprived of his generalship, and twenty-five new generals were appointed, of whom Hêrakteidês himself was one². Hitherto he had not been one of the body of generals, but had held a separate command at sea. And it was further voted to refuse pay to the men who had come from Peloponnêsos with Diôn³. These men were not common mercenaries; they had come from zeal in the cause, and had done great things for it; but they could not afford to serve for nothing in a strange country.

"The Peloponnesians gathered round Diôn, and prayed Pelopon-
nesians
stand by
Diôn. him to lead them against the Syracusans. Meanwhile the party of Hêrakteidês tried to win them over by offers of citizenship⁴. There had been a talk of division of lands, and most likely they were to get land instead of their pay. But the soldiers clave to Diôn, and Diôn refused to act

[¹ Plut. Diôn, 37.]

[² Ib. 38; *οἱ Συρακόσιοι πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι στρατηγοὺς ἐχειροτόνησαν, ὃν εἰς τὴν Ἡρακλείδης.*]

[³ Diod. xvi. 17. The reason given for the non-payment of the Peloponnesian mercenaries is that there was a scarcity of money in the city.]

[⁴ Plut. Diôn, 38; *ἐπαγγελλόμενοι καὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἰσομοίαν.*]

CHAP. XI. against the Syracusans. He accordingly went away with
 Diôn with- draws to his followers, 3,000 in number. They marched towards
 Leontinof. Leontinoi; on the road they were followed by the new
 Syracusan generals with their force. Diôn's men were
 much better soldiers than the Syracusans, and they easily
 drove off their assailants, Diôn striving to shed as little
 Syracusan blood as might be¹. He and his men were
 welcomed at Leontinoi and received to citizenship².

"The Syracusans had thus (B.C. 356) got rid of their deliverer about nine months after their deliverance. There were faults on both sides; but Diôn undoubtedly had an honest purpose to get rid of the tyranny, whatever kind of government he may have wished to set up in its stead.

Siege of
 Ortygia
 continued
 by Syra-
 cusans.

"The Syracusans had now to besiege Ortygia for themselves, without Diôn's help or that of his men." [For a time their prospects of success seemed good.] The tyrant's garrison in Ortygia were at their wits' end. Provisions had utterly failed them³, and they had no better commander than the young son of their master. The story reads like a kind of parody of the memorable moment when Gongylos came with the good news that help was coming to Syracuse, where a capitulation to the Athenian invaders had been all but decreed⁴. Then it was the men of Syracuse who had despaired of any longer defending their own city. Now it was the enemies of Syracuse who held her strongest quarter against her own people, and who were driven to the thought of giving up that stronghold of tyranny to the commonwealth which had again come to life. It marks the degree to which the barbarian mercenaries of the tyrants had put on the habits of Greek

[¹ Plut. Diôn, 39; Diod. xvi. 17.]

[² Diod. xvi. 18.]

[³ Plut. Diôn, 40.]

[⁴ See Sicily, iii. 237.]

military and civil life that the soldiers came together to discuss the question of surrender in a formal assembly. If the stronghold was to be given up, it should not be the secret act of a few traitors; it should be done by the general assent of the whole body. Apollokratês can hardly have presided at such a meeting; but, whatever were the forms of procedure, a regular vote was passed that, as soon as it was day, the Island and its garrison should be surrendered to the Syracusan people¹. While it was still night, heralds were sent from the army to announce the vote to the Syracusans, and doubtless to arrange the terms of surrender. The heralds had perhaps set out, they had certainly not come back², when, with the first dawn of day, deliverance came. The Gylippos of tyranny was an officer of Dionysios, Nypsios by name, a man of the Campanian Neapolis³, who is described as a brave and skilful soldier, and, however bad was the cause for which he fought, certainly showed himself so to be. He had sailed from Lokroi with a reinforcement of soldiers and with a number of merchant-ships filled with provisions. He escaped all notice on the part of Hêracleidês, and brought his precious freight through the mouth of the Great Harbour to land hard by the fountain of Arethousa⁴. He and his troops went on shore; his first act was to summon a military assembly⁵. All ground for any thought of surrender was now taken away; the

CHAP. XI.
Garrison of
Ortygia
votes for
surrender.

Arrival of
Nypsaia.

[¹ Diod. xvi. 18; οἱ δὲ μισθοφόροι τοῦ τυράννου . . . συνδραμόντες εἰς ἐκκλησίαν νυκτὸς ἐψηφίσαντο παραδοῦναι τὴν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς τοῖς Συρακοσίοις ἅμ' ἡμέρας.] [² Ib.]

[³ Diodôros (loc. cit.) and Plutarch (Dion, 41) describe him as Νύσιον τὸν Νεαπολίτην. Holm (G. S. ii. 460, 461) points out that Νύσιος is an Oscan name-form. It appears as ΝΥΜΨΙΟΞ on an inscription in Ischia, and Mommsen, *Unteritalienische Dialekte*, 282, further cites the Oscan form *Numsius*. From *Numsius* comes the later *Numisius* and Roman *Numenius*.]

[⁴ Diod. l. c.; κατέπλευνε μετὰ τοῦ στόλου, καὶ καθωρμίσθη περὶ τὴν Ἀρέθουσαν.]

[⁵ Ib.; κοινὴν ἐκκλησίαν συναγαγόν.]

CHAP. XI. negotiations with the Syracusans in the city, if any had
Further fighting resolved on. actually begun, were broken off; the assembly listened gladly to the call of the new commander to make themselves ready for a new struggle¹.

It seems to show strange carelessness, but a carelessness such as we have already heard of, that Nypsios could thus make his way into the Great Harbour while the Syracusans had, or ought to have had, the full command of the sea. But Hérakleidés or whoever was in fault was not slow to repair the error. It may be that the coming of the heralds from Ortygia had put the citizens on the alert; at any rate they learned with daylight what was going on. The one thought in the Island was to bring the welcome stores to land². All were engaged in this work when the Syracusan ships suddenly put to sea and came to the attack. Dionysios must have left some triremes behind him or Nypsios must have brought some with him. The service of the mercenaries was a land-service, and all were a moment before engaged in quite another business. The ships were hastily manned, and put to sea how they could, naturally in bad order³. Victory was for the fleet of the commonwealth. Four⁴ of the tyrant's ships were taken, others were sunk, and the rest were driven ashore. Whether any of the good things that Nypsios had brought fell into the hands of the Syracusans we are not told.

Sea-victory of Hérakleidés.

If we may again compare small things with great—remember that they seem so much smaller mainly through the difference of the telling—we seem to be reading afresh the day when Héraklès, on his auspicious day, gave victory to Syracuse on the same waters⁵. Again the toils and dangers of the sea-fight were followed by the wild revelry

[¹ Diod. xvi. 18.]

[² Ib.; *περὶ τὴν ἐξάφαισιν τῆς ἀγορᾶς διατρίβουσιν.*]

[³ Ib.; *τεθορυβημένως.*]

[⁴ Plut. Diôn, 41. In Diodóros, l. c., the number is not given.]

[⁵ See Sicily, 342 seqq.]

of the feast of victory. Men sacrificed thank-offerings to the gods, they ate and drank and made merry¹, as on the night when Hermokratês counselled in vain to bar the path of the retreating Nikias². But Hêrakteidês was not Hermokratês, and Nypsios, safe in the fortress of Ortygia, was another enemy from Nikias making ready for his march of sorrow. Day had not dawned when the mercenaries of the tyrant came forth in soldierly array from the gates of Ortygia³. They came forth with special orders from Nypsios to deal with the Syracusans as they would and as they could⁴. There was indeed a hindrance in their path before they could reach their victims. The new-built wall stood before them. But the mercenaries had scaling-ladders, and those ladders could be used without hindrance when the guards of the wall were sleeping their drunken sleep⁵. They were easily slain, and before long ten thousand barbarians were in defenceless Achradina, carrying out the bidding of their captain against its doomed inhabitants. Of Hêrakteidês we hear nothing personally; the commonwealth had many generals, but they were as drunk as the rest. When some glimmering of what was going on had reached their minds, they tried as they best might to call the citizens to arms. But the attempt was hopeless. The generals reached the *agora*—the spot where Diôn had been so lately welcomed as the deliverer of the city—to find it in the hands of the enemy, to be themselves cut down in the confusion or, the more lucky of them, to escape to some place of shelter⁶. It would not be hard for both generals and others to make their way into some of the other parts of the city, and there

CHAP. XI.

Successful
sally of
Nypsios.Nypsios
master of
the Agora
and Lower
Achradina.

[¹ Plut. Diôn, 41; *εἰς πότους καὶ συνουσίας μαυικὰς τρέψαντες*. Cf. Diod. xvi. 18.]

[² See Sicily, iii. 358.]

[³ Plut. Diôn, 41; Diod. xvi. 19.]

[⁴ Plut. l. c.; *κελεύσας χρῆσθαι τοῖς προστυγχάνουσιν ὡς βοήλονται καὶ δύνανται*.]

[⁵ Diod. l. c.]

[⁶ Ib.]

CHAP. XI. to gather in some kind of order while Lower Achradina was left a defenceless prey to the enemy.

**Sack of the
Agora by
Nysaios.** The bidding of Nysaios gave the city and its people over to the will of his mercenaries. Of slaughter there was plenty; but slaughter was but a secondary object; the barbarians, in possession of part at least of a wealthy and luxurious town, had to reap the reward of their toils. The first work of the mercenaries in possession of the *agora* was to break open and sack the houses of the citizens. Every man who came in their way, all who strove to withstand them in the darkness of the narrow streets, were slain or disabled. A few, but a few only, of their own body were killed by the citizens. But plunder, human plunder above all, was the first thought of the barbarians. The darkness did not hinder them from seizing and bearing away the rich spoil of the Syracusan houses, least of all from carrying off the women and children whom they found in those houses¹. Lust and greed had a rich feast that night, and it was to lust and greed that it was mainly devoted. The mercenaries of the tyrant had toiled and waited and hungered; they now had their reward.

**Human
spoil car-
ried off.**

**Continued
ravaging
of Achra-
dina.** The dawn of the next morning revealed to those of the citizens who had escaped to the upper parts of the city what the horrors of the night had been². Nor did those horrors cease with daylight. The mercenaries went on with their work during the whole of the next day; but seemingly in the lower city only. Epipolai at least was clear, and in the hands of the citizens³. With daylight they were able to come together in some kind of assembly,

[¹ Diod. xvi. 19; *οὐκ ὀλίγα δὲ σώματα γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων ἔτι δ' οἰκετῶν ἐξηνδραποδίζετο*. Plut. Diōn, 41; *γυναικῶν δὲ καὶ παίδων ἀγομένων εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν μετ' οἰμαγῆς*.]
[² Diod. xvi. 20.]

[³ This appears from the fact that the *Hexapyla* (Diod. xvi. 20) was still in the hands of the Syracusans. Plutarch (Diōn, 42) has the odd phrase; *τοῦ κινδύνου πρὸς τὴν Ἀχραδινὴν πλησιάζοντος*: but a good part of Achradina must have been already ravaged.]

while the barbarians were still working their will in the parts nearer to the Island. The general feeling in men's minds was that there was no hope save in the recall of Diôn; but for a while none dared for very shame to utter his name¹. But it was not a time to keep back from speech or from action. After a while the horsemen and the allies found a voice, and called aloud that there was but one chance, to send at once for Diôn and the Peloponnesians at Leontinoi. The moment the names were uttered, a general cry of assent and delight went up from the assembly. Men longed and prayed to see him again; they wept as they thought of his valiant deeds, of his zeal and energy in his own person, and it was he who had stirred them up to face the enemy as he did himself². Seven messengers were at once sent to Leontinoi; five were Syracusan horsemen; the other two represented the allies. The name of one of them, Archônîdês, raises a thought. Not a few Sikel allies had joined the march of Diôn³; was the present envoy a descendant or kinsman of the two famous Sikel bearers of his name, the friend of Ducetius and the founder of Halæsa⁴? Riding at full speed, they reached Leontinoi in the afternoon⁵. They first spoke to Diôn only. With tears in their eyes, they told him all that Syracuse was at that moment suffering. Their coming naturally awakened curiosity; Leontines and Peloponnesians crowded around Diôn to learn what the news was which called for the earnest pleadings which the envoys were pouring into the ears of Diôn⁶. With the true instinct of a Greek, Diôn led the way to the theatre, and

CHAP. XI.

Syracusans
resolve to
recall
Diôn.Their
envoys.Appeal to
Diôn at
Leontinoi.

[¹ Plut. Diôn, 42; πάντες μὲν ἐφρόνουν, ἔλεγε δὲ οὐδεὶς, ἀσχυρόμενοι τὴν ἀχαριστίαν καὶ τὴν ἀβουλίαν πρὸς Δίωνα.]

[² Plut. Diôn, 42.]

[³ See p. 253.]

[⁴ See p. 40, and Sicily, ii. 320 seqq.]

[⁵ Plut. loc. cit.; τῆς ἡμέρας ἤδη καταφερομένης.]

[⁶ Ib.; ὑπονοοῦντες εἶναι τι καινότερον.]

CHAP. XI. there the crowd took their places in an orderly assembly¹. Two of the envoys, Archônidês and the Syracusan horseman Hellanikos, stood forward to tell in short and pithy words of all that was still going on in Syracuse. They called on the soldiers of Diôn to come to the help of the city, to forget their own wrongs. They must themselves allow that the punishment of the men of Syracuse was yet greater than their wrong-doing².

Diôn responds to the call of Syracuse.

The envoys ceased speaking and a deep silence followed. Then Diôn arose; tears for a while checked his speech. His soldiers bade him be of good courage, while they wept with him³. At last he spoke. He had brought them, the Peloponnesians and other allies, to take counsel as to their own course. As for his own course there was no question. When Syracuse was perishing, it was his duty, if he could not save her, to go and bury himself in the flames of her ruin⁴. But his hearers had a choice before them. If they could forgive the most foolish and most unhappy people who had cast them forth, if they could still bring themselves to go to their help, in setting up again the Syracusan city, they would be setting up their own work⁵. If, after the treatment which they had undergone, they judged otherwise, he would pray that the gods might ever show them meet favour for the zeal and valour which they had ever shown towards him. And he would pray them to remember Diôn as one who had neither forsaken them when they were wrong, nor yet

His appeal to his Peloponnesian troops.

[¹ Plut. Diôn, 42. That the ἐκκλησία took place in the theatre appears from c. 43.]

[² Ib.; ὡς μείζονα δίκην δεδαικότεν αὐτῶν ἢ λαβεῖν ἂν οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες ἡξίωσαν.]

[³ Ib. 43; ἀναστάντος δὲ τοῦ Δίωνος καὶ λέγειν ἀρξαμένου πολλὰ τῶν θακρύνων ἐκπίπτοντα τὴν φωνὴν ἐπέσχευ· οἱ δὲ ξένοι παρακάλουν θαρρεῖν καὶ συνήχθοντο.]

[⁴ Ib.; εἰ σῶσαι μὴ δυνάμην ἀπειμὶ τῷ πυρὶ καὶ τῷ πτώματι τῆς πατρίδος ἐνταφισόμενος.]

[⁵ Ib.; ἐμότερον ἔργον οὖσαν ὀρθοῦτε τὴν Συρακοσίαν πόλιν.]

forsaken his own citizens in their day of suffering. The CHAP. XI.
 answer to his speech was a common shout of assent from
 the whole body of Peloponnesians and allies. They sprang
 to their feet, and called on Diôn to lead them to the rescue
 of Syracuse with all speed. The envoys from Syracuse
 embraced him and embraced his soldiers, calling every
 blessing from the gods upon their heads. As soon as the
 shout ceased, Diôn bade them go and sup and make ready Diôn's march to relieve Syracuse.
 for a march. They were to meet him in arms in the place
 where they were now gathered. It was a march by night
 that he designed.

The second night since the sea-fight was now drawing in.
 The soldiers of Dionysios had now been for a night and
 a day revelling in every form of outrage through at least
 the lower parts of the city, at the cost of a very few lives
 of their own number. As night came on, their wary cap-
 tain thought it wise to call them back into the stronghold
 of the Island. Meanwhile Diôn was on his march. A Contradictory mes-
sages.
 series of contradictory messages met him from the city.
 One came from the generals, telling him that his help was
 no longer needed; the enemy had withdrawn into the
 Island, and the Syracusans were able to defend themselves.
 This message, it was said, was the work of demagogues
 who bade the people to think no longer of Diôn nor to
 receive him if he came with his band of strangers¹.
 There was, so it was argued, no immediate danger; the
 enemy after their late success would keep quiet for a
 while. To receive Diôn and his Peloponnesians would be
 to acknowledge them as their betters and to confess that
 they could not save their city for themselves². It is
 not clear whether the message was sent out early enough
 to tell Diôn of the next stage of the evening's work by
 which, as night came on, a guard was set to keep the
 gates against him. In any case the message from the

[¹ Plut. Diôn, 44.]

[² Ib.]

CHAP. XI. generals did not come alone. The horsemen and better class of citizens contrived to send another message, calling on Diôn to come on to their help all the same. In this picture of the action of demagogues we see, as ever, the signs of that literary and philosophic dislike to all forms of popular government which marks all our later guides. Still nothing is more likely than that, even at such a moment, there should be two opinions in Syracuse as to the expediency of again receiving Diôn and his soldiers, and that two opposite messages should be sent to him. The effect of the two was that Diôn kept on his march, but somewhat slackened his pace¹. More decisive news might come before he reached Syracuse.

Urgent
appeals to
Diôn.

When the day, the third day, began to dawn, Diôn was about sixty stadia from the city, not far from the site of Megara. About this point he was first met by some of the Syracusan horsemen, ever friendly to Diôn, who had a grievous tale to tell. The city was again in the hands of the enemy². They were presently followed by men bearing news more frightful still. The party most hostile to Diôn had brought themselves to crave his help. They had to crave it with greater earnestness and in a deeper necessity than when the first appeal had reached Diôn at Leontinoi. A formal message was brought from the general Hêrakkleidês, a message brought by the general's brother and his uncle Theodotês, calling on Diôn to come and save Syracuse. There was no other hope; at the moment there was no resistance to the enemy; Hêrakkleidês himself was wounded; the city was on fire and well nigh destroyed.

The tale was a true one; help was needed as it had never been needed before; the horrors of the first night had been but a mild prelude to what was to come on the second. Nysios, in his stronghold in the Island, clearly knew all

[¹ Plut. Diôn, 44; *βραβέως ἅμα καὶ κατὰ σπουδὴν πορευόμενος προσήει.*]

[² Ib.]

that was going on. He had heard that Diôn was coming, that he was bidden not to come, that the gates were shut against him, that, in answer to other messages, he was still on his march. Now, from the point of view of Nypsius, was his own time and the time of his mercenaries, before Diôn could come, while Syracuse was still defenceless. CHAP. XI.

In the middle of the night the barbarian mercenaries were again let forth from Ortygia, in greater numbers and in a fiercer mood than on the night before. Of the first night the work had been mainly plunder, plunder in all its forms; slaughter had been its casual accessory. This second night of the barbarians in Syracuse was to have slaughter and destruction of all kinds for its main work. Nypsius despaired of permanently maintaining his master's power in Syracuse; he would reverse the saying once spoken at the council-board of the elder tyrant; he would bury the tyranny with the fallen city¹. The wall with which Diôn had cut off the Island from the mainland, the wall which they had scaled the night before, was now broken down to make an easy entrance into the city². The sack and massacre renewed in Syracuse.

Then the work began, a work of thorough havoc, a work of massacre and burning. Not only men, but women and children, were slaughtered. The city was systematically fired. The nearer houses were set fire to by torches; fiery arrows were shot into the more distant³. Men were burned in their houses, or came out of them either to be cut down in the streets by the soldiers or else crushed by the fall of the burning buildings⁴. It was the last and The city systematically fired.

[¹ Plut. Diôn, 44; ὡς περ ἐνταφιάσαι τὴν τυραννίδα τῇ πόλει πίπτουσαν ἐβούλετο. For the saying about Dionysios I. see p. 19, and Appendix II.]

[² Ib.; τὸ μὲν προτείχισμα πῶν εὐθὺς κατέσκαπτε.]

[³ Ib.; ἐπὶ τὸν δρύτατον διὰ πυρὸς πάντων δλεθρον καὶ ἀφανισμόν ἐχώρησαν, τὰ μὲν ἐγγὺς ἀπὸ χειρῶν θαρσὶ καὶ λαμπάσιν ὑποσιμπράντες, εἰς δὲ τὰ πρόσω διασπείροντες ἀπὸ τόξων πυροβόλους. Diodōros (xvi. 20) says that Nypsius set fire to the houses and buildings about the agora.]

[⁴ Plut. Diôn, 44; πολλῶν (οἰκίων) ἤδη φλεγόμενων καὶ καταφερομένων ἐπὶ τοὺς διαθέοντας.]

CHAP. XI. wildest revel of tyranny. Over how large a part of the city these horrors spread we are not distinctly told. But when the message reached Diôn they had clearly not reached the whole of the high ground. The Hexapyla were still in the hands of the citizens; they were no longer shut against the deliverer, and through them a helpless multitude, women and children and old men, to the number of ten thousand, poured forth to meet him on his way, and to implore him to hasten to the rescue of what was left of Syracuse¹.

Forced
march of
Diôn.

The prayer was needless. Since the last message Diôn and his comrades had been pressing along the road by the sea-shore with the quickest speed of which a body of armed men is capable. The final message once heard, he set forth the case to his army, he told them of the fearful danger of the city which they had come to rescue, and bade them hasten². The soldiers failed in no sort of the zeal of their leader; each man sped on and bade his comrade to speed on³. The north side of the hill was clearly free from enemies. Diôn and his men marched up by the roads which led to the Hexapyla; they went in without hindrance, and once more, as they had done at the Temenitês when need was far less pressing, they stood within the walls of Syracuse on an errand of deliverance.

He re-
enters Sy-
racuse by
Hexapyla.

The joy of the delivered citizens was boundless. The shouts of delight with which Diôn and his men were greeted were long and loud. The names of honour which were showered upon the general outdid those with which Gelôn had been welcomed on his return from Himera. If the deliverer was not hailed as a king, men went a step further and called him a god⁴. But the philosopher of

Hailed as
a god.

[¹ Diod. xvi. 20.]

[² Plut. Diôn, 45.]

[³ Plut. Diôn, 45; οὐκέτι βάδην ἦγεν ἀλλὰ δρόμῳ τὸ στράτευμα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ἄλλαν ἐπ' ἄλλοις ἀντιαζόντων καὶ θεομένων ἐπείγασθαι.]

[⁴ Ib. 46; τὸν μὲν Δία οὐκ ἔφη καὶ θεὸν ἀποκαλούντων. Gelôn had been

the Academy had his fellow-gods to pray to, and he called on them again to bless his enterprise¹. His soldiers were greeted as brethren and fellow-citizens, and such of the Syracusans as had saved their lives and their weapons amid the plundering hastened to join the ranks of the deliverers². CHAP. XI.

Dion, entering by the Hexapyla, found himself at the head of the long street called the Hekatompedon, answering to the road across the hill leading from modern Syracuse to Catania. He was, in a military point of view, in much the same position as the Roman general Marcellus when he entered Syracuse at the same point a hundred and forty years later. It is plain that the whole of Tycha and Epipolai was free from the enemy; but between him and his work of deliverance stood the old west wall of Achradina carried down by Dionysios to the Great Harbour³. Within that defence the mercenaries

Dion clears
Achradina.

halled as *εὐεργέτην καὶ σωτήρα καὶ βασιλέα* (Diod. xi. 26; see Sicily, ii. 202, 203).]

[¹ Plut. Dion, 46; τοῖς θεοῖς προσευχόμενος. So at a later stage (Diod. xvi. 20) ἔθυσσε τοῖς θεοῖς ὑπὲρ τῆς σωτηρίας.]

[² Plut. Dion, 45.]

[³ Ib.; ἦν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν πολέμων φοβερὰ πάντας ἀπηγρωμένον καὶ παρατεταγμένον παρὰ τὸ τεῖχος χαλεπὴν ἔχον καὶ δυσεμβάστον τὴν πρόσοδον. Mr. Freeman in the text supposes that by the *τεῖχος* is meant the W. wall of Achradina. Schubring, on the other hand (Achradina, 47), takes it to be the ruined cross-wall built by Dion to wall off Ortygia: and this appears the more probable view. Dion's obvious strategy would be to try to cut off at its converging point, near the gate of the Akropolis, the line of retreat of the plundering mercenaries. But in his endeavour to do this he would be impeded by the ruins of his own cross-wall. Nysios indeed had overthrown it, but it yet might serve as a breastwork behind which to draw up, as he appears to have done, a covering force to prevent Dion's troops pressing on to the gate of the Akropolis, and forcing an entry with the retreating mercenaries. The cross-wall itself is called simply τὸ *τεῖχος* by Plutarch (ch. 41),—mark the use of the article,—otherwise indifferently *περιτεῖχος* (ch. 30), *διατεῖχος* (ib.), and *προτεῖχος* (ch. 44). Diodoros (xvi. 19) calls the new work simply *τείχος*. Plutarch's words, then, must be taken to mean (1) that part of the enemy were engaged in plundering at large; (2) but that one division had been drawn up in battle array behind the ruins

CHAP. XL of the tyrant were still doing as they willed with the
 Diôn clears unhappy city and its people. Diôn now marshalled his
 Achradina. followers in such order as suited the work to be done.
 The light-armed troops were sent on to make the first
 attack; their coming would at least surprise the enemy
 and do something to raise the hopes of the citizens¹.
 The heavy-armed, his Peloponnesians and allies and the
 Syracusans who had joined them, were arranged in divisions
 under their officers, so as to act at several points at once².
 Diôn himself marched in the front rank of all³.

We have no clear account of the operations; but it is plain that the wall of Achradina had to be carried in some way. There such of the mercenaries as Nypsios could form in military array made a stand. They were most likely no large body. The more part were busy burning and slaying; this time plunder was secondary; yet some were plundering; they are set before us as carrying off on their shoulders various objects that tempted them⁴. When the deliverers had made their way in, they had to advance and the soldiers of Nypsios had to withstand them how they might. The fight had to be carried on in the narrow streets, not on level ground, but among the slopes and rocks and tombs of Syracuse, amid the smoke of the burning city, and with the burning houses falling at every step, over ground strewn with their ashes⁵, and choked up with the bodies of the slain. Fighting could

of the cross-wall. The pitched battle, as we see below, took place near the Akropolis.]

[¹ Plut. Diôn, 45.]

[² Ib.; ὁρβίους λόχους ποιῶν καὶ διαιρῶν τὰς ἡγεμονίας ὅπως [ὁμοῦ] πολ-
 λαχόθεν ἅμα προσφέροιτο φοβεράτερον. Diod. xvi. 20; κατὰ πολλοὺς τόπους
 εἰσπεσὼν εἰς τὴν πόλιν.]

[³ Plut. Diôn, 46; ἄγων ἐπὶ τοὺς πολέμους.]

[⁴ Diod. xvi. 20].

[⁵ Plut. Diôn, 46; καὶ διαπύρους ἐπιβαίνοντες ἑρπείοις καὶ καταφερομένοις
 ἀπορρήγμασι μεγάλοις ὑποτρέχοντες ἐπισφαλῶς καὶ πολλὴν ὁμοῦ καπνῷ δια-
 πορευόμενοι κοινορτὸν ἐπειρῶντο συνέχειν καὶ μὴ διασπᾶν τὴν τάξιν.]

only be done by small parties on either side; but the zeal of the followers of Diôn, their better discipline too under the circumstances, in the end carried all before them. When the wall of Achradina had been carried, no further defence stood in their way till they reached the immediate entrance of the Island. The wall which Diôn had built to hem in the enemy and which they might now have defended against them, had been broken down by the mercenaries themselves. The last struggle then was in the Lower Achradina hard by the Isthmus. The more part of the enemy were able to escape into Ortygia and to fasten the gates¹. Those who were left outside were slaughtered without mercy; no one could say that they had other than the just reward of their deeds. The number of slain enemies during the whole struggle was reckoned at four thousand². Diôn had for a second time set free all Syracuse save the special stronghold of the tyrant. The first time his entrance had been little more than a military and religious procession. The second had been made only with frightful toil, and it was made into a half-ruined and still burning city.

CHAP. XI.

Ravagers
driven
back to
Ortygia.

The enemy were overcome; but there was still work to be done; neither citizens nor strangers could sit down to enjoy their victory at ease³. The first work was to quench the fire that was still blazing among the houses, and to clear the streets of the dead bodies of friends and foes⁴. We hear nothing of any burial-truce being sought for by Nypsios; the laws of Hellenic warfare were perhaps not held to extend to barbarian robbers, murderers of unarmed citizens and women. But the trophy was not for-

Diôn's
trophy.

[¹ Plut. Diôn, 46; καὶ τὸ μὲν πλείστον αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἐγγυὲς οὖσαν ἀναφεύγον ἐσώζετο. Diod. xvi. 20; οἱ λοιποὶ συνέφυγον εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, καὶ τὰς πύλας κλείσαντες ἐξέφυγον τὸν κίνδυνον.]

[² Diod. l. c.]

[³ Plut. Diôn, 46.]

[⁴ Diod. l. c.; Plut. l. c.]

CHAP. XI. gotten ¹. The *agora* of Syracuse had become a battle-field, and had to be marked as such.

Diôn and Hêrakleidês. * "Diôn had thus saved Syracuse a second time, and his second entrance was of a very different kind from the first. As soon as might be, an assembly was held. The more part of Diôn's chief enemies had fled; Hêrakleidês and his uncle Theodotês confessed their fault and craved his pardon. Many of Diôn's friends urged him to put them to death and to free the city from their intrigues. But Diôn forgave them, after a somewhat pedantic speech ², saying that it was his business as a philosopher to outdo his enemies in virtue. He then repaired the wall which hemmed in the Island; he buried the dead, and ransomed the captives. In another assembly Hêrakleidês himself proposed that Diôn should be made general with full powers by land and sea ³. But it is said that the sailors who had shared Hêrakleidês' victory objected; so the command was divided, Hêrakleidês taking the command by sea ⁴. War with Dionysios went on for some while, but each side charged the other with negligence and treason, till Diôn and Hêrakleidês were again formally reconciled through the intervention of a Spartan named Gaisylos, who had come from Sparta to act, if need be, the part of Gylippos ⁵. We should like to know something more about his mission;

[¹ Diod. l. c.]

* Story of Sicily, p. 212 seqq.

[² The speech is given by Plutarch (Diôn, 47; see Grote, ch. lxxxiv). According to Plutarch it was addressed to the friends of Hêrakleidês previous to the meeting of the *Ekklesiâ*. Diôn's friends had urged him to execute Hêrakleidês; καὶ τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἐξελεῖν δημοκρασίαν, ἐπιμανὲς νόσημα, τυραννίδος οὐκ ἔλαττον.]

[³ Plut. Diôn, 48; καὶ παρελθὼν Ἡρακλείδης εἰσηγήσατο γνώμην αὐτοκράτορα στρατηγὸν ἐλίσθαι Δίωνα κατὰ γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν.]

[⁴ Plut. l. c.]

[⁵ Plut. Diôn, 49.]

but our account is most meagre in everything but what personally concerns Diôn. At any rate Gaisylos behaved thoroughly well, claiming nothing for himself, but binding Hérakleidès by the most solemn oaths to be faithful to Diôn. CHAP. XI

"Soon after this came the full completion of deliverance. We do not hear again of Nypsios; but Apollokratès the son of Dionysios found that he could hold out no longer. He sailed away under a truce which he made with Diôn, by which he was allowed to take away his mother and sisters and so much of his goods and treasure as he could take in five triremes¹. But the fortress and the military stores in it were given up to Diôn. And as nothing is said of the mercenaries, it would seem that they passed into Diôn's service. Diôn now went into the Island and was welcomed by his sister Aristomachê, the widow of the old Dionysios, by his wife Aretê, whom he took back again, and by his son Hipparinos. Diôn recovers the Island.

"The joy throughout Syracuse was great; but it was soon damped. Diôn went to live in his own house and not in the fortress; but he kept possession of the fortress when men hoped that he would destroy it altogether. We cannot blame him when he refused, what many wished, to destroy the tomb of the elder Dionysios, and to cast out his bones. But he kept power in his own hands, and kept on his haughty demeanour. He had no thought of restoring the democracy as it had stood before the tyranny began. He was still corresponding with Plato and with friends at Sparta and Corinth², cities used to aristocratic govern- Aristocratic government of Diôn.

[¹ Plut. Diôn, 50.]

[² Among the principal accusations against Diôn made by Hérakleidès

CHAP. XI. ment. Among them they dreamed of another beautiful scheme of government, in which what we may call king, lords, and commons were all to have their proper places¹. Hêracleidês and his party, whether they knew anything of all this or not, at least knew that Diôn had not restored the old Syracusan commonwealth, but kept all power in his own hands. They naturally complained. And now Diôn yielded to his friends who again suggested the death of Hêracleidês. Diôn had refused to put him to death when it could have been done, if not by a legal sentence, at least by military execution; he now sank to connive at the secret murder of Hêracleidês². Whatever he had

Murder of
Hêra-
kleidês.

and his followers (Plutarch, Diôn, 53), besides his preservation of Dionysios' tomb and his maintenance of the "Syracusan Bastille" (*ὅτι τὴν ἀκρὰν οὐ κατέσκαψε*: cf. Grote, ch. lxxxiv), was that he sent to Corinth for counsellors (*συμβούλους*) and fellow-Stratêgoi (*συνάρχοντας*, cf. Plut. Diôn, 29). He sent for Corinthians, adds Plutarch, because he thought that they would be readier instruments for introducing the form of government that he wished to establish at Syracuse (*ὁρῶν καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους ὀλιγαρχικώτερον τε πολιτευομένους καὶ μὴ πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν ἐν τῇ δήμῳ πράττοντας*). An interesting trace of Diôn's Corinthianizing policy may be found in the issue by him of a Syracusan coinage, modelled on the "Pegasi" (*Πῶλοι*) of Corinth. The coins of Corinth and her colonies had already, in the days of the Elder Dionysios, attained a large currency in Sicily (see Suppl. III. p. 349), but it is at this time that ten-litra pieces (*δεκαλίτροι στατήρες*), as they were known in the island, were first struck in the name of the Syracusans. A fellow coinage, evidently the result of a monetary convention with Syracuse, was at the same time issued by Leontinoi,—an evidence of the equal alliance between the two cities under Diôn (see Syr. Medallions, &c., 156 seqq., and Suppl. IV.)]

[¹ Plut. Diôn, 53; *Ἐπενόη δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀκρατον δημοκρατίαν, ὥς οὐ πολίταιαν, ἀλλὰ παντοπάλιον οὖσαν πολιτειῶν, κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα, καλύειν, Λακωνικὸν δὲ τι καὶ Κρητικὸν σχῆμα μζάμενος ἐκ δήμου καὶ βασιλείας ἀριστοκρατίαν ἔχον τὴν ἐπιστατοῦσαν καὶ βραβεύουσαν τὰ μέγιστα καθιστάναι καὶ κοσμεῖν*. Plat. Resp. viii. 551 d.]

[² Plut. Diôn, 53; *ὅς οὖν μάλιστα πρὸς ταῦτα τὸν Ἡρακλείδην ἐναντιώσασθαι προσεδόκα καὶ τὰλλα παραχῶδης καὶ εὐμετάβητος καὶ στασιαστικὸς ᾗν, οὗς πάλαι βουλομένους αὐτὸν ἐκάλυεν ἀνελεῖν, τοῦτοις ἐπέτρεψε τότε*. To soothe the Syracusans who were greatly excited by this act of violence, Diôn gave Hêracleidês a state funeral with military honours.]

done before, whatever he dreamed of doing, he was now CHAP. XI. practically tyrant.

"As such he was before long to undergo the tyrant's fate. With the position of a tyrant he had not learned to practise the system of caution and suspicion by which tyrants maintained their power. He still put faith in his Athenian friend Kallippos¹, who all the while was plotting against him. He had warnings and visions, and his son threw himself from a window and was killed. His wife Aretê, and his sister Aristomachê, knew better what was going on. They made Kallippos take the Great Oath, the most solemn of oaths in the name of the great goddesses of Sicily, that he was planning no ill against Diôn². But he cared not for the oath, and he presently compassed the death of Diôn at the hands of some young Zakynthians. These, one would think, must have been men who had followed Diôn when he set sail from their island, but who turned against him now that he was looked on as a tyrant."

Murder of Diôn.

B.C. 354 [June].

§ 2. *Tauromenion refounded by Andromachos.*

About this time yet another change took place in the settlement of the still youthful city which looked down

[¹ See p. 257.]

[² Plut. Diôn, 57. In order to swear "the great oath" (*δύσσαι τὸν μέγαν ὅρκον*) the votary descended to the Temenos of the Thesmophoroi—Démêter and Persephonê—which lay, in later times at least (see Cicero, Verr. iv. 53), within the limits of the Neapolis,—doubtless in contiguity to the great cemetery, now known as the Necropoli del Fusco (the mention of the descent almost suggests that the sanctuary lay below the lower terrace). He who took the oath was first wrapped round by the priests with "the purple robe of the Goddess" (*τὴν πορφύριδα τῆς θεοῦ*) and took in his hand a burning torch. Kallippos carried his impiety so far (*οὕτως κατεγέλασε τῶν θεῶν*) that he waited for the festival of the *Koreia* and the actual day of the Goddess to break his oath by accomplishing Diôn's murder. The feast of the Korê was at harvest-time—that is, in June. Cf. Diod. v. 4.]

CHAP. XI. from the height of Tauros on the site where Naxos once
 Colony of elder Dionysios at Tauro-
 menion. had been. We have seen Dionysios plant there a colony
 of his mercenaries, without being able to do more than
 guess at their nationality¹. To make room for them he
 had driven out the mass of Himilkôn's Sikel settlers, but
 seemingly not all². In such a state of things the in-
 habitants of Tauromenion would be of very mingled birth
 and customs. But there would be a Greek element among
 them, and it was the Greek element which would naturally
 assimilate the others. Greeks would settle at Tauromenion,
 and would bring with them the Greek language and Greek
 manners. That tongue and those manners would be
 adopted by Sikels, Campanians, and Iberians; there would
 be no fear of the Greeks being assimilated by the bar-
 barians. And we may go further and say that the older
 Greek element in Tauromenion, from whatever quarter it
 came, must have been mainly Doric; for the official
 speech of Greek Tauromenion remained Doric³ in the teeth
 of a large Ionic immigration.

New Ionic settlement at Tauro-
 menion. It is to this Ionic settlement that we have now come,
 an event which fixed the character of Tauromenion as a
 Greek city for three hundred years. Our account is
 provokingly meagre. We hear of Tauromenion without
 any hint as to its condition or constitution, except that
 it still stood open to receive fresh settlers. We hear of
 Andromachos. a citizen of Tauromenion, Andromachos by name, who is
 described as holding the chief position in the city by virtue
 of combined wealth and character. It is no doubt his own
 son who gives this report of him; for Andromachos was
 the father of the historian Timaios⁴. Was he a popular

¹ See above, p. 175.

² See above, loc. cit.

[³ This results from the coins which bear the legend ΤΑΥΡΟΜΕΝΙΤΑΝ and ΑΡΧΑΓΕΤΑΣ, and from the language of the great Tauromenitan inscriptions. C. I. G. 5640, 5641.]

⁴ Diod. xvi. 7; Ἀνδρόμαχος ὁ Ταυρομενίτης, Τιμαίου μὲν τοῦ τὰς ἱστορίας συγγράψαντος πατὴρ ὂν, πλοῦτος δὲ καὶ ψυχῆς λαμπρότητι διαφέρων.

leader, a magistrate of the commonwealth, or something more? Whether demagogue, magistrate, or tyrant, he had power or influence for a great work. And, as it was a work in direct opposition to the policy of the late tyrant of Syracuse, we may safely believe that Tauromenion had taken advantage of the death of Dionysios to assert its independence. One class of his victims, or rather their children, found at last a resting-place at the hands of Andromachos. The remnant of the scattered Naxians, driven from Naxos, driven again from Mylai¹, after wandering for years up and down Sicily, were at last brought together by the Tauromenitan leader, and were received to the citizenship of the city on the mountain-side².

CHAP. XI.

Andromachos
plants
Naxian
exiles at
Tauromenion.

It was a turning-point in the history of Tauromenion when these Naxian settlers first looked down from their new home upon the forsaken home of their fathers. From the youngest of the Greek cities in Sicily they looked down on the site of the eldest. Naxos in a manner sprang to life again in the now Greek Tauromenion. The city did not indeed adopt the Chalkidian speech of the new settlers; but it did adopt their traditions. For the Naxians came with traditions ready made; the mixed multitude whom they found in Tauromenion could have had no common traditions of any kind.

Naxian
traditions
taken over.

The story of the origin of the name, told once before of the Sikel settlers under Himilkôn, is told again of the Greek settlers under Andromachos. They would abide on Tauros, and the name of Tauromenion, with better luck than in the former case, set forth their purpose of so abiding³. By this last change the holy place of the patron god of Sikeliot settlement came back

¹ See above, pp. 157, 158.

² Diod. u. s.; 'Ἀνδρόμαχος ἤθροισε τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Νάξου τῆς κατασκαφείσης ἐπὶ Διονυσίου περιλειφθέντας.

³ Diod. u. s. See above, p. 108.

CHAP. XI. to his own people, to his own people in the strictest sense, to the children of those who had first reared his

Cult of
Apollôn
Archêgetês
at Tauromenion.

altar. That altar now again stood within the territory of a Greek city, and Tauromenion, in the persons of her Naxian settlers, devoted herself with all zeal to the worship of Apollôn Archêgetês, and commemorated him as her own upon her coins¹. The whole story of Tauromenion is singularly like the story of the Thermai of Himera². In both cases the Carthaginian founder had called a town into being whose special object was to stand in the way of Greek advance. Thermai was settled by Phœnicians, Tauromenion by Sikels; one was a part of the Carthaginian dominion in Sicily, the other was at most an ally bound to Carthage by ties of gratitude. In both cases the new foundation came to answer purposes exactly opposite to those for which it was founded. The spots which were meant to be outposts of the barbarian against the Greek were presently admitted within the Greek fold, and each took the place of a lost Greek city. The tale of Sikeliot commonwealths was not in the end shortened by the overthrow of Himera and Naxos. Thermai and Tauromenion, towns still abiding and keeping their ancient names, were added to the roll in their stead.

Analogy
with the
Thermai of
Himera.

Later history of
Tauromenion.

The city thus strengthened by new colonists grew and prospered, and became specially remarkable for the wealth of its citizens³. Greek Tauromenion ran through the usual course of a Sikeliot city in later times. Settled again by a Roman colony⁴, it lived on till the days of its

[¹ The coins bear on the obverse a head of Apollôn and the inscription ΑΡΧΑΓΕΤΑΣ. On the reverse they show a lyre or tripod, also a bull. (See B. M. Cat., Sicily; Head, Hist. Num. 165.)]

² See vol. iii. pp. 511, 512.

³ Diod. u. 8.; τάχυν δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἐπίδοσιν λαμβανούσης, οἱ μὲν οὐκ ἴσθροτες μεγάλους περιεποιήσαντο πλοῦτους, ἡ δὲ πόλις ἀξιώλογον ἄξιαμα περιποιησάμενη, κ.τ.λ.

⁴ Diod. u. 8.

greatest glory, as the last of Sikeliot cities to hold out for
 Christ and Cæsar against the assaults of the besieging
 Saracens¹. But even that greater memory does not shut
 out the thoughts of the stirring early days of the city.
 There is much on the spot to call up the names of Himil-
 kôn and Dionysios and Andromachos, and above all to set
 before our eyes the night-attack of the tyrant and his dis-
 comfiture. The rocks and the heights are there still, and
 not the rocks and the heights only. There is the wall
 with the work of the Sikel and the Greek side by side².
 There is the temple of the Greek changed into the church
 of the Christian apostle of Sicily. There is the theatre,
 the work of the Greek enlarged and modified by the
 Roman, the theatre which, unlike those of Syracuse and
 Argos, still keeps so large a part of its *scena*, and where
 we hardly mourn the loss of the rest as we look out
 on the hills and the sea between its fragments³. The
 so-called *naumachia* abides, and not a few other traces
 of the presence of the Roman. His lasting traditions
 too may be often seen in the survival of his manner of
 building long after the rule of even the Eastern Rome
 had come to an end. The Saracen has tombs and walls
 assigned to him; but no defender of Tauromenion, from
 Himilkôn onwards, seems to have thought it needful to
 fence in the city with any wall on the steep mountain-
 side above it. But beside the gates at the two ends of
 the town, there is another gate in the middle, and from
 each of these gates walls are carried up to join together
 the defences of the town with those of the castle. All
 these things, though of later date, may well represent
 earlier arrangements. Of the days of the Norman kings

CHAP. XI.

Site and
remains
of Tauro-
menion.

¹ Rametta held out longer than Taormina, but Rametta was hardly a city, and certainly not a Sikeliot city.

² See above, p. 109.

³ The *scena* at Taormina is undoubtedly Roman; and there is the coming question whether there was any Greek *scena* at all.

CHAP. XI. there is no perfect work ; but Taormina is rich in graceful
 Taormina. pieces of building of yet later styles. The matchless site would be something even without a story, but at Taormina the story is for ever written on the site. On the long ridge of the town, on its walls and gates, on the rocks on which it stands, on the prouder rocks which rise above it, we may truly say that, of all who have assailed or defended the mountain-city, alongside of the names of Ibrahim and of Roger, the first names in the long story of Tauromenion dwell there also. Himilkôn the Carthaginian founder—Dionysios the Greek who undid the founder's work—Andromachos who decreed that the work of both should turn to the behoof of Hellas—the names of all live there. They live not only in the echoes which have reached us from the writings of the comrade of Dionysios and the son of Andromachos ; they are stamped upon the spot itself, graven with an iron pen to be read on the rock for ever.

§ 3. *Period of confusion at Syracuse from Diôn's death to the coming of Timoleôn.* B.C. 354–344.

Reign of
 Kallippos
 at Syra-
 cuse.

[354–353.]

* "Several years of confusion followed the death of Diôn, who had begun so well and ended so ill. Kallippos kept himself in power for about a year¹. He gave himself out as a deliverer, and wrote a letter to that effect to his own city of Athens. He threw Aristomachê and Aretê into prison, where Aretê gave birth to a son. Next one Hiketas, a friend of Diôn, professed to have the two women released and sent to Peloponnêsos, but he had them drowned on the voyage. The child seems to have lived.

* Story of Sicily, p. 215 seqq.

[¹ For Kallippos' rule at Syracuse, see Plutarch, Diôn, 58, and Diod. xvi. 36.]

Presently men began to complain of Kallippos; but for a while he got the better of his enemies, who found shelter at Leontinoi. Then a new claimant appeared, Hipparinos, son of the old Dionysios, by Aristomachê, nephew therefore of Diôn. He would naturally strive to get dominion in Syracuse if he could, and he might even give himself out as the avenger of his mother and uncle. When Kallippos was warring against Katanê, Hipparinos contrived to enter Syracuse with his brother Nysaios and to get possession of the Island. Kallippos had to put up with the tyranny of Katanê¹ instead of that of Syracuse, and Hiketas got hold of the tyranny of Leontinoi. Hipparinos was presently killed in a drunken fit, and Nysaios kept the Island². Lastly, their elder half-brother, Dionysios himself (B.C. 346), tried his luck again. He had been living at Lokroi, his mother's city, since he had left Syracuse, and had made himself hated there by his cruelty and debauchery³. He now saw another chance,

CHAP. XI.

Hipparinos
seizes the
tyranny.
[353-351.]

Nysaios.
[351-346.]

Restora-
tion of Dio-
nysios II.
[346.]

[¹ It was said that Kallippos remarked on this that he "had lost a city and gained a cheese-scraper" (*ὅτι πόλιν ἀπολαλεῶς τυρόκηστιν εἰληφεν*, Plut. l. c.). This points to a play on the name *Katanê* otherwise explained as the Sikel word for a dish,—the Latin *catinum* (cf. Sicily, i. 377, 561; Holm, *das alte Katania*). Kallippos subsequently made an unsuccessful attempt on Messana, and, unable apparently to maintain his tyranny on Sicilian soil, succeeded (350 B. C.) in seizing Rhégion, where Dionysios II had recently planted his colony of Phoibia. There he was killed shortly afterwards by his companions, Leptinês and Polysperchôn, with the same ornamental knife, it was said, wherewith Diôn had been murdered (Plut. Diôn, 58).]

[² For the drunken end of Hipparinos and the dissipation of his successor Nysaios, Athênaios (x. 47) cites the histories (*Philippica*) of Theopompos of Chios, books 40 and 41 (cf. *Æl. V. H. ii. 41*). Nysaios as the emblem of his tyranny wore an embroidered robe and set up a four-horse chariot (*κατεσκευάσατο τέθριππον καὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα τὴν ποικίλην ἀνέλαβεν*).]

[³ Dionysios had seized the two citadels of Lokroi (Justin, xxi. 2, "arces occupat;" but later, Livy (xxix. 6) speaks of "duse arces haud multum

CHAP. XI. and he contrived to drive his brother Nysaios from the
 Restora- Island, which, with his son Apollokratês, he occupied, and
 tion of Dio- was tyrant once more. And all this time Plato was
 nysios II. dreaming dreams and writing letters and sketching an-
 other constitution for Syracuse, in which Dionysios and
 Hipparinos and the young son of Diôn should all be con-
 stituted kings at once ¹.

“It would seem that none of these tyrants who came in
 one after the other had occupied all Syracuse; they could
 have held only the Island. At any rate there were some-
 where citizens of Syracuse who were able to act. Besides
 all these tyrants, the Carthaginians were again beginning
 to be threatening. Men feared lest, not only freedom but
 Greek life altogether, should be wiped out in Sicily ².

inter se distantes”). He slew or banished the richest citizens; allowed
 his soldiers to tear off the ornaments of the Lokrian women in the temple
 of Aphroditê, where they were gathered together in fulfilment of a vow
 (Justin, xxi. 3). He turned the largest house of Lokroi into his harem,
 and there in chambers strewn with thyme and roses insulted the daughters
 of the citizens. (Athên. xii. 58; ÆL. V. H. ix. 8.) He appears moreover
 (Just. loc. cit.) to have claimed and exercised a kind of *jus primæ noctis*.
 According to Justin (l. c.) the attempt of Dionysios to recover Syracuse
 was the result of a successful uprising of the Lokrians who succeeded in
 expelling him and his mercenaries. The revenge now taken by the out-
 raged citizens on his wife and daughters outdid the worst horrors of the
 French Revolution. After undergoing every conceivable outrage they
 were tortured to death with pins thrust under their nails. The very flesh
 was torn from their bones and the passers-by made to partake of it. What
 remained was burnt and the sea sown with the ashes. (Athên. xii. 58;
 ÆL. V. H. ix. 8; Strabo, vi. i. 8; and cf. Plut. Reip. Ger. Præc. 28.)
 Dionysios' efforts to secure their liberation had been seconded by the
 Tarantines (Strabo, l. c.).]

[¹ Plat. Ep. viii. p. 356.]

[² The author of Plato's letters (Ep. viii. p. 353 F) goes so far as to
 say that throughout Sicily the Greek language was in danger of dying out,
 and that the island seemed about to be turned into a Phœnician or Oscan
 state; ἤξει δὲ ἐάντερ τῶν εἰκότων γίνηται τι καὶ ἀπευκτῶν σχεδὸν εἰς ἐρη-
 μίαν τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς φωνῆς Σικελία πᾶσα, Φοινικῶν ἢ Ὀπικῶν μεταβαλοῦσα
 εἰς τινα δυναστείαν καὶ κράτος.]

They sought for help, they sought it in Old Greece, at the hands of their metropolis Corinth. Hiketas too at Leontinoi was believed to be making plots in concert with Carthage; but he openly joined in the appeal to Corinth, and the free Syracusans chose him general¹."

Hiketas
chosen
general
by Syra-
cusans.

§ 4. *Timoleôn*. B.C. 344-338.

"And now the purest hero in the whole tale of Sicily, till his likeness came again in our own day, steps on the field. What Diôn had professed to do, what at one time we may believe he really meant to do, Timoleôn did. During our whole story we are struck with the true and generous zeal for the suffering Sicilian colony which is shown by the Corinthian commonwealth generally. In Timoleôn this zeal reaches its height. He was a noble Corinthian, son of Timodâmos, and he first distinguished himself by saving the life of his brother Timophanês in battle². But when Timophanês presently seized the tyranny, after exhorting him in vain to give up his ill-gotten power, he joined with Aischylos the brother-in-law of Timophanês in putting him to death, though he did not himself strike the blow³. To slay a tyrant was

Earlier
history of
Timoleôn.

[¹ Plut. *Timoleôn*, 1.]

[² The battle was fought against the Argives and Kleônaians (Plut. *Timoleôn*, 4). This was perhaps the battle of the year 368 B. C. mentioned by Xenophôn (Hell. vii. 1. 25) in which the Corinthian detachment took part with the Athenians under Chabrias against the Argives near Epidaurous. The Kleônaians indeed are not mentioned in Xenophôn's account. (See Holm, G. S. ii. 464, 465; Rehdantz, *Vitæ Iphikratias, Chabrias, Timothei, Atheniensium*, p. 106, N. 57 : and cf. F. J. Arnoldt, *Timoleôn*, pp. 34, 35.) Held is solitary in his opinion (Plut. *Vitt. Æmil. Pauli et Timol.* 539) that the battle connects itself with the Boeotian-Corinthian War, and took place in 393 B. C.]

[³ Plut. *Tim.* 4; cf. Corn. Nepos, *Tim.* 1. Timoleôn stood apart weeping and mantling his face. Diodôros (xvi. 65) makes Timoleôn himself murder his brother in the public *agora*.]

CHAP. XI. among the Greeks counted as the noblest of deeds; but some doubted whether it should be done by a brother-in-law and a brother. Men's minds therefore were divided; some honoured Timoleôn as the slayer of a tyrant, while others loathed him as the murderer of a brother. And among these last, to Timoleôn's great grief, was Damarrista, the mother both of himself and of his slain brother. According to one account, the Syracusan embassy came very soon after these events, while, according to another, a space of twenty years had passed¹. In any case, when the Syracusan embassy came to ask help from Corinth, Timoleôn was called to take the command. He was bidden to go forth as a kind of ordeal; his former act should be judged by his acts in his new character².

Enforced retirement of Timoleôn.

He is sent by Corinthians to deliver Syracuse.

"Just as in the case of Gylippos, more turned on the man that was sent than on the force that was put under his command. Corinth gave Timoleôn only seven ships, but one of these was specially consecrated to the goddesses of Sicily³. For the priestess of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê

[¹ According to Diodôros (xvi. 65) Timophanes was murdered 364-5 B. C., shortly before the arrival of the Syracusan envoys at Corinth. Plutarch (Tim. 7 and cf. Comp. Timoleôn. et P. Æmil. 2) gives an interval of twenty years during which Timoleôn lived in mourning and retirement, avoiding the *agora* and *bêma* and all public affairs. He had thought of starving himself to death but had been dissuaded by his friends.]

[² Plutarch says (Tim. 7) that the leading citizen Télekleidês remarked to the Assembly that if Timoleôn succeeded in his enterprise they would decide that he had slain a tyrant, if he failed, a brother ("ἀν μὲν γὰρ" ἔφη "καλῶς ἀγωνίσῃ, τύραννον ἀπρηκέαι δόξομεν, ἂν δὲ φαύλος, ἀδελφόν"). Diodôros (xvi. 65) who represents the Corinthian *Gerousia* as debating at the same time the question of Timoleôn's guilt and the request of the Syracusan envoys, makes them come to the formal decision—ἐὰν μὲν καλῶς ἔρξῃ τῶν Συρακοσίων κρίναι αὐτὸν τυραννοκτόνον ἐὰν δὲ πλεονεκτικώτερον ἀδελφοῦ φονέα. Plutarch's version is the more probable.]

[³ Plut. Tim. 8. Cf. Diod. xvi. 66.]

at Corinth dreamed that the goddesses told her that they were going on a voyage to Sicily with Timoleón¹. And he and his men had many signs on the voyage to show that the goddesses were with them². They were further strengthened by human help; for of the sister cities of Syracuse Leukas gave one ship, and Korkyra, once more, as in the days of Hippokratês, forgetting her quarrel with her mother, gave two³. But the force that went was but small, a few Corinthian volunteers, and about 1,200 mercenaries⁴. And these were mostly men of bad repute, who had served with the Phokian leaders who had robbed the Delphian temple. For we must remember that we have come to the days when Philip of Macedon had become a great power in Greece. He had already taken Olynthos, but he had not yet fought the battle of Chairô-
neia. With such a force as this Timoleón set forth to drive Dionysios a second time out of his stronghold in the Island of Syracuse. And on the way, when the fleet

CHAP. XI.

Voyage of
Timoleón.

[B.C. 344.]

[¹ Diod. xvi. 66; 'Ο δὲ Τιμόλεων προακηκοὺς ἦν ἐν τῇ Κορίνθῳ τῶν τῆς Δήμητρος καὶ Ἑρῆς ἱερειῶν, ὅτι κατὰ τὸν ὕπνον αὐταῖς αἱ θεαὶ προήγγειλαν συμπλεύσεσθαι τοῖς περὶ τὸν Τιμόλεοντα κατὰ τὸν πλοῦν τὸν εἰς τὴν ἱερὰν αὐτῶν νῆσον. Cf. Plut. Tim. 8.]

[² Timoleón himself on his way through the Gulf of Corinth paid a visit to Delphi. As he descended, after the customary sacrifice, to the shrine of the oracle (τὸ μαντεῖον), a votive diadem (ταυρία) embroidered with wreaths and Victories fell down from the wall and rested on his head (Plut. Tim. 8). A burning torch,—the mystic symbol of the Goddesses,—appeared at night in the heavens and led the way across the Ionian Sea to the Italian shore (Diod. xvi. 66; Plut. l. c.), which they reached at Metapontion (Diod. l. c.), —itself a chosen seat of Démêtér and her daughter.]

[³ Plut. Tim. loc. cit.]

[⁴ Diodoros (xvi. 66) speaks of 700 mercenaries. According to Plutarch (Tim. 11) his total force, counting the recruits from Korkyra and Leukas, was 1,000. Diodoros gives Timoleón still 1,000 men at Hadranum (xvi. 68), Plutarch (Tim. 12) makes it 1,200, but Diodoros (l. c.) mentions that he received some reinforcement at Tauromenion.]

CHAP. XI. reached Rhégion, now again a free city, they found there
 Timoleôn at Rhégion. a Carthaginian fleet of twenty ships, with envoys from
 Embassy from Hiketas¹. He had, he said, defeated the tyrant; he had
 Hiketas. recovered Syracuse, all but the Island, and there he was
 going to besiege Dionysios with the help of the Cartha-
 ginians². He would be glad to receive Timoleôn himself,
 and to consult with him as to operations; but the Cartha-
 ginians would not allow the Corinthian ships to come to
 Syracuse. There was more reason than ever to go on,
 as Hiketas now plainly showed that he was in league with
 Carthage; but it was hard to go on in the face of the
 Punic fleet. By a clever trick, planned with the Rhé-
 gines, who were zealous in his cause, he contrived to get his ships
 out and to land at Tauromenion without the knowledge of
 the Carthaginians³."

Timoleôn
 eludes
 Carthagi-
 nian fleet.

He knew whither to sail. The direct voyage across the strait to Messana would in any case have been dangerous with a stronger Punic force at Rhégion; and however the

[¹ Plut. Tim. 9; Diod. xvi. 68. A Carthaginian trireme had already (Diod. xvi. 66) met Timoleôn's squadron at Metapontion, and forbidden them to proceed to Sicily. The Rhé- gines meanwhile had offered him their alliance (ib.).]

[² Hiketas had captured Syracuse three days before Timoleôn's arrival at Rhégion (Diod. xvi. 68 f.; cf. Plut. Tim. 9).]

[³ Plut. Tim. 12; cf. Diod. xvi. 68. Timoleôn pretended to be ready to accept Hiketas' proposal that he should send back his fleet to Corinth, but urged that for his own security and in order that Hiketas' own intention fully to liberate Syracuse might be better known, he should make the Rhé- gine Démos a witness to the agreement, as being a Greek city on terms of friendship with both parties. The Rhé- gines in furtherance of Timoleôn's plan called an Assembly (*συνήγαν ἐκκλησίαν*) and closed the gates. Their orators made long speeches so as to give Timoleôn time to complete the embarkation of his troops while the envoys of Hiketas and the Carthaginians were engaged in the discussion. Timoleôn himself kept his place near the Béma, as if waiting for his turn to speak, while his followers made off, and finally, when all the other triremes had put to sea, slipped away himself and joined the last.]

people of Messana may have been ready to welcome the deliverer, there was a power over them to which Timoleôn must have been hateful, and to which the barbarian fleet would have been ready to give its best help. The tyrant Hippôn, of whom nothing more seems to be known, was lord of Messana¹. A little to the south, not within the strait, but on the open waters of the Ionian sea, the deliverer was assured of a safe refuge. The heights of Tauromenion are clearly seen from the haven of Rhêgion, and there freedom and Timoleôn had a sure friend. Andromachos, who had given the hill-city new citizens and a new life, was still in power there². Whatever was the exact nature of his authority, he was eager for the freedom of Syracuse and of all Greek Sicily, and a zealous enemy of the tyrants who held so many towns, Greek and Sikel. He had already sent invitations to Timoleôn, and offers of help in his work³. To Tauromenion then Timoleôn guided his handful of ships, and beneath the hill of Tauros the new deliverer first set foot on Sicilian ground. He was treading the soil trodden by the first Greek settlers in the island; if Naxos sat no more on her peninsula, her scattered children had found a new home on the height which looked down on it, and Apollôn Archêgetês stood ready to bless the work of those who came to free Greek cities as well as the older work of those who came to found them. Timoleôn and his followers were warmly welcomed by Andromachos and by the whole people of Tauromenion. He made their city his starting-point for the work of deliverance, and his eloquence strengthened the hearts of the citizens in their firm purpose to be true allies of the

CHAP. XI.

Landing of
Timoleôn
at Tauro-
menion.

[¹ Plut. Tim. 34.]

[² Ib. 10; καλούντος αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ πάλαι προθύμῳ Ἀνδρομάχου τοῦ τῇν πόλιν ἔχοντος καὶ δυναστεύοντος. Diod. (xvi. 68) calls him ὁ τῆς πόλεως ἡγούμενος. Plutarch (l. c.) adds τῶν τε ἑαυτοῦ πολιτῶν ἡγείτο νομίμως καὶ δικαίως, and that he was an enemy of tyrants.]

[³ Plut. l. c.; cf. Diod. l. c.]

CHAP. XI. Corinthians, their fellow-workers in the setting up again of Sicilian freedom ¹.

Punic envoys arrive at Tauromenion.

An enemy might have spoken—no doubt enemies did speak—of the men thus honoured by the Corinthian name as a gang of temple-robbers led by the murderer of his brother. It does not appear that so high a moral line was taken by the Punic envoys who presently came to Tauromenion with a message of threatening. Great was the wrath of the Carthaginians at Rhêgion when they found out the trick that had been played on them. But all the comfort that they got from the Rhêgines was the taunting answer that Phœnicians ought to be well pleased with those who knew how to carry their point by guile ². A trireme was at once sent to Tauromenion, bearing Carthaginian envoys.

Dialogue between Andromachos and envoys.

Their brief and pithy dialogue with Andromachos must have taken place in the general assembly of the Tauromenitan people. The usual place for such assemblies was the theatre, and it may be that the elder theatre of Tauromenion, the Greek building some parts of which still abide beneath the work of Roman days which has usurped its name, may have been already in being and may have been the place of audience. The Punic speaker ended in a proud and barbarian fashion ³ with a parable after the rhetoric of the East. He turned the palm of his hand upwards, and said that, if the Corinthians were not presently sent away from Tauromenion, the whole city should be turned upside down in the like sort ⁴. Androma-

[¹ Plut. Tim. 10; διὰ καὶ Τιμολέοντι τότε τὴν πόλιν ὀρμητήριον παρέσχε καὶ τοὺς πολίτας ἐπεισε συναγωνίζεσθαι τοῖς Κορινθίοις καὶ συνελευθεροῦν τὴν Σικελίαν.]

[² Ib. 11; εἰ Φοίνικες ὄντες οὐκ ἀρέσκοντο τοῖς δι' ἀπάντης πραττομένοις.]

[³ Ib.; ἐπαχθῶς καὶ βαρβαρικῶς.]

[⁴ Ib.; τέλος ὑπτίαν τὴν χεῖρα δείξας, εἴτ' αὐθις καταστρέψας ἠπέλιψε τοιαύτην ὁδὸν αὐτῷ τὴν πόλιν τοιαύτην ποιήσειν.]

chos was ready with an answer in kind. He turned his hand first downwards and then upwards, and told the barbarian that, if he did not sail away speedily, his ship should be turned over in the like sort ¹. CHAP. XI.

We hear nothing more of any Carthaginian action either at Rhêgion or at Tauromenion; twenty ships might be deemed too small a force to attack both cities, and, as their Syracusan ally sent to demand their immediate presence, they sailed away to the scene of more pressing need ², and left Timoleôn and his force untouched under the keeping of their friends on the hill-side of Tauros.

His position was hardly a hopeful one. His force was small,—a few volunteers and mercenaries, strengthened by such help as Tauromenion might give him. That one town was his only foothold on Sicilian soil. Of the Syracuse which he had come to deliver, the Island was held by Dionysios, the rest of the city by Hiketas, now a tyrant almost as openly avowed as Dionysios, while his Punic allies held the Great Harbour ³. A crowd of lesser tyrants ruled in other cities, Greek and Sikel; by this time a Greek and a Sikel town, a Greek and a Sikel tyrant, are hardly to be distinguished from one another. It must not be forgotten that the presence of a tyrant in a Sikel town was itself a sign, though a sad one, of advance in Hellenic ways. Hiketas himself kept Leontinoi. Of Hippôn of Messana we have already heard. A Leptinês, seemingly the murderer of the murderer Kallippos, had by some means won for himself a dominion among the Sikel towns of the north ³. Among others he was lord of inland Engyum.

[¹ Plut. Tim. 11; γελᾶσας δ' ὁ Ἀνδρόμαχος ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν ἀπεκρίνατο τὴν δὲ χεῖρα νῦν μὲν ὑπτίαν ὡς ἐκείνος νῦν δὲ πρηγὴ προτείνας ἐκέλευσεν ἀποπλεῖν αὐτὸν, εἰ μὴ βούλοιτο τῇ ναῦν ἀντὶ τοιαύτης γενέσθαι τοιαύτην.]

[² They were summoned by Hiketas (Plut. l. c.) to the Great Harbour of Syracuse.]

[³ Cf. Plut. Tim. 24 and Diod. xvi. 72. There is no direct evidence that this was the same Leptinês mentioned by Diodôros (xvi. 45) as the

CHAP. XI. holy place of the Mothers, and also of Apollônia, looking
 The down from its height upon the northern sea ¹. Nikodêmos,
 Sicilian tyrants. of whom nothing else is known, ruled on the fivefold crest
 of Centuripa ²; and our guide from Agyrium does not
 fail to tell us that his own city, once famous under the
 rule of Agyris, was now held by a certain Apollôniadês, of
 whom he has nothing further to record ³. Leptinês was
 seemingly a Greek reigning over hellenized Sikels; Niko-
 dêmos and Apollôniadês may have been the same; but it is
 quite as likely that they were hellenized natives, recalling
 in nomenclature, but in nothing else, the two Sikel princes
 who in earlier days had borne the name of Archônidês ⁴.

Mamercus of Katanê. A greater interest is awakened by the name of Mamercus,
 tyrant of Katanê. His Italian name, illustrious in the
 Æmilian house of Rome ⁵, had been borne by a brother of
 Stêsichoros ⁶, and it suggests the no less Italian name of
 Marcus, borne in days to come by the man of Keryneia
 who called the League of Achaia to its second being ⁷. It
 implies Italian descent or connexion; it is hardly enough

joint liberator of Rhégion, and by Plutarch (Dion, 58) as one of the
 murderers of Kallippos and as acting in the interest of mercenary troops.
 As a leader of mercenaries, however, he was at any rate in a position to
 seize the *tyrannis* in Sicilian towns.]

[¹ See Sicily, i. 144.]

[² Diod. xvi. 82.]

[³ Ib.]

[⁴ See Sicily, ii. 381, iii. 236.]

[⁵ The first Mamercus of the Æmilian *gens* was, according to one
 tradition, a son of King Numa, who is said to have named him after a son
 of Pythagoras (Plut. Numa, 8). From his winning manners (*αἰμυλία*) he
 is further said to have given his name to the Gens (see Mommsen, *Unterit.*
Dial. 356). The name is of course Oscan, connected with Mamers = Mars
 (cf. Festus, s. v.); and according to another account this Æmilian Mamercus
 was a son of Mars and Silvia (Plut. Parall. Gr. et Rom. 26).]

[⁶ According to Suidas, Stêsichoros had a brother called Mamertinus.
 Stêsichoros himself, though his activity as a poet is connected with Himera,
 appears to have been born of parents who had migrated hither from
 Maturus or Metaurum, on the W. coast of what was afterwards the
 Bruttian country. This would account for his brother's Italic name.]

[⁷ Pol. ii. 10. 41, 43. Cf. Freeman, *Hist. of Fed. Gov.*, 1st ed. 248;
 2nd ed. 193.]

of itself absolutely to prove that he had risen to power as a captain of Italian mercenaries¹. He was at all events either Greek by name or speech, or else he had gained a command of that tongue remarkable in a stranger. Like the elder Dionysios, he aspired to literary fame; he wrote poems and tragedies, and sometimes, it would seem, tried his hand at satire². CHAP. XL

To all of these men the coming of Timoleôn was threatening; his errand was to clear, not only Syracuse, but all Sicily, of the class of which they were members. And if Timoleôn was the natural object of the hatred of the tyrants, he had not yet won to himself the love or the trust of the victims of the tyrants. Deliverers had been rather plentiful in Sicily, and the distinction between the deliverer and the tyrant had not always been clearly drawn. It was on errands of deliverance that Pharax had come from Sparta and Kallippos from Athens, and men feared that the new deliverer from Corinth might prove no better than they³. And though the piety of his biographer shrinks from adding the name of Diôn to his list, the latter days of that deliverer also had not been such as to win much confidence for the new-comer whose promises were not more hopeful than those of Diôn had once been. Timoleôn
object of
the tyrants'
hatred.

For a while Timoleôn abode at Tauromenion, hanging

[¹ It is to be observed, however, that Cornelius Nepos (Tim. 2) speaks of Mamercus as "Italicum ducem . . . qui tyrannos adjutum in Siciliam venerat."]

[² Plutarch (Tim. 31) relates that after his victory over the Syracusan mercenaries Mamercus dedicated their shields to the Gods, with the inscription—

Τάσδ' ὁστρειογραφεῖς καὶ χρυσελεφαντηλέκτρον
δοσίδας δασιδίοις εἶλονεν εὐτελέσι.

The trophies at which this gibe was aimed were probably shields taken by Timoleôn from the Carthaginians and their barbarian allies at the Krimisos (Diod. xvi. 80). We recall the enamelled shields of the Gauls.]

[³ Plut. Tim. 11.]

CHAP. XI. on to Sicily, as his biographer says, by a narrow fringe¹,
 Timoleón but meeting with no general welcome or acceptance. Men
 at Tauro- did not at once flock to his standard, nor, for some weeks
 menion. at least, did the people of any other Sicilian town call
 on him to come to help them against either foreign enemies
 or home-bred tyrants.

The time of waiting however could not have been very
 long. And when an invitation did come to Timoleón, it
 came from a place whose good will might pass for a favour-
 able omen. Timoleón had been guided and guarded on his
 voyage by the Hellenic goddesses of Sicily; they had steered
 his course to the friendly shelter of Tauromenion; he was
 now to receive his first welcome from the votaries of the
 native powers of the land, and to count as his first ally the
 fire-god of the Sikel in his own person. Hadranum on the
 ledge below the southern slope of Ætna, the town which
 the elder Dionysios had called into being under the shadow
 of the ancient Sikel temple, did not as yet reckon among
 the great cities of Sicily, but it was looked on everywhere
 as holy, as the home of the god of the land whom all the
 nations of the land agreed in reverencing². But the
 sanctity of the spot did not keep its people from civil dis-
 cord. We are told nothing of the form of government in
 Hadranum; but it was one which admitted of vehement
 dissension and debate among its citizens. When we read
 that one party was for calling in Hiketas and the Cartha-
 ginians and another for calling in Timoleón³, we are
 tempted to think that the latter call was the true voice of
 the people, and that the allies of the barbarian were at most
 an oligarchy, perhaps only the following of a tyrant, who

Hadranum
and its
fire-god.

Its divided
politics.

[¹ Plut. Tim. 11; Τιμολέοντα ὥσπερ ἐκ κρασπέδου τινὸς λεπτοῦ τῆς Ταυρομενιτῶν πολίχνης τῇ Σικελίᾳ προσηρημένον.]

[² Ib. 12; [Ἀδρανιτῶν] πόλιν μικρὰν μὲν, ἱερὰν δ' οὖσαν Ἀδρανὸς θεοῦ τινος τιμωμένου διαφερόντως ἐν ὅλῃ Σικελίᾳ. See Sicily, i. 184, seqq.]

[³ Ib.]

felt his dominion passing from him. Each side called on its ally, and neither ally failed his partisans. If Hiketas started from Leontinoi, his march thence to Hadranum would be, in the number of stadia, perhaps a little shorter than that of Timoleôn from Tauromenion ¹. But the march from Leontinoi was an easy one, largely across the famous fields. The path of Timoleôn was harder. The easiest road to Hadranum would have been by way of Katanê; but we may doubt whether Mamercus, at this stage, would have given a free passage to Timoleôn. The deliverer had therefore, like Himilkôn when his path was stopped by the lava, to make his way by the toilsome inland road round the foot of Ætna. By that path among the eastern mountains Timoleôn and his Thousand ² set forth from the shore of Naxos, as a later Thousand made their way on the like errand from the shore of Marsala through the less toilsome mountains of the West.

CHAP. XI.

Timoleôn
marches on
Hadranum.

The end of the first day's march found them at a point still seemingly nearer to Tauromenion than to Hadranum. There they bivouacked. The second day, a day of slow and hard marching, was far advanced when they had reached a distance of less than four miles from this ground. At that point news was brought that Hiketas had drawn near to Hadranum from the other side, and had pitched his camp outside the town ³. Here was the work for which they were come, to save Hadranum from falling into the hands of the traitor. The officers of Timoleôn's little army at once halted their men. Let them rest and take food, and they would fall

Hiketas
approaches
Hadranum.

[¹ The distance of Hadranum from Tauromenion is given by Plutarch (l. c.) as 340 stadia,—about 40 miles.]

[² According to Plutarch (Tim. 12) the number was now 1,200. Timoleôn had received some reinforcement at Tauromenion. (See above, p. 295, note 4.) But, as in the case of Garibaldi, the force with which he had actually landed was 1,000.]

[³ Plut. Tim. 12; *ἤκουσεν ἄρτι προσμγγνῶναι τὸν Ἰκέτην τῷ πολυχίνῳ καὶ καταστρατοπεδεύειν.*]

CHAP. XI. upon the enemy with a better heart¹. But the general coming up prayed them to attack at once. They would find the enemy in no battle array, but resting in their tents and busy with their suppers². Timoleôn then seized his shield for the charge and marched on at the head of his men, as advancing to certain victory. The like spirit seized the rest; they followed their chief; they reached the camp of Hiketas with its disordered occupants, who fled at the first onslaught of a foe one-fifth of their own numbers. About three hundred were slain; about six hundred were taken prisoners; the camp of Hiketas passed into the hands of Timoleôn, and the deliverer, fresh from his first battle on Sicilian ground, stood victorious before the gates of Hadranum.

Timoleôn
defeats
Hiketas
at Hadra-
num.

Temple
legend
of Hadra-
num. The gates stood open to welcome him. The men of Hadranum, temple-keepers of the local god, received him with reverence and sacred awe. For the fire-god himself had spoken. The dogs of Hadranus, with their gift of discerning good and evil, might have been no ill judges of the question which had divided the public mind of Corinth. They might have been appealed to whether they would tear Timoleôn in pieces as the murderer of his brother, or greet him with whine and bound as the righteous slayer of a tyrant³. But that ordeal was not needed when Hadranus himself had declared his will by signs more speaking than any words. While the fight was going on, the innermost doors of the temple opened of themselves, and the statue of the god was seen waving his spear, and with his face dripping with sweat⁴. That the graven form of Hadranus showed these outward signs of toil and warfare was proof indeed that Hadranus himself, like Aias by the banks of

God
Hadranus
aids Timo-
leôn.

[¹ Plut. Tim. 12. The officers are spoken of as λοχαγοὶ καὶ ταξίαρχοι.]

[² Ib.; περὶ σκηρὰς καὶ δειπνῶν ἀσχόλους ὄντας.]

[³ See Sicily, i. 187, 188.]

[⁴ Plut. Tim. 12; ὁφθεῖν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ μὲν ὄρου σείδμενον ἐκ τῆς αἰχμῆς ἄκρας, τὸ δὲ πρόσωπον ἰδρῶτι πολλῷ βρόμενον.]

Sagras¹, had taken his place unseen in the ranks of Timoleón. The god of the Sikeli had shared in the struggle and the victory which were to bring freedom to Sikeli and Sikeliot alike. CHAP. XI.

After this solemn entrance of Timoleón we hear no more of the party in Hadranum which had sought to bring in Hiketas and the Carthaginians. Hadranum, instead of Tauromenion, became for a while the head-quarters of the liberating army.

Meanwhile Timoleón kept his head-quarters at Hadranum. Under the protection of the god, he needed no body-guard; he dwelled without state, without suspicion, among his local worshippers². Hiketas accordingly framed his scheme for getting rid of him. He sent two of his mercenaries³ to Hadranum with a charge to slay Timoleón. They reached the holy city and found that Timoleón was about to sacrifice to the local god in his temple. The murderers, carrying daggers hidden under their clothes, mingled with the general congregation, and gradually drew nearer and nearer to their intended victim as he stood by the altar. The moment had all but come when they were about to give one another the word to strike, when a blow, as if dealt by the spear of Hadranus himself, lighted on one of the intended murderers. A man in the crowd, men knew not who, drew a sword, and smote one of the guilty twain on the head with such a stroke that he fell dead before the altar. The slayer rushed from the temple, still holding his bloody sword. The holy place itself stood not far from the wall of the town and from the edge of the hill of Hadranum⁴. But behind the town there is

Attempt
on Timo-
león's life
at Hadra-
num

frustrated
by chance.

[¹ Paus. iii. 19. 12.]

[² Plut. Tim. 16; οὔτε ἄλλως περὶ τὸ σῶμα συντεταγμένην ἔχοντι φυλακὴν, καὶ τότε παντάπασι, διὰ τὸν θεὸν ἀνειμένους καὶ ἀνυπόπτως σχολάζοντι μετὰ τῶν Ἀδρανιτῶν. There is not a word to explain Timoleón's inactivity while the defeated Hiketas was acting and plotting.]

[³ Ib.; δύο τέττοους.]

[⁴ See Sicily, i. 185.]

CHAP. XI. higher ground again, partly covered by the streets of modern Adernd. Here the slayer climbed a rocky point and sat as if seeking sanctuary¹. Meanwhile the survivor of the conspirators, unhurt, untouched, unsuspected, but stricken in conscience as he saw the bolt of vengeance fall upon his comrade, grasped the altar as a suppliant, and called on Timoleôn to spare his life and he would tell him all². Timoleôn knew not what he was to hear; but he made the promise, and the penitent told him how he and the man who had just been slain had been sent together on their errand of murder. Meanwhile others had followed the slayer, and brought him down from his perch. He called out loudly that he had done no wrong, that he had only slain the man who had in past days slain his father in Leontinoi. Many in the crowd witnessed that his tale was true. And all men wondered at the mysterious power of destiny, which wrought its hidden purposes by means which human wit could not fathom, by bringing men and things together in a way which no forethought of man could foresee. The god who guarded Timoleôn, the god doubtless of the spot on which they stood, had made use of the injured son's righteous vengeance; he had kept back from him all opportunity for avenging his father, till the moment came when, in avenging his father, he could save Timoleôn also³. Of the surviving emissary of Hiketas we hear nothing more. To the avenger of his father and preserver of Timoleôn his grateful followers voted a crown of ten minæ⁴. And the deliverance of Timoleôn from such a danger raised men's hopes of his success on his great errand higher and higher. They held him as one who was to be guarded and revered as something holy, as

Timoleôn regarded as under
divine protection.

[¹ Plut. Tim. 16; φεύγον πρὸς τινα πέτρην ὑψηλὴν ἀνεπήδησεν.]

[² Ib.]

[³ Ib.; ἀλλὰ μετ' αἰτίας ἰδίας πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου σωτηρίαν ἀπὸ τύχης διετήρησεν.]

[⁴ Ib.; τὸν μὲν οὖν ἄνθρωπον ἐστεφάνωσαν οἱ Κορίνθιοι δέκα μναῖς.]

one who had come into Sicily under the express guidance of the gods, and not least under the guidance of the local god of Hadranum¹. CHAP. XI.

* "Timoleôn now for a while kept his head-quarters at Hadranum. His wonderful success made men believe that he was under the special care of the gods². Allies now began to flock in to him. Several cities joined him, specially Tyndaris³, the other foundation of the elder Dionysios on the northern coast. And the tyrant MamerCUS of Katanê sought his alliance. And presently a more wonderful message came than all. Dionysios grew tired of being besieged in Ortygia, and he gave up all hope of being able to win back anything beyond Ortygia⁴. And of the two he liked better to fall into the hands of Timoleôn than into those of Hiketas. So he offered to surrender, as it is put, to the Corinthians⁵. He would give up the stronghold and the horses and arms, and the

Accessions
to Timo-
leôn's
cause.

Dionysios
surrenders
to the Co-
rinthians.

[¹ Plut. Tim. 16; *ὡς ἱερὸν ἄνδρα καὶ σὺν θεῶι τιμωρόν.*]

* From Story of Sicily, p. 220 seqq.

[² Timoleôn regarded himself as a chosen instrument of the Gods. He dedicated his house to his good *Dæmôn* and set up a shrine there to the Goddess *Automatia*, the fortune that comes of itself. (Plut. Tim. 36; *ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς οἰκίας ἱερὸν ἰδρυσάμενος Ἀυτοματίας ἔθευεν αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν οἰκίαν ἱερῶ δαίμονι καθιέρωσεν.* Cf. Reip. ger. præc. 20.) Plutarch (Tim. 36) contrasts the spontaneity of Timoleôn's successes with the laborious triumphs of Epameinondas and others. So too, he adds, there is something forced about the poetry of Antimachos and the paintings of Dionysios the Colophônian, compared with the ease of Nikomachos' brush or Homer's lyre. But it is difficult to detect "the great Captain" in Plutarch's portraiture of Timoleôn, and the insistence on luck is not very complimentary to generalship.]

[³ Diod. xvi. 69. According to Plutarch (Tim. 13) several cities joined Timoleôn before MamerCUS' adhesion. According to Diodôros (loc. cit.) it was after that event.]

[⁴ Plut. Tim. 13; Diod. l. c.]

[⁵ Plut. l. c.; τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, αὐτὸς Διονύσιος ἀπειρηκὸς ἤδη ταῖς ἐλπίσι καὶ μικρὸν ἀπολείπων ἐκπολιορκεῖσθαι, τοῦ μὲν Ἰκέτου κατεφρόνησεν αἰσχροῦς ἡττημένου, τὸν δὲ Τιμολέοντα θαυμάζων ἔπειθεν ἐκείνῳ καὶ Κορινθίοις παραδ-δοῦς αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν.]

CHAP. XI. mercenaries, on condition of being sent safely to Corinth with his private property. This offer Timoleôn gladly accepted. He sent two Corinthian officers with a small body of men to take possession of the Island¹, and Dionysios, with his goods and a few friends, was sent in a trireme to Corinth. There the fallen tyrant lived as a private man for the rest of his days. It was thought the great wonder of the time to see one who had been so powerful living in a private station, more wonderful than if he had been slain or kept as a prisoner. He became the great sight of Corinth, and many stories are told of the sharp sayings that he made to people who came to see him². One may be enough, as it was made to so famous

Dionysios
exiled to
Corinth.

Anecdotes
of the fallen
tyrant.

[¹ Plut. Tim. 13; Timoleôn sent 400 troops under the Corinthians Eukleidês and Télemachos, but on account of the enemy they had to be introduced privily and in small bodies at a time. How they made their way through Hiketas' lines is not explained. They succeeded, however, in occupying the Akropolis and the Tyrant's Castle (τὰ Τυραννεία). Among the stores and munitions were 70,000 weapons, a quantity of catapult bolts (βελῶν) and every kind of military engine. Dionysios further transferred 2,000 of his mercenaries to Timoleôn's service. Diodôros (xvi. 70) speaks of Dionysios as having had his possessions guaranteed to him by a treaty (ὑπόσπονδον), so too Justin (xxi. 5); "recepto privato instrumento, Corinthum in exsilium proficiscitur." Cornelius Nepos (Tim. 2) makes Timoleôn spare Dionysios on account of services rendered by him and his father to Corinth.]

[² The accounts of Dionysios in exile have been carefully collected by Arnoldt (Timoleôn, 110, seqq.). For later writers he naturally became a peg from which to hang anecdotes of fallen greatness, and it is difficult to distinguish the genuine tradition. He is said to have gone in deliberately for every kind of low dissipation in order to avoid any suspicion of political intrigue, and to disarm by his present abject condition the personal enemies that his former tyranny had called into being (Justin, xxi. 5; Plut. Tim. 14). He preferred to make the market-place the scene of his drunken brawls, put on rags, prowled about the butchers' shops with hungry eyes, and consorted with the lowest of the low. Plutarch (Tim. 14) adds that he gave instruction to singing girls and discussed with them theatrical pieces and the music to which they were set. According to other accounts he turned schoolmaster ("novissime ludimagistrum professus pueros in trivio docebat;" Justin, xxi. 5. Cf. Valer. Maximus,

a man. King Philip of Macedon asked him how his father, with so much else to do, had found time to write tragedies. Dionysios answered that he wrote them in the time which himself and Philip and all the rest who passed for happy spent at the wine-cup¹. His old friend Plato had died before he came to Corinth, or we might have had some reflexions on his fall.

"The surrender of Ortygia to Timoleôn happened within fifty days after his landing in Sicily². The Corinthians now thought it worth while to send out a larger force³. When they were off the coast of Italy, they were hindered from going on by a Carthaginian fleet; so they spent the

Reinforce-
ments from
Corinth.

vi. 9; Cicero, Tusc. iii. 12), whether, as variously stated, to keep himself before the public, or to gain a livelihood, or, as Cicero suggests (l. c.), because he still felt the need of tyrannizing over somebody. Finally, we are told (Klearchos cited by Athénaios, xii. 58; 541 e) he became a *Métragyrtes* or begging-priest of Kybelé, and went about beating a drum and whining for alms like a wandering dervish.]

[¹ Plut. Tim. 15. The interview with Philip probably took place in 337 B. C., on the occasion of his summoning the representatives of all Greek states to that city. Some of Dionysios' remarks show a good deal of his father's biting wit. His reply to a friend who asked him what Plato and philosophy had done for him is full of bitter irony,—“Do you think I have gained nothing from Plato when you see me bearing my altered lot as I do?” (Plut. loc. cit.; cf. Apophth. Reg. et Imp.) To one who was contrasting the careers of the father and son he made the shrewd rejoinder (Plut. Ap. R. et I.), “My father rose to power when Democracy was hated, I myself when Tyranny was envied.” His beatitude is also worth recalling; “Blessed are they who have been brought up to misery!” (*Ὡς μακάριοι οἱ ἐκ παιδὸν δυστυχεῖν*. Jo. Stobaïos, Florileg. tit. cx. 13. p. 582.)]

[² Plut. Tim. 16; *ἐπιβὰς Σικελίας ἐν ἡμέραις πεντήκοντα, τὴν τ' ἀκρόπολιν τῶν Συρακοῦσῶν παρέλαβε καὶ Διονύσιον εἰς Πελοπόννησον ἐξέπεμψεν*. Diodoros (xvi. 69, 70) (apparently confusing the account of Timoleôn's later demolition of the tyrant's strongholds on the island with the account of its capture) turns the whole story about and makes Timoleôn only take possession of Ortygia after his expulsion of Hiketas from Achradina and Neapolis,—well on, that is, in 343 B. C. (Cf. Arnoldt, op. cit. 98, seqq.)]

[³ Plut. Tim. 16; Diod. xvi. 69. The names of the Corinthian leaders were Demarchos and Demaretos. They sailed with ten vessels, bringing with them 2,000 heavy-armed troops and 200 horsemen, as well as a sum of money.]

CHAP. XI. time in a work of the same kind as that on which they were sent, namely in helping the people of the Greek town of Thourioi against the neighbouring barbarians¹. Meanwhile Hiketas went on besieging Ortygia, while Timoleôn still stayed at Hadranum.

Timoleôn's
forces
struggle
against
Hiketas
and Ma-
gôn.

"Hiketas now prayed the Carthaginian commander Magôn to come to his help with his whole force². The Punic ships now filled the Great Harbour, and, for the first time in all the wars between Carthage and Syracuse, a Punic force was admitted into the Syracusan city³. Timoleôn's men in the Island were now in great straits; but he contrived to send them in provisions in little boats; and when Hiketas and Magôn went to besiege Katanê, Neôn, the officer in command in Ortygia, made a sudden sally and occupied Achradina⁴. And about the same time the Corinthians in Italy contrived to elude the Punic fleet there and to cross the strait⁵. Timoleôn now took the

[¹ The barbarian foes of the Thourians were the Bruttians (*Βρῆττιοι*, Plut. l. c.), elsewhere described as the revolted slaves of the Lucanians, and who first come into notice shortly before this date (in 356 B.C.). From c. 19 it appears that the country between Thourioi and Rhégion was already occupied by them.] [² Plut. Tim. 17.]

[³ Ib. Magôn brought with him 150 ships and was able to land a force of 60,000. Every one thought, says Plutarch, that the long prophesied *ἐκπαρβάρισις* of Sicily was now about to be fulfilled. See above, p. 216.]

[⁴ Plut. Tim. 18. The passage relating to Achradina is worth noting; *ἐκράτησε καὶ κατέχευε τὴν λεγομένην Ἀχραδινὴν, ἧ κράτιστον ἰδοῦκει καὶ ἀθραυστότατον ὑπάρχειν τῆς Συρακοσίων μέρος πόλεως, τρόπον τινὰ συγκειμένης καὶ συντηρησμένης ἐκ πλείονων πόλεων*. The outer defence of Achradina, on the side of the island, that Neôn had first to carry was Diôn's cross-wall. Schubring, Achradina, p. 48. See above, p. 262.]

[⁵ Plut. Tim. 19, 20. They forced their way through what was now the Bruttian country to Rhégion. Arrived at Rhégion they found the Carthaginian admiral, whose duty it was to watch the straits, had sailed away to Syracuse to terrify Timoleôn's garrison with sham trophies which they pretended to have taken from the relieving force. The Corinthians accordingly crossed the straits in coasting boats and were welcomed by Timoleôn near Messina, of which he forthwith made himself master.]

command, and marched to Syracuse¹. There Hiketas and Magôn still held all the city outside Ortygia and Achradina, as well as the Great Harbour. But Timoleôn was able to encamp by the Anapos, the old camping-ground of so many armies². Magôn presently grew suspicious of Hiketas, and sailed away³. When he reached Carthage, he was so fearful of the punishment of this cowardice that he killed himself, and the Carthaginians could only crucify his dead body⁴.

"The gods had thus again fought for Timoleôn. He now planned a threefold assault on those parts of Syracuse

[¹ Plut. Tim. 20.]

[² Ib. 21.]

[³ The cause of Magôn's suspicions, as related by Plutarch (Tim. 20), is of great interest from the light it throws on the temper of the Greek mercenaries of the day. It appears that the good eel-fishing that was to be had on the marshy borders of the Syracusan haven, where the Anapos runs into the sea, afforded a favourite sport for the hired soldiers on both sides when off duty. The mercenaries happening in both cases to be Greeks, though willing for their pay to fight bravely against each other, harboured no personal enmity against their opponents, and, when thrown into each others' neighbourhood by their common sport, joined in friendly conversation (*οἱ αὖτ' Ἕλληνες ὄντες καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐκ ἔχοντες ἰδίαν ἀνεχθειῶν πρόφασιν, ἐν μὲν ταῖς μάχαις διεκινδύνεον ἐβρώσας, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀνοχαῖς προσφοιτῶντες ἀλλήλοις διελέγοντο*). In this way one of the Greeks in Timoleôn's service was able to address to those on the other side some words in favour of the common cause of Hellas against the barbarians, which went the round of Hiketas' troops and excited Magôn's suspicions. "Were they then," he remarked to some of the other side who were admiring the greatness of the city and its productiveness,—“Greeks as they were,—to assist in planting Carthaginians in its midst, when Hellas needed many Sicilies as its bulwarks against them? Or did they think that this great host had been collected from the pillars of Héraklēs and even the Atlantic shores for the benefit of Hiketas and his dynasty? If Hiketas were a good general he would not be trying to drive out those whom Syracusans should look to as their fathers, but would find his true glory and power in coming to an arrangement with Timoleôn and the Corinthians.” Plutarch puts this in a rhetorical form little appropriate to the occasion, but something like it may well have been said.]

[⁴ Plut. Tim. 22; *πυθαρόμενοι (οἱ Συρακόσιοι) τοὺς Καρχηδονίους τοῦ Μάγονος ἑαυτὸν ἀνελόντες ἀνεσταυρακέναι τὸ σῶμα*. Holm (G. S. ii. 203) connects Magôn's sudden departure with the conspiracy of Hannôn.]

CHAP. XI.
Timoleôn
defeats
Hiketas at
Syracuse.
B. C. 343.

Timoleôn
master of
all Syra-
cuse.

Rases
tyrants'
castle.

Depopula-
tion of
Sicilian
cities.

Timoleôn's
re-coloniz-
ation of
Syracuse
and other
Sicilian
cities.

which were still held by Hiketas. He himself attacked on the south side of the hill, and other Corinthian officers led on their troops on the north side and from Achradina¹. All the posts were taken; Hiketas contrived to escape to Leontinoi². All Syracuse was delivered, and it was a real deliverance. Timoleôn did not do this time as Diôn did; he did not give the least suspicion that he wished to keep more than lawful power in his own hands. Diôn had kept possession of the stronghold of the tyrants; Timoleôn called on the Syracusans to come and help with their own hands in destroying it³. The whole fortress was swept away, and courts of justice were built on the site⁴. But Syracuse and the other Sicilian cities were in a sad state through all these tyrannies and wars. Some towns were quite forsaken; the tyrants and their mercenaries held the fortresses, while the citizens lived in the country. Stags and wild boars were said to occupy some towns, and in Syracuse itself the grass grew thick in the *agora*⁵.

"Timoleôn saw that one great need of Syracuse and all Sicily was an increase of citizens. He wrote to Corinth, and at his request the Corinthians made proclamation at the various games of Greece, and sent messengers to the islands and to many parts of Asia, calling on all banished Syracusans and

[¹ Plut. Tim. 22.]

[² Diod. xvi. 72.]

[³ Diod. xvi. 70; τὰς κατὰ τῆς νήσου ἀκροπόλεις καὶ τὰ τυραννεῖα κατέσκαψε. Plut. Tim. 22; οὐ μόνον τὴν ἀκρὰν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς οἰκίας καὶ τὰ μνημεῖα τῶν τυράννων ἀνέτρεψε καὶ κατέσκαψεν.]

[⁴ Plut. Tim. l. c.; εὐθὺς δὲ τὸν τόπον συνομαλόντας ἐνφεοδόμησε τὰ δικαστήρια.]

[⁵ Ib.; ἡ μὲν ἐν Συρακούσαις ἀγορὰ δι' ἐρημίας οὕτως πολλὴν καὶ βαθεῖαν ἐξέφυσεν ὕλην, ὥστε τοὺς ἵππους ἐν αὐτῇ κατανέμεσθαι τῶν ἱπποκόμων ἐν τῇ χλῆθι κατακειμένων, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι πόλεις πλὴν παντελῶς ὀλίγων ἐλάφων ἐγένοντο μεστὰ καὶ σὺν ἀγρίων, ἐν δὲ τοῖς προαστείαις καὶ περὶ τὰ τείχη πολλάκις οἱ σὺν ἄγοντες ἐκνηγέτον.]

other Sikeliots to come home again¹. Many such flocked to Corinth, but the number was by no means so great as was needed. Another Corinthian proclamation invited all Greeks everywhere to take a part in what was in truth a second Corinthian settlement of Syracuse, with Timoleôn as its second founder². Many came at this invitation, and were carried to Sicily under the auspices of the metropolis. Others flocked to Timoleôn of their own accord from various parts of Sicily and Italy. At last as many as sixty thousand returning exiles and new-comers were brought together in restored Syracuse³. Two Corinthian citizens,

CHAP. XI.

Corinthian
re-settle-
ment at
Syracuse.[¹ Plut. Tim. 22, 23.][² Ib. ; *πάλιν ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς οἰκιστάς.*]

[³ Plut. (Tim. 23), who cites the Syracusan historian Athanis as his authority for the number. Of these, 50,000 came from Italy and Sicily, 10,000 from Greece, especially from Corinth. Diodōros (xvi. 82) makes 5,000 come from Corinth, and speaks in general terms of the others being drawn from Greece. He says that 50,000 lots of land were divided among the new colonists,—40,000 in the Syracusan territory, 10,000 in that of Agyrium, which (adds the Agyrian historian) was large and good. Cornelius Nepos (Tim. 3) speaks first of Sicilian and then of Corinthian colonists. The above numbers (cf. Holm, G. S. ii. 469) refer simply to the new citizens, not counting the women and children, so that the total amount of immigrants would be nearer 200,000. The arrival of such a vast body of new settlers must have been a gradual process, and the proclamation by heralds at the great Games of Greece (*ἐπιόντες τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἀγῶνας ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι καὶ τὰς μεγίστας τῶν πανηγύρεων*, Plut. Tim. 23) must itself, as Arnoldt (op. cit. p. 127) points out, have taken time. Plutarch (l. c.) places this re-colonization and re-foundation of Syracuse between 343 and the date of his great campaign against the Carthaginians, Ol. ex. 1 (340-339). Diodōros (l. c.), whose dates however are confused (cf. Arnoldt, op. cit. 136), mentions it under Ol. ex. 2 (339-338 B. C.). Nepos (Tim. 3) cannot be taken as an authority for the chronology. It is however evident that that part of the colonization which relates to the territory of Agyrium could not have been carried out before the overthrow of its tyrant, about 338 B. C. The land seems to have been distributed gratis to the colonists (*τῇ μὲν χάριτι διέτριψε*), but the houses were sold for 1,000 talents,—nearly a quarter of a million of our money,—the old Syracusans, however, being given the right of preemption. The want of money was still so much felt by the Syracusan Treasury that the bronze statues of the tyrants were melted down, Gelôn's however being spared out of gratitude for his victory at Himera (Plut. Tim. 23), and those of Dionysios the Elder because he

CHAP. XI. **Kephalos and Dionysios, were sent to legislate for what might almost be looked on as a new commonwealth. Citizens of an aristocratic city, they were wise enough to restore the old constitution of the democracy¹ and to enact the laws of Dioklēs afresh².**

New legis-
lation at
Syracuse.

was represented in the guise of Dionysos (Dion Chrysostom, Or. xxxvii. See above, Suppl. I. pp. 216, 217).]

[¹ Timoleón, ever eager for religious sanction (cf. Nep. Tim. 4), sought, as a set-off to the purely democratic element of the constitution, to ballast the ship of state by conferring the supreme magistracy on the Amphipolos or minister of the Olympian Zeus (Diod. xvi. 70; κατέστησε δὲ καὶ τὴν κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἐντιμοτάτην ἀρχὴν, ἣν Ἀμφιπολίαν Διὸς Ὀλυμπίου οἱ Συρακοῖται καλοῦσι). Diodōros adds that the first Ἀμφιπόλος was Kalliménēs, that the Amphipolos gave his name to the year, and that the office continued to his own time, when the Romans changed the constitution and conferred on the Syracusans their own citizenship, that is, the *Jus Latii*, granted B.C. 44. Besides Kalliménēs, the names of only two other Syracusan Amphipoloi are known, Theomnastos and Hērakleios, both of Verres' time (Cic. Verr. Act II, ii. 51; iv. 61). On the election of the Amphipoloi a valuable notice is supplied by Cicero, from which it appears that they were chosen by lot out of three *genera*,—a restriction of the franchise quite natural in the case of a priestly officer, but which nevertheless has an aristocratic look (Verrin. Act II, ii. 51; "Syracensis lex est de religione quæ in annos singulos Jovis sacerdotem sortito capi jubeat, quod apud illos amplissimum sacerdotium putatur. Quum suffragiis tres ex tribus generibus creati sunt, res revocatur ad sortem"). On the Amphipolia, see especially Ebert, *Zirkelav*, 108, seqq. The office is shown by inscriptions to have existed at Centuripa (C. I. G. 5742; Holm, G. S. ii. 468; *Διὶ ὅριον ἀμφιπολεύσας*), at Argos, where the God ministered to was Apollo, and at Melita, where there was an Amphipolos of Augustus. The priesthood of Zeus Olympios at Syracuse was itself of very old standing; thus we hear of Hippokratēs of Gela after his victory over the Syracusans in 492 encamping in the Olympieion (Sicily, ii. 117; Diod. fr. lib. x), and taking the priest of Zeus prisoner (κατέλαβε δὲ αὐτὸν τὸν ἱερέα). What Timoleón seems to have done was to make the office annual and convert it into the chief magistracy. The special aspect under which Zeus was honoured would be as Zeus Eleutherios, whose cult was, as in Thrasyboulos' time, the symbol of the triumphant democracy at Syracuse (cp. Diod. xi. 72). About this time was struck a fine series of coins with the head of Zeus and the inscription ΖΕΥΣ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΟΣ. (See Supplement IV. p. 350.) The reverse type of some of these coins is equally significant—a free horse, already in Dioklēs' time selected as a monetary symbol of democracy at Syracuse.]

[² The accounts of Timoleón's legislation are meagre in the extreme.

"All these reforms took time. And while they were going on, Timoleôn had other work to do. He had to set the rest of Greek Sicily free both from domestic tyrants and from barbarian masters. Of the tyrants the nearest was Hiketas at Leontinoi. Timoleôn marched against him, and, according to one account, he now underwent the only failure that is recorded of him¹. The walls of Leontinoi were too strong for him. He therefore marched northwards to the inland town of Engyum, and to Apollônia near the northern coast². These were Sikel towns which had by this time fully taken to Greek ways. They were held by a tyrant named Leptinês³, who submitted on terms, and Timoleôn sent him to Corinth, that the Greeks of Old Greece might see another fallen tyrant⁴. A little later, it would seem, Hiketas thought it time to submit, to give up his mercenaries to Timoleôn, and to pull down his stronghold at Leontinoi. He was then allowed to live there as a private man⁵.

CHAP. XI.
Timoleôn's
campaign
against the
tyrants.

Submission
of Hiketas.

"The Carthaginians were still threatening, and making

(Compare Diod. xvi. 82 and xiii. 35 with Plut. Tim. 24.) The laws of private contract and inheritance (*περὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν συμβολαίων ἢ κληρονομίων*) as laid down by Dioklês were left unaltered, those relating to public affairs were amended according to the needs of the time. It is thus, perhaps, that Kephalos, like the later legislator Polydôros, was spoken of (Diod. xiii. 35) as having been rather an interpreter of the old laws and translator of antiquated legal phraseology (*οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι . . . οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν ἀνέμασαν νομοθέτην, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐξηγητὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου διὰ τὸ τοῖς νόμοις γεγραμμένους ἀρχαία διαλέκτῳ δοκεῖν εἶναι δυσκατανόητους*). Such a political gap had intervened in the last two generations that it is quite possible that a good deal of Dioklês' laws had become quite unintelligible; but the Dorian dialect of Syracuse could not itself have been so completely changed.]

[¹ Diod. xvi. 72. See Appendix VI.]

[² Diod. l. c.; Plut. Tim. 24.]

[³ See above, p. 299.]

[⁴ Plut. Tim. l. c.]

[⁵ Ib. See Appendix VI.]

CHAP. XI. ready for greater efforts in Sicily. Timoleôn, like Dionysios, thought it well to strike first, the more so as he was in great straits for money to pay his mercenaries. He sent two of his Corinthian officers on a raid into the Carthaginian territory (B.C. 343-342)¹. There they won over several towns to the Greek side, and brought back great spoil, which was useful both for paying the soldiers and for making ready for the greater campaign that was coming."

Raid into
the Cartha-
ginian
Dominion.

Carthage
prepares
for the
coming
struggle.
B. C. 344.

The Carthaginians by this time saw that their dominion in Sicily was likely to be seriously endangered by the advance of the new champion of Hellas in the island. They began to make good their ground against him both by warlike and by politic means. To their allies in Sicily they made friendly advances². One would think that this referred to such allies as they had among other races rather than to the Phœnician cities which are now commonly spoken of as actual parts of the Carthaginian dominion. They further made up any differences that they had with any of the Greek tyrants. To withstand the man who came to free Sicily alike from tyrants and from barbarians was the common interest of both. With Hiketas above all, the most powerful of the order and so directly threatened by Timoleôn, they entered into specially friendly relations³. Moreover they sent a powerful force into Sicily under the

Allies her-
self with
Hiketas.

[¹ Diod. xvi. 73; Plut. Tim. 24. Timoleôn sent 1,000 men under the Corinthian officers, Deinarchos and Démaretos. The chief conquest made was Entella. Diodôros describes this as a plundering expedition to which Timoleôn was led by want of money to pay his mercenaries. But the money thus acquired could not have gone very far, since at the time of the mutiny in Timoleôn's camp, just before the battle of the Krimisos, we find Thrasios demanding long arrears of pay for the mercenaries (Diod. xvi. 78).]

² Diod. xvi. 67; τοῖς μὲν κατὰ Σικελίαν συμμαχίσι πόλεσι φιλανθρώπως προσέφέροντο.

³ Ib.; μάλιστα δὲ πρὸς Ἰκέταν τὸν τῶν Συρακοσίων δυναστεύοντα, διὰ τὸ τοῦτον πλεῖον ἰσχύειν.

command of Hannôn. We hear of a hundred and fifty ships of war, fifty thousand foot, over two thousand chariots¹ with a great stock of warlike engines and missiles, with a store of food and all things needful.

CHAP. XI.
Expedition
of Hannôn.

But we hear little of the results of the expedition. Its first object seems to have been to get rid of any enemies who still barred the Punic advance towards the eastern part of the island. Such enemies were found on the rock of Entella. Its Campanian occupants had taken the side of the elder Dionysios in his last Punic war². They may have kept up friendly relations with his son; at any rate they were enemies of Carthage and therefore of Hiketas. The Carthaginian army laid waste the lands of Entella and besieged the town. The Campanians, seeing so great a power brought against them, sent, we are told, for help to the other towns that were hostile to Carthage. Two only are mentioned by name, and those are both far away. Sikel Galaria had learned Greek ways of warfare, and sent a thousand heavy-armed to the help of Entella. The Campanians of Ætna, moved by the danger of their kinsfolk³, were making ready a force to go on the same errand. But the men of Galaria outstripped them. They fell in with a Punic force; the Sikel phalanx was overpowered by numbers, and was cut to pieces to a man⁴. The news reached Ætna before the relieving force had begun its march. The men of Ætna feared the same fate as the valiant warriors of Galaria. They stayed at home, and left their kinsfolk at Entella to their fate⁵.

Cartha-
ginians at-
tack Cam-
panians at
Entella.

Defeat of
Galarians.

[¹ Diod. xvi. 67. Diodôros' words are; ἄρματα τετραπόδια συνεπιβάς δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς ἄσχυλίας. Here the *συνεπιβάς* are evidently two-horse chariots; but how the *ἄρματα* were distinguished from them is not stated by Diodôros. The explanation may, however, be found in Plutarch (Tim. 25) who mentions *τρίημινα*. Plutarch (loc. cit.) gives 200 triremes, 1,000 transports, and an army of 70,000 men.]

[² See p. 206.]

[³ Diod. xvi. 67.]

[⁴ Ib.]

[⁵ Ib.; *ἔκριναν ἡσυχίαν ἀγειν.*]

CHAP. XI.

Fate of
Entella
uncertain.

Campanians and
Sikels
represent
Greek
cause.

What that fate was we are not distinctly told. Five years afterwards, in the great expedition of Timoleôn, the battle-ground is in the neighbourhood of Entella, and the march of both Greek and Carthaginian armies towards that point suggests that the object on the Punic side was to attack Entella and the object on the Greek side to defend it. But we are told nothing distinctly. We know not whether its Campanian citizens held out for five years against the Punic attack, or whether the Carthaginians had been driven to raise the siege. Still the campaign of which we have this very imperfect account has its interest in the story of the spread of Greek influence over Sicily. The attack on Entella and its defence are as clearly part of the warfare of Greek and Phœnician as any Carthaginian siege of Syracuse. But, as far as we can see, not a Greek was there. The cause of Europe was represented by the older and the newer inhabitants of the island. The Sikels marched across a large part of Sicily to give help to the Campanian. In face of the Phœnician, Greek, Sikels, and Campanian were all one; all were gradually becoming fused into that undistinguishable mass of Sicilian Greeks which Cicero found in the island. The Galarian heavy-armed, marching in Greek order to rescue another Sicilian town from the Phœnicians, felt themselves as Greeks marching against the barbarians. The Campanians themselves, with their name wrought on their coins in Greek letters¹, were fast hastening towards the same change.

B. C. 339.

A resolution was now come to at Carthage to make a greater effort than all that had gone before, with the deliberate purpose of altogether driving the Greeks out of Sicily². Two commanders, Asdrubal and Hamilkar,

[¹ B. M. Cat., Sicily, p. 60; Head, Hist. Num. 119, 120; and cf. Coinage of Syracuse, p. 36, note. For these coins see Supplement IV. p. 352.]

² Plut. Tim. 25; *ὡς οὐκ ἔτι ποιησόμενοι κατὰ μέρος τὸν πόλεμον, ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ πάσης Σικελίας ἐξελάσονται τοὺς Ἕλληνας*. They came this time, "Non cauponantes bellum, sed belligerantes."

were sent with this commission. But the mere numbers, as they are given us, of the force which they led do not reach the tale of the host which Hannibal had led seventy years before to the destruction of Selinous and Himera¹. The force that was sent from Africa, with the troops that Carthage already had in the island², did not by land reach a higher number than seventy thousand footmen and ten thousand horses, those of the horsemen and the chariots both being reckoned. The naval force was two hundred ships of war, and a thousand transports and ships of burthen for the horses, artillery, provisions, and all that was needed. But what specially distinguished this expedition was not its mere numbers, but the character of one class of the troops that were employed. It shows that a special effort was designed, when Carthage, commonly so chary of the blood of her own citizens, sent forth a chosen body of the noblest among them to take their part in it. The Sacred Band, all men of birth and wealth and personal repute, all armed with the goodliest harness and weapons, now crossed into Sicily, to defend, not Carthage herself, but the choicest of her foreign possessions. Their numbers are reckoned in different accounts at two thousand five hundred and at the less likely figure of ten thousand³.

The fleet sailed to Lilybaion, and found that the Carthaginian province was already harried by the mercenaries of Timoleôn. A party under a leader named Euthymos of

CHAP. XI.

Carthaginian expedition under Hamilkar and Asdrubal. B.C. 339.

Arrives at Lilybaion.

¹ See Sicily, iii. 455.

² The larger number comes from Plutarch, the smaller from Diodôros (xvi. 77). Experience fairly allows us to believe that Plutarch followed Ephoros and Diodôros Timaios. Diodôros distinctly says that his numbers were *ὡς τὸν τοῖς προεπάρχουσιν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ*.

³ It is singular that neither account mentions the sending of the Sacred Band at this stage. It comes in in the account of the battle (Diod. xvi. 80; Plut. Tim. 27). Diodôros describes them as *Καρχηδονίαν οἱ μὲν τὸν ἱερὸν λόχον ἀναπληροῦντες, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἀριθμὸν ὄντες δισχιλίοι καὶ πεντακόσιοι, ταῖς δ' ἀπαιταῖς καὶ δόξαις, ἐν δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις πρᾶξιες*. The larger figure comes from Plutarch.

CHAP. XI. Leukas seems to have been in possession of Ietai, a point well suited for action against Panormos¹. At all events some action on the Greek side was already going on within the Punic boundary. Hamilkar and Asdrubal, stirred up to wrath, left these smaller enemies, and determined to march, as one account puts it, against the Corinthians². That is, they resolved on a land march all across the island with Syracuse as its goal. Of the fleet we hear nothing at this stage.

Timoleôn
marches
against the
invaders.

The news of the landing of the Punic host reached the foremost of the Corinthians. Timoleôn at once determined on an immediate march against the Carthaginian territory. He wished, if possible, to carry the war into the enemy's country, and to spare his allies the burthen of a barbarian host passing through their land³. The two armies in short set out for the two ends of Sicily, each seeking to invade the territory of the other. When we remember that the Carthaginians had the advantage of the time that the news of the landing took to go from Lilybaion to Syracuse, and still more when we read the circumstances of his march, it shows the inherent superiority of Greek warriors and the special energy of Timoleôn that the armies met for the decisive battle at a spot more than three times as far from Syracuse as it is from Lilybaion.

But so to do Timoleôn had to set forth with such forces as he could command at the moment, and the odds in point

¹ I hope I am right in putting this together from two passages of Plutarch. In Tim. 25, he says of the Carthaginians on their landing, *πυθόμενοι πορθείσθαι τὴν ἐπικράτειαν αὐτῶν*. By whom was it ravaged? Not by Timoleôn's main army, which did not set out till the news of the Punic landing had reached Syracuse. But in Tim. 30, after the battle and quite unconnected with it, we hear of mercenaries in Timoleôn's service, *τοὺς μετ' Εὐθύμου τοῦ Λευκαδίου μισθοφόρους*, a person not mentioned before, *περὶ τὰς καλουμένας Ἰετὰς*.

² Plut. Tim. 25; *εὐθὺς ἔργῃ πρὸς τοὺς Κορινθίους ἐχώρουν*.

³ Diod. xvi. 78; *ἔδοξε δ' αὐτῷ τὸν πρὸς τοὺς Φοίνικας ἀγῶνα συστήσασθαι κατὰ τὴν τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐπικράτειαν, ὥστε τὴν τῶν συμμάχων χώραν ἀσινῇ διαφυλάξῃ, τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους οὔσαν διαφθείρῃ*.

of numbers were frightfully against him. He made peace with Hiketas, and increased his own force by taking the soldiers of that tyrant into his service¹. Still, after this increase, his whole army of Syracusans, allies, and mercenaries reached only the tale of ten thousand—it is surely a foolish spirit of romance which cuts the thousands down to seven or five². He summoned a military assembly; he spoke as Timoleón would speak at such a moment; he was answered by an universal shout bidding him march at once against the barbarians³. He may have told them that the odds after all were not so great as those against which the Athenians and Plataians had marched to Marathôn, and the Carthaginians were at least not, like the Medes on that day, unknown enemies whose very name was a name of fear⁴. But Miltiadês and Kallimachos commanded only true-hearted citizens and allies; Timoleón was less lucky. He had men in his army who not only served merely for hire, but who were held to be under the special curse of the gods. Moreover, through the poverty of the Syracusan treasury, large arrears of pay were due to them⁵. They had gone a long way on their march; they were in the Akragantine territory, seemingly at some point further from Syracuse than the city of Akragas, when a mutiny broke out⁶. The

¹ Diod. xvi. 77; *προσλαβόμενος τοὺς μετ' αὐτοῦ [Ἰκέτου] στρατιώτας*.

² Again it is Diodóros who gives the more prosaic number and Plutarch the more exciting; but Plutarch's figures do not seem consistent throughout. In c. 25 he has three thousand Syracusans and four thousand mercenaries; but directly after the whole force is five thousand foot and a thousand horse, an unusually large proportion of cavalry in a Greek army.

³ Diod. xvi. 78; *πάντων ἀποδεξαμένων τοὺς λόγους, καὶ βοῶντων ἀγεῖν τὴν ταχίστην ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους*.

⁴ Herod. vi. 112.

⁵ Diod. xvi. 78.

⁶ It would seem from Diodóros (xvi. 79) that the Punic camp was not very far off; *προῆγεν ἐπὶ τοὺς πολέμιους οὐ μακρὰν στρατοπεδεύοντας*. But no site that is at all possible for the battle can be said to be οὐ μακρὰν from Akragas.

CHAP. XI. ringleader was one Thrasios, a bold and desperate man according to his name¹, who had had a hand in the Phokian sacrilege at Delphoi. He harangued the mercenaries on the madness of the enterprise of Timoleôn², how he was leading them against an army six times their number, to a battle-field eight days' journey from Syracuse, where there would neither be shelter for those who fled, nor any to bury those who might be slain³. Timoleôn, who had left his soldiers so long unpaid, was clearly playing his game with their lives as his counters⁴. And we may believe that in the eyes even of Timoleôn the life of an adventurer who fought simply for hire was of somewhat less value than the life of a citizen of Syracuse or of Corinth. Let them, said Thrasios, go back to Syracuse and demand their pay; let them not march a step further on an enterprise which was doomed to destruction⁵.

Insub-
ordination
of Thrasios.

Mercen-
aries un-
paid.

It was a moment of trial. Roman commanders, the Dictator Cæsar foremost among them, could bring back mutinous soldiers to their duty by a single word or a single act. It was enough to seize the ringleaders for punishment, or to appeal to the military instinct by the change of a familiar formula⁶. But the soldiers of Cæsar were Romans by race or by long service; they were bound by the military oath; their leader was their *Imperator*, not their paymaster. The Roman method would hardly have

¹ Diod. xvi. 78; *μισθοφόρον τις ὄνομα Θράσιος . . . ἀπονοία καὶ θράσει διαφέρων*. Plutarch does not mention him.

² In Diodōros, Thrasios calls Timoleōn *παραφρονοῦντα*; in Plutarch (Tim. 25) the thousand go away, *ὡς οὐχ ὑγαινόντος τοῦ Τιμολέοντος ἀλλὰ μαινομένου παρ' ἡλικίαν*.

³ This touch is from Plutarch (Tim. 25), as well as the number of days; *ὅθεν οὔτε σωθῆναι τοῖς φεύγουσιν οὔτε ταφῆναι τοῖς πεσοῦσιν αὐτῶν ὑπάρξει*.

⁴ Diod. xvi. 78; *ἐναποκυβεύων ταῖς τῶν μισθοφόρων ψυχαῖς*.

⁵ Ib.; *στρατείαν ἀπεγνωσμένην μὴ συνακολουθεῖν*.

⁶ Cæsar addressed the insubordinate soldiers (Suet. Cæs. c. 70) as "Quirites." Thereupon they protested that they were "milites" and returned to obedience.

succeeded even with Greek citizens; it would have been utterly useless with Greek mercenaries. And the mercenaries after all had a case. Their service was a matter of buying and selling; they had agreed to jeopard their lives for hire, and they were called on to jeopard them while their hire was unpaid. Timoleôn had to yield to circumstances; he had to entreat, to promise, and by entreaties and promises he won back the greater part of the mutineers to his service¹. But Thrasios, at the head of a thousand of his comrades, remained stiff-necked; they would follow Timoleôn no further. Violent measures against them would have been useless or impossible; he therefore put off their punishment for the present. He even wrote letters to those who were left in authority at Syracuse, bidding them receive the deserters friendly and pay up their arrears². CHAP. XI.
Thrasios and his mercenaries withdraw.

With the rest of his force Timoleôn marched on. We are told that the Punic camp was at no great distance; it was on the further side of the river Krimisos; that is, not the Krimisos that flows not far from Segesta, but the southern Krimisos, the right branch of the Selinuntine Hypsas or Belice. Even this site is not very near to any part of the Akragantine territory; but the northern Krimisos is still further away. Notwithstanding the delay that the mutiny must have caused, Timoleôn had far outstripped his enemies. If he had not actually entered the Carthaginian territory, he had come near enough to it to deliver a friendly city on its borders. For the position of the two armies seems to show that the immediate object was on the one side to attack Entella, and on the other to defend it³. We again ask, Had the Campanians, left to themselves, kept on their defence through all these Carthaginian camp on the Krimisos.

¹ Diod. xvi. 79; μόγις, πολλὰ δεηθεὶς αὐτῶν, καὶ δωρεὰς ἐπαγγελλόμενος.

² He writes πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Συρακούσαις φίλους. But they must have been persons in office.

³ See above, p. 316, n. 1.

CHAP. XI. years? Or was the expedition of Euthymos and his mercenaries meant as a diversion on their behalf?

The
opposing
forces
on the
Krimisos.

The time had now come for the greatest pitched battle, simply as a battle, ever fought between Greeks and Phœnicians. The stake was at least as great as it had been in the days of Gelôn; the fighting was far more in the open field; and, if at Himera we almost forget that Gelôn was a tyrant, with Timoleôn by the Krimisos there is nothing to forget. The topography we must take as we find it; but the march seems a long one. Before it began, Timoleôn again summoned the military assembly; he reminded his hearers of the great deeds of Gelôn which they were to renew. He further dwelled, we are told, on the cowardice of the Phœnicians¹. Such a charge could hardly be brought against the Sacred Band of Carthage; it could assuredly not be brought against the mercenaries from Spain.

Military
assembly.

The Greek
advance.

The march began; it led over a hill, from which the Greeks expected to see the full multitude of the enemy². On the ascent, they were met by a train of mules, bearing burthens of the herb of Selinous, the wild celery, to be used for fodder³. To the soldiers the omen seemed an evil one. Celery was the herb with which men crowned the monuments of the dead; a proverb spake of one who was sick unto death as one who would soon need his celery⁴. Such thoughts, call them what we will, do

¹ Diod. xvi. 79; διήλθε μὲν τὴν τῶν Φοινίκων ἀναδρῖαν, ἐπέμνησε δὲ τῆς Γέλασος εὐημερίας.

² Plut. Tim. 26; λόφον, ὃν ὑπερβαλόντες ἔμελλον κατόψεσθαι τὸ στρατεύμα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν πολεμίων.

³ Plutarch, whose purpose it exactly suited, tells the story of the parsley at greater length than Diodoros, but it is from the shorter account that we get the use of the σέλινον εἰς τὰς στιβάδας.

⁴ Plut. Tim. 26; παροιμία τις ἐκ τούτου γέγονε, τὸν ἐπισηφᾶως νοσοῦντα δεῖσθαι σελίνου. Needing parsley was like becoming a god in the case of Vespasian.

come into the minds of large bodies of men in all times and places; and it shows very small knowledge of human nature to see in them mere matter for smiles¹. But it is for commanders, like Timoleôn, Cæsar, and William, to turn the impression the other way by their own ready wit. To a man of Corinth the plant which the Syracusans and mercenaries dreaded—the mercenaries, we may be sure, more than the Syracusans—suggested an omen of the happiest kind.

The general ordered a halt; he again harangued his men. The crown of victory, he told them, had come into their hands of its own accord before the battle². The plant whose sight had troubled them was the very plant which the sacred and ancestral custom of Corinth twined round the heads of the victors in the Isthmian games³. He took a handful of the well-omened herb, and twined a wreath for his own brow; the officers and the whole army did the like. At the same moment the soothsayers who, as usual, accompanied the army, pointed out two eagles in the sky. One bore in his claws a struggling serpent; the other sent forth a loud cry of daring and defiance⁴. The host marched on with the Isthmian crowns on their heads,

CHAP. XI.
Omen of
the celery.

Omen of
the two
eagles.

¹ Sir T. Erskine May (Hist. of Democracy, i. pp. 111, 112) "cannot but smile at their superstition." Grote (ch. lxxxv) takes things more gravely.

² Plut. Tim. 26; τὸν στέφανον αὐτοῖς ἔφη πρὸ τῆς νίκης κομίζόμενον αὐτομάτως εἰς τὰς χεῖρας ἔκειν. We shall presently come to Timoleôn's worship of Αὐτοματία.

³ Plut. u. s.; ἱερὸν καὶ πατριὸν στέμμα τὸ τοῦ σελλίνου νομίζοντες. Plutarch goes on to mention the later change by which at the Isthmian games a wreath of pine was used instead of one of parsley, while at Nemea the parsley still went on.

⁴ Ib.; ὁ δ' ἵπτατο κεκλαγὼς μέγα καὶ θαρραλέον. One thinks of the Atreidae,

μέγαν ἐκ θύμου κλάζοντες Ἄρη
τρόπον αἰγυγίαν, κ.τ.λ.

[For an apparent allusion to this omen on coins of Timoleôn's time, see Supplement IV. p. 354.]

CHAP. XI. deeming that the gods had promised them victory, and raising their voices in thanks and vows to their divine protectors¹.

The hill-top
gained by
Timoleón's
force.

It was in the heat of summer, the midst of the month of June. The sun was still climbing the heavens, and had not reached his noontide height, when the army of Timoleón gained the top of the hill². We more than ever crave some further topographical detail. Had they marched all night, or had they halted for the night at some point not recorded? They might well have passed the night at Entella; they could not have marched in the course of one morning from any point in the territory of Akragas to any hill overlooking the Krimisos. On the hill-top the army—the Corinthians they are called—stopped to rest, and laid aside their shields³. The low ground below them was still covered with a thick mist rising from the river, while heavy clouds gathered round the height which they had reached. Nothing could be seen; but a loud hum of confused noises told the men on the heights that a mighty host was on its march below⁴.

Punic army
crosses the
Krimisos.

At last the mist cleared away from the low ground, and they saw the river Krimisos and the Punic army in the act of crossing it. Ten thousand men, so the Greeks reckoned, had already crossed. First came the war-chariots, each drawn by four horses, an array well fitted to strike an enemy with fear, but less fitted perhaps to do him actual damage⁵. Far more really dangerous was one division of the ten thousand

¹ In Plutarch the soldiers seem simply to copy the action of the general; Diódoros makes them crown themselves παραγγέλαντος τοῦ Τιμολέοντος.

² Plut. Tim. 27; τοῦ ἡλίου περιφερομένου καὶ μετεωρίζοντος τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν.

³ Ib.; θέμενοι τὰς ἀσπίδας διανεπαύοντο.

⁴ Ib.; ἡχὴ τις ἀκριτος καὶ συμμιγῆς . . . πρόσωθεν ἀνισταμένης στρατιᾶς τοσαύτης.

⁵ Ib.; πρῶτοι μὲν τοῖς τεθρίπποις ἐκπληκτικῶς πρὸς ἀγῶνα κατεσκευασμένοις.

which came behind the chariots. They were heavy-armed CHAP. XI.
 foot, with a harness of greater weight than that of the Sacred
 Greek phalanx; their bodies were fenced in with iron breast- band of
 plates; they wore brazen helmets on their heads, and they Carthage.
 bore huge shields of burnished white, like Adrastos when
 he marched against Thebes. As they marched on, a
 moving shield-wall, with slow and firm and steady step,
 men knew that these were no pressed subjects, no hired
 mercenaries, but the very hope of Carthage, the wealthiest
 and bravest of her sons, the Sacred Band itself. Hellas
 had that day to match herself with Canaan, when Canaan
 showed himself in such a guise as he had never before put
 on on Sicilian soil.

With this sight before him, Timoleôn formed his plans The attack
 in a moment. He would come down with all speed from by Timo-
 the hill; he would attack the enemy while only part had leôn.
 crossed the stream, and while those who had crossed had
 not yet fallen back into their perfect order. Dêmaratos,
 with the horse, should first charge the Sacred Band, and
 try to put them into disorder before their line was fully
 formed. After a moment's pause, he would himself with
 the phalanx follow up the charge of the horse. He came
 down the hill. In the wings he placed the Sikeliots of
 other cities than Syracuse, mingling with them a few of
 the mercenaries; he himself, with the Syracusans and the
 most valiant of the mercenaries, held the centre. Dêma- Advance
 ratos obeyed his orders as he could; but the chariots stood impeded
 in his way. His horsemen could not reach the Sacred by the
 Band face to face; they were driven to movements back- chariots.
 wards and forwards to avoid the rush of the chariots.
 Timoleôn then sent orders to Dêmaratos to keep out of
 the way of the chariots and to make a flank charge on
 the Sacred Band behind them.

Meanwhile he himself led on his phalanx. How he
 escaped the annoyance of the chariots we are not told;

CHAP. XI. men were too busy in painting the striking moment of the fight that followed. Lifting up his shield, Timoleôn called with a mighty voice to his men to follow him with all boldness. The shout was louder than his wont. His biographer, calmly telling the tale ages after, hints that all might be the enthusiasm of the moment. To the men who stood by Timoleôn on the day of battle it seemed that some god was calling to them by the voice of their general¹. The host took up the shout in answer; they bade him lead on and not delay; the trumpets sounded; the first rank of the phalanx, closing tight together, charged the enemy. With shield and spear they bore down on the Punic army, where the noblest of Carthage fought in the foremost ranks. Two masses of heavy-armed men met face to face, to decide the day by the mere physical force of push and thrust. But the thick array of the Sacred Band, their huge shields locked close together, withstood the thrust of the Greek spears like the wall of a fortress. The Greek was driven to forestall the warfare of the Roman; the spear was cast aside and the sword drawn. And now the more active frames, the more highly trained skill, of the Greek warriors, were too much for the massive force of Carthage². The Sacred Band fought on with courage worthy of their fame; they were cut to pieces to a man by the Greek swords. The rest of those who had already crossed the river took to flight; of the war-chariots we hear nothing more.

Timoleôn
charges the
enemy.

Resistance
of Sacred
Band.

But the fight was not yet over. Thus far the Greeks may have had a slight advantage in point of numbers, as

¹ Plut. Tim. 27; ἔδοξεν ὑπερφυεῖ φωνῇ καὶ μείζονι κεκρήσθαι τῆς συνήθους, εἴτε τῷ πάθει παρὰ τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ τὸν ἐνθουσιασμόν οὕτω διατεινόμενος, εἴτε δαιμονίου τινός, ὥς τοῖς πολλοῖς τότε παρέστη, συνεπιφθεγξαμένου.

² Ib. 28; ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰς ξίφη συνήλθεν ὁ ἀγὼν, καὶ τέχνης οὐχ ἦττον ἢ βάρους ἐγγράνει τὸ ἔργον. Cf. the battle of Corinth (Xen. Hell. iv. 4, 10). Livy's famous blunder here comes true. "Abjectis hastis gladio rem gerunt."

they certainly had in position. But now the whole Punic host had crossed the river; and, in numbers at least, the advantage lay wholly on their side. The fight began again; but at this stage, so men deemed at the time, the gods of Hellenic Sicily openly put forth all their strength to crush the barbarian invader. The clouds from the heights come down on the plain; a fearful storm of rain, hail, and thunder broke forth. The elements were on the side of Greece. The storm fell only on the backs of Timoleôn's soldiers, while rain and hail dashed right in the faces of the barbarians. The sound of the rain and hail, and the clashing of the weapons, made such a confused din that no man could hear the orders of his officers. The ground was now muddy with the rain; the heavy-armed Carthaginians were exposed to the nimble attacks of the lighter Greeks; many stumbled and fell, and under the weight of their harness they could not rise again. Still for a while they fought on. A band of four hundred who held the first rank in what we may call the second army was cut to pieces by the Greeks. Then the whole host fled as it might, horse, foot, and chariots, in utter confusion. Some were trodden down by their comrades or smitten by their weapons¹; many strove again to cross the river, but the Greek horsemen followed them, cutting them down from behind². But by this time the stream of Krimisos was swollen by the rain; torrents, *fumare*, were pouring wildly down every gorge and combe in the hills³. Many, perhaps men from the Iberian mountains, looked to the hills for help, and strove to climb; but the

CHAP. XI.

Cartha-
ginian rear-
guard
crosses the
Krimisos.

Storm
breaks in
face of the
Cartha-
ginians.

Rout of
Cartha-
ginians.

¹ Diod. xvi. 80; ἐπ' ἀλλήλων συμπατούμενοι καὶ τοῖς τῶν συμμάχων ξίφεσι καὶ λόγχαις περιπειρόμενοι.

² Ib.; ἐπὶ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἑπείων εἰς τὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ βεῖθρον ἀγεληδὸν συνελανόμενοι καὶ κατὰ νότου τὰς πληγὰς λαμβάνοντες.

³ Wherever the site of the battle may be fixed, Plutarch's description will fit many a Sicilian hillside; τὸ πεδῖον ἐπὶ πολλὰς συναγκείας καὶ φάργγας ὑποκείμενον ἐπίπλατο βρυμάτων οὐ κατὰ πόρον φερόμενον.

CHAP. XI. Greek light-armed could deal with them¹. The more part, horse, foot, and chariots, were swept away by the waters. The stars in their courses once more fought against the chariots and horses of Canaan, and Krimisos, on that day of deliverance, did well the work of elder Kishon.

15,000
captives.

10,000
killed.

Spoils of
victory.

Trophy.

The great salvation was wrought, and the spoil was now to be gathered in. The human part of it numbered fifteen thousand captives, of whom the soldiers, like the Syracusans after the surrender of Nikias, took the more part to their private profit². Ten thousand of the barbarians had died by the Greek sword, beside those who were swept away by the waters. The blow to Carthage was heavy, such a blow as she had never felt in any earlier fight. In other wars the loss had been that of hiring Spaniards, Numidians, and Libyans; never before had she lost so many of her own sons, of her own noblest. The camp was sacked, a camp in which iron and brass went for nothing, so rich was the store of gold and silver³. Mules, waggon, and their burthens were in abundance; of the war-chariots two hundred fell into the hands of the victors. The store of arms was comparatively small; Krimisos and his fellows had so well played the part of Virgil's Simois⁴. Yet a thousand breast-plates of splendid workmanship, and ten thousand shields, were piled up before the tent of the general. So busy was the whole army in gathering up the plunder that it was not till the third day that the formal trophy was set

¹ Plut. Tim. 28; πλείστοις δὲ τῶν λόφων ἐφιερμένους ἐπιθήοντες οἱ φίλοι κατεργάσαντο. Who were the φίλοι in Timoleon's army?

² Ib. 29; τῶν δ' αἰχμαλώτων οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ διεκλάπησαν ὑπὸ τῶν στρατιωτῶν.

³ Ib.; ἐλάχιστος γὰρ ἦν χαλκῶν καὶ σιδηρῶν τοῖς σκυλεύουσι λόγος. οὕτως ἀφθονοὺς μὲν ἦν ἀργυροῦς, ἀφθονοὺς δὲ χρυσός.

⁴ Æn. i. 100, 101.

up¹. Of the arms some were hung up in the temples of Syracuse and the other allied cities. The goodliest were sent by Timoleôn to his own Corinth, a special gift to Poseidôn of the Isthmos. It was the glory of the city which had sent forth the deliverer to receive such a prize. In other temples might be seen spoils which Greeks had won in warfare from kindred Greeks. Here were spoils of holier and more righteous victory. Men read on the armour from the Krimisos how the Corinthians and Timoleôn their general, having freed the Greeks of Sicily from the Carthaginians, made these thank-offerings to the gods².

CHAP. XI.

Arms
dedicated
to Isthmian
Poseidôn.Votive
inscription.

Within a few years another inscription, marking other votive weapons, told how the Greeks, save only the Lacedæmonians, offered their spoils from the barbarians of Asia. But by that time the style was changed. Then it was "Alexander and the Greeks;" now it is "the Corinthians and Timoleôn." And the Corinthians and Timoleôn made it their boast that they had set free the Greeks of Sicily. Alexander and the Greeks say nothing about having set free the Greeks of Asia³. Yet they might fairly have claimed the credit of having done so; the Macedonian conquest might fairly pass for the deliverance of all those Greek cities which were subject or tributary to the Persian. But their deliverance was not the most obvious, it was

Timoleôn
compared
with
Alexander.

¹ They were delayed (Plut. u. s.); *ὀλίγοι δὲ πολλοὺς σκυλεύοντες καὶ μεγάλας ἐντυγχάνοντες ἀφελείας*.

² Diodōros (xvi. 80) says only; *τινὲς δ' εἰς Κόρινθον Τιμόλεων ἀπέστειλε, προστάξας εἰς τὸ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος ἱερὸν ἀναθεῖναι*. Plutarch does not mention the particular temple, but he points the contrast between this offering and those won from fellow-Greeks, and adds the inscription, *Κορίνθιοι καὶ Τιμόλεων ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐλευθερώσαντες τοὺς Σικελίαν οἰκοῦντας Ἕλληνας ἀπὸ Καρχηδονίαν χαριστήρια θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν*.

[³ For Alexander's inscription see Plutarch, *Vita Alex.* 16; "Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Φιλίππου καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων τῶν τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντων." The inscription accompanied the trophy sent to Athens after the battle of the Granikos.]

CHAP. XI. hardly the foremost, object of the expedition of Alexander. And their deliverance was in any case less complete than that of the Greeks of Sicily. The subject and tributary cities of Asia passed from a barbarian lord to a lord who was, or wished to be deemed, one of their own people. But they still had a lord. The deliverance wrought by Timoleôn was perfect; with him to set free meant to shut out the power of any lord, whether barbarian master or native tyrant. All this marks the difference between the king and the republican leader. The princely deliverer holds that he has a right to reign over those whom he delivers, the republican leader seeks to reign over no man. The princely deliverer Sicily has not yet seen; but he has already shown himself in the neighbouring peninsula, and before many years he is to show himself in Sicily also. But for a thousand years and more it is only for a moment that he shows himself. Then the Norman came to do in Sicily what the Macedonian could do in the East, but what the Epeirôt could not do in the West. But two-and-twenty ages were to pass, the words kingship and freedom were to become words which no longer shut out each other, before Sicily again saw the likeness of Timoleôn.

Character
of Timo-
leôn's de-
liverance.

Krimisos
and
Himera.

Divine
interven-
tion.

The moral greatness of the victory of Timoleôn cannot be surpassed; no battle was ever fought and won in a purer cause. And as a military exploit, as a defeat of the many by the few, it ranks high among the great battles of history. In Sicilian history, as a victory of Greek over barbarian, it ranks along with Himera, perhaps before it. And, as men thought in those days, the glory of Timoleôn and his comrades was in no way lessened, it was rather not a little enhanced, because their victory was not wholly their own, because the gods almost visibly stepped in to help them. It was much for Timoleôn to be the smiter of the barbarian, the liberator of the Greek; it was more to be the special favourite of Heaven, the man for whose behoof a special

goddess was as it were to be called into being. A distinguished historian of Sicily compares the victory of the Krimisos, as a victory of the few over the many, with the English victories at Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt¹. As those can hardly be called victories of freedom, an Englishman would rather compare it with the victories of the Confederates over the might of Austria and Burgundy². Unhappily its fruits were less lasting. Timoleôn gave Greek Sicily a moment of freedom and happiness, of freedom and happiness more perfect for the moment than that which the land had enjoyed between the fall of the old tyrants and the beginning of the Athenian invasions. But it was yet shorter. In a few years after Timoleôn's death tyranny was again a power in Sicily, and it was only by a tyrant's arm that the barbarian could be withstood.

CHAP. XI.

Transient effects of victory.

* "Timoleôn had beaten the barbarians³; he had still to deal with the tyrants. Mamercus at Katanê had turned against him and had asked for help at Carthage. Just

[¹ Holm, *Geschichte Siciliens*, ii. 210, 211.]

[² Morgarten, Sempach, Granson and Morat.]

* From *Story of Sicily*, p. 227 seqq.

[³ What is not stated is how Timoleôn followed up his victory over the Carthaginians. Diodôros (xvi. 81) says that the remains of the Carthaginian army made its way with difficulty to Lilybaion, but adds that they were afraid to sail away to Libya. No account is given us of any attempt on the great Carthaginian cities, Ras Melkart (Hérakleia Minôa) or Panormos, not to speak of Lilybaion itself. There is something inconsequent and inconclusive in Timoleôn's conduct, perhaps due to the wish of his mercenaries to return with their booty, perhaps to the fear of enemies in his rear. It is however too much of a piece with his loitering at Hadranum after the defeat of Hiketas. Plutarch (Tim. 29) complacently relates that three days were spent in erecting the trophy; and though a body of mercenaries, insufficient, as it proved, even for that task, was left to harry the *Epikrateia*, Timoleôn himself, so far from trying to drive the Carthaginians into the sea, returned to Syracuse. Carthage showed greater energy, and we find her dispatching a fleet of seventy ships to the assistance of her Sicilian subjects and allies. It is noteworthy too that Hiketas so far from being overawed by Timoleôn's victory chose the moment to revolt, and was given time to receive Carthaginian help.]

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[¹ See Appendix VI.]

[² Plut. Tim. 34. To these tyrants Diodôros (xvi. 82) adds Nikodemôds at Centuripa and Apollóniadês at Agyrum.]

[³ Plut. Tim. 30.]

[⁴ It is strange to find (Plut. Tim. 32) Hiketas for a while overrunning and ravaging at will the Syracusan territory and the victorious Timoleôn with only a small body of troops to oppose him (*ὀλίγους στρατιώτας*). The geography of the campaign is obscure. Hiketas with superior forces mocks at Timoleôn, then encamped by Kalauria, an otherwise unknown town. Finally, Timoleôn, with horsemen and light-armed, attacks Hiketas' army drawn up in a strong position on the further side of the Damyras, which had therefore to be forded in the face of the enemy. To chose the leaders of the assault where many were clamouring to be first, Timoleôn collected the rings of his cavalry officers (*ἀράρχει*) in his chlamys, and the first he drew, having on it a trophy engraved for its device, was greeted as an omen of victory.]

[⁵ Plutarch himself is compelled to remark (Tim. 33), *καὶ δοκεῖ τοῦτο τῶν Τιμολέοντος ἔργων ἀχαριστότατον γενέσθαι*.]

[⁶ On the occasion of successes gained over Timoleôn's mercenaries near Messana and Ieta (Plut. Tim. 30), Mamercus had written the insulting lines quoted above (p. 301). He was defeated by the river Abolos,—perhaps the Alabon (cf. Holm, G. S. ii. 214, 471, 472),—with a loss of 2,000

rendered to Timoleôn on condition that he should have a trial before the Syracusan assembly and that Timoleôn should not speak against him. Timoleôn held his peace; when Mamercus saw how strongly the Syracusans were against him, he tried to dash his head against the stone seats of the theatre where the assembly was held ¹. But he failed, and he was put to death as a robber. As for Hippôn, he fell into the hands of the Messanians themselves, who put him solemnly to death, sending for the boys to see, as the punishment of a tyrant was held to be an edifying sight ². These things seem harsh to us; but we should remember that all Greeks held that a tyrant who had risen by trampling all law underfoot had lost all right to the protection of law, and that he might be rightly dealt with as a wild beast.

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Hippôn
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men, a large part of them Geskôn's contingent (Plut. Tim. 34). His first resource was to try and obtain the assistance of the Lucanians, but his fleet deserted him and handed over Katané to Timoleôn. He was finally captured at Messana where he had taken refuge with Hippôn (Plut. l. c.)]

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δρόμῳ φερόμενος συνέρρηξε τὴν κεφαλὴν ὡς ἀποθανοῦμενος.]*

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calls the boundary river the "Lykos." As in Diodóros (xv. 17), this is the
Eastern Halykos or Platani.]

CHAP. XI. And the Carthaginians bound themselves by a clause most unlike their first treaty with Dionysios, not to give help to

Remaining
tyrants put
down.

any tyrant. There were still some to put down at Centuripa and Agyrium¹. The people of the last Sikel town, when set free from their tyrant Apollóniadês, were admitted to Syracusan citizenship, and they received Greek settlers in their territory². So greatly had the distinction between Greek and Sikel, so clearly marked a hundred years before,

Campan-
ians of
Ætna
destroyed.
Gela and
Akragas
recolonized.

now died out. Timoleôn also put an end to the Campanians at Ætna³, and he sent fresh settlers to Gela and Akragas⁴. Akragas now again became a place of some importance, though it never rose again to its old greatness. Thus, if not all Sicily, yet nearly all that part of Sicily which had ever been either Greek or Sikel, was now free. It became again a land of free commonwealths, without either foreign masters or domestic tyrants.

Abdica-
tion of
Timoleôn.
B.C. 338.

"Timoleôn's work was now done. He laid down his office of general, and with it all extraordinary powers⁵. He became a private man, and, as a private man, he chose

[¹ Diod. xvi. 82. About this time too (Diod. l. c.) Timoleôn seized and executed the Tyrrhene pirate Postumius, who with twelve piratical vessels had put in to the harbour of Syracuse "as a friend."]

[² Diod. l. c.; τοὺς ἐλευθερωθέντας Συρακοσίους ἐποίησε. For the division of part of the Agyrian territory among the new colonists, see above, p. 33.]

[³ Diod. l. c.; τοὺς δ' ἐν Αἰτνῇ Καμπανούς ἐκπολιορκήσας διέφθειρε.]

[⁴ Plut. Tim. 35. Akragas was colonized by Velians (Eleates) under Megellos and Pheristos; Gela by Gorgos of Keos. The remains of the old citizens were also collected. Fresh inhabitants were further sent to Kamarina (Diod. xvi. 82); but the Leontines were transplanted to Syracuse (Diod. l. c.).]

[⁵ Plutarch (Tim. 37) uses the phrase ἀποθίσθαι τὴν μοναρχίαν. He makes Timoleôn abdicate his powers immediately on his return to Syracuse after putting down the tyrants. The cause of his retirement was his blindness which had come upon him when encamped at Mylai (Milazzo), in his campaign against Hippôn of Messana and Mamercus.]

rather to live in the land which he had delivered than to go back to his own Corinth. He sent to Corinth for his wife and children, and spent the rest of his days on an estate close to Syracuse which the Syracusan people had given him¹. He became blind, and he seldom visited the city or took any part in public affairs. But when the Syracusan people wished for his advice, he was brought in a carriage into the theatre, and he told them what was best². Once or twice men spoke against him; then all that he said was that the wish of his heart was now fulfilled; every man in Syracuse could speak as he pleased³. At last, about eight years after his first coming into Sicily, he died (B.C. 336)⁴. As a special honour, he was buried within the city, and around his monument in the *agora* was built a range of public buildings called after him the Timoleonteion⁵. So

[¹ Plut. Tim. 36.]

[² Ib. 38.]

[³ Ib. 37. Upon one, Laphystios, making an accusation against him, Timoleôn would not suffer the Syracusans to howl him down. It was, he said, in order that any one who wished should be able to have recourse to the laws that he had endured such toil and danger on their behalf. His other utterance of the same nature was on the occasion of Dêmainetos making many charges against his conduct as *stratêgos*; *πρὸς ἐκείνον μὲν οὐδὲν ἀντείπε τοῖς δὲ θεοῖς ἔφη χάριν ὀφείλειν, οἷς εὗετο Συρακοσίου ἐπιθεῖν τῆς παρησίας κυρίου γενομένου.* Cf. Corn. Nep. (Tim. 5), where "Lamistius" is given for Laphystios.]

[⁴ Diod. xvi. 90. Diodôros' words—*στρατηγήσας ἔτη ὀκτώ*—take in the period of his retirement as well as his *stratêgia*. Ol. cx. 4 is here given as the date of his death, that is, the last half of 337 or the first of 336 B. C. But as Arnoldt (op. cit. 191) points out, the numerous accounts of Timoleôn as a private citizen by Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos weigh in favour of the later year, 336.]

[⁵ Plut. Tim. 39. His bier, supported by youths chosen for the purpose by lot, was carried over the site of the levelled castle of Dionysia. Many myriads of people, with wreaths on their heads and clothed in white, gathered together from the whole of Greek Sicily, followed, as in some great festal procession, but real weeping and wailing mingled with the ritual chanting of the dead man's praises. As the body, still resting on its funeral couch, was laid on the pyre, the herald Dêmêtrios, who had the

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calls the boundary river the "Lykos." As in Diodōros (xv. 17), this is the
Eastern Halykos or Platani.]

CHAP. XI. And the Carthaginians bound themselves by a clause most unlike their first treaty with Dionysios, not to give help to

any tyrant. There were still some to put down at Centuripa and Agyrium¹. The people of the last Sikel town, when set free from their tyrant Apollôniadês, were admitted to Syracusan citizenship, and they received Greek settlers in their territory². So greatly had the distinction between Greek and Sikel, so clearly marked a hundred years before, now died out. Timoleôn also put an end to the Campanians at Ætna³, and he sent fresh settlers to Gela and Akragas⁴. Akragas now again became a place of some importance, though it never rose again to its old greatness. Thus, if not all Sicily, yet nearly all that part of Sicily which had ever been either Greek or Sikel, was now free. It became again a land of free commonwealths, without either foreign masters or domestic tyrants.

Campanians of Ætna destroyed. Gela and Akragas recolonized.

Abdication of Timoleôn. B.C. 338.

"Timoleôn's work was now done. He laid down his office of general, and with it all extraordinary powers⁵. He became a private man, and, as a private man, he chose

[¹ Diod. xvi. 82. About this time too (Diod. l. c.) Timoleôn seized and executed the Tyrrhene pirate Postumius, who with twelve piratical vessels had put in to the harbour of Syracuse "as a friend."]

[² Diod. l. c.; τοὺς ἐλευθερωθέντας Συρακοσίου ἐποίησε. For the division of part of the Agyrian territory among the new colonists, see above, p. 33.]

[³ Diod. l. c.; τοὺς δ' ἐν Αἴτνῃ Καμπανούς ἐπολιορκήσας διέφθειρε.]

[⁴ Plut. Tim. 35. Akragas was colonized by Velians (Eleates) under Megellos and Pheristos; Gela by Gorgos of Keos. The remains of the old citizens were also collected. Fresh inhabitants were further sent to Kamarina (Diod. xvi. 82); but the Leontines were transplanted to Syracuse (Diod. l. c.).]

[⁵ Plutarch (Tim. 37) uses the phrase ἀποθέσθαι τὴν μοναρχίαν. He makes Timoleôn abdicate his powers immediately on his return to Syracuse after putting down the tyrants. The cause of his retirement was his blindness which had come upon him when encamped at Mylai (Milazzo), in his campaign against Hippôn of Messina and Mamercus.]

rather to live in the land which he had delivered than to go back to his own Corinth. He sent to Corinth for his wife and children, and spent the rest of his days on an estate close to Syracuse which the Syracusan people had given him¹. He became blind, and he seldom visited the city or took any part in public affairs. But when the Syracusan people wished for his advice, he was brought in a carriage into the theatre, and he told them what was best². Once or twice men spoke against him; then all that he said was that the wish of his heart was now fulfilled; every man in Syracuse could speak as he pleased³. At last, about eight years after his first coming into Sicily, he died (B.C. 336)⁴. As a special honour, he was buried within the city, and around his monument in the *agora* was built a range of public buildings called after him the Timoleonteion⁵. So

CHAP. XI.
Timoleôn
as a private
citizen.

Death of
Timoleôn.
B.C. 336.

[¹ Plut. Tim. 36.]

[² Ib. 38.]

[³ Ib. 37. Upon one, Laphystios, making an accusation against him, Timoleôn would not suffer the Syracusans to howl him down. It was, he said, in order that any one who wished should be able to have recourse to the laws that he had endured such toil and danger on their behalf. His other utterance of the same nature was on the occasion of Dêmainetos making many charges against his conduct as *stratêgos*; *πρὸς ἐκεῖνον μὲν οὐδὲν ἀντίειπε τοῖς δὲ θεοῖς ἔφη χάριν ὀφείλειν, οἷς εὖρατο Συρακοσίου ἐπιθεῖν τῆς παρησίας κυρίου γενομένου.* Cf. Corn. Nep. (Tim. 5), where "Lamistius" is given for Laphystios.]

[⁴ Diod. xvi. 90. Diodôros' words—*στρατηγήσας ἔτη ὀκτώ*—take in the period of his retirement as well as his *stratêgia*. Ol. cx. 4 is here given as the date of his death, that is, the last half of 337 or the first of 336 B. C. But as Arnoldt (op. cit. 191) points out, the numerous accounts of Timoleôn as a private citizen by Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos weigh in favour of the later year, 336.]

[⁵ Plut. Tim. 39. His bier, supported by youths chosen for the purpose by lot, was carried over the site of the levelled castle of Dionysios. Many myriads of people, with wreaths on their heads and clothed in white, gathered together from the whole of Greek Sicily, followed, as in some great festal procession, but real weeping and wailing mingled with the ritual chaunting of the dead man's praises. As the body, still resting on its funeral couch, was laid on the pyre, the herald Dêmétrios, who had the

CHAP. XI. died, and so was honoured, the man of the worthiest fame in the whole story of Sicily, the man who thought it enough to deliver others and who sought nothing for himself.

Example of
Diôn and
Timoleôn
followed.

“ But though neither Sicily nor any other part of the Greek world ever saw such another as Timoleôn, and though the immediate work of Timoleôn lasted only a short time, yet the example of Diôn and Timoleôn had a great effect. It became the custom now for the Greeks of Italy and Sicily, when they were pressed by any enemies, at once to ask for help in Old Greece. We must remember the state of Old Greece at the time. When Timoleôn sailed for Sicily, Philip of Macedon was fast advancing to the supremacy of Greece, and before Timoleôn died, the battle of Chairôneia in B.C. 338 had actually given him that supremacy. This was a state of things which made many in Greece dissatisfied, and anxious to try their fortunes in the West. Presently came the wonderful conquests of Alexander, and the establishment of Greek kingdoms in Asia and Egypt by his generals stirred up ambitious princes to attempt the like in other lands. There were now no great citizens like Timoleôn or even like Diôn; but several kings of Sparta and of Epeiros showed themselves eager for western adventure. The first of these was Archidâmos of Sparta, who had played a considerable part in the older state of things in Greece, and who was glad to

Archidâ-
mos of
Sparta.

strongest voice of any, read a decree of the Syracusan people, proclaiming that a public funeral, at an expense of two hundred minæ, had been voted to Timoleôn as liberator and refounder of the chief Sicilian cities, as conqueror of the barbarians and lawgiver to Syracuse, and announced the establishment in his honour of musical, equestrian, and gymnastic games. The *Timoleonteion*, built about his tomb, itself served as a gymnasium and palestra. (Cf. Diod. xvi. 90; Corn. Nep. Tim. 5.)]

escape from the new by trying his fortune elsewhere. The Tarantines, pressed by the Lucanians and Messapians, asked help of their metropolis Sparta, just as the Syracusans had asked help of their metropolis Corinth. Archidâmos came out to their help; but he was slain (B.C. 338) in a battle with the barbarians at Manduria or Mandurion, on the same day, men said, as Philip's victory at Chairôneia¹.

"We can only guess at the objects of Archidâmos. The next who came, the Molottian king Alexander, uncle of the more famous Macedonian of the same name, certainly came to found a dominion for himself over Greeks and barbarians (B.C. 332-331)². He began the work with some success; he even made a treaty with Rome, then a strong power in Central Italy but which had not reached so far south. But he was presently murdered, and his schemes died with him. Neither of these princes actually touched Sicily³, though some of those who came after them on the same errand had directly to do with Sicilian affairs. Meanwhile we have nothing to say about Sicily itself for several years,

[¹ Diod. xvi. 88. For Archidâmos' Italian expedition, cf. Diod. xvi. 63; Paus. iii. 10; vi. 4; Strab. vi. 3; Plut. Agis, 3; Theopomp. ap. Athen. xii. 536.]

[² For the Molottian Alexander, see Diod. xvi. 72; Justin, viii. 6; ix. 6, 7; xii. 2; xvii. 3; xviii. 1; xxiii. 1; Livy, viii. 3, 17, 24.]

[³ I have elsewhere (Horsemen of Tarentum, 83) shown from numismatic evidence, that the Epeiroi Alexander, during his campaigns against the Lucanians and Bruttians, had concluded an alliance with the Lokrians, and have further called attention to the fact that some bronze coins struck at Syracuse shortly after Timoleôn's time, point to the conclusion that the Syracusans also claimed him as their ally. On these pieces (see Supplement IV. p. 350) the head of Zeus Eleutherios is coupled on the reverse with the thunderbolt and seated eagle which on the contemporary coinages of the Italiot cities were the badges of the Molottian alliance. It may be inferred that the Western Alexander included Sicily in his far-reaching schemes.]

CHAP XI. till a new power arises which brings Sicily into a wider connexion with the world in general than any that came before it."

Timoleôn's
successors.

[On the other hand the careers of the series of princely deliverers from over sea called in by the Italiot Greeks who had been to so large an extent the subjects or dependents of Dionysios suggest many points of comparison with those of Diôn and Timoleôn in Sicily. The chief moving cause in this case was the advance of the Lucanians, a Sabellian race, and the forerunners of their greater kinsmen of Latium in South-Italian conquest. The Greek city which now took the lead among the Italiot confederates was Taras, and from Taras on each occasion came the first invitation of foreign help which brought over in succession the Spartan king Archidâmos, the Molottian Alexander, the Spartan princes Akrotatos and Kleónymos, and to which in the next age the intervention of Pyrrhos was to be due.]

Timoleôn
and Ar-
chidâmos
compared.

The western enterprise of Archidâmos was begun and ended while Timoleôn still lived. And there are some points which connect the two, in opposition to those that came after. Both came from the ancient and acknowledged cities of Old Greece, while Alexander and Pyrrhos came from a land whose Greek character had hitherto been doubtful, and which their career did much to establish as a Greek state. Alexander and Pyrrhos too were kings in the full sense, not Eastern despots certainly, but still fully kings. Timoleôn was a simple citizen of a commonwealth, and if Archidâmos was a king, he was king in a city whose kings were rather hereditary magistrates than kings even in the Epeirot or Macedonian sense.

Again, there is another point of union, incidental but very significant. Few as are the years which part the enterprises of Timoleôn and Archidâmos from that of

Alexander of Epeiros, it marks a great advance in the state of Italy that Rome has no dealings with Timoleôn and Archidâmos, while the dealings of Rome with Alexander form an important part of his story. Between Timoleôn and Archidâmos again there is this marked difference, that the career of Timoleôn is wholly Sicilian, while that of Archidâmos is wholly Italian. But this difference is little more than incidental. Timoleôn's career of deliverance might have been extended to Italy as easily as were careers of aggrandizement on the part of Dionysios before him and of Agathoklês after him. And Italian success on the part of Archidâmos might well have opened a career in Sicily for him.

All alike, Timoleôn, Archidâmos, Alexander, Kleônymos, Pyrrhos, mark that the later age of Greek history, the age in which Macedonia plays a leading, often a dominant part, has already begun. They belong however to three different stages. Timoleôn and Archidâmos set out when Philip is already threatening Greece but is not yet her master. Archidâmos certainly, perhaps Timoleôn, turned his face westward because Sicily and Italy offered a better field for Greek energy than Old Greece itself. Alexander of Epeiros strove to repeat in the West what Alexander of Macedon had done in the East. Pyrrhos was one of the successors of Alexander whose destiny led him westward instead of eastward. But all belong to a time distinguished alike from the old days of Athens and Sparta on the one side and from the later days of Achaia and Aitôlia, of Rhodes and Byzantion, on the other. That is, Timoleôn and Archidâmos belong to it as far as their western career is concerned. The slayer of Timophanês, the winner of the Tearless Battle, belong in their birth and their earlier years to days before Philip had sprung to greatness.

But, to look at things again from a more general point of view, all come within those two or three generations

CHAP. XI.

Macedonian age
of the
Deliverers.

CHAP. XI. which saw the question decided, what parts of the world were to be brought under direct Greek influence in any shape, and what was to be the range of such influence in the East and in the West, in Asia and Eastern Europe on the one hand, in Italy, Sicily, and the lands beyond Italy and Sicily, on the other. Old Greece, lying between these two outlying seats of Greek influence, had, from the earliest days of her colonial settlements, been led to look in both directions. On both sides the outlying Greek settlers had to strive with barbarian neighbours, and from both sides the threatened outpost of Hellas often called on the mother-land for help.

Range of
Greek in-
fluence
now
decided in
East and
West.

Mace-
donian
extension
of Greece
in Asia;

The cry had come first from the East, because it had been by the great Asiatic kingdoms, first Lydia, then Persia, that the freedom of Greek cities had been first threatened and overthrown. The Persian invasions of Greece, the Greek invasions of Persia, the tale of Miltiadês and Themistoklês, of Kimôn and Xenophôn and Agêsilaos, of Jasôn and Philip and Alexander and Seleukos, form a long drama which begins with the taking of Milêtos and the help given by Athens to her colony. The age of Alexander and his successors fixed what was to be the results of the struggle. A Greek dominion—for from our point of view a Macedonian dominion must count as Greek—stretching from the Hadriatic to the Hyphasis, was proved to be a day-dream. But a vast extension of Greek dominion, a still vaster extension of Greek influence, was found to be no dream at all. It was found possible to extend the bounds of the immediate Greek world by the recovery of the Greek cities and a good deal beyond the Greek cities; it was found possible to make the eastern coast of the Ægean, the southern coast of the Euxine, more thoroughly a Greek land than ever, and to begin the process by which all Asia Minor gradually became a land essentially Greek. Alexander and his followers were able to found great Greek cities as capitals of

a lasting
achieve-
ment.

Syrian and Egyptian kingdoms, and to spread a certain varnish, sometimes more than mere varnish, of Hellenic culture, not only over the lands ruled by Greek kings, but to a great extent over the lands of their barbarian neighbours. Greek colonization, Macedonian conquest, had laid the foundation of the state of things when Rome should move to a colonial Greek city of Europe, and when the solid peninsula of Asia Minor should be before all others the Roman land, the *Romania* which neither Slave nor Saracen could conquer, in days when the name of Rome implied the speech, the culture, and the later faith of Greece. CHAP. XI.

The cry from the West was later in coming, because any serious danger to the Greek settlers in Sicily and Italy came later. For the most part the Greeks of those lands fight their own battle. The earlier applications to Old Greece are not strictly cries for help for the Greek against the barbarian. Least of all can that name be given to a cry from Segesta for help against Syracuse. Diôn, if he could be said to be invited at all, was not invited to give help against barbarians, nor did he wage any warfare with barbarians. With Timoléôn a change comes. He is sent for to deliver Syracuse from a domestic tyrant; but from the very beginning he has to strive against Carthage as well. In this sense then the cry from Syracuse which brought Timoléôn from Corinth was the forerunner of the oft-repeated cry from Taras which brought the princes of Sparta and Epeiros on errands which were equally fruitless whether we look on them as errands of deliverance or as errands of conquest. Interference of Old Greece in the West.

For the main distinction between interference from Old Greece in the East and in the West is the utter fruitlessness of the westward action. In the East the various stages of Greek colonization and Macedonian conquest led to an abiding Greek influence, in the end to what on one side was a Greek dominion. In the West the traces of Fruitless in its results.

CHAP. XI. Greek colonization died out slowly but surely. A Greek dominion, answering to the Greek kingdoms of the East, was never formed. Every attempt at it was shattered. Failure of Greek action in the West. No Spartan or Epeiros did in Sicily or Italy what the Macedonians did in Asia and Egypt. None of them founded any power which could be called Greek in the same sense as the kingdom of Pergamon or even as the kingdom of Baktria. Agathoklēs and Hierōn were native rulers, and as founders of a Greek power their work was not lasting. The barbarian of Africa was driven out, but only to make room for the barbarian of Italy. And Rome in the West did not put on the same half-Greek shape as Rome in the East. The utmost that can be said is that the fact that Sicily and southern Italy clung so long to the Eastern instead of the Western Empire undoubtedly did something to keep up Greek life in them. In this sense Belisarius, though he certainly came on no such conscious errand, was a more effectual missionary of hellenism than Archidāmos or Pyrrhos. In dealing therefore with the remote fore-runners of Roger, we have to record, not a series of successes but a series of failures. But there is a kind of poetical justice in the story that the one man who did carry out the errand on which he came was the one man whose career was wholly pure, the one who sought nothing for himself, the one who was only a deliverer, a conqueror only towards the enemies of those whom he delivered.

Timoleōn a liberator only. Here then comes the main distinction between Timoleōn and the princely adventurers who came after him. The errand of Timoleōn was purely an errand of deliverance. A citizen of a commonwealth, he came to free a commonwealth from the enemies of its freedom within, to defend it from the enemies of its national being without. As the reward of these services he took, we can hardly say that he asked, such honours and such influence as a free commonwealth may rightly give to its worthiest citizen. The

errand of Archidâmos, of Alexander, of Pyrrhos, was, in one sense, an errand of deliverance no less than the errand of Timoleôn. Their object undoubtedly was to act as champions of Hellas, to secure the Greeks of Italy and Sicily from all danger of overthrow, or even of dependence, at the hands of barbarians. The Western Greek world was to be strengthened, its bounds were to be enlarged, not only against Bruttians and Lucanians, but against Rome and Carthage. But we cannot give to the deliverer from Sparta, still less can we give to the deliverer from Epeiros, credit for doing this work in the spirit of Timoleôn. They were minded, whenever they had the chance, to set Greeks free from barbarian rule. But they deemed that the deliverer had a right to reign over those whom he had delivered.

CHAP. XI.

Later
princely
adventurers
seek for
dominion.

In the later expeditions it cannot be doubted that the Macedonian conquests in Asia were before the eyes of Alexander and Pyrrhos; what may have been before the eyes of Kleônymos it is less important to enquire. The purpose of the two Molottian kings clearly was to do in the West what other Greek princes were doing in the East. They designed to form a Greek dominion West of the Hadriatic to match the Greek dominion which had arisen East of the Ægean.

But their designs came to nought. Their age proved, as I have already said, what were to be the bounds of Greek dominion and Greek influence in the East and in the West. In the East temporary dominion was to lead to abiding influence. Dominion and influence alike were to be spread far over new lands; Hellas, politically subdued at home, was to make the most wide-spreading of her conquests abroad. In the West no new Greek power was to be founded, no old one was to be extended. The decree which had called an Italian city to the rule of the Mediterranean world was not to be turned aside in favour of any prince from Sparta or Epeiros, not even in favour of the purer

Failure
of their
designs.

CHAP. XI. deliverer from Corinth. One form of Greek influence was indeed to spread over Rome and the whole West. But it was not an influence of the same kind as that which made some Asiatic lands really Greek and which spread an outward tinge of hellenism over a far wider range. In the West no more lands or cities exchanged their own national life for that of Greece. Many lands and cities which had been thoroughly Greek gradually fell away from the Greek fold. No part of Italy or Sicily is now Greek; Asia Minor is Greek to this day wherever Greek life—one might almost say human life—has not been stamped out of it by Turkish desolation.

Sicilian
princes
fail to
achieve
lasting
Italian
dominion.

[The attempts of the series of princely adventurers from Old Greece or its border-lands to found for themselves a dominion on Italian soil had thus no lasting result. Nor was any Sicilian power destined to succeed where Spartan and Epeiroi failed. The Italian conquests of Dionysios had indeed foreshadowed these later enterprises, and he at least had been able to hand on to his son his Italian possessions and dependencies. The conquests of Agathoklês in this direction were still shorter lived.] The Sicilian commonwealths and tyrants had, as a rule, too much to do at home. There was ever before them the great struggle in their own island, the struggle between the Greek and the Phœnician. The far-reaching policy of Dionysios and Agathoklês stands almost by itself. Sicily for the most part remained a world of its own, a house largely divided against itself, and ever threatened by a single powerful enemy who always kept his hold on some possessions, greater or smaller, in the island itself. It is only by fits and starts that the history of Sicily takes a wider range than the local history of the island. It is only by fits and starts that Sicily has much to do either with Italy or with Old Greece. Throughout the fourth century before Christ there is no dread among the Sikeliot cities, as there con-

stantly was among the Italiot cities, of interference on the part of any native Italian power. Bruttians, Lucanians, Samnites, Romans, were all seen from a distance. With Old Greece too dealings are rare and fitful. The Athenian invasion in the fifth century and the consequent appearance of Syracusan forces among the enemies of Athens in Old Greece are events that stand by themselves. Less important than the warfare of Hermokratês on the coast of Asia, but in some sort more striking as showing the wider range which the Greek world was taking, was the occasion when among the allies of Sparta, fighting her Peloponnesian battles, there appeared Gauls and Spaniards in the pay of a tyrant of Sicily. Later in the same century come a more wholesome form of connexion from the other side, in the expeditions of Diôn and Timoleôn to give freedom to Syracuse in name or in truth. The work of Timoleôn has several sides. As the deliverance of a once free city from a tyrant, it may pass as one of the last and worthiest exploits of the elder day of Greek freedom. It has no fellow till the deliverance of Sikyôn and Corinth by Aratos began its later day. In this aspect the expedition of Timoleôn is the very opposite to the attempts of princes from Old Greece to found realms for themselves in Italy or Sicily. But in the general history of the world it ranks along with them. Timoleôn, like Archidâmos and Pyrrhos, went in answer to a cry for help sent by the Greeks of the West to the Greeks of the mother-land. At first indeed it was a cry for help against a domestic tyrant and not against a foreign enemy. But he who overthrew the domestic tyrant had presently to struggle with the foreign enemy also. Strangely as the name of Timoleôn sounds if we place it between those of Dionysios and Agathoklês, yet, in the list of champions of Hellenic Sicily against the Phœnician, Dionysios, Timoleôn, and Agathoklês find their places side by side. But Dionysios and Agathoklês were native Sikeliots; Dionysios was

CHAP. XI.

Fitful
connexion
between
Sicily and
Old Greece.

Timoleôn
as a
champion
of Hellas.

CHAP. XI. a native Syracusan ; in that character, as well as in their character of tyrants, they continue the same series as Gelôn and the elder Hierôn. Timoleôn, a deliverer from outside, belongs, from that side of him, to the same series as Archidâmos, Pyrrhos, Geôrgios Maniakês, and Roger of Hauteville. That he alone came with the single-minded object of restoring a free city to its freedom does not change his position in the general history of the battle-ground of the Mediterranean powers.

[SUPPLEMENT IV.]

(By the Editor.)

NUMISMATIC LIGHTS ON THE SICILY OF TIMOLEÓN.

THE Sicilian coinage of Timoleón's time throws a welcome light on the economic results of his enterprise, and is besides of great historical value as an authentic contemporary record of his work as a liberator.

At Syracuse itself, where since the time of Dionysios the Elder the mint had almost ceased its activity, the whole monetary system was reorganized, and a new and prolific currency was put forth in the name of the refounded Commonwealth. The reform was made the more profitable by the issue of electrum pieces, from 100 to 10 litras in value, which though containing some 20 per cent. of silver passed for the value of their weight in gold (see Head, *Coinage of Syracuse*, p. 26 seqq.). The coinage of silver "Pegasi" (πῶλοι), like those of Corinth, had already in all probability begun in Diôn's time, but it now for the first time attained large dimensions (See Pl., fig. 2). By the coinage of silver 1½ litra pieces, answering very closely in weight to the Corinthian diobols, a further approximation was achieved to the monetary system of the mother city. A great developement was further given to the coinage of bronze pieces¹, which from their imitation by more than one of the Sikel cities seem to have been specially useful for the commerce with the interior of the island.

In the types chosen for this new coinage we find repeated references to the divine sanction under which Timoleón had accom-

¹ I am not able to follow Mr. Head, however, in his view (*Coins of Syracuse*, 30) that "copper coins of substantial weight" were now for the first time struck at Syracuse. There seem to be good reasons for supposing that the large bronze coins with the head of Pallas and the "webbed" star and the smaller pieces with the same head and the sea-horse go back at least to Diôn's time (see *Syr. Meds.* 159).

Religious subjects of Timoleón's coin-types. The Archégetés. plished his great work. On his fine electrum *staters* (Pl., fig. 4) there appears the head of Apollo Archégetés, beneath whose altar on the old Naxian shore the Corinthian leader had first made good his footing on Sicilian soil. An identical representation of the God, in this case with the inscription ΑΡΧΑΓΕΤΑΣ, in fact occurs on the earliest coins of Tauromenion, where Timoleón had found such timely shelter and assistance at the hands of Andromachos (Pl., fig. 5; see pp. 297, 298). The head of the Archégetés further appears, doubtless in the same connexion, on coins of Adranum and of Alæsa struck in the name of Timoleón's Sicilian allies. As refounder of Syracuse, Timoleón must have held in special honour the cult of the divine leader of the first Greek colony on Sicilian soil. Nor did he forget the respect due to his Corinthian predecessor, if,

Head of Archias.


as seems probable, the hero's head in a Corinthian helmet, that appears on the large bronze coins of Syracuse struck about this time, is intended to represent Archias, the original founder of the city (Pl., fig. 3; Head, *op. cit.* p. 32). On the reverse of these coins the dolphin of Syracuse and Pégasos of Corinth are linked in the same design.

Of Anapos.

The facing head ascribed to the young River-God Anapos (Head, *op. cit.*, Pl. vii. 6, p. 31) on a smaller bronze piece (associated on the reverse with a half Pegasus) recalls the fact that it was from his camping-ground on the banks of the Anapos that Timoleón led his successful onslaught on Epipolæ.

Of Zeus Eleutherios.

But the most speaking image on the coinage of Timoleón is the laurelled head of Zeus Eleutherios (Pl., fig. 6) which occurs in all metals, usually accompanied by the inscription ΖΕΥΣ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΟΣ, and with a free horse on the reverse. The cult of Zeus the Deliverer had been the especial badge of Democracy at Syracuse from the days of the overthrow of Thrasyboulos onwards, and the festival of the *Eleutheria* then instituted (Diod. xi. 72) had already found its numismatic tribute in the days of the democratic outburst that followed the Athenian defeat (see *Syr. Meds.* 95). It was no doubt in connexion with this aspect of the Syracusan cult of Zeus that Timoleón raised the priest of the Olympieion to the first rank in the Syracusan magistracy (see p. 314, note 1). A few years later we find the Molottian Alexander, called to play the deliverer's part in Great Greece, borrowing for his Italian coins Timoleón's Syracusan type of Zeus Eleutherios, though in this case, as befitted one who had at heart rather to play the conqueror's part than





1

DEKADRACHM OR 'MEDALLION' BY EULENETOS
OF TIME OF DIONYSIOS THE ELDER



2



SYRACUSE: PEGASUS
(Πήλος)



4



3



SYRACUSE
HEAD OF ARCHIAS



5



ALLIANCE PIECE, WITH
KAINON



SYRACUSE: ELECTRUM



6



SYRACUSE
ZEUS ELEUTHERIOS



8

MORGANTIA
HEAD OF
SIKELIA
AND
OMEN OF
KRIMISOS



7



HERBESSUS
HEAD OF SIKELIA



9

TAUROMENIUM



COINS OF SYRACUSE AND ALLIED CITIES: TIME OF TIMOLEON



10



11



12



GOLD STATER OF AGATHOKLES, WITH
HIS NAME, c. 308 B.C.



AGATHOKLES, IN NAME OF
SYRACUSANS, 317 B.C.



AGATHOKLES, WITH HIS
NAME, c. 308-300 B.C.



13



AGATHOKLES, WITH ROYAL TITLE
c. 300 B.C.

COINS OF THE THREE PERIODS OF AGATHOKLES

that of the restorer of Democracy, the bridleless horse was omitted on the reverse, being replaced by the seated eagle of his own Dodona, beside the thunderbolt. It was in this Molottian guise, and not without regard to the new champion of Hellenism in the West (who seems like his successor Pyrrhos to have included Sicily in his far-reaching schemes), that Timoleôn's type was modified at Syracuse itself soon after his decease, and spread to Ætna and Agyrium¹.

The appearance of the same head of Zeus the Deliverer, coupled on the reverse with Aphroditê and her dove (Head, *op. cit.* p. 36, Pl. vii a. 5), on coins of Eryx, overstruck on large Syracusan bronze pieces of somewhat earlier date, is a still more interesting phenomenon. The earlier coinage of Eryx with its Greek and Elymo-Greek epigraphy had been but sparsely continued after its occupation by the Carthaginians at the end of the fifth century. The small silver pieces, however, that for a while at least were still struck there, reflected the new political conditions by their Phœnician legends,—the civic name now for the first time appearing as אֶרֶיִךְ (cf. Salinas, *Scoverta del nome fenicio di Erice: Arch. Storico Sic.*, i. 498; *C. I. S.*, i. 172). Later on, in the fourth century, "Pegasi" with the same Semitic legend were also struck at Eryx (Head, *Hist. Num.* 120, 121), and may well represent the influence of Timoleôn's coinage. But in the case of the bronze pieces, cited above, we have not only Syracusan metal and a Syracusan type, but the Greek inscription EPYKINON. The revived autonomy which this coinage indicates, as well as the adoption of Timoleôn's type, may be taken as sufficient evidence that either his earlier campaign in the west of the island which resulted in the liberation of Entella, or his later victory on the Krimisos, encouraged the men of Eryx to throw off for a while at least the Carthaginian yoke. As showing the extent of this defection we may recall the statement of Diodôros (xvi. 73)—immediately following the account of the capture of Entella—that many *Sikan* as well as *Sikel* cities then revolted from the Carthaginian dominion and formed alliances with Timoleôn. Under "Sikan" Diodôros may have roughly intended to describe the præ-Hellenic population of Western Sicily in general, including the Elymian element.

Zeus the Deliverer on coins of Eryx.

Phœnician types of Eryx.

Greek now restored to her dies.

¹ In both these cases the reverse presents a thunderbolt, at Agyrium coupled with the seated eagle, which from contemporary Italian parallels we may justly regard as a compliment to the Molottian.

Coins of
Héraklei-
ans from
Kephaloï-
dion.

An altogether new light on Timoleón's re-colonization of the Sicilian cities has been thrown by some remarkable coins presenting the inscription ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΩΤΑΝ ΕΚ ΚΕΦΑΛΟΙΔΙΟΥ (Imhoof-Blumer, *Berliner Blätter*, v. 40). These pieces, which exhibit on one side a youthful head of Héraklēs, and on the other a butting bull, are shown by their style to belong to about this period, and they have been supposed to commemorate a re-foundation of Hérakleia Minōa at the hands of Timoleón (Holm, *G. S.* ii. 478). But there are grave objections to a too literal acceptance of this view. Hérakleia in Diôn's time was still the Carthaginian Ras Melkart, and as Timoleón by his treaty with Carthage only regained the territory up to the Halykos, Ras Melkart itself appears to have remained in Punic hands (see p. 335). In Agathoklēs' time it is still a Carthaginian city, nor is there any evidence of a break in its prolific coinage of fine tetradrachms with the civic name in Phœnician characters. The small silver pieces of the "Herakleians from Kephaloïdion" point to a less flourishing community, and it seems more reasonable to suppose that Timoleón, desirous to perpetuate the old name among the cities of Hellenic Sicily, founded a new Hérakleia, perhaps as a Greek outpost on the left bank of Halykos, and for some reason colonized it with citizens of Kephaloïdion—now Cefalù—on the northern coast.

The free
horse on
coins of
Syracuse
and allies.

The free horse—that speaking symbol—which characterizes more than one of Timoleón's Syracusan dies, now appears on the autonomous coins of Entella, and no doubt commemorates the liberation achieved there with Timoleón's help. At Nacona, another city in Campanian occupation, the same loose-bridled steed also makes its appearance (Friedländer, *Berliner Blätter*, i. 266, and cf. Imhoof-Blumer, op. cit. v. 53; Head, *Hist. Num.* 139). At Ætna on the other hand, where it also occurs, we must rather regard it as a manifestation of alliance with the other two Campanian cities of Sicily, and as struck therefore about the date of Timoleón's first campaign in the west of the island, than as due to its liberation from its own Campanian occupants by Timoleón himself in 339 B.C. At Tyndaris, however, where the same design is linked with the head of Helen on coins of the same date, it may once more be reasonably connected with Timoleón's enterprise. The free horse also marks the coins of two other Greek foundations of Sicily re-colonized and called into new life by Timoleón—Gela and Kamarina.

Upon other contemporary pieces (Pl. fig. 5) the same horse is associated with the legend KAINON, which has been interpreted to mean "the new coinage," and was evidently struck by one of the ruined cities restored by Timoleón (Gardner, in Head's *Coinage of Syracuse*, 38, note). These coins stand in very close relation to the alliance pieces struck at this time by Alæsa, but the remarkable parallelism between the griffin on their reverse and the pard on the slightly earlier bronze coinage of Centuripa may incline us to refer their issue to that city¹. That this "new coinage" was issued before 339 B. C. may be inferred from the fact that a coin of the Campanians at Ætna (*Berliner Blätter*, i. 271) is overstruck on one of these pieces.

As in the case of Eryx, numismatic evidence further supplements our historic sources by the clear light that it throws on the prominent part played by Alæsa in the war of liberation, about which Plutarch and Diodóros are alike silent. Timoleón's type of Zeus Eleutherios is found on coins of this city (Head, *Coinage of Syracuse*, 37), coupled on the reverse with the legend ΑΛΑΙΣΙΝΩΝ ΣΥΜΜΑΧΙΚΟΝ, which has been justly brought into relation with the alliance entered into with Timoleón by the Sicilian cities against the Carthaginians in the period immediately preceding the battle of the Krimisos (*op. cit.* 38, 39; cf. Diod. xvi. 73). The reverse type of these Alæsan coins shows two ears of barley,—the emblems of the Sicilian Goddesses,—and between them the lighted pine-torch of Persephonê, which recalls the fiery torch that guided Timoleón's ships by night across the Ionian Sea to his Italian landing-place, Metapontion,—itself a chosen seat of the Goddesses².

Upon other examples of these alliance coins appears the inscription ΣΙΚΕΙΑ and the head of personified Sicily, occupying the place otherwise filled by Zeus the Deliverer. This personification is itself of great historical interest as showing how the common interests of Hellenic and Hellenized Sicily, as against the Carthaginian stranger or the mercenary and barbaric hordes in the pay of insular tyrants, were giving birth to a new and wider form of patriotism as distinguished from purely local feeling. This idealized

¹ One in the writer's possession is plated over and was intended to pass as silver.

² Upon other coins of this class the symbols of "The Goddesses" are associated on the obverse with a head of Apollo Archégetês—thus combining a tribute to both the guiding powers of Timoleón's expedition.

image of Hellenic Sicily was a protest against that prophesied *ἐκβαλόμενος* of the island,—the realization of which had seemed so near,—when Greek itself was to die out there and Punic or Oscan should take its place. At Hadranum, the scene of Timoleón's earliest victory and of the special manifestations of divine favour towards him, the same head of Sikelia occurs with a crown of myrtle, on what we may safely regard as another alliance piece parallel with those of Alæsa.

Head of
Sikelia
confined to
Sikel dies.

We shall find the same ideal representation elsewhere on contemporary coins. It is however to be observed that the head of *Sikelia* that appears at this time on the coins of several Sicilian cities is confined to the originally Sikel communities, and does not appear on the dies of any true Hellenic foundation. It was natural that the Hellenized descendants of the aboriginal inhabitants of Sicily should be the first to merge their civic particularism in the commonweal of the whole island. At the purely Greek cities whose coinage was revived by Timoleón, the types, except so far as they took over the free horse as the emblem of recovered liberty, remained local,—the crab at Akragas, the head of Athênê at Kamarina, of Helen at Tyndaris, of Poseidôn at Messana. The first embodiment of the interests of Sicily as a whole on the dies of a city originally Greek is to be found on the Syracusan coinage of the time of Agathoklês, where the tyrant's claim to lordship over the whole island is symbolized by the *triquetra*.

Omen
of the
Krimisos
on coins of
Herbessus
and Mor-
gantina.

Contemporary with these coins of Alæsa and her allies is a very beautiful representation of the personified Sicily, myrtle-crowned, struck over bronze coins of Syracuse with the head of Zeus Eleutherios (Pl. fig. 7), by Herbessus. The same myrtle-crowned head recurs at Morgantina (Pl. fig. 8¹), and in both instances it is found associated with a reverse design of an eagle and serpent. The "minister of Zeus" destroying the noxious reptile was according to Greek ideas a symbol of victory, and in the present case this symbolic device seems to have an actual reference to the omen which was said to have preceded the battle of the Krimisos. Plutarch, it will be remembered (see p. 325), relates (Tim. xxvi) that, on the eve of the fight, the soothsayers who accompanied Timoleón's army pointed out to the host two eagles, one of which

¹ The impressions from which the figures 7 and 8 of the Numismatic Plate are taken were courteously supplied me by Cav. Ign. Virzi of Palermo, from originals in his collection.

held a serpent in his claws and screamed triumphantly as if pre-saging victory. The same victorious omen had already appeared in the Iliad (xii. 200 seqq.). In another form—the two eagles seizing a hare—it had supplied the design for the most splendid of the coins of Akragas (cf. Head, *Hist. Num.* 106), and had inspired Æschylos with a noble passage in the Chorus of his Agamemnôn (1110 seqq.).

Of the other Sicilian cities of purely Greek origin refounded by Timoleón, a new coinage was at this time issued by Akragas, Gela, and Kamarina. On the small silver coins of Akragas (*Hist. Num.* 107) the local types of the eagle and the crab are coupled, as elsewhere, with the head of Zeus and the free horse (Pl. fig. 9). At Kamarina (*Hist. Num.* 113) the free horse is associated with the head of her Pallas, at Gela with the bearded head of the horned River-God and with the figure of a warrior sacrificing a ram. On another interesting type of Gela, which has been referred to this period (*Hist. Num.* 124), the river Gelas under the form of a bull is linked on the obverse side with a female head, corn-crowned like that of Démêtêr, but here, as the legend tells us, the personification of EYNOMIA, the spirit of Good Law.]

CHAPTER XII.

THE TYRANNY OF AGATHOKLÊS¹.

B.C. 317-289.

Transient
results of
Timoleôn's
work of
liberation.

Agathoklês.

*“ **I**T is grievous to think that the freedom and well-being which Timoleôn brought back to Syracuse and to all Greek Sicily lasted hardly more than twenty years. The tyrants could do more lasting evil than the deliverers could do good. Seventeen years after Timoleôn's death we again hear of civil disputes in the Greek commonwealths of Sicily, and of wars between one commonwealth and another. Three years later again there came a tyranny which in some things was worse than any that Timoleôn had overthrown. A man in many things like Dionysios, even more enterprising and far more cruel, made Syracuse again the centre of a great dominion. This was Agathoklês son of Karkinos. About him several things are to be noted. Dionysios was a born Syracusan, and, after all his dealings with Carthage and

¹ On the authorities for this period, Mr. Freeman expresses himself as follows (Story of Sicily, p. 233):—"We still have the continuous narrative of Diodôros through the greater part of the reign of Agathoklês; for the latter part we have only fragments. At this time Diodôros no doubt largely followed the History of Timaios of Tauromenion, who was a bitter hater of Agathoklês. There is no other continuous narrative except the short one in the Latin epitomator Justin. But there are many references to Agathoklês in the later collectors, Polyainos and the like, and we are getting on so far that we get a little help from the Latin historian Titus Livius of Patavium, commonly spoken of as Livy. Polybios himself has some discussion of the acts of Agathoklês, but no narrative of them."

* From Story of Sicily, p. 233 seqq.

with other barbarians, he was on the whole a champion of CHAP. XII. Hellas, and, whenever he showed himself in that character, he was zealously supported by all Greek Sicily. Agathoklès, Agathoklès contrasted with Dionysios. on the other hand, was not a Syracusan by birth, and, though he did greater things against the Carthaginians than any other Greek, he was never so distinctly as Dionysios the champion of united Greek Sicily. Dionysios too lived before, and Agathoklès after, the great victories of Alexander in Asia. This made a great difference in the position of the two men. Agathoklès saw the Macedonian captains founding kingdoms for themselves, and he made himself a king to match them. And there was a great difference between the kind of tyranny practised by the two men. Dionysios was harsh and suspicious; but, while he stuck at no useful crime, he seldom showed himself wantonly cruel. Agathoklès affected a frank and jovial demeanour, and thus kept the good will of the lower people; but ever and anon he did deeds such as Dionysios never did. Dionysios never wrought a massacre; to Agathoklès it sometimes seems as if a massacre was really a kind of amusement.

§ 1. *Rise of Agathoklès.*

"The father of Agathoklès, banished from Rhègion, Childhood of Agathoklès. settled at Therma (the Baths of Himera) on the northern coast of Sicily, then a Greek town under Carthaginian dominion. Warned by an oracle that the child would do great mischief, Karkinos ordered him to be exposed; but his mother saved him and persuaded her brother to bring him up¹. Afterwards he was received by his father, and

[¹ The story is told at length in Diodòros, xix. 2. For the date of his birth there are two concordant data. In Diod. (xxi. 16) Agathoklès is

CHAP. XII. when Timoleôn was planting new citizens at Syracuse, the whole family moved thither. There Agathoklës passed his youth in the trade of a potter¹; but he was strong and handsome, and he specially won the favour of a leading man named Damas², whose widow he afterwards married, and received great wealth with her. He was a valiant soldier, and Damas got him promotion in the army."

State of
Syracuse.

It is not easy to see what was the exact political constitution of Syracuse at this moment. Both in that city and in Sicily generally things seem to have passed through strange changes in the few years which had followed the death of Timoleôn. There are again wars between Sikeliot cities and revolutions within their walls. The Punic enemy appears in a strange light, as something of a mediator between city and city, between party and party. This fact, we cannot doubt, is connected with a change which has for some time past been coming over the character of Carthage and her people. It was not for nothing that the men of the East had made themselves the mightiest power of the West. It was not for nothing that they had had endless dealings with Hellas in peace and war. The Carthaginians of this age were coming nearer to the likeness of their descendants of the next century, the more than equal rivals of Rome in arms and arts and policy, than to their forefathers who had come against Selinous

Changed
attitude of
Carthage.

stated, on the authority of Timaios, to have died at the age of seventy-two after a reign of twenty-eight years. According to Polybios, again (xii. 15), Agathoklës was brought by his father to Syracuse at the time of Timoleôn's colonization (343 B. C.), being then eighteen years of age. Both these notices lead us back to 361 as the date of his birth.]

[¹ Diod. xix. 2; Justin, xxii. 1; Plut. Reg. et Imperat. Ap. (op. de sui laude, 13); Polyb. xii. 15. He is said (Plut. loc. cit.) in after-times to have had clay vessels set on table beside the gold, and to have pointed a moral to the younger generation on his rise from small beginnings by means of diligence and valour.]

[² Diod. xix. 3.]

and Himera with no object but simple destruction, with no means of compassing destruction beyond the mere brute force of multitudes. They had learned something more from Greek enemies and neighbours than simply to carve Greek legends on their coins. They were capable of taking their part in matters of general Hellenic policy, if not as Greeks among Greeks, yet almost as Europeans among Europeans. Even in the days of Dionysios we have seen that some Punic commanders had learned the art of winning allies by good faith and humane dealing¹. Yet in his day every Greek had preferred the tyrant to the barbarian. It was due partly to the difference in the tyrant, partly to a change in the barbarian, that many Greeks now preferred the barbarian to the tyrant. The interference, hostile or friendly, of Carthage in the affairs of any Greek commonwealth is beginning to have much the same air as the interference, hostile or friendly, of another Greek commonwealth. We must not indeed think that the Æthiopian had changed his skin or the leopard his spots. Canaan is still Canaan, and Hellas is still Hellas. But Canaan is beginning to put on somewhat of the outer garb of Hellas. The Hellenistic states are soon to begin their course in the East; we are sometimes tempted to look on the Phœnician mistress of European lands as their fellow in the West.

On the other hand, we see Syracuse, under whatever form of internal government, still carrying on the best traditions of her earliest masters. The Greek of Sicily did not turn a deaf ear to the call of the Greek of Italy for help against the barbarian neighbours who threatened him. And those barbarians were none the less threatening at the moment because the workings of real, if unseen, kindred enabled them to be in the end brought into a closer fellowship than the Phœnician could ever be. The helpers from

CHAP. XII.
Helleniza-
tion of
Carthage.

Syracusans
help
Kroton
against
Bruttians.

¹ See above, pp. 103, 168.

CHAP. XII. Sparta and from Epeiros had done little abiding good for the Italiot Greeks. The threatened cities, instead of princes, now tried commonwealths. We hear of a Syracusan contingent warring to save Krotôn from Bruttian besiegers¹. It was the brightest side of the reign of Hierôn to have saved Kymê. That Hêrakleidês and Sôsis-tratos did at this stage do something to relieve a Greek city in danger of barbarian overthrow may be so far set against the misdeeds, whatever they were, with which they are somewhat vaguely charged.

Hêra-
kleidês
and Sôsis-
tratos.

The career of these men, the way in which they rose to power and the way in which they used power, was recorded, or was meant to be recorded, by our native Sicilian guide. But if the narrative ever was written, it has at least not come down to us. We are told only that they had during the greater part of their lives been guilty of conspiracies and slaughters and deeds of the highest impiety². If so, they must have been still young; they could hardly have done such things while Timoleôn was general or counsellor of Syracuse. Their position is not very clear; but we may safely say that there was no open tyranny in Syracuse at this time. There was a strife of parties, parties not very well defined, but seemingly not scrupulous in their dealings with one another. Hêrakleidês and Sôsis-tratos were leaders of a party which its enemies at least called oligarchic and spoke of its chiefs as aiming at tyranny. And we hear dimly of a body called the Six Hundred, who are clearly of great importance in the commonwealth, but who are not spoken of as if they formed an acknowledged senate or magistracy of any kind. They were rather a political club

The Six
Hundred.

¹ Diod. xix. 3.

² Ib.; 'Ηρακλείδης καὶ Σωσίστρατος, ἄνδρες ἐν ἐπιβουλαῖς καὶ φόνοις καὶ μεγάλοις ἀσεβήμασι γεγονότες τὸν πλείω τοῦ βίου περὶ ὧν τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἢ πρὸ ταύτης κατέχει βίβλος. So in c. 10; τὴν πρὸς 'Ηρακλείδην καὶ Σωσίστραταν κοινωνίαν, περὶ ἧς ἐν τῇ πρὸ ταύτης βίβλῳ τὰ κατὰ μέρος διήλθομεν. But nothing of this kind is now to be found in the eighteenth book.

of wealthy men bound closely together, such as we know CHAP. XII.
 were to be found in other Greek commonwealths, even in
 other Greek democracies. As such they would be bound to
 an united policy; they would promote each other's interests
 in elections to magistracies and in suits before the courts
 of justice¹; but it does not appear either that they were
 a body known to the law or that they had supplanted the
 authorities which the law did acknowledge.

The story reads as if the democratic constitution restored by Timoleôn had not been formally abolished, but rather that its forms were abused in the interest of a compact and energetic faction. We may take for granted that in these revived Syracusan constitution still formally Democratic.
 Sikeliot commonwealths, made up of men from all parts, among whom the dwellers within the same walls had not necessarily any common local feelings, any common ancestral traditions, it was not so easy to carry on the order of democratic government as it was in the Athens of the past or the Achaia of the future. As for the particular evils spoken of, the conspiracies, the murders, the acts of impiety, which are laid to the charge of Hêrakleidês and Sôsisratos, of these, in the absence of details, we can say nothing. Conspiracy is of the very nature of such a society as that of which they were the heads; we are left to guess whether the deeds of slaughter spoken of were acts of secret murder or votes into which a misguided assembly was hurried. At all events the meeting of the assembly was not disused. But even at Athens it was sometimes whispered that the vote of the assembly did not always answer to the genuine will of the people. Besides Sôsisratos and Hêrakleidês, besides Damas himself, the names of Tisarchos, Anthrôpinos, and Dioklês—the last a renowned name in Syracuse—have been incidentally handed down to us as members of this dominant faction².

¹ See Appendix VII.

² The names come from Diod. xix. 6; Polyainos, v. 3. 8. See

CHAP. XII.

Wars
among
Sicilian
cities.

Besides civil dissensions, there were also wars among various cities of Sicily, Greek and Sikel. We may indeed doubt whether it is any longer needful to draw that distinction. The old Sikel towns are now marked, no longer as the dwellings of another people, but simply as the towns of the inland country as opposed to those of the coast¹. The coming of Timoleôn had made Greek Sicily again a system of independent cities; occasional disputes, occasional warfare, followed as a matter of course; they were the signs of life and of freedom. Akragas, which Timoleôn had raised into a new being, had taken up her old position of enmity towards Syracuse, and the first glimpse that we have of the new state of things shows us the first and second of Sikeliot cities again at war. Other towns, Leontinoi, Morgantia, Herbita, Ætna, are spoken of as commonwealths hostile to Syracuse, perhaps only hostile to this or that party in Syracuse, and willing to give shelter to banished members of the other.

Agathoklês
serves
against
Akragas.

Of the war with Akragas we hear neither the occasion nor any of the details. It is memorable only as it is now for the first time that Agathoklês is brought on the actual scene of our story. Damas was in command as general; Agathoklês was serving under him. The memory of his old affection had not passed away from the mind of Damas, and on the death of one of the *chiliarchs* he procured the promotion of Agathoklês to the vacant post². His merits might have pleaded for him without any irregular help. The tall, hardy, valiant, soldier who marched in a panoply of a weight that none other could bear, had already won

Appendix VII. [Mr. Freeman has followed the orthography of Polyainos.]

¹ Diod. xix. 5; ἰδίαν δύναμιν ἐν τῇ μεσογείῳ συνεστήσατο. 6; ἐν τῇ μεσογείῳ πρὸς Ἑρβίτην συνάγουσι δύναμιν. We hear no more of Σικελοί, Σικελῶν χώρα, and the like.

² Ib. 3; μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα αἰρεθείς [ὁ Δάμας] ἐπ' Ἀκράγαντα στρατηγός, ἐπειδὴ τῶν χιλιάρχων τις ἀπέθανε, τοῦτον εἰς τὸν ἐκείνου τόπον κατέστησεν. In Justin, xxii. 1, the war is against Ætna. See Appendix VII.

the admiration of his comrades¹. In his new office his credit rose, the credit of one who never shrank from danger in battle, and who was ready and cheerful of speech in his harangues to the military assembly². Damas presently died of sickness, leaving great wealth to his widow. That wealth passed to Agathoklēs by a marriage not wholly free from scandal, and made him one of the richest men in Syracuse³. Now came the expedition for the relief of Krotōn, in which Agathoklēs again served with his former rank⁴. The leaders of the army were Hērakleidēs and Sōsistratos, but we are a little startled to hear that Antandros, brother of Agathoklēs, shared with them in the general's office⁵. Of him we shall hear again, in a character, as it has been well put, answering to that in which Philistos stood to the elder Dionysius, as the counsellor and lieutenant of his brother, and withal as the historian of his actions⁶. But we are left to guess at the causes or chances which, for the moment at least, put Antandros in a higher command than Agathoklēs. It is certain that

CHAP. XII.

Marriage of Agathoklēs.

He serves against Bruttians.

His brother Antandros Stratēgos.

¹ Diod. xix. 3; ὁ δὲ καὶ πρὸ τῆς στρατείας μὲν ἦν πολλὸν σεμνὸς διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ὅπλων· ἐπετῆδεν δὲ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐξοπλάσεσιν φέρειν πανοπλίαν τηλικαύτην τὸ μέγεθος, ὥστε μηδένα τῶν ἄλλων δύνασθαι βαδίως χρῆσθαι τῇ βάρει τῶν ὅπλων.

² Ib.; πολλὸν δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον γενόμενος χιλιάρχος πεμπούησατο δόξαν, φιλοκίνδυνος μὲν ὦν καὶ παράβολος ἐν ταῖς μάχαις, ἱταμὸς δὲ καὶ πρόχειρος ἐν ταῖς δημηγορίαις. This may take in the civil assembly as well. So Justin, xxii. 9; 'Et manu strenuus et in contionibus perfacundus habebatur. Brevi itaque centurio ac deinceps tribunus militum factus est.' "Tribunus" is χιλιάρχος; what is "centurio"?

³ Diodōros (xix. 3) says simply, Ἀδάμαντος νόσφ' τελευτήσαντος καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καταλιπύοντος τῇ γυναικί, ταύτην ἐγγίμε, καὶ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων εἰς ἡρωμεῖτο. Justin (xxii. 1) adds a bit of scandal which clearly comes from Timaios, that the widow was already "adulterio cognita."

⁴ Diod. u. s.; μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Κροτωνιάταις πολιορκουμένοις ὑπὸ Βρεττιῶν, οἱ Σαρακούσιοι δύναμιν ἀδρᾶν ἐπέμφαν. Agathoklēs was ἔγνωμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ χιλιαρχικῆς ἡγεμονίας.

⁵ Diod. u. s.; ἦς ἐστρατήγει μὲν μεθ' ἑτέρων Ἀντανδρὸς ὁ Ἀγαθοκλέους ἀδελφός, τῶν δ' ἄλλων εἶχον τὴν ἡγεμονίαν Ἡρακλείδης καὶ Σωσίστρατος. It is now that he gives his picture of them. See Appendix VII.

⁶ Holm, G. S. ii. 221.

CHAP. XII. the valiant chiliarch, the admired of the Syracusan army
 Unsuc- and people, was not in favour with his other superiors in
 cessful agitation of command. First in every encounter with the barbarians,
 Agathoklès he was, at the end of the campaign, refused by Hèra-
 against the Generals.

kleidès and Sôsisstratos the rewards and honours which were the fitting prize of his exploits¹. Stirred to wrath at this wrong, he harangued the people of Syracuse against the doers of it. He charged them before the assembly with aiming at the tyranny. Nothing came of his accusations. The people either did not believe him or else shrank from acting on their belief. Sôsisstratos kept the chief influence at Syracuse². Agathoklès, whether formally banished or not, found that the city was no place for him.

The military merits of Agathoklès need no insisting on; and his whole public conduct up to this time is consistent

Agathoklès with the character of an honest citizen. But the truth of
 not a born what Alkibiadès had said nearly a hundred years before³
 Syracusan.

was even truer now than it had been in his day. To the son of the man who had moved from Rhègion to Therma, from Therma to Syracuse, Syracuse was not what it had been to such a son as Hermokratès or to such an adopted son as Timoleôn. If Agathoklès really had any feelings for country or commonwealth, they may well have been Italiot rather than Syracusan. In his whole story we must never forget that we are not dealing with a born citizen of Syracuse. In the uncertainties of those times almost anything might happen, but we are a little surprised when the next that we hear of the Syracusan military officer and opposition-speaker is that he is in Italy, in command of some kind of military force, but acting as a private adventurer, and acting against the city which, in the discharge of his public duty, he had just helped

Unsuc-
cessful
attempt on
Krotôn.

¹ See Appendix VII.

² Diod. xix. 3; *οὐ περὶ Σωσίστρατον ἐδυνάστευσαν*. See Appendix VII.

³ See vol. ii. p. 326; vol. iii. pp. 96, 97.

to defend. He strove, but in vain, to take Krotôn. CHAP. XII.
 A serious blow is implied when we read that he escaped to Taras with only a few followers¹. There he entered into the service of the Tarantine commonwealth as a mercenary; Agathoklēs in Tarantine service. but entering on doubtful and dangerous schemes—their exact nature we are not told—he was dismissed from his post². Discredited there too. He next gathered a following of the exiles of whom there were many to be found in Italy, and again directly opposed the ruling powers of Syracuse. Hērakleidēs and Sōsistratos, lately the deliverers of Krotôn, were now, in what quarrel we know not, warring against Rhêgion. To the mind of Agathoklēs the claims of the ancestral city may have seemed stronger than those of the city of his adoption; he led his band of exiles to the help of Rhêgion against the Syracusan generals³. Helps Rhêgion against Syracuse. They were carrying out the traditions both of Hierôn and of Dionysios.

Of the military result of this Rhêgine campaign we hear nothing. Either the war itself or its conduct must have been unpopular at Syracuse; for the next event that is recorded is the downfall of the power of Hērakleidēs, Sōsistratos, and the Six Hundred⁴. They were banished, and Agathoklēs was recalled. Recalled by Syracusans. The banished men, as so often happened, took to arms; the war is spoken of as a war between an existing democracy and its oligarchic enemies⁵.

¹ Diod. xix. 4; καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν τῶν Κροτωνιατῶν πόλιν ἐπιχειρήσας, ἐξέπεσε, καὶ μετ' ὀλίγων εἰς Τάραντα διεσώθη. [Ἐξέπεσε seems to imply that the attempt on Krotôn was made from within.]

² Ib.; ταχθεὶς δὲ παρὰ τοῖς Ταραντίνοις ἐν τῇ τῶν μισθοφόρων τάξει, καὶ πολλοαῖς καὶ παραβόλοις ἐγχειρῶν πράξεσι, εἰς ὑπόψιν ἦλθε καινοτομεῖν διόπερ ἀπολυθεὶς καὶ ταύτης τῆς στρατηγίας, κ. τ. λ.

³ Ib.; συνήθροισε τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν φυγάδας, καὶ Ῥηγίνοις πολεμουμένοις ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἡρακλείδην καὶ Σωσίστρατον ἐβοήθησεν.

⁴ Ib.; ἔπειτα τῆς ἐν Συρακούσαις δυναστείας καταλυθείσης, καὶ τῶν περὶ Σωσίστρατον φυγόντων, κατήλθεν εἰς τὴν πατρίδα. From this point we hear only of Sōsistratos. Was Hērakleidēs dead?

⁵ Ib.; συνεκπεσόντων δὲ τοῖς ἐνδύσταις πολλῶν ἐνδόξων ἀνδρῶν, ὡς ἂν τῆς

CHAP. XII. That is to say, the banishment of the dominant faction had changed a democracy in name into a democracy in fact. The exiles called in help from the Carthaginians¹. Constant warfare followed, in which Agathoklês, not yet general, but sometimes in a lower command, sometimes in none, drew all eyes upon him. He had other military qualities besides strength and daring; he had the quick eye and the ready energy to discern and to do what was needful to be done at any particular moment².

Agathoklês
at Gela.

One exploit of his is specially recorded in some detail. The scene is Gela, a city, like Akragas, restored to a fresh life by Timoleôn³. In our perplexing narrative of events without visible causes or results, we see the city in the hands of the enemies of Syracuse, Syracusan and Carthaginian; but the story reads as if the Geloans themselves were allies of Syracuse held down by a foreign force. Anyhow Gela was, in the military point of view, a post to be attacked by the arms of Syracuse. The Syracusan camp was pitched somewhere on those wide fields on which the camp of Carthage had once been pitched⁴. Agathoklês, with a thousand men, his following, it would seem, in his old post as chiliarch, threw himself by night into the town⁵. Presently a much larger force under the command of Sôsisstratos, a force seemingly in occupation of the town, fell on the party of Agathoklês, slew three hundred, and put the rest to flight. They strove to escape by a narrow path, by a postern, one might fancy, in the wall, opening on some steep

ὀλιγαρχίας κεκοινωνήκωσαν τῆς τῶν ἑξακοσίων τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων, ἐνέστη πῶλεμος τοῖς φυγάσι πρὸς τοὺς ἀντεχομένους τῆς δημοκρατίας.

¹ Diod. xix. 4; συμμαχούτων τῶν Καρχηδονίων τοῖς περὶ τὸν Σωσίστρατον φυγάσιν.

² Ib.; Ἀγαθοκλῆς, ποτὲ μὲν ἰδιώτης ὢν, ποτὲ δὲ ἐφ' ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένος, ὑπελφθῆ δραστηκὸς εἶναι καὶ φιλότεχνος ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς ἑκαστον τῶν καιρῶν ἐπινοεῖσθαι τι τῶν χρησίμων.

³ See above, p. 336.

⁴ See vol. iii. pp. 562, 564.

⁵ Diod. xix. 4; αὐτὸς μὲν νυκτὸς παρεῖσέπεσεν εἰς τὴν πόλιν μετὰ χιλίων στρατιωτῶν.

track up the not very lofty hill¹. The enemy pressed on; Agathoklês, doubtless guarding the rear, fought most valiantly of all, till his strength failed him under the stress of seven wounds². But his ready wit was untouched. He must have been carried outside the gate when he bade the Syracusan trumpeters to go on each side of the town, on each side of the long hill of Gela, on the side of the fields and on the side of the sea, and on both sides to sound a blast as for a charge³. Sôstratos and his followers,

CHAP. XII.

Stratagem
of Agathoklês
at Gela.

¹ Diod. xix. 4; τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιβαλομένων μὲν φεύγειν διὰ τινος στενοῦ τόπου καὶ τὴν σωτηρίαν ἀπευγυκόντων, παραδόξως αὐτοὺς Ἀγαθοκλῆς ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων ἐρρύσατο.

² Ib.; αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ λαμπρότατα πάντων ἀγωνισάμενος, ἔπτα τραύμασι περιέπεσε, καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τοῦ βνέντος αἵματος τὸ σῶμα παρελύετο.

³ Ib.; παρήγγειλε καὶ τοῖς σαλπικταῖς ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τὰ μέρη τοῦ τεύχους παρελθόντας σημαίνειν τὸ πολεμικόν. Σημαίνειν, like "signal" for the war-cry. [The only position from which the execution of such an order could have been practicable would be at one or the other end of the long city. But there could have been no time—considering the shortness of the descent down the slope below the walls to the level country—for such a stratagem to have been of any use. I have carefully studied the topography of Gela in the course of repeated visits to the spot, but know of nothing answering to the "narrow place" described. Agathoklês would have found himself either on the Gelôan plain or in the river. Neither is it very credible that the enemy could have been made to believe in a sudden assault from the sea. In short, the whole account of the supposed "stratagem"—at least in the shape recorded by Diodôros—must be regarded as a childish invention. But this opens up the whole subject of Agathoklês' stratagems, of which Diodôros gives such a long array. Dr. Rudolf Schubert in his *Geschichte des Agathokles* (21, 43, &c.) comes to the conclusion that the whole of these marvellous tales are due to the invention of Douris, who had deliberately tried to embellish his narrative with theatrical touches and picturesque incidents, many of which are manifestly absurd. He instances the blowing of trumpets and singing of pœans at inappropriate times (cf. p. 410, n. 2; p. 414, n. 3; and p. 440, n. 3), and a whole series of senseless or impossible "stratagems" such as the above. Douris' imagery (cf. Plut. Demetr. 44 and fr. 31) smacks of the stage. He is fond of love-stories (Schubert, op. cit. 20) and romantic incidents and disguises (op. cit. p. 17; see too Droysen zu Douris u. Hieronymus, *Hermes*, xi. p. 458; Melber, *Quellen &c. Polyæns* (N. Jahrb. f. Phil., Supplementbd. xiv. 658). We have Plutarch's authority (Periocl. 28) for the fact that Douris habitually lied. To his "History of Agathoklês" much of the mythical element which undoubtedly exists in the received accounts of the tyrant's career may be fairly traced.]

CHAP. XII. bewildered by the darkness, fancied that a larger Syracusan force was assailing Gela on both sides. They left off pursuing Agathoklés and his party, and, parting into two divisions, went to keep the wall on both sides. Agathoklés could now rest and recover somewhat of his strength¹. By his happy device he was able to bring off the remainder of his party in safety. With them, we are told, he also saved seven hundred men of the allies². This can mean nothing else than seven hundred friendly citizens of Gela, who had perhaps invited the Syracusan officer to his attempt, and who in any case held themselves to be safer in the Syracusan camp than in their own city when it was occupied by Sôistratos.

The distinction which Agathoklés gained by this and his other warlike exploits was clearly such as to make him an important person in Syracuse, but not such as as yet to raise him to the highest places in the commonwealth. Or rather, it may be that his very distinction hindered him from gaining them. The next mention of him implies that his very ability caused him to be suspected of aiming at the tyranny³. This seems to have some connexion with the fact that Syracuse had just now a new chief. The Corinthian Akstoridás was now general, general possibly with full powers⁴. There is something strange and sad in the mention of a Corinthian now. When Timoleôn came, no great time before, Philip was coming, but he had not yet come; in the few years that had passed, Philip had come and Alexander, and Antipatros and Polysperchôn after them. Still, as Carthage looked to Tyre under the lord-

Agathoklés
suspected
of aiming
at tyranny.

¹ Diod. xix. 4; ἐν τοσούτῃ τευχόντῃ ἀνοχῇ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλῆα, μετὰ πάσῃ ἀσφαλείᾳ διεσώθησαν εἰς τὸν χάρακα.

² Ib.; οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ παραδίξας ἔσωσεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμμέχων ὑπτασσέσθαι ἀνδρας.

³ Ib. 5; δόξας ἐπιθέσθαι τυραννίδα διὰ τὴν σύνεσιν.

⁴ Ib. On this Akstoridás see Appendix VII. There is neither beginning nor end of him.

ship of the Persian, Syracuse yet looks to Corinth under the lordship of the Macedonian. It could only have been the memory of the last deliverer that led Syracuse once more to seek for the healing of her sicknesses at the hands of a citizen of her metropolis. But the ways of Akestoridâs were hardly the ways of Timoleôn. The schemes of Agathoklês are dreaded; but for fear of disturbance in the city it was deemed wise not to slay him openly. Akestoridâs bade the suspected candidate for tyranny to leave the city, and set liers-in-wait to slay him on the road. But Agathoklês was richer in devices than his enemies. He had a slave who was greatly like him in height and face; him he sent forth clothed in his own dress, mounted on his own horse, and harnessed with his famous panoply of war¹. He himself went along the road in beggar's rags, and went safely, while the slave tricked out in the garb of his master met with death at the hands of the liers-in-wait. Again an exile, Agathoklês took him to the inland parts of Sicily, and again gathered together a force ready to follow him in any scheme of adventure².

Escape of Agathoklês from assassination.

Meanwhile there was another change at Syracuse. Akestoridâs passes out of sight without any further account of him. Sôistratos and the other exiles—Hêrakleidês has already sunk out of notice—were recalled, and peace was made with the Carthaginians³. The Six Hundred appear again; but the government is called a democracy, and it is plain that the popular assembly acted, and acted freely. Agathoklês meanwhile was gaining power and reputation in his banishment. By services whose exact nature is not described he won the highest favour among the inland towns; his headquarters were at Morgantina, a town hostile to Syracuse, whose citizens, on the strength of that enmity,

Political changes at Syracuse.

¹ Diod. xix. 5; *τούτῳ δοὺς τὴν πανοπλίαν καὶ τὸν ἵππον, ἐτι δὲ τὴν ἐσθῆτα.*

² See Appendix VII.

³ Diod. u.s.; *πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους εἰρήνην συνθεμέναν.* See Appendix VII.

CHAP. XII. raised Agathoklès, after trial in a lesser post, to their highest command ¹. He became formidable to the powers of Syracuse and to the Carthaginians themselves. In this state of things, where we are not surprised to find any city the friend or the enemy of any other, we may believe that he warred against Leontinoi and took it; we can hardly believe an elaborate story of treachery and massacre which at this stage of his career could in no way have served his interests ².

Agathoklès attacks Syracuse.

He was presently recalled to Syracuse. The fullest version of his return represents him as actually leading his force, Morgantine and mercenary, to a siege of Syracuse. By the powers within the city, Hamilkar, now no longer an enemy, was implored to play the part of an active ally. The Punic host marched to guard the greatest of Greek cities ³ against Greeks and hellenized Sikels, led by a chief who might be claimed at pleasure by Rhègion, by Syracuse, and by the Therma of Himera. Agathoklès soon found that his force was no match for Syracuse thus strengthened. But, if not in strength, yet in cunning, he showed himself a match for the Phœnician himself. He made an agreement with Hamilkar, by which the Carthaginian leader promised to bring about the restoration of Agathoklès, perhaps something more than his restoration. Agathoklès, so restored, was to work for the interests of Carthage, and Hamilkar was to supply him with a military force to enable him to do so ⁴.

Restored by Hamilkar's mediation.

¹ "Primo prætor, mox dux creatur," says Justin, xxii. 2. One would like to know the exact ranks in a Morgantine army. Some generations earlier they might have talked of a "prætor."

² See Polybios, v. 3. 2, and Appendix VII.

³ See Appendix VII. Justin (xxii. 2) remarks, "Ita uno eodemque tempore Syracusæ et ab hoste civili amore defensæ, et a civis hostili odio impugnatæ sunt." In all such sayings we must never forget that Agathoklès was not a born Syracusan.

⁴ Justin, xxii. 2; "Qua spe impletos Hamilcar societatem cum eo mutux potentix jungit, ut quantum virum Agathocli adversus Syracusanos dedisset, tantum ipse ad incrementa domesticæ potentix reciperet." He had just before spoken of Agathoklès as "peculiaris in ipsum Hamilcarum officia sua re-promittens." This looks like some treasonable scheme of

The policy of Carthage had greatly changed within the last hundred years. Hamilkar knew that the Carthaginian power in Sicily was better promoted by bringing Greek cities under various degrees of dominion, supremacy, or influence, than by sweeping them from the earth, like Hannibal at Himera. It was a great step when a Punic general was accepted as a mediator in the internal quarrels of Syracuse. It was something different from the guaranty which Carthage had once given to the tyranny of Dionysios¹. That was simply a promise to bring force, if force should be needed, to support the tyrant against the citizens. Here too something of the same kind is looming in the future; but the immediate work of Hamilkar is peaceful. He reconciles Syracusan parties. Sôsistratos and his Six Hundred have yielded to his pressure, backed, we may be sure, by an overwhelming popular demand for the recall of the famous captain who, like Alkibiadês or Gaius Marcius, had shown how much he could do both for his own city and against her.

CHAP. XII.

Syracuse under Carthaginian influence.

Hamilkar's work of reconciliation.

But all, Hamilkar among them, agreed in holding it to be expedient to bind the conscience of Agathoklès by the most awful sanctions that the religion of Syracuse knew of. In the holy place of the Goddesses, in the sacred garb, under all the solemnities of the Great Oath, Agathoklès bound his soul to do naught against the commonwealth, against the democracy, and withal to be a friend to Carthage². The Great Oath on the lips of Agathoklès went for about as much as it had gone for on the lips of Kallippos³. It went for about as much as an oath in nearly the same words went for on the lips of the one man of our day in Europe who has walked in the path of Dionysios

Agathoklès swears the Great Oath.

Hamilkar at Carthage, or perhaps rather in the Carthaginian possessions in Sicily.

¹ See vol. iii. pp. 583, 584.

² Diod. xix. 5; *μηδὲν ἐναντιωθήσεσθαι τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ*. See Appendix VII.

³ See above, p. 285.

CHAP. XII. and Agathoklēs. We who have watched with our own
 Agathoklēs com- eyes "the despot's progress ¹," can trace with more lively
 pared with interest the exile, the recall, the election, the oath, the con-
 Louis Na- spiracy, the massacre, the banishments, the assumption of
 poléon. princely titles, the wars in foreign lands, the victories
 and the defeats, all done, as if of set purpose, to carry out
 the platform of the elder tyranny in all its fulness. Yet one
 thing failed to Agathoklēs at Syracuse. The chosen of
 the people had no need to drive out a lawful assembly from
 its place of meeting. And, when the end came, he died in
 his own land, in the land of his earliest adoption—and he
 died a king.

Agathoklēs made
 General
 and Guard-
 ian of the
 Peace.

The oath was sworn ; the new special votary of the God-
 desses of Sicily now stood forth as the leader of the Syra-
 cusan people, the man whose wily speech they hearkened to,
 and whom they were ready to raise to the highest honours
 and the fullest trust that they had to bestow. A vote of the
 people called Agathoklēs to the office of general of the com-
 monwealth, a general trusted with a further special power
 in civil affairs. He was clothed with something like the
 authority and the duties of an ancient *Aisymnēlēs*. Aga-
 thoklēs was to be guardian of the peace of Syracuse till he
 had brought round all the contending parties, all the many
 classes of citizens from divers places, to true unity and
 brotherhood ². Such a commission might well last long ;
 it might be equivalent to an appointment for life, even in one
 who should reach the days of Isokratēs or of Gorgias. Timo-
 leōn had held it for his highest boast that he had won for
 every man in Syracuse the power of speaking his mind ³.

¹ Grote, x. 602, et seqq.

² Diod. xix. 5 ; στρατηγὸς κατεστάθη καὶ φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης, μέχρι δὲ νῦν γηγῆσις δμονοήσουσιν οἱ συνεληλυθότες εἰς τὴν πόλιν. These last words well express the mixed population of the Syracuse of that day. I was once surprised at finding a "Justitia pacis" at Antivari ; here we have a "Conservator pacis" on a grand scale.

³ See above, p. 337.

Agathoklès sought rather that all Syracuse should be of one mind, and he had his own way of bringing about that result. He had on his side most likely some real attachment to himself on the part of the mass of the people; he could certainly reckon on their hatred to the Six Hundred and their partisans. He could further reckon on his old soldiers from Morgantia and the other inland towns. They had fought for him against the power of Carthage; but the power of Carthage, as represented by Hamilkar, was now on his side. Five thousand Africans—that is, five thousand mercenaries of Carthage, of whatever nation—were left under the command of Agathoklès by the Punic general ¹.

CHAP. XII.

§ 2. *Agathoklès becomes tyrant of Syracuse.*

Agathoklès had now only to grasp the tyrant's power. But it would seem that before he had committed any illegal act, some of the party opposed to him left Syracuse, and were already trying to establish themselves in some inland post of their own. It is the tale of Kasmenai, the tale of Maktòrion, in earlier revolutions ², the tale of Agathoklès himself in his shelter at Morgantia ³. The name of the place is given as Herbita; but Herbita, royal seat of the elder Archônidès ⁴, far away among the Nebrodian mountains, seems a place so ill-suited for the purpose that one is tempted to think of the nearer Herbessus. The general of the Syracusans proclaimed a march against the traitorous citizens who were attacking a town in alliance with the commonwealth ⁵. He specially bade three chief men of the party opposed to himself, Tisarchos, Anthròpinos, and Dioklès, to meet him the next morning at the

Secession
of oppo-
nents.

¹ "Accepitis ab eo v. millibus Afrorum," says Justin (xxii. 2). See Appendix VII.

² See vol. ii. p. 101.

³ See above, p. 369.

⁴ See vol. ii. p. 381.

⁵ Polyainos, v. 3. 8. Diod. xix. 6. See Appendix VII.

CHAP. XII. Timoleonteion to consult or to receive orders for the expedition ¹.

Massacre
planned
by Aga-
thoklês.

We have come to another of those marked events in Syracusan history the memory of which gathers round the lower ground of Achradina, the ground adorned by the buildings which bore the name of the last deliverer. Where Ducetius had sought shelter at the altar, where Hermokratês had fallen in civil strife, where the first Dionysios had cut down his revolted enemies, where Diôn had first harangued the liberated people, where the honours of Timoleôn had been proclaimed over his monument within the city walls, in that same memorable quarter did Agathoklês strike the first blow in a slaughter far more calmly planned, far more bloodily carried out, than the defensive deed of Dionysios. The elder tyrant, in an hour of fierce strife, slew a few men to win back power which, however unlawfully gained, he had actually held. The younger, in an hour of peace within the walls, had made ready for a slaughter like that wrought by Nypsios and his barbarians, in order to grasp unlawful power for the first time. In the kalendar of Agathoklês his second of December had come ².

On the appointed day the doomed men, with a following perhaps of two hundred ³, came to the Timoleonteion. The whole quarter was occupied by the general of the commonwealth and guardian of the peace at the head of the mercenaries lent him by Hamilkar and of three thousand of his own soldiers from Morgantia and the other towns of his last warfare. Devoted to Agathoklês, ready to do anything at his personal bidding, they perhaps cared little for Syracusan party politics, but they assuredly had no

¹ See Appendix VII.

² Grote, ch. xcvi.

³ Forty, according to Diodoros, two hundred, according to Justin. See Appendix VII.

love for Sôsistratos and the Six Hundred¹. A multitude too of Syracusan citizens, such as Syracusan citizens had become, a mob most likely base and violent enough, but which is described only in the stock phrases used to describe any democratic gathering², had also come together on the memorable spot, as ready as the veterans of Morgantina, to do ought that Agathoklês bade them do against the oligarchs. The first blow was the arrest of Tisarchos and the others. The Guardian of the Peace must have affected to look on the crowd of soldiers and bystanders as making up a Syracusan assembly. He harangued them on the evil deeds of the prisoners and of the rest of the Six Hundred, how they had plotted against himself on account of his good will to the people³. The vote came in the ancient shape of a shout; but of no mere shout of Yea or Nay. It was a fierce cry calling on him to listen no longer, but at once to take vengeance on the guilty⁴. Armed with this fresh commission, Agathoklês bade the trumpets sound for a charge⁵, and gave the word of command to slay the prisoners and to sack the houses of the Six Hundred and their abettors⁶. A shower of darts put an end to Tisarchos and his companions⁷, and the whole multitude of soldiers and citizens, armed and unarmed, rushed on to the tempting work of plunder and slaughter. One military precaution at least was not

CHAP. XII.
Massacre
in the
Timoleon-
teion.

¹ Diod. xix. 6; *τούτων δ' ὄντων μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἰς τρισχίλους, ταῖς δ' ὁρμαῖς καὶ ταῖς προαιρέσεσιν ἐθελουσίαν πρὸς τὴν κατάλυσιν τῆς δημοκρατίας*. No special stress need be laid on this word; neither Agathoklês nor his followers would have allowed that they were overthrowing a democracy.

² Ib.; *προσεπελέξατο καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς διὰ πέναν καὶ φθόνον ἐναντιο- μίτους ταῖς τῶν ἰσχυρόντων ἐπιφανείαις*.

³ Ib.; *φῆσας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξακοσίων ἀρπάξεσθαι διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον εἶνοιαν*. What is the exact force of ἀρπάξεσθαι?

⁴ Ib.; *παροξυνομένου δὲ τοῦ πλήθους καὶ βοῶντος μηκέτι μέλλειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ χειρὸς ἐπιθεῖναι τοῖς ἀδικήσασιν τὴν δικήν*.

⁵ Ib.; *τὸ πολεμικόν*, as above, p. 367, note 3.

⁶ See Appendix VII.

⁷ The darts are from Polyainos (v. 3. 8). See Appendix VII.

CHAP. XII. bewildered by the darkness, fancied that a larger Syracusan force was assaulting Gela on both sides. They left off pursuing Agathoklês and his party, and, parting into two divisions, went to keep the wall on both sides. Agathoklês could now rest and recover somewhat of his strength¹. By his happy device he was able to bring off the remainder of his party in safety. With them, we are told, he also saved seven hundred men of the allies². This can mean nothing else than seven hundred friendly citizens of Gela, who had perhaps invited the Syracusan officer to his attempt, and who in any case held themselves to be safer in the Syracusan camp than in their own city when it was occupied by Sôistratos.

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of aiming
at tyranny.

¹ Diod. xix. 4; *ἐν τοσούτῃ τυχόντες ἀνοχῆς οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα, μετὰ πάσης ἀσφαλείας διεσώθησαν εἰς τὸν χάρακα.*

² Ib.; οὐ μόνον τοὺς σὺν αὐτῷ παραδόξως ἔσωσεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ἑπτακοσίους ἀνδρας.

³ Ib. 5; *δόξας ἐπιθέσθαι τυραννίδι διὰ τὴν σύνεσιν.*

⁴ Ib. On this Akestoriðâs see Appendix VII. There is neither beginning nor end of him.

ship of the Persian, Syracuse yet looks to Corinth under the lordship of the Macedonian. It could only have been the memory of the last deliverer that led Syracuse once more to seek for the healing of her sicknesses at the hands of a citizen of her metropolis. But the ways of Akestoridâs were hardly the ways of Timoleôn. The schemes of Agathoklês are dreaded; but for fear of disturbance in the city it was deemed wise not to slay him openly. Akestoridâs bade the suspected candidate for tyranny to leave the city, and set liers-in-wait to slay him on the road. But Agathoklês was richer in devices than his enemies. He had a slave who was greatly like him in height and face; him he sent forth clothed in his own dress, mounted on his own horse, and harnessed with his famous panoply of war¹. He himself went along the road in beggar's rags, and went safely, while the slave tricked out in the garb of his master met with death at the hands of the liers-in-wait. Again an exile, Agathoklês took him to the inland parts of Sicily, and again gathered together a force ready to follow him in any scheme of adventure².

Escape
of Aga-
thoklês
from assass-
ination.

Meanwhile there was another change at Syracuse. Akestoridâs passes out of sight without any further account of him. Sôsistratos and the other exiles—Hêrakleidês has already sunk out of notice—were recalled, and peace was made with the Carthaginians³. The Six Hundred appear again; but the government is called a democracy, and it is plain that the popular assembly acted, and acted freely. Agathoklês meanwhile was gaining power and reputation in his banishment. By services whose exact nature is not described he won the highest favour among the inland towns; his headquarters were at Morgantina, a town hostile to Syracuse, whose citizens, on the strength of that enmity,

Political
changes at
Syracuse.

¹ Diod. xix. 5; *τούτῳ δοὺς τὴν πανοπλίαν καὶ τὸν ἵππον, ἔτι δὲ τὴν ἐσθῆτα.*

² See Appendix VII.

³ Diod. u.s.; *πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους εἰρήνην συ. θεμένων.* See Appendix VII.

CHAP. XII. raised Agathoklès, after trial in a lesser post, to their highest command¹. He became formidable to the powers of Syracuse and to the Carthaginians themselves. In this state of things, where we are not surprised to find any city the friend or the enemy of any other, we may believe that he warred against Leontinoi and took it; we can hardly believe an elaborate story of treachery and massacre which at this stage of his career could in no way have served his interests².

Agathoklès attacks Syracuse.

He was presently recalled to Syracuse. The fullest version of his return represents him as actually leading his force, Morgantine and mercenary, to a siege of Syracuse. By the powers within the city, Hamilkar, now no longer an enemy, was implored to play the part of an active ally. The Punic host marched to guard the greatest of Greek cities³ against Greeks and hellenized Sikels, led by a chief who might be claimed at pleasure by Rhègion, by Syracuse, and by the Therma of Himera. Agathoklès soon found that his force was no match for Syracuse thus strengthened. But, if not in strength, yet in cunning, he showed himself a match for the Phœnician himself. He made an agreement with Hamilkar, by which the Carthaginian leader promised to bring about the restoration of Agathoklès, perhaps something more than his restoration. Agathoklès, so restored, was to work for the interests of Carthage, and Hamilkar was to supply him with a military force to enable him to do so⁴.

Restored by Hamilkar's mediation.

¹ "Primo prætor, mox dux creatur," says Justin, xxii. 2. One would like to know the exact ranks in a Morgantine army. Some generations earlier they might have talked about a "prætor."

² See Polyainos, v. 3. 2, and Appendix VII.

³ See Appendix VII. Justin (xxii. 2) remarks, "Ita uno eodemque tempore Syracusæ et ab hoste civili amore defensæ, et a cive hostili odio impugnatæ sunt." In all such sayings we must never forget that Agathoklès was not a born Syracusan.

⁴ Justin, xxii. 2; "Qua spe impletus Hamilcar societatem cum eo mutue potentiæ jungit, ut quantum virium Agathocli adversus Syracusanos dedisset, tantum ipse ad incrementa domesticæ potentiæ reciperet." He had just before spoken of Agathoklès as "peculiararia in ipsum [Hamilcare] officia sua re-promittens." This looks like some treasonable scheme of

The policy of Carthage had greatly changed within the last hundred years. Hamilkar knew that the Carthaginian power in Sicily was better promoted by bringing Greek cities under various degrees of dominion, supremacy, or influence, than by sweeping them from the earth, like Hannibal at Himera. It was a great step when a Punic general was accepted as a mediator in the internal quarrels of Syracuse. It was something different from the guaranty which Carthage had once given to the tyranny of Dionysios¹. That was simply a promise to bring force, if force should be needed, to support the tyrant against the citizens. Here too something of the same kind is looming in the future; but the immediate work of Hamilkar is peaceful. He reconciles Syracusan parties. Sôsistratos and his Six Hundred have yielded to his pressure, backed, we may be sure, by an overwhelming popular demand for the recall of the famous captain who, like Alkibiadês or Gaius Marcius, had shown how much he could do both for his own city and against her.

CHAP. XII.

Syracuse
under Car-
thaginian
influence.Hamilkar's
work of
reconcilia-
tion.

But all, Hamilkar among them, agreed in holding it to be expedient to bind the conscience of Agathoklês by the most awful sanctions that the religion of Syracuse knew of. In the holy place of the Goddesses, in the sacred garb, under all the solemnities of the Great Oath, Agathoklês bound his soul to do naught against the commonwealth, against the democracy, and withal to be a friend to Carthage². The Great Oath on the lips of Agathoklês went for about as much as it had gone for on the lips of Kallippos³. It went for about as much as an oath in nearly the same words went for on the lips of the one man of our day in Europe who has walked in the path of Dionysios

Agathoklês swears
the Great
Oath.

Hamilkar at Carthage, or perhaps rather in the Carthaginian possessions in Sicily.

¹ See vol. iii. pp. 583, 584.

² Diod. xix. 5; *μηδὲν ἐναντιωθήσεσθαι τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ*. See Appendix VII.

³ See above, p. 285.

CHAP. XII. and Agathoklés. We who have watched with our own eyes "the despot's progress¹," can trace with more lively interest the exile, the recall, the election, the oath, the conspiracy, the massacre, the banishments, the assumption of princely titles, the wars in foreign lands, the victories and the defeats, all done, as if of set purpose, to carry out the platform of the elder tyranny in all its fulness. Yet one thing failed to Agathoklés at Syracuse. The chosen of the people had no need to drive out a lawful assembly from its place of meeting. And, when the end came, he died in his own land, in the land of his earliest adoption—and he died a king.

Agathoklés made General and Guardian of the Peace.

The oath was sworn; the new special votary of the Goddesses of Sicily now stood forth as the leader of the Syracusan people, the man whose wily speech they hearkened to, and whom they were ready to raise to the highest honours and the fullest trust that they had to bestow. A vote of the people called Agathoklés to the office of general of the commonwealth, a general trusted with a further special power in civil affairs. He was clothed with something like the authority and the duties of an ancient *Aisymnétés*. Agathoklés was to be guardian of the peace of Syracuse till he had brought round all the contending parties, all the many classes of citizens from divers places, to true unity and brotherhood². Such a commission might well last long; it might be equivalent to an appointment for life, even in one who should reach the days of Isokratés or of Gorgias. Timoléon had held it for his highest boast that he had won for every man in Syracuse the power of speaking his mind³.

¹ Grote, x. 602, et seqq.

² Diod. xix. 5; στρατηγὸς κατεστάθη καὶ φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης, μέχρι ἀν γησίας ὁμονήσουσιν οἱ συνελθυῖντες εἰς τὴν πόλιν. These last words well express the mixed population of the Syracuse of that day. I was once surprised at finding a "Justitia pacis" at Antivari; here we have a "Conservator pacis" on a grand scale.

³ See above, p. 337.

Agathoklès sought rather that all Syracuse should be of one mind, and he had his own way of bringing about that result. He had on his side most likely some real attachment to himself on the part of the mass of the people; he could certainly reckon on their hatred to the Six Hundred and their partisans. He could further reckon on his old soldiers from Morgantia and the other inland towns. They had fought for him against the power of Carthage; but the power of Carthage, as represented by Hamilkar, was now on his side. Five thousand Africans—that is, five thousand mercenaries of Carthage, of whatever nation—were left under the command of Agathoklès by the Punic general ¹.

CHAP. XII.

§ 2. *Agathoklès becomes tyrant of Syracuse.*

Agathoklès had now only to grasp the tyrant's power. But it would seem that before he had committed any illegal act, some of the party opposed to him left Syracuse, and were already trying to establish themselves in some inland post of their own. It is the tale of Kasménai, the tale of Maktôrion, in earlier revolutions ², the tale of Agathoklès himself in his shelter at Morgantia ³. The name of the place is given as Herbita; but Herbita, royal seat of the elder Archônidès ⁴, far away among the Nebrodian mountains, seems a place so ill-suited for the purpose that one is tempted to think of the nearer Herbessus. The general of the Syracusans proclaimed a march against the traitorous citizens who were attacking a town in alliance with the commonwealth ⁵. He specially bade three chief men of the party opposed to himself, Tisarchos, Anthrôpinos, and Dioklès, to meet him the next morning at the

Secession
of oppo-
nents.

¹ "Acceptis ab eo v. millibus Afrorum," says Justin (xxii. 2). See Appendix VII.

² See vol. ii. p. 101.

³ See above, p. 369.

⁴ See vol. ii. p. 381.

⁵ Polyainos, v. 3. 8. Diod. xix. 6. See Appendix VII.

CHAP. XII. Timoleonteion to consult or to receive orders for the expedition ¹.

Massacre
planned
by Aga-
thoklês.

We have come to another of those marked events in Syracusan history the memory of which gathers round the lower ground of Achradina, the ground adorned by the buildings which bore the name of the last deliverer. Where Ducetius had sought shelter at the altar, where Hermokratês had fallen in civil strife, where the first Dionysios had cut down his revolted enemies, where Diôn had first harangued the liberated people, where the honours of Timoleôn had been proclaimed over his monument within the city walls, in that same memorable quarter did Agathoklês strike the first blow in a slaughter far more calmly planned, far more bloodily carried out, than the defensive deed of Dionysios. The elder tyrant, in an hour of fierce strife, slew a few men to win back power which, however unlawfully gained, he had actually held. The younger, in an hour of peace within the walls, had made ready for a slaughter like that wrought by Nypsios and his barbarians, in order to grasp unlawful power for the first time. In the kalendar of Agathoklês his second of December had come ².

On the appointed day the doomed men, with a following perhaps of two hundred ³, came to the Timoleonteion. The whole quarter was occupied by the general of the commonwealth and guardian of the peace at the head of the mercenaries lent him by Hamilkar and of three thousand of his own soldiers from Morgantia and the other towns of his last warfare. Devoted to Agathoklês, ready to do anything at his personal bidding, they perhaps cared little for Syracusan party politics, but they assuredly had no

¹ See Appendix VII.

² Grote, ch. xcvi.

³ Forty, according to Diodôros, two hundred, according to Justin. See Appendix VII.

love for Sôsistratos and the Six Hundred¹. A multitude too of Syracusan citizens, such as Syracusan citizens had become, a mob most likely base and violent enough, but which is described only in the stock phrases used to describe any democratic gathering², had also come together on the memorable spot, as ready as the veterans of Morgantina, to do ought that Agathoklês bade them do against the oligarchs. The first blow was the arrest of Tisarchos and the others. The Guardian of the Peace must have affected to look on the crowd of soldiers and bystanders as making up a Syracusan assembly. He harangued them on the evil deeds of the prisoners and of the rest of the Six Hundred, how they had plotted against himself on account of his good will to the people³. The vote came in the ancient shape of a shout; but of no mere shout of Yea or Nay. It was a fierce cry calling on him to listen no longer, but at once to take vengeance on the guilty⁴. Armed with this fresh commission, Agathoklês bade the trumpets sound for a charge⁵, and gave the word of command to slay the prisoners and to sack the houses of the Six Hundred and their abettors⁶. A shower of darts put an end to Tisarchos and his companions⁷, and the whole multitude of soldiers and citizens, armed and unarmed, rushed on to the tempting work of plunder and slaughter. One military precaution at least was not

CHAP. XII.
Massacre
in the
Timoleon-
teion.

¹ Diod. xix. 6; *τούτων δ' ὄντων μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἰς τρισχίλιους, ταῖς δ' ὁρμαῖς καὶ ταῖς προαιρέσεσιν εὐθεωτάτατον πρὸς τὴν κατάλυσιν τῆς δημοκρατίας*. No special stress need be laid on this word; neither Agathoklês nor his followers would have allowed that they were overthrowing a democracy.

² *Ib.*; *προσεπείλετο καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς διὰ πένιν καὶ φόβον ἐναγιστομένους ταῖς τῶν ἰσχυρόντων ἐπιφανείαις*.

³ *Ib.*; *φήσας ὑπὸ τῶν ἑξακοσίων ἀρπάζεσθαι διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον εὐνοίαν*. What is the exact force of *ἀρπάζεσθαι*?

⁴ *Ib.*; *παροξυνομένου δὲ τοῦ πλήθους καὶ βοῶντος μηκέτι μέλλειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ χειρὸς ἐπιθεῖναι τοῖς ἀδικήσασιν τὴν δίκην*.

⁵ *Ib.*; *τὸ πολεμικόν*, as above, p. 367, note 3.

⁶ See Appendix VII.

⁷ The darts are from Polyainos (v. 3. 8). See Appendix VII.

CHAP. XII. forgotten; all the gates of the city were shut, so that none of the intended victims might escape¹.

The Mas-
sacre in
the Timo-
leonteion.

The picture of mere havoc, the familiar threefold alliance of plunder, slaughter, and rape, is much the same whether the work is done at the bidding of Nypsios or of Agathoklès. But the evil deeds done by the soldiers of Nypsios were wholly the deeds of barbarians; this time it added to the grief and suffering that, largely at least, the work was the work of Greeks against Greeks, of citizens against citizens, that it was a work in which the ties of nature and friendship and solemn oaths, and the reverence due to the gods, were all trampled under foot². This time the deed was not done by night; but the blow came as suddenly as if it had been by night. Men in their houses heard a noise; they went down into the streets to learn what was happening; unarmed and without resistance, they were cut down by the soldiers³. The gates were barred, the narrow streets were guarded; every man suspected of oligarchic politics was of course slain; men too slew their private enemies, but with them, as ever happens at such times, not a few against whom Agathoklès himself could have brought no charge⁴. Slaughter was the rule; yet some prisoners were made, those perhaps who came under the immediate eye of the Guardian of the Peace⁵. But it was not only in the streets that the slaughter went

¹ Diod. xix. 8; *pāσαι αἱ πόλεις τῆς πόλεως ἐκλείσθησαν*.

² Ib. 7; *καὶ ταύτ' ἐτόλμων ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ πατρίδι παρανομεῖν Ἕλληνες καθ' ἑλλήνων, οἰκείοι κατὰ συγγενῶν, οὐ φύσιν, οὐ σπονδὰς, οὐ θεοὺς ἰντροπέμενοι, ἐφ' οἷς οὐχ ἔστι φίλος ἀλλὰ καὶ παντελῶς ἔχθρὸς μέτριός γε τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐκ ἂν τὴν τῶν πασχόντων τύχην ἐλεήσειεν*. This can hardly be Antandros, it may be Timaios, it may be Diodōros. If Diodōros, it does him honour. There may be a dim general resemblance of Thuc. iii. 82-4.

³ Ib. 6; *οἱ χαμίστατοι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀγροοῦντες τὸν καθ' αὐτῶν κεκυρμένον δλεθρον, ἐξεπήδαν ἐκ τῶν οἰκιῶν εἰς τὰς ὁδοὺς, μαθεῖν σπεύδοντες τὸν θόρυβον*.

⁴ Ib. 7; *πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν μηδ' ὀτιοῦν διαβεβλημένων ἀγροοῦντο, δέμενοι μαθεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἀπωλείας*.

⁵ We get the *ζωγρηθέντας* at the end of c. 8.

on. Such slight amount of resistance as the destroyers met with from the tops of the houses only stirred them up to attack the houses themselves. Doors were broken open; men climbed up by ladders and slew the defenders of the roofs¹. The temples gave no shelter; men put themselves under the protection of the gods; but there was now no cry of "Save the Suppliant²." Some, seeking a way out by the barred gates, only fell into the hands of their enemies. So did many of those who made their way to the walls, and tried to throw themselves over. Others were dashed in pieces; some, more lucky, were saved alive, and contrived to make their way to Akragas. There the exiles, now enemies of Syracuse, found a welcome shelter³. We are surprised to be told that, in one way or another, as many as six thousand contrived to make their way out of the city⁴.

It seems to be implied that deeds of this kind went on through the whole length and breadth of the city made up of many cities. At least we have no topographical distinctions between the fate of one quarter and another, such as we have in the pictures of earlier scenes of the same kind. The work went on through the whole day and through the day that followed. In the night between the two slaughter seems to have rested to give other passions their turn. Simple robbery, as in the days of Nypsios, is hardly dwelled on; perhaps it is taken for granted⁵.

¹ This is especially attributed to those who wished to better themselves by the slaughter of the rich; *οἱ δὲ ταῖς τῶν εὐπόρων σφαγαῖς οἰόμενοι τὰς ἰδίας εὐπορίας ἐπαυροῦσθαι, πᾶν ἐμηχανῶντο πρὸς τὸν κατ' αὐτῶν ὄλεθρον.*

² Diod. xix. 7; *οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῖς εἰς τὰ τεμένη καταφυγοῦσιν ἡ τῶν θεῶν ἱκετεία παρέχετο τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, ἀλλ' ἡ πρὸς θεοὺς εὐσέβεια ἐνικατο πρὸς ἀνθρώπων.*

³ Ib. 8; *οἱ πλείστοι κατέφυγον πρὸς τοὺς Ἀκραγαντίους, καὶ κεῖ καθηκούσης ἐπιμελείας ἡξιώθησαν.*

⁴ On the numbers see Appendix VII.

⁵ Cf. n. 1 above. The original order was *διαπράξιν τὰς κτήσεις τῶν ἐξακοσίων*. Directly after (c. 6) we hear of the *πλεονεξία* of the murderers, and how they rushed *ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρπαγὴν*. And in c. 9 we come across *οἱ διαφορεῖοι*.

CHAP. XII. But now came the wrong on which our narrator is fullest. The matrons and maidens of Syracuse passed into the power of those who had slain their husbands and fathers and had taken possession of their houses¹. By the evening of the second day, the objects of Agathoklés had been gained; slaughter enough had been done by the hands of his followers. He then himself sat in judgement on those who had been taken alive. Those who were most bitterly his enemies he slew; the rest he allowed to live in banishment. To one alone, Deinokratés, a man of whom we shall often hear again, he gave, on the ground of former friendship, a free pardon². Even Agathoklés was human.

Deino-
kratés par-
doned.

After the arrests, the banishments, the massacre, came in due order the *plebiscite*. A vote of the Syracusan Assembly was of course in form a true *plebiscitum*, though one may doubt as to perfect freedom of voting in an assembly summoned by the master of eight thousand armed strangers fresh from the work of blood. But in form at least the Assembly was summoned and came together, and the question laid before it was something more than a simple vote of Yea or Nay. Agathoklés then made his speech to the people. The day had come which he had longed to see, the day when Syracuse should be free³. The Six Hundred and their oligarchy were overthrown; all who had sought for a power beyond the laws were swept away; he himself, the instrument in the work, wished for nothing more than to rest from his toils and dwell as a private citizen, one among his fellows, in the delivered common-

The As-
sembly
summoned.

κότες τὰ τῶν ἰτυχηχότων. But there is no wrought-up picture of plunder as in the other case; that is reserved for another kind of wrong.

¹ Diod. xix. 8; πῶς προσεφέροντο παρθένους ὀρφαναῖς καὶ γυναῖξιν, ἐρήμοις μὲν οὔσαις τῶν βοηθούντων, πεπτακκίαις δ' ἐπ' ἐξουσίαν αὐτοκράτορα τῶν ἐχθίστων.

² Ib.; τοὺς ζῶντων ἀφαιρῶντας ἀδελφούς, Δεινοκράτην μὲν ἀφῆκε διὰ τὴν προγεγενημένην φιλίαν, κ.τ.λ. See Appendix VII.

³ Polyainos, v. 3. 7. See Appendix VII.

wealth¹. Then, in plain imitation of Gelôn after his return from Himera, he laid aside his dress as general, and came down from his *bēma* in the daily garb of a private man². CHAP. XII.

Generals had now to be chosen. But the mass of those who were called on to choose were men whom Agathoklès could trust, men who had had a hand in the deeds which had just been done; he knew full well that they would choose him and none other. A voice soon arose—first of all, it is said, from those who had enriched themselves by the goods of the slain men—calling on Agathoklès not to forsake them, but to abide and take care of the affairs of the state³. For a while he kept silence. Then, as the cry grew louder, he consented again to take on him the office of general. Diôn, in his better days, when chosen to that post along with his brother, had asked that, according to the law of Syracuse, other colleagues should be joined with him⁴. Agathoklès, on the other hand, improving on the precedent of Dionysius, protested that he could accept the office only in the character of a “single person;” he could have no colleagues. He could not, he said, make himself answerable before the law for deeds that others might do against the law⁵. A vote was passed, making Agathoklès sole general, general with full powers, the office under the cover of which

¹ Diod. xix. 9; καθαρὰν φήσας τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκέναι τῶν δυναστεύειν ἐπιχειρούντων, ἀπεφαίνετο τῇ δῆμῳ τὴν αὐτονομίαν ἐλικρινῇ παραδίδουσι, καὶ βούλεσθαι ποτε τῶν πόρων ἀπολυθεὶς ἰδιωτεύειν ἴσος ἂν πᾶσι.

² Ib.; τὸ μὲν χλαμύδιον ἑαυτοῦ περιέσπασε, τὸ δ' ἱμάτιον μεταλαβὼν ἀπῆε, τῶν πολλῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀποδείξας ἕνα. [Cf. Polyainos, v. 3. 7.] See the story of Gelôn in vol. ii. p. 204.

³ Ib.; εὐθὺς γοῦν οἱ διαφερομήκτες τὰ τῶν ἡτυχηκότων ἐβόων μὴ καταλιπεῖν ἑαυτοὺς, ἀλλὰ προσδέεσθαι τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἐπιμέλειαν.

⁴ See above, p. 262.

⁵ Diod. u. 8.; προσδέεσθαι μὲν ἔφησε τὴν στρατηγίαν, μὴ μέντοιγε μετ' ἄλλων ἀρξείν· οὐ γὰρ ὑπομένειν, ὅταν ἄλλοι παρὰ νόμον αὐτὸν συνάροντα λόγον ἀποδιδόναι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους.

CHAP. XII. Dionysios had marched to the tyranny. In the case of Agathoklès no further step was needed. Under the name of a constitutional office, he was already lord of Syracuse. On the lips of his enemies at least, he bore no name but that of tyrant¹.

Blackness
of Aga-
thoklès'
procedure.

We have had to record many evil deeds in our story, many base ways of rising to power; but the story of the rise of Agathoklès is surely the blackest of all. Dionysios rose by many base tricks and false accusations; but he was at no time guilty of any deed of blood on such a scale, and so wholly unprovoked, as this of Agathoklès. Nypsios was an avowed enemy, a captain of mercenaries; Agathoklès was the general of the Syracusan commonwealth. The thing most like his act in all Greek history is the rooting out of the oligarchic party at Korkyra by two successive massacres at the hands of the *Démos*. Those were deeds foul and bloody enough, and in the second of the two massacres treachery was added to bloodshed². But even deeds like these do not reach to the measure of the crime of Agathoklès. The massacres at Korkyra were not planned in the interests of a single man seeking for unlawful power. They were a general outburst of popular fury, fury directed against men who had provoked it by massacre done by themselves on a smaller scale³. And the slaughter was not followed by the rise of any tyranny. In the case of Agathoklès, a single man stirs up and uses a bloody popular impulse to his own selfish purposes. Whatever may have been the earlier crimes of Hérakleidès and Sôsistratos, their day within the city was past. Agathoklès was in power; he was holder of the highest lawful office in the state, clothed with special authority for the preservation of the peace. Military action against the exiles who were assaulting Herbessus was an obvious part of his duty as

¹ See Appendix VII.

² Thuc. iv. 46.

³ In the murder of Peithias and his sixty companions, Thuc. iii. 70.

general; it was under cover of that duty that he took the first step in treachery and slaughter by the destruction of Tisarchos and his comrades. Sicily and Syracuse had already an evil name for the doings of their tyrants; but Agathoklès outdid all that had gone before him. CHAP. XII.

Yet it might have been easy to plead that Agathoklès was no tyrant at all. A subtle advocate might say that his worst deeds were done, not in the exercise of an unlawful power, but in the wrongful exercise of a lawful power. It might be said that such acts were the deeds of an evil magistrate, but not the deeds of a tyrant. Dionysios, through the means of his authority as general with full powers, had taken to himself the tyrant's badge of a body-guard¹. Agathoklès did not receive that full authority till after his massacre, and then he did not assume the special outward ensign of tyranny². But for all practical purposes he was a tyrant, though a tyrant holding a special position among his class. He comes under Aristotle's class of tyrants who rose to power by the arts of the baser kind of demagogue. Or more truly, in becoming a tyrant, he did not cease to be a demagogue. In one Assembly of the people, seemingly in that momentous one which voted to him the chief power in the state, the chosen general promised an abolition of debts and a division of lands among the poor³. We are not told how far he actually carried out these promises; but it is said that by promises to some, by actual benefits to others, by a pleasant and conciliatory demeanour to all, he won the general good will of the great mass of the people.

¹ See vol. iii. p. 558.

² Diod. xix. 9; ἔχων τηλικαύτην δυναστείαν, οὐτὲ διάδημα ἀνέλαβεν, οὐτὲ δορυφόρους εἶχεν, οὐτὲ δυσεντευξίαν ἐζήλωσεν, ἅπερ εἰώθασι ποιεῖν σχεδὸν ἅπαντες οἱ τύραννοι.

³ Ib.; ἐπηγγέλλετο γὰρ Ἀγαθοκλῆς κατὰ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν καὶ χρῶν ἀποκοπὰς ποιήσασθαι καὶ τοῖς πένησι χώραν δωρῆσασθαι. It was not wonderful then that πολλοὶ τῶν ἀπόρων καὶ καταχρέων ἄσμενοι τὴν μεταβολὴν προσεδέξαντο.

CHAP. XII.

It is significantly said that, as soon as his power was confirmed, he left off inflicting death or other penalties on any man¹. We shall see that, as he rose to power by a deed of blood to which the career of Dionysios supplies no parallel, so he was ever ready on occasion to do deeds of the same kind whenever they were dictated by policy or passion, sometimes, it would seem, by mere caprice. Most of the bloodiest deeds of Agathoklês were done to enemies in time of war. Yet even within the Syracusan city he did not shrink from a massacre when it would serve his purpose. Still such cases are exceptional, altogether unlike the general character of his home government. As a rule, the lord—the general—of Syracuse was mild and gracious within the walls of Syracuse; it was the would-be lord of all Sicily that shed blood without mercy as if bloodshed were his sport².

Agathoklês dispenses with body-guard.

At home Agathoklês in no way affected the outward badges of power. Master of a strong military force, trusting at the same time in the good will of large classes of the mingled people of Syracuse, the general-with-full-powers needed not the immediate bodyguard with which the tyrant commonly surrounded himself. That he did not take to himself the diadem is a remark suggested to our guide by a later stage of his career; here it is out of place³. Of a merry, jovial, and pleasure-

¹ Diod. xix. 9; ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων γενόμενος, τοῦ μὲν ἔτι φονεῦειν ἢ κολάζειν τινας ἀπέστη· μεταβαλόμενος δ' εἰς τοῦναντίον εὐγνωμόνως τοῖς πλήθεσι προσεφέρετο· καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν εὐεργετῶν, οὐκ ὀλίγους δ' ἐπαγγελίας μετεωρίζων, πάντας δὲ λόγοις φιλανθρώποις δημαγωγῶν, οὐ μετρίως ἀποδοχῆς ἐτιύγχανεν. But a follower of Agathoklês would have said that there was no change εἰς τοῦναντίον, nothing like "exuere antiquum hominem." He always remained the same, slaying one kind of people and befriending another.

² On this side of his character Diodôros enlarges in another place (xix. 1); εἰς τοῦτο προήλθε θυράμεως ἅμα καὶ μαίφονίας ὥστε . . . ὕβρεως δὲ καὶ σφαγῆς ἐμπλήσσαι τὰς κατὰ Σικελίαν πόλεις. οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν πρὸ τούτου τυράννων ἐπετελέσατό τι τοιοῦτον, οὔτε τοιαύτην ἐμύθητα κατὰ τῶν ἱποταγμένων ἔσχε. He goes on at some length.

³ See above, p. 381, note 2.

seeking disposition, Agathoklēs had nothing of the harsh and suspicious mood of Dionysios¹. He enjoyed feasts and drinking-bouts; and he turned them to his purposes by bidding to his table those of whom he had reason to be doubtful, and, according to the rule of the Latin poet, proving them in their cups². In public he gave himself no airs; he affected no state; he was easy of access to all³. He kept on the usual assemblies of the people; he came to them unattended; the people themselves were said to be his guards⁴. He addressed the multitude in frank and scoffing speeches, after the manner of a jester or mountebank rather than of a king or magistrate⁵.

CHAP. XII.

Debonair bearing of Agathoklēs.

To the mixed multitude with which the Syracuse of his day was filled his rule was clearly acceptable. To the men whose citizenship dated from elder days, he was naturally hateful; they were driven either to hide their loathing or to join the exiles who had left the city. The Guardian of the Peace had, after all, by whatever means, made Syracuse more nearly an united commonwealth than it had often been. Agathoklēs had no need either for a rule of constant grinding oppression or for that rule of petty annoyance which often stirs men's hatred more strongly than grinding oppression. He could bear himself as a mild, popular, jovial-hearted ruler,

His rule acceptable to the people.

¹ Diod. xx. 63; οὐχ ὁμοίως Διονυσίῳ τῷ τυράννῳ, οὗτος γὰρ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀπίστως δέεικτο πρὸς ἅπαντας, κ. τ. λ.

² Ib.; ἀπειθήτο δ' ἐν τοῖς πότοις τὸ τῆς τυραννίδος ἀξίωμα, καὶ τῶν τυχόντων ἰδιωτῶν ταπεινότερον ἑαυτὸν ἀπεδείκνυνεν, ἅμα μὲν διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης πολιτείας θηρώμενος τὴν παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν εὐνοίαν, ἅμα δὲ διδοὺς ἐν τῇ μέθῃ καθ' αὐτοῦ παρρησίαν, ἀκριβῶς κατενόει τὴν ἐκάστου διάνοιαν. So Horace,

"Reges dicuntur multis urgere culullis
Et torquere mero," &c.

³ See above, p. 363, note 1. So of Hippias, Thuc. vi. 57. 2.

⁴ Diod. xx. 63; δορυφορούμενος ὑπὸ πλῆθους, εἰς τὰς ἐκκλησίας εἰσῆγει μόνος.

⁵ Ib.; ὑπάρχων δὲ καὶ φύσει γελαστοποιὸς καὶ μέμος, οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἀπείγετο τοῦ σπῶπτεν τοὺς καθημένους καὶ τινας αὐτῶν εἰκάσειν· ὥστε τὸ πλῆθος πολλάκις εἰς γέλωτα ἐκτρέπεσθαι, καθάπερ τινὰ τῶν ἡθολόγων ἢ θαυματοποιῶν θεωροῦντας.

CHAP. XII. who, now and then, even within his own city, was ready, if needs of state called for such a course, to do some deed of slaughter against his enemies which perhaps did not greatly displease his friends.

When we look at the whole sum of his actions, we begin to understand a judgement on him which at first sight startles us. We do not wonder when Polybios, on the authority of Scipio himself, places Agathoklês and Dionysios side by side among the foremost men of action, as men of a small group who had at once the eye to discern and the hand to act¹. We are perhaps amazed when we further hear that Agathoklês, bloodiest of tyrants in his way of gaining power, was mildest of tyrants in his way of using it². Yet of one side of him the saying is true. He was, at least in Sicily after Gelôn's day, the mildest of tyrants. He was also the most treacherous and the most bloody.

§ 3. *Wars of Agathoklês against Sikeliot cities and Carthaginians.*

We are now well pleased to get some glimpses of those inland towns which we once used to look on as Sikel, but which now play their part on the general field of Sicilian history without any visible distinction between them and their Hellenic neighbours. We have seen that, earlier in his career, Agathoklês had won the good will of some of them. The massacre by which he rose to power had been

¹ Pol. xv. 35. 6; διδ καὶ Πόπλιον Σκιπίωνα φασὶ τὸν πρῶτον καταπολεμήσαντα Καρχηδονίους ἐρωτηθέντα τίνας ὑπολαμβάνει πραγματικωτάτους ἄνδρας γεγονέναι καὶ σὺν νῶ τολμηροτάτους, εἰπεῖν τοὺς περὶ Ἀγαθοκλέα καὶ Διονύσιον τοὺς Σικελιώτας.

² Ib. ix. 23. 2; τίς γὰρ Ἀγαθοκλέα τὸν Σικελίας τύραννον οὐχ ἰστόρηκε, διότι, δόξας ὡμότατος εἶναι κατὰ τὰς πρῶτας ἐπιβολὰς καὶ τὴν κατασκευὴν τῆς δυναστείας, μετὰ ταῦτα, νομίσας βεβαίως ἐνδεθέσθαι τὴν Σικελιωτῶν ἀρχήν, πάντων ἡμερώτατος δοκεῖ γεγονέναι καὶ πραότατος. Here again is the notion of a change of character; it would be truer to say that Agathoklês was both ὡμότατος and ἡμερώτατος all along.

largely the work of men of Morgantina¹. After his rise to power, he would seem to have turned against his old friends. We hear at least of his subduing many of the inland towns without mention of their names². CHAP. XII.

We now see the effects of this process. Two of the best-known Sikel sites, now seemingly counting as Greek towns, appear as under the dominion of Agathoklês, or at least as having their strongholds held by his garrisons. This last case, as the experience of Athens herself in this age so often showed, did not necessarily imply that all the forms of a commonwealth came to an end in the town which was thus bridled. It was enough that no open action could be taken against the will of the master. Centuripa, on her height looking out on Ætna, had in this way been brought under the power of Agathoklês. His soldiers kept most likely that one of the five rays of her star which looks to the navel of Sicily over the southern plain. But they held Centuripa against the will of her people, and messages, as in the days of Gellias, passed between Centuripa and Akragas³. The citizens prayed Deinokratês and his force of exiles to come to their help, stipulating only that they should not simply be made to change one master for another, but that Centuripa should again become an independent commonwealth⁴. Centuripa garrisoned by Agathoklês.
Appeals to Akragas.

A large body of the exiles was sent under the command of Nymphodôros on the work of deliverance. They climbed up under cover of night by such paths as then led up the mountain-side, and contrived to make their way into the town. Of the action of the citizens of Centuripa we hear nothing; but the officers who commanded for Agathoklês learned what had happened. They Abortive attempt to free Centuripa.

[¹ See p. 374.]

[² Diod. xix. 9; προσεπελάβετο δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ μεσογείῳ χωρίων καὶ πόλεων τὰς πλείους.] [³ Diod. xix. 103.]

[⁴ Ib.; ἐφ' ᾧ τὴν αὐτονομίαν δοθῆναι τῷ δήμῳ.]

CHAP. XII. fell on Nymphodôros and his party; the captain was slain and the whole body was cut to pieces¹. To the mind of AgathoklĒs the conspiracy against his authority came as an opportunity for a massacre, the first of a long series wrought in one town after another that displeased him. He went, it would seem, in person to Centuripa; he rebuked the people for their opposition to him and slew all who had a hand in the movement². For once a deed of blood is recorded without the numbers of the victims.

Massacre
at Cen-
turipa.

While the lord of Syracuse was thus busy at Centuripa, a threatening blow, but one which proved to be only threatening, was struck at the very heart of his power. Fifty Punic ships³ sailed into the Great Harbour of Syracuse. Nothing is said of its means of defence; the story seems to imply that there was none. That is strange enough; but it sounds stranger still to hear that a Carthaginian fleet in possession of the Syracusan haven found nothing to do but to set upon two harmless merchant-ships. One of them, an Athenian, they sank, and cut off the heads of the crew. This piece of wanton cruelty could hardly have been done by the orders of Hamilkar, who was striving to win allies and subjects for Carthage by a conduct exactly opposite. But men marked that the vengeance of the gods did not fail to light on them that had done this deed to men who had in no way wronged them⁴. When the fleet sailed out of the Great Harbour, some of the ships manned by the offenders were carried far north to the coast of Bruttium. There they fell into the hands of the captains of AgathoklĒs, who did by them as they had done by the Athenians⁵.

Punic ships
enter Great
Harbour.

[¹ Diod. xix. 103.]

[² Ib.; ταύτης τῆς ἀφορμῆς λαβόμενος Ἀγαθοκλῆς ἐνεκάλεσέ τε τοῖς Κεντοριπῖνοις, καὶ τοὺς δόξαντας αἰτίους γεγονέναι τοῦ νεωτερισμοῦ πάντας ἀπέσφαξε.] [³ Ib.; πενήκοντα σκάφειν.]

[⁴ Ib.; ταχὺ δὲ δαίμονιον αὐτοῖς ἐπέσημνηεν.]

[⁵ Ib.; καὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον οἱ ὠγρηθέντες τῶν Φοινίκων ἔπαθον οἷα ἔπραξαν εἰς τοὺς ἄλλοντας.]

Meanwhile another of the old Sikel sites comes into our story. Some way north-west of Centuripa, on the other side of the Kyanosôros, stood Galaria, the home of a valiant people. We have already heard of their gallant, if unlucky deeds, in the wars of Timoleôn¹. And now the men of Galaria, of their own free will, called in Deinokratês to help them to get rid of the garrison which was kept in their town by Agathoklês². He came, with another exile named Philônidês, at the head of no less a force than three thousand foot and two thousand horse. The aggressions and oppressions of Agathoklês were fast swelling the ranks of his enemies. The garrison of Galaria was driven out; Deinokratês formed a camp near the town³, the town itself, we must suppose, being left to the defence of its own citizens. Agathoklês, hearing of his loss, sent a force of five thousand men, under two of his captains, Pasiphilos and Damophilos, to win back the lost town. A pitched battle followed. The force of Deinokratês and Philônidês was drawn out in order, each captain taking the command of one of the wings⁴. The fight went on for a while on equal terms, till Philônidês fell and his wing gave way. The battle was lost; Deinokratês was forced to withdraw, and Galaria fell again—we are not told whether by storm or surrender—into the hands of the captains of Agathoklês. Pasiphilos acted as his master's lieutenant, and chastised those who had brought about the revolt of Galaria. Such are the words of our story⁵. Is the phrase a mere euphemism for another massacre, or are we to suppose that the captains of Agathoklês were satisfied with whips where their master would have wielded his scorpions?

CHAP. XII.
Revolt of
Galaria.

Deino-
kratês
marches to
the help
of the
Galarians.

Is defeated
by Agatho-
klês.

But the recovery of Centuripa and Galaria was a small

[¹ See p. 317.]

[² Diod. xix. 104.]

[² Ib.; *πρὸ τῆς πόλεως ἱστρατοπέδουν.*]

[⁴ Ib.]

[⁵ Ib.; *τοὺς αἰτίους τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἐκόλασαν.*]

CHAP. XII.
Agathoklês turns
against
Akragas
and Cartha-
ginians.

Hamilkar
at Eknomo-
mos.

matter beside the hoped-for prize of Akragas. It was thither that all the energies of Agathoklês were now turned. Things had strangely turned about since, a hundred years before, the commonwealth of Syracuse had sent helpers to guard Akragas against the Punic besiegers¹. It was now on Punic help that Akragas mainly relied for defence against the tyrant of Syracuse. Hamilkar kept his camp on the great advanced post of Akragas, the hill, the all but island, that stands straight in the way of friend or enemy advancing from the east. He held the height of Eknomos, the fortress where Phalaris was thought to have kept the famous bull and which was strangely thought to have taken its name from his unlawful deeds². It looked down on the boundary stream between the lands of Gela and of Akragas, the southern Himeras, whose salt waters wriggle to and fro in the broad dale between the Geloan and the Akragantine hills.

Here Agathoklês saw that his main struggle must be. The scale of the war was growing. It was no longer a question of winning or keeping this or that Sicilian town for the dominion of the lord of Syracuse; it was becoming a struggle for supremacy, almost for existence, between the great powers of Eastern and Western Sicily. The strife of Greek and barbarian, the strife of Timoleôn and of Gelôn, seems to be coming back. Unworthy as was Agathoklês of the Hellenic championship of his predecessors, we find ourselves instinctively falling, we find our guide instinctively falling, into the language of the old days. It is again the Greek and the barbarian that meet face to face³. It may even be that the mouth of the southern Himeras suggests the thought of the great fight by the mouth of its northern namesake. But memories like these are checked by the fact which stares us in the face, that Agathoklês,

[¹ Sicily, iii. 525.]

[² Diod. xix. 108; see Sicily, i. 462.]

[³ Diod. xix. 104, 108.]

encamped between Gela and Akragas, had on each side of him a Greek city which feared Hamilkar less than it feared him. The presence, perhaps only the promised presence, of the Selinuntine contingent on the Phœnician side did not hinder the strife of Gelôn and the first Hamilkar from being truly a strife of Hellas against Canaan. We can hardly give that name to the strife of Agathoklès and the new Hamilkar as long as Akragas and Gela are driven to call in the help of Canaan, in self-defence. It is only when Agathoklès has set his foot on another continent that we begin to give him some feeble share of the good will with which we watched the champions of Hellas march to the banks of Krimisos and of the Himeras of the North.

The Greek was ready for the strife before the barbarian. Agathoklès marched with his full power till he drew near to the Punic camp on Eknomos. His heart was lifted up by the successes of his lieutenants¹. They had won back revolted Centuripa and Galaria; he was himself ready and eager to face the full might of Carthage. But the full might of Carthage was not there. The Punic force on Eknomos was so small that, when Agathoklès challenged the enemy to come forth and fight, he deemed it prudent to keep within his camp. The lord of Syracuse deemed himself master of the open country without striking a blow². He had won some plunder, most likely by harrying the land which the Carthaginian allies of Akragas did not dare to defend. With less prudence than one would have looked for from him, he marched back to Syracuse in triumph, and adorned the chief temples of the city with the spoils of his bloodless campaign.

If Agathoklès really so far forgot the realities of his position as to think that he could afford to neglect the

[¹ Diod. xix. 104; ἐπὶ τοῖς πόλεσι τῇ προγεγενημένῃ νίκῃ.]

[² Ib.; νομίσας ἀκοντὶ κρατεῖν τῶν ἐπαύθρων.]

March of
Agathoklès
on Eknomo-
mos.
B. C. 311.

CHAP. XII. Carthaginian power, he was speedily awakened from his dream.

Military
prepara-
tions of
Carthage.
B.C. 311.

* "The danger from the advance of Agathoklès was well known at Carthage. It was therefore determined to take to the Sicilian war in good earnest; and Hamilkar was sent forth with another of those great fleets and armies that we have so often heard of¹. This one was notable for two things. One was the great number of Balearic slingers²; the other was that, as in the expedition in Timoleôn's day, an unusual number of Carthaginian citizens, many of them men of high rank, were sent to serve. But a great storm met them on their way and sank many ships, specially those that carried the native Carthaginians. The blow was so heavily felt at Carthage that the walls were hung with black as a sign of mourning. Hamilkar saved what he could of the fleet, and made up his numbers by levies in Sicily, till he sat down again on Eknomos at the head of forty thousand foot and five thousand horse³. This was much smaller than the armies which the earlier Punic generals had commanded; but Punic military skill had grown since then, and Hamilkar no longer trusted to the brute force of multitudes. Agathoklès set out to meet them, and did one of his worst deeds on the road. He cunningly surprised Gela; he slew many, plundered the rest, and marched on⁴. He must have heard on the way

Fleet de-
stroyed by
a storm.

Sicilian
levies.

Agathoklès
surprises
Gela.

* From Story of Sicily, p. 239 seqq.

[¹ For the expedition of Hamilkar, see Diod. xix. 106 seqq. Cf. Justin, xxii. 3, who calls him 'filius Giskonis.']

[² Diod. xix. 106; *Βαλιάραι σφενδομήτας χιλιούς.*]

[³ Ib. 108.]

[⁴ Ib. 107. He is said to have slain over 4,000. He then forced the surviving Gelôans to hand over to him all their money and all the

that twenty of his ships had been taken by the Carthaginians in the strait of Messana." CHAP. XII.

§ 4. *Battle of the Himeras.*

The camps, Greek and Phœnician, were thus pitched on two opposite hills, one on each side of the dale of Himeras, at a distance of about five miles apart. Hamilkar kept his old post on the right bank, on the hill of Eknomos. Agathoklēs occupied another point round which, as round Eknomos, gathered the memories of the famous tyrant of old times. The hill on which the Greeks encamped still bore his name; tradition spoke of Phalarion as the site of a fortress of his rearing¹. From these heights the two armies looked out on one another for many days. Both sides shrank from crossing the river. For the tradition of the land had handed on an ancient saying, that near that spot should many men be slain in fight². The voice of fate must have been vague; it could have said nothing about Greeks or barbarians, about men of Syracuse or men of Akragas. There was nothing to raise special hope or to strike special fear into either side. Where the risk was thus equal, neither army cared to be the first to face it; parties went down to plunder on both sides, but each of the main armies sat on its height. Accident at last brought on the great battle, in its scale and results one of the greatest in the whole strife of Greek and Phœnician on Sicilian ground, but in which it is hard to make our hearts

gold and silver they possessed, both coined and uncoined. The coinage of Gela which ceased on the Carthaginian capture in 405 had been revived in Timoleōn's time (see Supplement IV. p. 355). There is now another long gap, lasting till after the Roman Conquest, when bronze coins were again issued by its mint.]

[¹ Diod. xix. 108. Cf. Sicily, ii. 69; Schubring, *Hist. Geogr. Studien über Altisicilien*, places the Phalarion on Monte Cufino, the highest point above Licata.]

[² Diod. xix. 108; φῆμαι δὲ κατεῖχον ἐπὶ τῶν προτέρων χρόνων, ὅτι δεῖ περὶ τὸν τόπον τοῦτον πλεῖστος ἀνθρώπων ἐν μάχῃ διαφθαρῆναι.]

CHAP. XII. go forth with Agathoklês as they go forth with Timoleôn and with Gelôn.

Pre-
liminary
skirmish-
ing.

As when the elder Hamilkar was encamped beside the southern Himeras, the active Libyans went forth in parties to plunder¹. Agathoklês was stirred thereby to send down his men to do the like. He saw what would come; he planted an ambush of picked men close on his own bank of the river. The Greeks, perhaps by special orders, carried their harryings far and wide; they came up close to the Punic camp, and drove off the beasts of burthen which were doubtless resting outside the camp, as they might have done outside an Eastern town. Presently a party, seemingly a considerable party, came forth to chase the daring plunderers. They followed; they crossed the river; at the right place and moment the liers-in-wait of Agathoklês rose up; they fell on the disordered barbarians and drove them back to their camp with great slaughter². Agathoklês deemed that the moment was come to change the skirmish into a battle; he bade his whole army march forth to the attack of the camp of Hamilkar.

Battle
of the
Himera.
[B.C. 310,
June.]

Immediately at the foot of Eknomos, the winding river runs much nearer to the hills on the Akragantine side than to those on the Geloan. Between the stream and the hill is the site of the later town of Phintiás, the modern Licata; we may conceive the camp spreading down to the river, with Eknomos itself for its akropolis. Suddenly the Greek army appeared before its defences. Agathoklês was ready for any need of warfare; his men began speedily to fill up the ditch and to tear up the palisade³. The barbarians were taken by surprise; but they came to the defence with stout hearts, if in no good order. And now came the special calling of the native Carthaginians. With true Semitic spirit, the noblest of the city gave themselves to

[¹ Diod. xix. 108. Cf. Sicily, ii. p. 191.]

[² Ib.]

[³ Ib.; *ταχὺ μέρος τῆς τάφρου χάσας ἀπέσπασε τὸν χάρακα . .*]

fight for the ditch, as if they had been defending captured CHAP. XII.
Motya¹ or Carthage itself. The struggle was stubborn on both sides; but the Greeks seem to have had the advantage of numbers, and they came pressing faster and faster into the camp.

Success stirred up the spirit of the assailants; the Greeks were still pushing forward, the camp of Carthage was all but taken, when Hamilkar bethought himself of a new weapon. It was not by the hand-fighting of the men of the ruling city but by the active and ready skill of one of their bands of mercenaries that the lord of Syracuse was to be checked in his hour of pride. The Spanish sword had for a while made the victory of Gelôn doubtful²; it was the sling of the Balearic islanders³ that was to wrest from the hands of Agathoklès a victory that was all but won. A thousand of them were in the army of Hamilkar, men trained from childhood in the use of their special weapon, men who had played their part in many battles and who had often had no small share in deciding their result. A ceaseless shower of stones, launched with unerring skill, stones of a size which the slingers of Rhodes could not equal, now fell thick and heavy on the Greeks who had made their way within the Punic camp. Some were killed outright, many were wounded; the more part had their defensive armour crushed in and would henceforth fight at a disadvantage⁴. In the face of such a storm there was no advance; the Greeks

[¹ See above, p. 79.]

[² See Sicily, ii. 198.]

[³ Diod. xix. 109. They are described as *μναίους λίθους βάλλειν ειωθότες* . . . *ὡς ἂν ἐκ παιδὸν παρ' αὐτοῖς τῆς ἐν ταῖς σφενδόναυς γυμνασίας διαπονουμένης*. These stones "of a mina's weight" would weigh somewhat over a pound. With regard to the early training of the Balearic slingers, Strabo (iii. 5. 1) relates that children were refused their bread till they had hit it with a sling (cf. Veget. de re mil. i. 16). The Balearic slings were made of rushes.]

[⁴ Diod. xix. 109; *τῶν δὲ πλείστων τὰ σκεπάζοντα τῶν ὅπλων συνέτριβον*.]

CHAP. XII. who had made their first entrance into the camp were driven out discomfited. But the struggle was not over; even the hope of taking the camp had not passed away; different bands of the soldiers of Agathoklès made the assault at different points. The fight was still going on, the camp was again in danger of falling into the hands of the assailants, when the sudden coming of fresh reinforcements turned the day in favour of Carthage.

Cartha-
ginian rein-
forcements
brought up.

Rout of the
Greeks.

It must have been the tidings of the loss in the storm which stirred up the home government of Carthage to send out the second force which reached Sicilian ground at this lucky moment for its purpose. We hear nothing about the new-comers, nothing of their numbers, of their leaders, or of the nature of the troops, nothing save that they did come, and that at once on their coming they took a part in the battle which they found raging. They at once set upon the Greeks who were attacking the camp; they could choose their points, and compass them in on all sides¹. Their coming also raised the spirits of the defenders of the camp; the Greeks, now forced to strive against enemies within and without, presently gave way and took to flight. But flight supplied little safety; five miles of level ground with the river to be crossed lay between the fleers and their camp. The horse of the barbarians, five thousand in number, easily caught them up and slaughtered many. The fight too was fought in the middle of the dog-days, and, when the Greeks turned, the summer sun of Sicily was coming down on them with his noon-tide power². Fire and water were in alliance; Himeras, *Fiume Salso*, unlike loyal Krimisos, showed himself that day the friend of the barbarians. Some fell dead—simply of heat and toil. Others, like the Athenians at Assinaros, urged by a wild thirst, threw themselves into the stream and

[¹ Diod. xix. 109; κύκλω περίσταντο τοὺς Ἕλληνας.]

[² Ib.; ἐπὶ κίνα οὔσης τῆς ὥρας.]

drank eagerly of its salt and baleful waters¹. So many CHAP. XII.
 died by these less wonted forms of death, that of the seven
 thousand Greek corpses which the barbarians reckoned,
 they were amazed to find more than half the number
 without wounds. Five hundred only of the Carthaginian
 host was said to have fallen; yet one would have thought
 that such a strife as the battle for the camp is painted to
 us would have supplied a larger tale of victims.

Such a blow as this, even if we prudently take off some- Greatness
of the
disaster.
 thing from the figures, was a heavy blow to any Greek
 power, even to such a power as the Syracuse of Agathoklês
 had grown into. And it was the more heavy because the
 Syracuse of Agathoklês was a power to which blows of
 such a kind were specially dangerous. Outside the im-
 mediate territory of Syracuse the dominion of the lord of
 Syracuse was a dominion of simple force. The moment he
 was thought to be weaker than a power which was now
 less hateful than his own, his unwilling subjects were sure
 to fall away from him and to join themselves to the
 conqueror. And he did indeed seem weakened by the
 defeat which he had just now undergone by the banks
 of the southern Himeras. The loss of a great battle, less
 awful and terror-striking than such days as the storm of
 Selinous and of Himera, seemed more distinctly to prove
 a failure of military power. Nothing like it had happened
 since Hellas and Canaan had first met in arms in Sicily.
 Carthage, and powers earlier and weaker than Carthage,
 had driven back Pentathlos and Dôrieus; Dionysios, if he
 had gained Punic towns, had also lost them; his brother
 Leptinês had been overthrown by a Punic fleet in a great
 battle by sea. But in all the great fights by land the
 Greek had had the better; no Greek army that had fought
 its way into a Punic camp had been driven out again.

[¹ Diod. xix. 109; ἀλυκοῦ τοῦ βέεματος ὄντος.]

CHAP. XII. Gelôn and Thêrôn had fought their way into the camp by Himera ; Dionysios had fought his way into the camp beneath his own wall on the hill of his own Syracuse. Timoleôn had no Punic camp to storm ; the gods had given

Movements
in Greek
Sicily
against
Agathoklès.

him his crowning mercy in another shape. But now Agathoklès, wielding a power not less than any one of them, had failed as none of them had failed. He had stormed no camp, he had won no battle ; his host had been driven in a murderous flight across the whole width of the plain between Eknomos and Phalarion. The conqueror had ceased to conquer ; it was time that the tyrant should cease to rule. To cast aside the supremacy of Agathoklès, to welcome the less grievous alliance of Hamilkar, was the cry which now went up through all the Hellenic cities of central and eastern Sicily.

The enemies of Agathoklès knew not that the blow which had fallen upon him stirred him at once to deal a yet heavier blow back again. They knew not that in the very hour of overthrow the thought had come into his heart of a deed of daring such as had never before come into the heart of man. Nor could his friends as yet have seen any deeper into his purpose than his enemies. As yet he showed himself only as the defeated general, defeated but not cast down, working with all energy and all coolness to make up as far as might be for the heavy loss which he had undergone. We could be thankful to our collectors of anecdotes for some characteristic picture, whether literally true or false, of the personal bearing of Agathoklès at such a moment. But all that we are told is the general course

Agathoklès
marches to
Gela.

of his actions. He got together the remnant of his scattered army ; he burned his now useless camp on Phalarion¹, and at once marched for Gela. So to do was part of his policy ; it was equally part of his policy to spread abroad a report that he was on his march for Syracuse. So he

[¹ *Diod. xix. 110.*]

was to be presently, but not yet. His object was to go thither, to make ready when he got thither, without let or hindrance. To that end it was well to put the enemy for a while on a false track. CHAP. XII

The object of Hamilkar was less to make an immediate attack on Syracuse than to make ready for an overwhelming attack on Syracuse by bringing all the other cities of Sicily into his alliance. The first meeting of his forces and those of the enemy after both had rested from the great battle showed what was in the minds of both. Three hundred Libyan horsemen overtook some stragglers from the army of Agathoklès. The place must have been in the land of Gela, somewhere between Phalarion and the city. The Greeks said, and the Africans believed, that Agathoklès was already on his way to Syracuse. It did not occur to the Punic officer to press on and up in the Island of Ortygia. The help of an Asdrubal was at that moment more needful to Carthage than the haste of a Maharbal¹. The thought of the leader of the three hundred was that the moment was come to win over Gela to the Punic interest. His own party could at once do this valuable piece of service; in a city which had suffered so much at the hands of Agathoklès, the Gelôan Apollôn himself, now released from his Tyrian bondage², would not forbid his servants to welcome the soldiers of Carthage as their friends. Welcomed as friends they were by the people of Gela; but Agathoklès was already in the town; it was seemingly through his cunning that the Africans were received within the gates, but were presently surrounded by a band of darters, under whose weapons they all perished³. It was open to Agathoklès at this moment to march unheeded to Syracuse; but he reckoned that, if he remained at Gela, the thoughts of his enemies would be drawn off thither, and the Syracusans

Hamilkar
allies him-
self with
Greek
cities.

Libyan
squadron
annihilated
in Gela.

[¹ See Livy, xxii. 51.]

[² See Sicily, iii. 563, 564.]

[³ Diod. xix. 110.]

CHAP. XII. would be able to carry in their ripe corn¹ and whatever else they needed, as in time of peace. With these purposes, Agathoklés, the defeated of the Himéras, with the remnant of his routed army, shut himself within the long walls of Gela, knowing that, by so doing, he was best keeping open the way to Syracuse and the way to lands farther off.

We may curse the tyrant; but we cannot help admiring the captain. The daring and enterprise of Agathoklés, guided, as they always were, by sound reckoning and by military skill, never stood out more brilliantly than in this hour when skill and daring, reckoning and enterprise, seemed all to have failed him. But if, from the mere master of the captain's art, we are tempted to look to the man who uses the captain's art to the great purposes of the world's history, if we strive to think of Agathoklés, like earlier captains of Syracuse, as an Hellenic and European champion, we shall see that character fast dropping away from him every moment. The horsemen of Africa had been welcomed by the men of Gela. Agathoklés now held Gela, and Hamilkar made it his first object to besiege him there. But, when he saw how firm a hold the tyrant had on the city, how sternly he was bent on defence, how well provided he was with all that was needed for defence², the Punic general turned away from the assault of Gela to win over other Greek cities by easier means.

Hamilkar
turns away
from Gela.

And the means were easy; he had but to march to and fro, to this town, to that castle, dealing friendly with all whom he had to deal with, and everywhere making proclamation for the cities of Sicily to enter into alliance with the Punic deliverer. We have seen how few years it may take, when policy turns on the will of a single man, for a power that was yesterday worthily

[¹ Diod. xix. 110. The Sicilian harvest-time is in June, which gives the time of year when these events took place.]

[² Ib.]

hailed as a deliverer to win for itself the loathing of an oppressor. An European state, set free from the yoke of the barbarian, may soon come to look on the barbarian himself as less hateful than the power that set it free. So it was in Hellenic and Hellenized Sicily when Agathoklès stood in the place of Timoleôn. Not forty years before, city after city had opened its gates to welcome the true deliverer who came to drive away at once the domestic tyrant and the barbarian enemy. Now city after city sent forth its envoys to call on the barbarian enemy to free them from the man into whose hands the power of Timoleôn had passed. Tauromenion, first spot of Sicilian soil to welcome the deliverer from Corinth, had now to mourn and to avenge her slaughtered citizens, to mourn perhaps that the son of her second founder could no longer set down the story of his people at his father's hearth¹. Katanê, freed by Timoleôn from Mamercus, had either seen, or feared to see, a worse than Mamercus come to reign over her². Leontinoi had at least to mourn the loss of freedom; she had perhaps further to mourn a slaughter wrought among her hills such as Hiketas had never plotted. Kamarina, hard by the tyrant's path from Gela to his own Syracuse, perhaps dreaded before all things that the next moment might make her as Gela was. From these towns and from a crowd of others envoys thronged to the camp of Hamilkar, offering their friendship and hailing the old enemy as a new deliverer. The movement spread; presently more envoys came from more distant Messênê on the strait, from Abacenum among the northern hills, from this city and that, each hastening, out of common hatred to the tyrant, out of joy that, as they deemed, his power was broken, to plight their good will to one who, barbarian as he was, promised

[¹ Timaios was banished by Agathoklès (Diod. Fr., lib. xxi), but the date of the banishment is uncertain.]

[² For the defection of Katanê and the other cities, see Diod. xix. 110.]

CHAP. XII.
Hamilkar's
alliance
sought by
Sicilian
Greeks.

CHAP. XII. so fair¹. It was the crowning feat of Phœnician art, an ancient art preached on a new scale and to new ends, to beguile Greek cities to forget that though Hamilkar might be a worthier leader than Agathoklês, yet Agathoklês might give way to a new Timoleôn, while Canaan, even with Hamilkar as its chief, could never become ought but Canaan.

§ 5. *Agathoklês in Africa.*

Meanwhile the Greek who had turned so many Greek commonwealths against him knew his own purpose. He had done his immediate work. Hamilkar had turned from Gela to receive the friendly greetings of the whole land from Kamarina to Abacænum. But, the while he gathered his allies, no foe had trodden the road to Syracuse. The crops were coming in freely; no man hindered the reapers. In what case he left Gela we are not told; he tarried there as long as he had need to tarry. He then marched to Syracuse. He repaired whatever was dangerous in the defence²; he secured the stores of corn; he got together within the walls such forces as were needed. But for what were they needed? The thoughts of Agathoklês were not in Syracuse; they were not in Gela; they were not in Kamarina or in Abacænum. From the height which Gelôn and Dionysios had fenced in, he could look out over the southern sea, the sea beyond which lay the home of the enemy. It was beyond those well-known waves, in the land no less well known to peaceful traders, but where no warrior of Hellas had ever set his foot, that the potter of Therma, the lord of Syracuse, had found his calling for all time. [It was to Libya, to the homeland of Carthage itself, that Agathoklês now set sail.]

Agathoklês
returns to
Syracuse,

and sets
sail for
Africa.
[Aug. 15,
B.C. 310.]

* "He left his brother Antandros to command in Syracuse [with Erymnôn an Aitolian soldier of fortune as his more

[¹ Diod. xix. 110; καὶ πάντων ἐχρήτο φιλασθέντος, ἐκαλούμενος τοὺς Σικελιώτας πρὸς εὐνοίαν.] [² Ib.; τὰ πεποιημένα τῶν τειχῶν ἐπισκεύασε.]

* From Story of Sicily, p. 243.

active colleague]; his two sons Archagathos and Hérakleidés went with him. Many guesses were made as to his intended course; but none knew¹. The next day the whole fleet was frightened by an eclipse of the sun (August 15, B.C. 310²), but all still obeyed, and on the seventh day of their voyage they reached Africa. [The Carthaginian ships had followed them but they were beaten off and Agathoklés was able to land his forces] in the Peninsula opposite to Carthage, a little way south-west of the promontory now known as Cape Bon³. ”

CHAP. XII.
Landing
of Aga-
thoklés
near Cape
Bon.

The Greek had thus the better both in the race and the fight. Agathoklés was able to land his forces without further hindrance on the shore of Libya. The place was

[¹ For Agathoklés' voyage to Libya and the calculations on which it was based, see Diod. xx. 1-5; Justin, xxii. 4, 5; and cf. Grote, ch. xcvi., and Holm, G. S. ii. 236, 237. Agathoklés amongst other methods for raising the necessary funds resorted to some of Dionysios' financial devices. He seized the votive offerings of the temples and the jewellery of the women, and took possession of the property of orphans, of whom, like Dionysios, he seems to have constituted himself the official guardian, promising to repay the sums thus taken when the wards came of age. He also levied forced loans on the merchants, and contrived a massacre of some of the rich and disaffected citizens, followed by a confiscation of their goods. He set sail from Syracuse with sixty vessels (cf. Polyæn. v. 3. 5) and 13,500 soldiers, mostly mercenaries. See Diod. xx. 11.]

[² The date of the eclipse as calculated by Baily (Phil. Trans. 1811, p. 238) and other astronomers (cf. Wiese, de Agathocle, p. 95) was Aug. 15, 310 B.C. Dr. Julius Zech (über die wichtigeren Finsternisse, &c., des klassischen Alterthums, Leipzig, 1853, pp. 34, 47, 48) fixes the date as "Aug. 14. — 309." By 309, however, he appears to mean B.C. 310 (according to the antiquated French way of reckoning), and thus differs from other astronomers by a day only.]

[³ This is Barth's conjecture (Wanderungen auf den Küstenländern des Mittelmeeres, i. 131-133, and see Grote, ch. xcvi.), who supposes that Agathoklés landed at a flat inlet west of Cape Bon, where ancient and extensive stone-quarries may still be seen. It is near the eastern entrance of the gulf in which Carthage lay. Cf. too Maltzan, Reise in Tunis, &c., ii. 308 seqq., and Tissot, Géographie comparée de la Province romaine d'Afrique, 174. The modern name is El-Haouria, which appears to occupy the site of the Aquilaria of the Civil Wars (Tissot, l. c.).]

CHAP. XII. known in Greek as the *Latomiai* or stone-quarries¹, some
 Landing of Aga- Phœnician name being thus translated into a word so
 thoklès in memorable in the topography and history of Syracuse.
 Africa. He encamped on a peninsular point, which he fortified
 by drawing a trench from sea to sea, and drew his ships
 on land.

B.C. 310. It was no small moment in the history of the world
 when the first European army, pioneer of so many that were
 to follow, from the days of Regulus to our own, set foot on
 the continent from which so many armies had come to lay
 waste European lands and cities. Rome was in the end to
 do the work, but it was well that the first blow should
 come from Syracuse. Agathoklès had done what none had
 done before him, what, as far as we know, no leader of
 Syracuse, no lord of Syracuse, had ever dreamed of. He
 stood on the shore of Africa as the conscious avenger of
 Syracuse and Sicily, as the unconscious champion of
 Europe, the unconscious teacher of her future champions.
 Well might we wish that such a calling had fallen to one
 more worthy, to Hermokratès or to Timoleôn. But it was
 to the tyrant, not to the deliverer, that it fell to lead the
 way on this great enterprise. And, could he but have
 kept his hands clean from fresh crime while that enterprise
 was a-doing, we might have striven, while telling the
 tale of his warfare in Africa, to forget his deeds in Sicily
 before and after.

He had done, as his historian remarks, a daring deed,
 and he followed it up by one more daring still. With such
 frightful odds against him, rashness might well become
 prudence, rashness at least of that kind which stirs men
 up to the feeling that they have no hope but in their
 own hearts and their own swords. Agathoklès would cut
 off his own retreat; he would make it hopeless for his fol-
 lowers to think of returning except as conquerors. The

[¹ Diod. xx. 6.]

ships of Syracuse had brought them to Africa; the ships of vanquished Carthage should take them back to Sicily. CHAP. XII.

The resolve of Agathoklès was carried out with much of religious solemnity and somewhat of theatrical display. He first took his officers into the secret, and found no opposition on their part. He then sacrificed to the Goddesses of Sicily, to the Mother and her Child, and called the military assembly together¹. Clad in a garment of shining white, speaking friendly to all who came immediately in his path, the lord of Syracuse harangued the invaders of Africa. When the Carthaginian fleet was still pursuing them, he had vowed to the Goddesses to light up all his ships with torches in their honour². The patronesses of Sicily had brought them safely to the enemy's land; they must now perform the vow. For whatever offerings they made now, the Goddesses would repay them, if they strove bravely, an hundredfold; for they had caused the victims to foretell victory in the warfare which they had undertaken.

It is not clear whether the somewhat ambiguous words of Agathoklès were understood by all his army; but his meaning was soon made plain enough. A servant brought him a blazing torch; another such was given to the captain of every trireme. Again calling on the Goddesses, Agathoklès, torch in hand, went on board his own admiral's ship, and standing at the stern bade the rest to do as he did. The tyrant and his captains, as one man, each set fire to his own ship³; the flames blazed speedily on high; the trumpets

[¹ For Agathoklès' sacrifice to Démêtér and Korè and the subsequent execution of his vow, see Diod. xx. 7; and cf. Justin, xxii. 6.]

[² Diod. xx. 7; ἔφησε ταῖς κατεχούσαις Σικελίαν θεαῖς Δήμητρι καὶ Κόρῃ πεποιῆσθαι εὐχὰς, λαμπαδεύσειν ἀπάσας τὰς ναῦς.]

[³ Ib.; τῶν ὑπηρετῶν τις προσήνεγκεν ἡμμένῃν δῶδα· ἦν δεξάμενος, καὶ τοῖς τριηράρχαις ὁμοίως ἀπασι προστάξας ἀναδούναι, τὰς τε θεὰς ἐπεκαλέσατο, καὶ πρῶτος ὤρμησεν ἐπὶ τὴν ναυαρχίδα τριήρη, στὰς δ' ἐπὶ τὴν πρῶμῃαν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ παραπλήσιον ποιεῖν παρεκελεύετο. This dedication of the ships to the Sicilian Nether Goddesses seems to have been paralleled by an earlier episode of Syracusan history. On some Syracusan coins struck at

CHAP. XII.
Devotion
of the
ships to
the Nether
Goddesses.

sounded a war-note; the whole army shouted aloud, praying and vowing for a safe return. The Shophet of Carthage on the coast of Sicily had once given his body to be burned as an offering to the gods of Canaan. And now the lord of Syracuse on the soil of Africa gave the fleet of Syracuse to be burned as an offering to the Goddesses of Sicily.

Motives
for the act.


There was now no hope for a defeated army; but those for whom Dêmêtêr and the Korê fought could never be defeated. The invaders of Africa must go back as conquerors or not at all; but faithless was he who doubted of their going back as conquerors.

Things did not, as we shall see, turn out exactly according to these alternatives. And it is added that, beside the grander motive that was avowed, Agathoklès had other and lowlier reasons for getting rid of his ships. With the force that he brought, he could not afford to leave a detachment to guard them, and to leave them unguarded was simply to make a present of them to the enemy¹. These more prosaic arguments were perhaps not announced to the host in general. But the high-strung enthusiasm

the time of the sea victory over the Athenians in the Great Harbour a design appears which, as I have elsewhere pointed out (Syr. Meds. 131), clearly refers to the devotion of the naval trophies—in part, no doubt, to ships themselves—by fire to the Chthonic Goddess. Upon the type in question Persephoné in her car is seen holding aloft a lighted torch, towards which Nikê flying forward stretches forth an *ἀπλαστρον* or aplustre, the ornament of the poop of one of the captured vessels. In the present instance too, as if following the same ritual procedure, Agathoklès and his captains first apply their torches to the stern of the ships (*πρύμνα*), and would naturally have begun with its projecting ornament or *ἀπλαστρον*.]

[¹ The three practical motives of Agathoklès for his act as given by Diodôros (xx. 7) were, (1) that his soldiers should realize that defeat meant annihilation; (2) that no part of his force should be drawn off to guard the ships; (3) that they should not fall into Carthaginian possession. Cortès when with the advice of his captains he destroyed his ships at Vera Cruz did so that his troops might know that their only salvation lay in God and their own courage, and to be able to employ his seamen for military service on land (Bernal Diaz, *Historia de la Conquista de la Nueva España*, c. lviii, lix).]





to which the speech and the symbolic action of Agathoklès CHAP. XII. had stirred up his followers soon began to give way. Under the fascination of the moment, all had admired the deed, without stopping to think of the strait in which it left them. Now they began to remember where they were, how wide a sea rolled between them and their homes, and their hearts sank again.

The only way, their general saw, was to give them March on Megalépolis. something at once to cheer them, something in the way of victory, something in the way of plunder. And plunder indeed there was easily to be had, plunder such as perhaps no other region of the world could have supplied. In the immediate territory of Carthage war was as little known, the presence of an enemy was as little looked for, as they had been at Sparta till the spell was broken by Epameinondas. The march aimed at a town whose Phœnician name had, on Greek lips, put on the same shape as the Arkadian creation of the great Theban. The Great City—*Megalé Polis*—was the first object of attack.

The march lay through a fertile district cultivated to Fertility of the district. the highest point of the agricultural skill of the time. It was full of the country-houses, the gardens and home-farms, of the richest men of Carthage. There were goodly houses with their rich stuff, stored with the wealth of their owners, gardens and fields well watered with artificial streams, and rich with every kind of crop, with every tree and plant that served to the enjoyments of man. Africa no longer needed to import the wine and oil of Akragas; here were vineyards, there were olive-groves¹, not, we may suppose, of such stunted and un-

[¹ Diod. xx. 8; ἡ δὲ χώρα ἥ μὲν ἦν ἀμπελόφυτος, ἡ δὲ ἐλαιοφόρος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν καρπίμων δένδρων ἀνάπλεες. In xiii. 81, on the other hand (cf. Sicily, ii. 390), he had spoken of the Akragantines exporting their wine and oil to Carthage; οὕτω γὰρ κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους τῆς Λιβύης πεφυτευμένης. This last statement refers to the middle of the fifth century, but that Carthaginian Africa should have been so far behind

CHAP. XII. heeded growth as we now see in that land, but doubtless rivalling the richest fruits of Sicily or of modern Liguria. Herds of oxen fed on the pasture-ground; the marshes hard by nourished troops of horses¹. All this wealth, the gathering of ages of undisturbed prosperity, lay before the hungry eyes of the soldiers of Agathoklès as the spoil which was to be the reward of victory. The district would seem not to have been systematically plundered on the march; such licence might have relaxed discipline before a blow had been struck; but enough must have been gathered in the mere passage through such a land to whet not a little the appetite for more. At last the Great City was reached². The coming of the invaders was wholly unlooked for; the citizens had never seen war, and it would almost seem that a garrison was thought needless³. Agathoklès brought up his forces against the walls; the town was taken by a sudden assault, and was given up to plunder. We can hardly conceive that the surrounding district could have any longer escaped.

Plunder of
Cartha-
ginian ter-
ritory.

Something had thus been done to reward the toils and further to raise the hopes of the men who a few days

the opposite coast of Sicily in the culture of the vine and olive is highly improbable, and from the recent discovery of a vessel with impressed olive-leaves round its border in a Sikeli tomb of Mykénæan date near Syracuse (Orsi, *Necropoli Sicula presso Siracusa*, 1893, p. 21) it now appears probable that olive culture in Sicily goes back at least to the twelfth century B.C. At the present day this part of the Carthaginian coastland is bare and desolate.]

[¹ Diod. xx. 8; τὰ πλεῖστον ἔλη φορβάδων ἱππων ἔγεμε. In the matter of horses Northern Africa still maintains its Libyan traditions.]

[² Megalépolis has been identified by Shaw and others with Soliman, by Barth with Missua (Sidi-Daoud-en-Noubi), but Tissot (*Province romaine d'Afrique*, 537) rejects both these identifications. He considers that Agathoklès in marching on Carthage must have left the impracticable Kourbès range on the left and passed through the centre of the peninsula. An "episcopus Megalopolitanus" figures among the lists of African bishops, but no other mention of Megalépolis occurs.]

[³ Diod. xx. 8; τῶν ἐνδον διὰ τὴν ἀγνοίαν καὶ τὴν τῶν πολέμων ἀπειρίαν ὀλίγον ὑποστάντων χρόνον, κ.τ.λ.]

before thought that they had left hope behind them. But they were not to loiter; they pressed on to reap the spoil of another wealthy Punic town where it is easier to call up their presence than in the unknown Great City. Their course must have led them along to the southern shore of the Gulf of Tunis, to the city which still keeps the name and still deserves the epithet which it bore in the days of Agathoklés. White Tunis¹, as it is called in our narrative, whatever it owed its whiteness to then, owes it now to the passionate love of whitewash which it shares with the other Saracen towns of its neighbourhood, with Susa and with Kairouan. Of its Punic days it contains not a sign; of its Roman days we meet with, we stumble over, the memorials at every step. The Tunis of the days of Agathoklés has vanished; but the Tunis of the days of Cyprian and Gaiseric lives in the columns and capitals, here lying unheeded, there built up by hundreds in the buildings of the Saracen city. But the epithet shows that the Tunès against which Agathoklés marched must have had the same general air in the distant view as the Tunis which in the sixteenth century bowed to the last crowned and anointed Augustus, and which the later days of the nineteenth have gone far to make once more part of the Latin world. Planted on the eastern slope of the steep isthmus which divides its two lakes, its higher ground looks over the more famous of the two, the lake, the *stagnum* of Tunis, home of the tall flamingo, to the thin rim of land, the *tania* of later story², pierced by the narrow neck which joins the inner

CHAP. XII.
March
of Aga-
thoklés on
Tunès.

[¹ τὸν Λευκὸν Τύνητα καλούμενον. See above, p. 96, note 2.]

[² In an article on Tunis in "The Speaker" of April 12, 1890, Mr. Freeman speaks of the projected destruction of "the low and slender ridge of land which parts the Gulf of Tunis from the Lake of Tunis. In the last Roman siege of Carthage we hear of the *tania*; in the African warfare of Charles V. a great part is played by *La Goletta*. That narrow rim of land is the *tania* and *La Goletta* is strictly the narrow channel by which the *tania* is pierced, furnishing the only means of approach from the Gulf to the Lake."]

CHAP. XII.
Tunis and
Carthage.

lake to the open bay beyond. And in looking on that thin rim of land and on the neighbouring shore of the lake, men then looked on Carthage. They looked on its hills, on its buildings, doubtless gleaming white in the sun of Africa, on the mighty threefold wall, on the Bozrah, home, so legend said, of Didô, where the holy place of Saint Lewis has supplanted the holy place of Esmoun¹. They looked on the further hill beyond the walls, divided now between the saints of Islam and a prince of the Roman Church, on the furthest hill of all, with its sides honey-combed with Punic graves, perhaps with some burrowings even older than the days of Punic settlement². From the high ground within the present inner wall of Tunis, which likely enough represents the extent of the Punic city, Agathoklês might look on the goal of his journey, on the richest city of Phœnicia and the world, as a prey which lay near indeed to the invaders' hands. A strange warfare indeed it was, when at the same moment the hosts of Carthage threatened Syracuse and the hosts of Syracuse threatened Carthage.

Tunis
taken by
Agathoklês.

We have no details of the taking of Tunis, not even so much as the few words which record the taking of the Great City. We hear only that, by some means or other, either by storm or by surrender, the town came into the hands of Agathoklês³. But there must be some confusion

[¹ Mr. Freeman in an article on Carthage, written on the spot (see *Historical Essays*, vol. iv. p. 1 seqq.), refers to the dedication of a new Latin metropolitan church here. "The Bozrah of Dido, the royal seat of Gaiseric, the official dwelling of the Proconsuls of Rome, is now the hill of Saint Lewis. It was already crowned with his chapel when France was a foreign power; since the political supremacy of France has in some sort restored Africa to the Latin world it has been further crowned by the metropolitan church of the primate of Algiers and Carthage." *Op. cit.* p. 18.]

[² *Djebel Khâwi* = the hollow hill, known as the Catacomb hill.]

[³ *Diod. xx. 8*; *ἔχειρῶσατο τὴν πόλιν*. Diodôros makes Tunês distant 2,000 stadia from Carthage—a patent error. It was only about 120 stadia, or 14 miles, from Carthage; *Polyb. i. 67*.]

in the story when our guide goes on to tell us that the soldiers wished to occupy the two towns which had been taken, as store-houses for their plunder, but that Agathoklés, following the same policy as that of the burning of the ships, destroyed the two towns and encamped in the open country¹. What happened is not easy to say; at Tunis at least it is certain that he could not even have slighted the walls; for somewhat later in the story Tunis appears as a walled town, held by Agathoklés and besieged by a Carthaginian force². That somewhat later he had a camp outside the town appears from the same account; but for that there may have been many reasons. Discipline might be relaxed in quarters within the city; and it may be that it was expedient to spare the people of Tunis as much as might be. Carthage was not loved either by African subjects or by Phœnician allies. We shall presently see some towns joining the invaders out of sheer hatred of their harsh mistress³. Tunis too may well have been one of those disaffected towns with whose inhabitants it was the policy of the invader to keep on good terms. Near to Carthage as they were, they may have been well pleased to have the protecting camp of Syracuse pitched near their walls, without receiving the motley host of Agathoklés into their own dwellings.

*"Agathoklés now made Tunis his head-quarters"

[¹ But, as Meltzer (*Gesch. d. Karthager*, i. 371) points out,—the statements are not necessarily inconsistent,—it is unlikely that Agathoklés could have found time to destroy the city walls, however much these houses may have been destroyed by fire within. It does not therefore seem necessary to suppose with Holm (*G. S.* ii. 477) and others that there were two Tunises; one distinguished from the other by the epithet of "White."]

[² *Diod.* xx. 17.]

[³ *Ib.*; see below, p. 417.]

* From *Story of Sicily*, pp. 243, 244.

[⁴ *Tunés* (cf. *Grote*, ch. xvii.) was the natural starting-point of an enemy in making an attack on Carthage. The revolted Libyans in 396 B.C., Regulus in his first invasion of Carthaginian territory, the revolted mercenaries and native Africans at the close of the first Punic War, made it successively their base of operations.]

CHAP. XII. throughout the war. The Carthaginians made all things ready for defence, and put two generals, Hannôn and Bomilkar, at the head of their army. This was on the strange ground that they were personal enemies, and would therefore each try to excel the other¹. Hannôn was a brave soldier, and did his duty; Bomilkar was already suspected of aiming at tyranny, and was perhaps in league with Agathoklës.

Defeat of the Carthaginians. A battle followed, between Tunis and Carthage², which reversed the fortunes of the fight by the Himéras. The Greeks won a great victory, putting the Sacred Band of Carthage to flight, and taking the Punic camp³. The whole

[¹ Diod. xx. 10. Grote shrewdly observes on this (ch. xvii.), "What is more probable, each had a party sufficiently strong to prevent the separate election of the other."]

[² For an account of the battle, see Diod. xx. 10-13, and cp. Grote, ch. xcvii., Holm, G. S. ii. 239, 240. The Carthaginians put into the field 40,000 foot soldiers, 1,000 cavalry, and 2,000 war-chariots. Agathoklës had to oppose them a force of only 13,500. It consisted of 3,500 Syracusans, 3,000 Greek mercenaries, 3,000 Samnite, Etruscan, and Gaulish mercenaries, 2,500 troops not more nearly described, 1,000 chosen hoplites with Agathoklës' guard, and 500 archers and alingers. To make a show of a reserve he is said to have equipped his ships' crews with sticks and the leathern cases of shields, and to have revived the drooping courage of his troops, in the face of such odds, by letting fly a number of small owls which he had collected for the purpose. The birds of Athénë perched on the warriors' shields and helmets and were taken as an omen of victory. How Agathoklës could have managed to effect what Diodôros describes is not easily intelligible, and Schubert (Op. cit. p. 111) sets the whole story down to the invention of Douris. A piece of numismatic evidence has indeed been taken to show that some omen of victory was actually drawn from owls on this occasion. On a gold stater struck by Agathoklës some time after his victory of 310 and bearing for the first time his name in the form ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΑΕΟΞ, though still without the kingly title, an owl appears before the winged figure of Pallas Promachos (Imhoof-Blumer, Num. Zeitschr. iii. Pl. v. fig. 2, and p. 43; Head, Coinage of Syracuse, 46, 47, but see below, p. 488); and the same emblem appears beside the head of Athénë on some of his silver staters. It is possible therefore that, though, in the form handed down to us, the story has doubtless been worked up, there is some substratum of truth in it. Grote (l. c.) compares Louis Napoléon's eagle.]

[³ The Carthaginian Sacred Band bore the brunt of the action under

open country was now in the hands of Agathoklés. The Carthaginians could only keep themselves shut up in their city¹. Their consciences smote them that they had neglected the due honours of their gods. So they sent sacred embassies to their metropolis Tyre², and caused five hundred children of the chief houses of Carthage to pass through the fire to Moloch³."

CHAP. XII.
Human
sacrifice
of Cartha-
ginians to
Moloch.

the Shophet Hannôn. His fall was the signal for the treasonable retreat of his colleague Bomilkar with the other wing, thus leaving the Sacred Band unsupported. The loss of the Carthaginians was variously given (Diod. xx. 13) from one to six thousand, while Agathoklés is said to have lost only 200, according to Diodôros; according to Justin (xxii. 6) 2,000. Among the spoils of the Carthaginian camp were 20,000 manacles (no doubt an exaggerated number), which they had brought with them to bind their prisoners. Trophies of a like kind were taken from the Spanish Armada, and one of them is still preserved in the Ashmolean Museum at Oxford.]

[¹ Diod. xx. 13; 'Αγαθοκλῆς Καρχηδονίους παραλόγως νικήσας τειχίρεις συνείχεν. Agathoklés (Justin, xxii. 6) encamped only five miles from Carthage.]

[² They sent great offerings—notably gold shrines from their temples—to the Tyrian Héraklés or Melkart (Diod. xx. 14.)]

[³ Moloch, the Phœnician *Milk*,—so frequent an element in Carthaginian personal names,—is here given by Mr. Freeman in Biblical language, as the equivalent of Diodôros' Κρόνος. Milk=king, and is used as an appellative of the chief God of various Semitic tribes. The use of this title is in all these cases connected with the sacrifice of children, and it is natural, therefore, to identify the Kronos of Diodôros with the Carthaginian divinity in whose name the same appellative forms an integral part—namely, Melkart (מלך קרת) = "the king of the city"—in other words, Baal-Chammân, the chief God of Carthage, whose name is regularly invoked in her votive inscriptions. On some of the votive Carthaginian *stelæ* (cf. Baudissin, *Jahve et Moloch*, p. 45) Baal-Chammân has the title "King of Eternity." The inscriptions of Roman Africa, however, supply the most conclusive grounds for identifying the chief Carthaginian divinity Melkart or Baal-Chammân with the "Kronos" of Diodôros. On these he is regularly translated by "Saturnus." So too Servius (ad *Æn.* i. 729) writes, "Saturnus lingua Punica Bal deus dicitur;" and we have the direct statement of Eupolemos (ap. Euseb. *præp.* ev. 9. 17), Βαβυλωνίους γὰρ λέγειν πρῶτον γενέσθαι Βῆλον ὃν εἶναι Κρόνον. At Byblos indeed, and perhaps elsewhere, as may be gathered from the euhemeristic account of Philo, Kronos seems to have been identified rather with El, "the father of Baal and son of Heaven;" but Eduard Meyer does not seem justified in

CHAP. XII. Moloch was thus appeased, and the guilty conscience of the commonwealth of Carthage had found its absolution¹.

Phœnician craft then set itself to devise the means of repairing defeat by claiming an imaginary victory. Carthage had after all something in the shape of Syracusan trophies. When Agathoklēs burned his ships, their brazen prows were left behind, and the fleet which had chased him in vain to his landing-place was at least able to carry off these relics and to take them to Carthage². There an use was found for them. Messengers were sent to Hamilkar before Syracuse with two stories, one for the world at large, the other for the private ear of the general. They carried with them the Syracusan prows, and they were to show them as visible proof of the great victory which they claimed for Carthage. The invaders of Africa had been smitten by land and sea; fleet and army had been swept away; here was all that was left of them³. Hamilkar was to hear another tale. To him the truth was to be told; he was to be bidden at once to send help to Africa;

The brazen prows of Agathoklēs' ships shown as trophies by Carthaginians.

his opinion (Art. *El* in Roscher's Lexicon) that at Carthage too the same identification is required. Neither does the fact that Melkart in another aspect appears as the Tyrian Hēraklēs by any means exclude the further equation with Kronos. The Sicilian Ras Melkart, as we have seen, is Hērakleia—but the Hērakleia of Minōs. And Minōs takes us back to the grimmer notion of "the King." One account of the Cretan cult (Porph. De Abst. ii. 52) makes the Kourētes sacrifice the children to "Kronos."]

[¹ It was said (Diod. xx. 14) that of late Carthaginian citizens in offering their vows to Kronos had tried to palm off on him children not their own whom they had privily bought and fed up (*θρέψαντες*) for the purpose. Two hundred children were now chosen from the noblest Carthaginian houses, and three hundred besides, who were suspected of having been saved by this sinful substitution, gave themselves up, or were given up by their parents, for the sacrifice (Diod. l. c., and cf. Festus ap. Lactantium, Inst. Div. i. 21; Justin, xviii. 6. 12; and see Grote, ch. xcvi.). The statue of "Kronos" was of bronze, with his hands, palms upwards, stretched towards the ground, so that the victims fell off them into the fiery pit before him (*ἱερευαὶς τὰς χεῖρας ὑψίας ἐγκεκλιμένας ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, ὥστε τὸν ἐπιτεθέντα τῶν παιδῶν ἀποκυλίσθαι καὶ πίπτειν εἰς τι χάσμα πληρὲς πυρός*).

[² Diod. xx. 15.]

[³ Ib.]

to save Carthage was a greater object than even to capture CHAP. XII.
Syracuse.

The wile succeeded for a time; dismay was spread Dismay at Syracuse.
to all Syracuse; Antandros and his counsellors, hardly
knowing what to believe, dreaded before all things
a movement of the disaffected party in the city. The Exile of disaffected.
measures that they took were swift and stern, but they
were mild compared with some of the doings of their
master. Where he might have slaughtered, they only
banished. Besides others who were suspected on their own
account, the friends and kinsfolk of the exiles with Deino-
kratès, men, women, and children, to the number, it is said,
of eight thousand, were at once driven from Syracuse¹.
A pathetic picture is given of their sorrow, their wailings,
their mourning for the supposed dead, their clinging to
hearths and altars at which they were not allowed to
linger. They went forth, almost like the multitudes which
a hundred years earlier had gone forth from Akragas and
from Gela. But they were better off than the useless
mouths that were sent forth from Rouen when King Henry
of England lay before its walls. Hamilkar gave them Exiles kindly received by Hamilkar.
protection and shelter. Mildness was throughout his policy,
and these banished ones were in some sort sufferers in the
cause of Carthage. The exact spot of his encampment
at this stage is not marked; it was clearly not far from
Syracuse, but not immediately under any part of its long
line of defence. He now marched his army nearer to
the city. He hoped that the dismay caused by the false
message and the lack of any seeming help would work on
the minds of its defenders. From his new position he
sent a message to Antandros and his colleagues in com-
mand, calling on them to surrender Syracuse, and promising
safety for themselves².

[¹ The account of their expulsion and reception by Hamilkar is given
in Diod. xx. 15.]

[² Diod. xx. 16.]

CHAP. XII. We are carried back to the memorable day when Gonylos sailed into the Little Harbour just in time to hinder the carrying out of the vote to treat with Nikias¹. Antandros, Erymnôn, and their fellows met in council. The tyrant's brother, a man, we are told, who had no share in the tyrant's energy, was for surrender². The mercenary from Aitôlia had a stouter heart. His words won over all the assembled officers to hold out till they should at least more distinctly hear the truth³. Hamilkar, baffled of his hope of marching into Syracuse without further effort, brought up his engines for an assault on such parts of the wall as they could reach⁴. But the true tale of all that had been done in Africa was already on the road. Straightway after his victory Agathoklês had built two vessels of thirty oars. One of these he manned with his best rowers under Nearchos, one of his most trusted friends, and bade them take the news to Syracuse. Winds and waves were in their favour, and on the night of the fifth day of their voyage they were close off the harbour of Syracuse. Thinking their toils over, they put on wreaths and sang the pæan of thanksgiving, and with the morning-light they began to row towards the city. But the Punic guard-ships were ware of them and gave chase. The space between pursuers and pursued was small; it became a simple trial of rowing between Greek and Phœnician⁵. If anything could stir the hearts and arms of

Syracusans
reject sum-
mons to
surrender.

Vessel
of Aga-
thoklês
brings
news of his
victory.

[¹ See Sicily, iii. 237 seqq.]

[² Diod. xx. 16; *ὃν ἀνάνδρος φύσει καὶ τῆς τάδεαφοῦ τόλμης καὶ πράξεως ἐναντίας ἔχον διδάθεσιν.*]

[³ Ib.; *διακαρτερεῖν μέχρις ἂν πύθωνται τῶληθός.*]

[⁴ Ib.]

[⁵ Ib.; *ἀγὼν τῆς εἰσεσίας ἐγίνετο.* Schubert (op. cit. 122) regards the "rowing-match" and what precedes it as a bit of colouring introduced by the inventive art of Douris. Diodôros' account of the crew putting on wreaths and singing pæans at the moment when their natural object would have been to escape the notice of the Carthaginian guardships in the early dawn is certainly absurd. The whole is little more than a repetition of what has been already said in ch. 6. There too we have the sudden

either side to yet greater efforts, it was that, as on the day of the last fight of Athens and Syracuse in the Great Harbour, the besieged multitude within the walls and the Punic army without were both gazing at the race. Unable as yet to give any help to their toiling countrymen, the men of Syracuse stood ready with darts in their hands, and meanwhile stirred up the crew to yet greater efforts by their cheering voices. But helpers were not lacking to the city. On the elder day Héraklès had fought for Syracuse, and some one or other of the gods of the land were near at this moment also. The Phœnician ship was close upon the Greek, when all Syracuse raised one voice of prayer and vows to the heavenly powers¹. The prow of the pursuing vessel was dashing hard against the stern of the chase, when its onward course brought it within reach of missiles from the shore, and a well-aimed shower of Syracusan darts disabled the Phœnician and brought in the Greek bark in safety. Men flocked to the shore to hear the good news that had been brought to them by so narrow a chance and by such gallant striving. Syracuse now for the first time heard the fate of her daring lord and of his army. For the first time in the world's history Hellas had smitten Canaan on the soil of Libya, and all thought of yielding to Canaan on the soil of Sicily passed away from the heart of Hellas.

CHAP. XII.
Greek vessel escapes
Punic guard-ships.

Elation of
Syracusans
at news.

But the Punic leader before Syracuse, the victor by the banks of Himéras, had a ready wit to choose his times and his ways of attack. He deemed that in the full joy of the glad tidings, when the whole city was pressing to hear a tale such as none had ever heard before, he had a good chance of finding some unguarded point in the long

pursuit of the Carthaginian ships at dawn, and the race (*ὡς περὶ τινες ἀγωνισταί*) to the shore. Only the spectators, so theatrically arranged in the second episode, are wanting to complete the parallel.]

[¹ Diod. xx. 16; *οἱ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως δδυνατοῦντες βοηθεῖν τοῖς θεοῖς ἤρχοντο περὶ τῆς σωτηρίας τῶν καταπλεόντων.*]

CHAP. XII. line of wall which girded in the city¹. We hear nothing
 Hamilkar's of the engines which he had so lately brought; the
 assault on the blow to be struck is of the old sort of Lamachos and
 Syracuse repulsed. Dêmostenês; only Lamachos and Dêmostenês, when they
 had gained their footing on the hill, had not found the
 wall of Dionysios to be scaled. At some point, hardly a
 point so distant as that chosen by the Athenian leaders, at
 some one perhaps of the less steep paths on the southern
 side, a body of the choicest men in the Punic army was sent
 up with their scaling-ladders to make their way into Syra-
 cuse. A place was found which the sentinels immediately
 entrusted with its care had failed to guard. The barbarians
 crept up warily and got possession of the whole space
 between two towers. But the watch that paced the whole
 round of the wall soon came near². A fight began; before
 others could come from the Carthaginian army to give
 help to the endangered climbers, the attempt was defeated;
 some were slain, some were thrust down the hill-side from
 the battlements³. The day that brought the news of the
 victory in Africa beheld another of those many memorable
 hours when Syracuse has driven back invaders, Greek or
 barbarian, from her walls.

This short but stirring campaign of Hamilkar is told us
 without any of those distinct topographical signs to which
 we are used in warfare around Syracuse, and to which we
 shall come again with our next recorded fighting in Sicily.
 Hamilkar draws near to Syracuse; he draws nearer to
 the wall; he makes an attempt to scale it. We are left,
 however, to guess at the exact place of his encampment,
 and the exact place of his assault. But we instinctively
 picture the camp of Hamilkar on the usual camping-

[¹ Diod. xx. 16; ὑπολαβὼν εἶναι μέρος τι τοῦ τείχους ἀφύλακτον.]

[² Ib.; καὶ σχεδὸν αὐτῶν μεσσηγίων ἤδη κατειληφτότων, ἢ κατὰ τὸ
 σῆματες ἐφοδία παραγενομένη κατενόησε.]

[³ Ib.; οὗς δ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπάλξεον κατεκρήμνισαν.]

ground, of which we have heard so often and of which we shall hear so often again, in the neighbourhood of the Olympieion and the Anapos. Wherever it was, he deemed that it was no longer safe to hold it. He obeyed the orders of his government by sending five thousand men to the defence of Carthage, and for some months made no more attempts at a renewed siege of Syracuse. CHAP. XII.

Meanwhile the lord of Syracuse and his army were still in Africa, and in full possession of the open country round Carthage. From his head-quarters at Tunis, he marched hither and thither as he thought good. "He took by force the places round Carthage¹," a vague phrase which makes us wish for names and details. But the process is distinguished from that of winning many towns, which, in the case of one starting from so near a point as Tunis, seems to imply that by "the places round Carthage" we are to understand places very near Carthage indeed. To besiege Carthage in any strict sense was not in the power of Agathoklès. He had no fleet to attack her by sea; he seemingly had no engines to bring to bear upon the vast walls which fenced her in on the land side. But Carthage, like Syracuse, had her outposts, and it might well suit the purposes of Agathoklès to occupy any of them, as so many invaders had occupied, and were yet to occupy, the Polichna of Syracuse. One hardly knows whether one is justified in conceiving that he may even have held the hill of Cape Carthage and the hill of the tombs, and that the defenders of the Bozrah may have looked out on Greek enemies holding a height loftier than their own. While Carthage was in any case hard pressed, Agathoklès received the surrender of many towns, some of which came over to him through fear of his power, and some out of hatred towards the Carthaginians². Of these towns we would gladly know the names, the

[¹ Diod. xx. 17; τὰ περὶ τὴν Καρχηδόνα χωρία κατὰ κρᾶτος ἔρει.]

[² Ib.; ἃς δὲ διὰ τὸ πρὸς Καρχηδονίους μίσος.]

CHAP. XII. positions, the exact relations towards the ruling city, and the character of the population of each. When we see how little love there was between Carthage and her neighbours even of her own race, how slight and easily broken was the tie that bound them to her, we wonder the more at the wide-spread power which rested on so small a basis of physical strength at home, at the perfect peace, the unbroken prosperity, which the great city so long enjoyed, while there were so many enemies at her gates ready to turn against her the first moment that they could do so without danger.

Agathoklès
fortifies
camp near
Tunia.

Carthage was thus straitened and harassed, but not besieged. The object of Agathoklès was to straiten and harass her yet further, by winning over, whether by force or persuasion, as many as might be of her subject towns. Our narrative now becomes a little clearer and more detailed, though there still is much to wish for. Agathoklès had now done all that his force enabled him to do in the immediate neighbourhood of Carthage; it was time to turn his arms to more distant points. To preserve what he had already won, he made a fortified camp near Tunis¹, doubtless on the side towards Carthage, though the hills on the other side, looking down on Tunis and both her lakes, must have been at least held as outposts. He left a force to guard the camp, and struck south-eastward, towards the cities on the sea to the south of his first landing-place. The first that he reached was another Carthage, another Naples, a *Nea Polis*, which he took by storm, but dealt gently, we are told, with those whom he had overcome². He then went on to a better-known spot, one which has a name in later history, and whose look at the present moment may not be so very unlike what it was when Agathoklès drew near to it. Hadrumetum now, by a strange coincidence of sounds, bears the same name which Shushan the Palace

Capture of
Neapolis.

[¹ Diod. xx. 17; παρεμβολήν πλησίον τοῦ Τύνητος ὀχυρωσάμενος.]

[² Ib.; φιλανθρώπως ἐχρήσατο τοῖς χειρωθείσιν. Neapolis is now Nebel.]

bore on the lips of the old Greek and which the Secusia CHAP. XII.
of Pippin's Lombards bears on the lips of the modern
Italian. To the Arab and to the Italian Hadrumetum is Hadru-
now Susa; its French masters have, after their manner, cut metum.
it short to *Sousse*. Sloping down from the high ground
above to the eastern sea, girded by its white Saracenic walls
standing, in true oriental fashion, free from suburbs, with
its Arab Kasba on the height and its half-European haven
at the foot, Susa may now pass as a model of an oriental
town placed on a site which must have always compelled it
to have some dealings with the European as well as the
barbarian world. What Susa is now, Hadrumetum may well,
in general effect, have been then; only its houses of Baal
were hardly marked by such towers as are attached to the
mosques of Susa and which we could almost conceive trans-
planted to serve as the bell-towers of Romanesque churches
in Christendom. From the conquest of *Nea Polis*, easily
taken at the first assault, Agathoklês went on to the longer
business of an attack on Hadrumetum.

We hear that he besieged the city; yet at Hadrumetum, Besieged
as at Carthage, he had neither fleet nor engines for a siege by Agatho-
in the strictest sense. But he was presently strengthened klês.
by the coming of a native ally who was, as usual, ready to
help the newly-come strangers against the strangers whom
he knew too well. A prince described as Elymas King of
the Libyans—he sounds like an *epónymos* from north-western
Sicily—came to share in the siege of Hadrumetum as an
ally of Agathoklês¹. This union of enemies evidently

[¹ Diod. xx. 17; 'Ελύμαν τὸν βασιλέα τῶν Λιβύων εἰς συμμαχίαν προσελά-
βητο. The coincidence of the name with that of the Elymi and of Elymos
the son of Anchisês is probably not accidental. On the one hand, Elymian
traditions (see Sicily, i. 543) connected their migration with the Libyan
coast; on the other hand, Libyan tribes, like the Maxyes (the Maahouasha
of Egyptian monuments), traced a Trojan descent (Herod. iv. 191). At
the time, too, of the great invasion of Egypt the Libyan tribes appear in
close alliance with members of the Thraeco-Phrygian race.]

CHAP. XII. struck no small fear into the hearts of the defenders of Carthage. Their course of action was his own on a smaller scale. They left Hadrumetum to defend itself, as Agathoklês had left Syracuse, and set forth with the whole force that was then at their command to the attack of the Greek head-quarters at Tunis. Along the flat ground by the north of the lake, the Carthaginian army, supplied with engines for a siege, marched to the Syracusan camp, and were able to get possession of it. But the town was held against them, either by its own citizens or by a Syracusan garrison, and the army of Carthage had to besiege a Punic city within sight of their own walls, as if it had been Akragas or Himera. The engines were brought up against the walls of Tunis, and many fierce assaults were made on them ¹. The news of the loss of his camp and of the danger of Tunis was brought to Agathoklês in his leaguer before Hadrumetum. He did not raise the siege or send any force to the relief of Tunis. He first tried a stratagem. With a body of attendants and a few soldiers he went to a high place among the hills which could be seen alike from Hadrumetum and from Tunis. It is for Alpine climbers to say where among the mountains whose sharp outlines form such a feature in the landscape to the south of the lake of Tunis, the point, if there be any, best suited to such a purpose may be found. On his chosen height Agathoklês caused many great fires to be kindled by night ². The blaze was seen on both sides, by the besiegers of Tunis and by the besieged of Hadrumetum. Fear seized on both. The Carthaginian force at Tunis deemed that the whole Greek army was coming against them from Hadrumetum. The defenders of Hadrumetum deemed that the whole Greek army was coming against them from Tunis. From Tunis the Punic force fled with speed back to Carthage, leaving their warlike

Carthagi-
nian diver-
sion against
Tunis.

Alleged
stratagem
of Agathoklês.

[¹ Diod. xx. 17; τῇ πόλει δὲ μηχανὰς προσαγαγόντες, συνεχεῖς προσβολὰς ἐποιούντο.]

[² Ib.]

engines behind them. In Hadrumetum the spirits of the CHAP. XII.
besieged gave way, and they surrendered their city to Surrender
of Hadru-
metum.
Agathoklês.

We can only tell this story as we find it. But there is no reason to doubt that Hadrumetum was taken and that Tunis was relieved. Agathoklês went on with his career of conquest. From Hadrumetum, won by capitulation, he went on to Thapsos, which he took by storm ¹. He went through Thapsos
stormed. all the towns of that region, taking some by force, winning others by persuasion, till in the end more than two hundred African posts were in his hands. No such success had ever before fallen to the lot of any Greek captain in Western warfare. The lord of Syracuse seemed to be winning a new realm for Hellas; at any rate he was striking such a blow as had never before been struck against the most dangerous enemy of Hellas.

The coast of the immediate Carthaginian territory, at all Agathoklês
marches
inland. events the coast to the south-east of Carthage, had thus been torn away from Carthaginian dominion. Agathoklês now determined to turn his arms inland. For this course his motives are not very clear, unless he hoped to win more African allies to follow the example of Elymas. We can hardly give Agathoklês credit for the spirit of discovery which certainly mingled with the ambition of Alexander, and which led him to go through a large part of Asia in the character of an armed explorer. Whatever his motive, his design of inland warfare lost him his Libyan ally. Elymas now turned against him ². Still he set forth, and marched for several days.

Meanwhile the forces sent by Hamilkar from Sicily Carthagi-
nian rein-
forcements
from Sicily. to the help of Carthage had reached Africa ³. Their coming and the falling away of Elymas from the Greek side filled the Carthaginians with new hopes of overcoming

[¹ Diod. xx. 17; *Θάψον εἰλε κατὰ κράτος.*]

[² Ib. 18.]

[³ Ib.]

CHAP. XII. the invader. With the troops from Sicily and such other forces as they had in the city, the Carthaginian leaders took the opportunity of the absence of Agathoklés again to lay siege to Tunis. Some of the posts which the invader had taken were also won back again.

Return of
Agathoklés
to Tunis.

Letters from Tunis carried the news to Agathoklés¹. He at once turned back. When he was about five-and-twenty miles from Tunis, he halted. He had somewhat of a stratagem to practise this time also, of a kind exactly opposite to his late bonfires on the mountains. He forbade his soldiers to light any fires at all at the place of their halt. When night came, he began his march afresh, and with the dawn of day he came upon the Carthaginians before Tunis, who in no way looked for his coming. The camp which he had made for the defence of Tunis was now in the hands of its besiegers. But in the belief that the enemy was far away, confidence had risen, discipline and effort had relaxed.

Defeat of
Carthagi-
nians;

When the Greek army this time came near to Tunis, some of the nominal besiegers were foraging, others were wandering outside the camp without order. The attack and the victory were sudden and swift. The Carthaginians were driven back with the loss of two thousand slain, and of many who became prisoners to the Greeks². Elymas too had to pay his forfeit for the desertion of his ally.

and of
Libyans.

The Libyan prince ventured to meet the Syracusan army in a pitched battle, of which we should be glad to be able to draw some clearer picture. How far had the subjects of a Libyan prince, the ally or vassal of Carthage, learned any of the arts of civilized warfare³? All

[¹ Diod. xx. 18; *βιβλιαφόρον αὐτῷ παραγεγεννημένον ἀπὸ τοῦ Τόντος.*]

[² Ib.]

[³ It must however be borne in mind that, owing to their contact with Egypt, the Libyan tribes, whose physical characteristics proclaim them to have been of European stock, had early attained a considerable measure of civilization. The Libyan arms taken by Rameses III. were in some respects superior to those of the West Asiatic peoples; their rich silver orna-

that we know is that the followers of Elymas could not stand against Greeks and European barbarians trained in Greek discipline. Agathoklès had the victory, and Elymas, with a large part of his army, was slain ¹. CHAP. XII.

§ 6. *Hamilkar's assault on Syracuse.*

It was perhaps not very long after these successes that a ghastly trophy was brought to him which told of another successful defence of Syracuse against Punic attacks, while Syracusan armies were so closely pressing Carthage and her power in her own land. Some months had now passed since the Punic assault on Syracuse which had been driven back on the day when the good news was brought from Africa. Hamilkar had not been idle. We are told vaguely that, having now brought all other places into his hands, he determined to lead his whole force to an attack on Syracuse¹. When we hear that the Syracusan exile Deinokratès was in his company we seem to gain some further light on his course. We may suppose that his headquarters were still at Akragas, and that, in fellowship with the banished Syracusans, a body whose number had been greatly enlarged by the action of Antandros and Erymnôn, he had been carrying on the work of winning the inland towns from the allegiance of Agathoklès. The time was now come for the great enterprise. It is plain that it was planned and carried out on a greater scale and with a more serious purpose than the campaign of the year before. It was a general enterprise of the enemies of Agathoklès, Greek and barbarian. Hamilkar is said to have commanded

Hamilkar
joined by
Deinokra-
tès.

ments and bronze vessels speak of great comparative advance in metallurgy as early as the close of the fourteenth century B.C. Already at that early date they were capable of maritime enterprise and had wide political connexions. The later contact with Phœnicians and the Greeks of Kyréné must also have left its mark. It is difficult to see on what grounds such barbarism should be imputed to them in the text.]

[¹ Diod. xx. 29.]

CHAP. XII.

Campaign
of Hamil-
kar and
allied
Greeks
against
Syracuse.
B. C. 309.

a hundred and twenty thousand foot and five thousand horse¹. That those five thousand consisted largely of the Greek horsemen of Sicily, Akragantines and homeless Syracusans, we may infer from the post of their captain being held by the Syracusan Deinokratês. The foot too marched in two divisions, a Greek and a barbarian phalanx², an arrangement which certainly does not prove the Greek foot to have reached the number of sixty thousand, but which certainly marks them as an important division of the army. We are tempted to look on the campaign as wrought by the hand of Hamilkar under the guidance of Deinokratês. And this time the topography, a topography with which we have got familiar in many campaigns, is now clearly marked enough. It is a well-known path that we have again to tread; but each time that we tread it there is something that marks off that time from the other times before and after it.

The special characteristic of this campaign would seem to be its shortness. We have been used to Nikias and Himilkôn abiding through many ups and downs of fortune in the low ground by the Great Harbour. Hamilkar's own attempt of the last year, if it involved no such lingering as theirs, was something more than an affair of to-day and to-morrow. But this great assault, evidently the outcome of no little scheming on the part of Greeks and Phœnicians, comes down as suddenly as the lightning-flash and passes by as quickly. Hamilkar had full command by sea; we are not directly told that the Punic fleet was in the Great Harbour; it at least kept the mouths of both the harbours, and hindered food of every kind from going into Syracuse by sea. By land he marched, laying waste the fields of the citizens and subjects of Syracuse as he went³. His camp

[¹ Diod. xx. 30.]

[² Ib. 29.]

[³ Ib.; τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας κερποὺς καταφθείρας. This looks as if it had been early summer.]

was pitched, or was to be pitched, where so many camps CHAP. XII. had been pitched from the days of Hippokratês onwards. If it did not, like that of Himilkôn, actually take in the precinct of Olympian Zeus, it was at least hard by; it must have taken in the profane ground of Polichna¹. The only doubt is whether any camp was pitched at all; there at least was not time for such full occupation and defence as we hear of at other times.

For Hamilkar deemed that he had a work to do, March of
Hamilkar
on Syra-
cuse. a joyful entry to make, and withal to do them speedily. The prophet of the staff had scanned the signs of the sacrifices, and had pronounced that on the evening of the morrow the general would sup in Syracuse². It was most likely Deinokratês who suggested the way that was chosen to make the prediction certain, by repeating the attempt of Dêmosthenês to the letter. We Assault
planned on
Epipolai. must always remember that, when Lamachos first led the attack on Epipolai, it was made from the north side by an army fresh from its landing in the bay of Trôgilos. Dêmosthênês could reach the same point only by a toilsome march all round the extreme western end of the hill. Deinokratês seems to have led his Punic allies by the same course without the same reason. We are not told what was Hamilkar's line of march; one would have thought it would have been worth his while, if it were so needed, to fetch a considerable compass, in order to assault, like Lamachos, directly on the north. On that side Diôn too had come in on his march from Leontinoi. Neither Lamachos nor Diôn had needed a camp; yet one might have thought that these two memorable marches might have suggested to Deinokratês that the true course for an

[¹ Diod. xx. 29; ἐπεβάλετο καταλαβέσθαι τοὺς περὶ τὸ Ὀλύμπιον τόπους, κειμένους μὲν πρὸ τῆς πόλεως.]

[² Ib.; τοῦ μάντεως εἰρηκότος αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν τῶν ἱερῶν εἶναι τῇ μετὰ ταύτην ἡμέρᾳ πάντας ἐν Συρακούσαις δειπνήσει. See, too, Cicero de Div. i. 24; Val. Max. i. 7, 8.]

CHAP. XII. assailant of Syracuse, who designed a storm on the north side, was to forestall the position of Marcellus instead of repeating that of Himilkôn. But as the story is told us, it is plain that the camp was, or was to be, on the site of the camp of Himilkôn, and it seems from our account that the attack was to be made on the northern side, which could be reached from the neighbourhood of the Olympieion only by the same roundabout way by which Dêmosthenês had reached it¹.

The example of Dêmosthenês.

Yet in striving to follow the march of Hamilkar and Deinokratês we miss at every step the guidance of the hand which makes us feel as if we had actually trod the ground at the side of Dêmosthenês. We see why Dêmosthenês took his masons and carpenters; had he succeeded, he would have had something to build; we do not see why Hamilkar should have taken his five thousand horsemen to scale the heights of Epipolai; still less do we see why he should have cumbered himself with a confused multitude, useless for any military purpose, and serving only to cause noise and disorder². The only explanation is that,

Syracusans reinforce garrison of Euryâlos.

in his eagerness to fulfil the prophecy, Hamilkar set forth before the camp by the Olympieion had been put into such a state of defence as to be a safe shelter for any one. The news of what was coming was known in the city, and at nightfall three thousand foot and four hundred horsemen were sent to the defence of Euryâlos³.

We must again remember the change in the site since the days of Dêmosthenês. Hamilkar had quite another work before him from that in which Dêmosthenês failed. The Athenian had before him only the wall and the detached forts thrown up for the purposes of the siege. The Cartha-

[¹ See Sicily, iii. 309 seqq.]

[² Diod. xx. 29; παρηκολούθει δὲ πλῆθος ὄχλου παντοδαπὸν ἐκτὸς τῆς τάξεως, ἀφελείας ἔνεκα, χρεῖαν μὲν στρατιωτικὴν οὐδαμίαν παρεχόμενον, θορόβου δὲ καὶ ταραχῆς ἀλόγου γινόμενον αἴτιον.]

[³ Ib.]

ginian and his Syracusan guide had before them the finished walls of Dionysios meeting in the strong castle which had now taken the name of the Broad Nail. That forces were specially sent to it at this moment does not prove that it was wholly unguarded. It would naturally need an increased garrison at such a moment. What is instructive is that Euryálos seems to be taken for granted as something apart from the city in general¹. So it doubtless still was. Dionysios had, for military reasons, taken the whole line of Epipolai within the same line of defence as Ortygia and Achradina; but it was far from being joined on to them as part of a continuously inhabited town.

While the castle was thus making ready to withstand them, the Punic host, still under the cover of darkness, wound its way round the top of Belvidere to the point on the northern side of Epipolai which has become the familiar ground for such enterprises. Hamilkar led the van with his twofold phalanx, Greek and barbarian; the horsemen under Deinokratês formed the rereward. And with them, in whatever order or disorder, came the aimless multitude whose presence was to make the attempt hopeless. They straggled hither and thither, one striving to get before his fellow; they blocked up the narrow paths; their confused cries were welcome warnings to the defenders of Euryálos. By the time the real men of war began to make the actual ascent, everything was ready for them. To the defenders, knowing every step of the ground, the darkness was not the same hindrance that it was to the assailants. Why was not Deinokratês, who at least knew the way, not the foremost man to lead the storming-party? Of the defenders each party had its own work. Some simply stood on the height and hurled darts at the invaders as they strove to climb up². Some undertook the more delicate

Assault on
Epipolai.

[¹ Thus Diodôros (l.c.) speaks of *οἱ κατειληφότες τὸν Εὐρύηλον Συρακούσιοι*.]

[² Diod. xx. 29; *τινὲς μὲν ἐν τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς ἐστῶτες ἐβαλλον τοὺς ἐπὶ ὀντας* . . .]

CHAP. XII. task of picking out convenient points of the path, and there blocking the way of the climbers¹. Others, as the assault on Epipolai repulsed. climbers began to waver and turn, drove them to other points where they had no hope but in their chance of throwing themselves from the rocks². All was wild confusion; no man in the host of Hamilkar knew where he was or could tell friend from foe. They fought with one another; of the horsemen of Deinokratès all that we hear is that some of their comrades were trodden to pieces by them. We can hardly believe that the horses shared in the actual climb in the darkness. They most likely waited for a more favourable moment, and so were able to ride off in safety. Deinokratès at all events lived to fight another day. Not so Hamilkar. He showed no great wisdom in his scheme of attack; but he at least did his best in the hour of overthrow. Leading the van as he did, if any man in his army made his way to the top of the hill of Syracuse, it was he. He fought as one man might against the defenders of Euryâlos; he called on his men to do as he himself was doing. Forsaken by all, left alone to wage the fight with multitudes, he fell alive into the hands of the men of Syracuse.

Hamilkar taken prisoner.

In their city, his prophet had told him, he was to sup on the day which presently began to dawn. We are not distinctly told, but we may almost take for granted from the turn of the story, that the words of the soothsayer were known in Syracuse, and that care was taken that Hamilkar should have a last meal within the walls. But his fate was a hard one. If ever an enemy had deserved favourable treatment from his captors, it was Hamilkar son of Giskôn. In him the barbarian had given lessons to the Greek, perhaps

[¹ Diod. xx. 29; *τινὲς δὲ τοὺς εὐκαίρους τῶν τόπων καταλαβόντες, ἀπέκλειον τῆς ὁδοῦ τοὺς Βαρβάρους.*]

[² *Ib.*; *ἄλλοι δὲ κατὰ τῶν κρημνῶν τοὺς φεύγοντας ῥίπτειν αὐτοὺς ἡνάγκαζον.*]

in actual humanity, at all events in that enlightened policy which practically does the work of humanity. While Agathoklès set city after city against him by treacherous massacres, Hamilkar had won over city after city to his side by strictly observing the laws of justice and good faith. But by this time, by dealing with barbarians unlike Hamilkar, the Greek had sunk to the level of the barbarian. The doom of Nikias and Dêmosthènes had been simple death, death perhaps by their own hands. Hamilkar was handed over to all who listed to deal with him as he thought good. He was led in bonds through the city, every one who had lost a friend or kinsman in the war pressing round him to add some further bitterness of insult or of anguish. At last his cup was full; his tormentors became weary of their sport. Death relieved him of his sufferings, and by the bidding of Antandros and his colleagues his head was cut from his body¹. The head was sent to Agathoklès in Africa, a trophy and witness of Syracusan victory. The prows of the Syracusan ships had carried grief and fear to Syracuse; so well may a genuine witness be taught to tell a tale of falsehood. The head of Hamilkar told a surer tale; it was evidence which left no room for doubtful disputations.

Barbarous execution of Hamilkar by Syracusans.

Head of Hamilkar sent to Agathoklès.

We follow the ghastly trophy on its way to Africa. The exact position of the armies there at the moment when the head of Hamilkar was brought to Agathoklès is not clearly marked. But the whole stress of the war just now lies between Tunis and Carthage, and, if we are to take quite strictly the phrase of our author which speaks of a Carthaginian camp, we must understand it of a camp pitched on the low ground near Carthage, as the camp of Agathoklès was pitched on the low ground near Tunis. We think of

The war in Africa.

[¹ The fate of Hamilkar is described in Diod. xx. 30.]

CHAP. XII. later leaders of warfare between Europe and Carthage, of Hannibal and Asdrubal and Gaius Nero, when we hear how the lord of Syracuse, seemingly in person, rode towards the camp of Carthage with the head of Hamilkar, and having come within the range of the human voice, he shouted out the tale of the blow which those whom he had left in Sicily had dealt to Carthage, and held up the head of the slain Shophet as the witness of his words¹. The sight smote the whole Carthaginian host with grief and fear; but they did not forget to pay what slight honours they could pay to the dead. At the sight of the head of Hamilkar, they bowed in reverence², as they would have bowed to their living leader. That moment was the highest point of the fortunes of Agathoklés in which we may call the first stage of his African warfare. He and those whom he had trusted had smitten the ancient enemy in two worlds. The Phœnician had been beaten back from Syracuse; the Greek still struck terror into Carthage. Presently, in Africa and Sicily alike, the caprice of fortune turned against him. In his personal career he was at the next moment after his great success brought again in a strange way to the brink of ruin, and was again delivered in a way no less strange. Meanwhile in the land which he had left behind him Sicilian affairs were taking a new turn of special interest as concerns the relations of the Sikeliot cities to one another.

Hamilkar's
head shown
to Cartha-
ginians.

§ 7. *The Akragantine Alliance.*

In the night-assault on Syracuse Hamilkar had fallen, or rather he would have been happier if he had fallen in the night attack itself. Deinokratês still lived; he had most likely not shared the dangers of his chief. Among the

[¹ Diod. xx. 33. Agathoklés is described as riding with Hamilkar's head *πλησίον τῆς παρεμβολῆς τῶν πολεμίων εἰς φωνῆς ἀκοήν*.]

[² *Ib.*; *βαρβαρικῶς προσκνήσαντες*. That is to say, they did not simply bow but prostrated themselves in Eastern fashion.]

survivors of the mingled force, Greek and barbarian, which Hamilkar had led against Syracuse, a dispute now arose. After the first moment of utter fear and confusion, the army came together to choose generals. The Carthaginians were for the obvious course of acknowledging, now that Hamilkar was dead, the officers who were next in command to him as his successor¹. The Greeks, on the other hand, both the Syracusan fugitives and others, chose Deinokratês, not only as their own immediate commander, but, as it would seem, as general of the whole army, Greek and barbarian². Such a claim was clearly in the teeth of all Carthaginian discipline. Its effect was that the remnant of the army of Hamilkar parted asunder. From this time Deinokratês and the exiles appear as a distinct power from the Punic army, with objects and movements of their own. But we are perhaps a little surprised at the way in which two elements which had hitherto been in close concert, now part off in a like way. Hitherto Akragas has been the centre and city of refuge for Syracusan exiles. It was from thence that Deinokratês had set forth for the deliverance of Centuripa and Galaria from the dominion of Agathoklês³. It may be that the ill-success of those enterprises had lessened his reputation, and the result of the attack on Epipolai was not likely to repair it. At this point the Akragantines began to think that they could do a work by themselves without helpers. A chance seemed to offer itself for the city of Phalaris and Therôn to claim its old place, or more than its old place, among the commonwealths of Sicily. The old instinct of local independence, the special instinct of rivalry between Akragas and Syracuse, the abiding enmity between Greek and barbarian, all began to stir once more in their fulness in the hearts of patriotic Akra-

CHAP. XII.

Breach
between
Carthagi-
nians and
Greek
allies.Deino-
kratês
general.Independ-
ent action
of Akragas.

[¹ Diod. xx. 31; Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τοῖς δευτερεύουσι τῇ μετὰ τὸν στρατηγὸν τιμῇ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἐνεχείρισαν.]

[² Ib.]

[³ See above, p. 385.]

CHAP. XII. gantines. Akragas could have no natural love for Phœnician allies; they could be endured only as long as they were needed as helpers against something worse. And Syracusan exiles could have no charm except as being enemies to the powers which at the moment bore sway in Syracuse. They were well pleased to believe that all three alike, Agathoklès, the exiles, and the Carthaginians, had so worn themselves out in their mutual attacks that all would fall back, and would leave room for Akragas to come to the front. Carthage could not hold up against the warfare of Agathoklès in Africa; her power in Sicily could not fail to be overthrown or seriously lessened. Syracuse had suffered so deeply in the war, she was so straitened for lack of supplies, that she could no longer, at present at least, maintain her place as the first of Sikeliot powers. And if no hindrance was to be looked for in those two more dangerous quarters, Deinokratès and his band of exiles were not likely to be able either to hinder or to forestall the plans of a powerful city, soon it was hoped to become the head of a powerful alliance. A wide field, and a tempting one, seemed open to Akragantine ambition.

Liberating
mission of
Akragas.

And Akragantine ambition at that moment took a generous form. We are carried back to the schemes of Olynthos about eighty years earlier, as we have learned them in the teaching of the historian of Greek democracy¹. The Akragantine and the Olynthian movements are alike among those events in Greek history which make us both lament and wonder that the true form of a federal system was not lighted on by those who were feeling their way so near to it. Markos of Keryneia was already born; he may well have been already of an age for action, but his work was never to be done in Sicily. Failing this happy revelation which Zeus Hellanios already held so near to another group of cities, Akragas, like Olynthos, offered all that was

[Grote, ch. lxxvi. See Freeman, *Fed. Gov.* (2nd ed. p. 149 seqq.).]

to be had. A perfectly equal alliance could not be; some leadership was to be vested in Akragas, but it was to be a leadership which should leave every city free and independent, at all events in its internal affairs¹. None would be any longer controlled either by barbarian allies or by the barbarian hirelings of tyrants. The old cry of freedom for all Hellenic commonwealths, union of all Hellenic commonwealths against all barbarian enemies, was again to go forth, and the leaders of Akragantine policy hoped, and not without reason, that such a cry would speedily bring many willing allies to the Akragantine banners.

For a while they were not disappointed. The work of deliverance began; it began alike among the cities that were strictly Greek and those which were now fully Greek by adoption. Alike from the coast and from the inland regions—we need no longer say from the Greek and from the Sikel—came appeals to the centre of freedom at Akragas crying for a helping hand to be stretched out to them that were still in bondage. The city on the height of Atabyrian Zeus had first to hear the petition of her own enslaved metropolis between the mouths of the chilly river. Akragas was now held by a very mingled people; but we may be sure that they adopted the traditions of the spot. If Gela could not be to the new Akragantines all that Corinth had come to be to the new Syracusans, still the name of the mother city must have had its charm for a daughter which had so long lived in friendship by the side of her parent. A message came from Gela craving to be set free from the dominion of Agathoklēs; how bloody that dominion could be no city knew better². A large force was already gathered under the Akragantine general Xenodikos. He

CHAP. XII.
Allied
cities
under
Akragan-
tine
hegemony.

Help de-
manded by
Gela
against
Agathoklēs.

[¹ Diod. xx. 31; τὴν στρατείαν αὐτῶν ποιουμένων ἐπ' ἐλευθερώσει τῶν πόλεων ἀσμένως ἅπαντας ὑπακούουσθαι, διὰ τε τὸ πρὸς τοὺς Βαρβάρους μῖσος καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐμφυτον πᾶσιν ἐπιθυμίαν τῆς αὐτονομίας.]

[² See above, p. 390.]

CHAP. XII. marched at once to Gela ; the friends of Akragas received
 Gela set free. him and his army. The garrison of Agathoklès was over-
 powered ; Gela was free, and a large force and great store
 of wealth passed into the hands of the new alliance¹. The
 military chest and the stores of Agathoklès of course
 became the spoil of the victors ; the citizen levies of Gela
 would of course enlist alongside of those of Akragas ; but
 are we to think that any of the mercenaries of Agathoklès
 entered the service of the new deliverers, as the accomplices
 of Phayllos and Phalaikos had entered the service of Timo-
 leôn² ? In any case the whole force of Gela itself joined
 with all zeal in the cause ; they had been set free themselves ;
 they would go on to set free others.

Call from Henna. The first call to them came from the holy height of
 Henna. We would give something to know the exact
 relation in which the worship of that high place stood at
 this moment to the religious mind of Greek Sicily. By
 this time the name of the Goddesses of Sicily may have
 been as stirring a call to Greek and Sikel as the name of the
 Palici had been to the Sikel only. The combined forces of
 Akragas and Gela struck inland ; the mountain city opened
 her gates to the Akragantine general, and the deliverers
 climbed up by the steep path to set the holy city free.
 Liberation of Henna and Herbessus. Next they marched to Herbessus, where the city was held
 by a barbarian garrison in the service of the tyrant. A
 sharp fight followed ; the citizens rose and gave their help
 to the liberating army. Many of the garrison were slain ;
 five hundred laid down their arms and surrendered³. Her-
 bessus was free, like Gela and Henna. We again ask what
 became of the prisoners. They might be untoward com-
 rades for the liberators, but they would be more obviously
 dangerous if set free to join the enemy, and they would have
 been no small encumbrance if kept as abiding prisoners.

[¹ Diod. xx. 31.][² See above, p. 295.][³ Diod. xx. 31.]

This progress of the new alliance was naturally not pleasing to those whom Agathoklēs had left in command and defence of Syracuse. The deliverance of Herbessus above all brought the liberating movement dangerously near to the immediate Syracusan territory. Something was at once to be done to check the march of freedom. Herbessus was seemingly left alone; but a force was sent to occupy another inland town further to the west, the once Sikel town of Echetla¹. If its site is rightly placed, that town lay well for the purpose immediately designed. It formed a centre for plundering expeditions on both sides, against the lands of Leontinoi towards one sea and of Kamarina towards the other. These towns were already free; they were among those which had gone over from Agathoklēs to Hamilkar, when the Punic general had shown himself as a liberator of Greek cities. It does not appear that they had as yet joined the Akragantine alliance. But it was easy to bring them into it. Xenodikos marched to their relief, and drove away the plunderers². He next marched—the men of Leontinoi and Kamarina surely marched with him—to attack their head-quarters at Echetla. The town, like all inland Sikel towns, was lofty and strong; but the force of the liberators, helped doubtless by the citizens of the town, overcame all hindrance; the mercenaries were got rid of; the democracy of Echetla was restored³. A heavy blow had been dealt to the power that now held Syracuse; freedom had been restored to an extent of Sicilian territory which makes a visible show on the map.

[¹ Diod. xx. 31. The site of Echetla is uncertain. Diodōros, xx. 32, brings it into connexion with the territories of Leontinoi and Kamarina. Schubring (Hist. Geogr. Studien über Altsicilien, p. 112) seeks it at Vizzini or Licodia. From Philinos, cited by Polybios, i. 15, we know that it lay on what in 264 B.C. was the frontier of the Syracusan and Carthaginian territory.]

[² For the continuation of the Akragantine campaign of liberation, see Diod. xx. 32.]

[³ Ib.; τοῖς πολίταις τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἀποκατέστησε.]

CHAP. XII. And for a while it remained undisturbed. The lieutenants of Agathoklès at Syracuse seem to have made no attempt against the liberated cities for a full space of two years.

Three-
cornered
warfare in
Sicily
between
Syracusans,
Akragan-
tine allies,
and Car-
thaginians.

The next events that are recorded well illustrate the strangely complicated relations among the powers of Sicily at this time. Agathoklès was at war with Carthage; he or his lieutenants were at war with the Akragantine alliance. But Carthage and Akragas had been in alliance at the time of the battle of Himéras and the sailing of Agathoklès for Africa. We know not by whom Carthage was represented in Sicily after the death of Hamilkar; but even Hamilkar would hardly have been well pleased at the growth of the Akragantine alliance. He was quite ready for the deliverance of Greek cities from Agathoklès, but he would be himself the deliverer, and he would deliver in such a sort as to make the liberated places at least allies of Carthage, perhaps with a certain tendency to become her dependencies. The independent growth of Akragas, Gela, and their fellows could not be pleasing to any Carthaginian commander. But there has been as yet no sign of any open breach. The Syracusan exiles under Deinokratès had been in alliance with both Carthage and Akragas up to the time of the failure on Epipolai. Since then we have seen that the Akragantine leaders looked on them with a certain jealousy; but we have heard nothing of any open breach; indeed we hear nothing of Deinokratès and his followers for about two years; they may likely enough have been acting along with the Akragantines. But we now come to an open breach and open warfare between Carthage and the Akragantine alliance. And it is needless to say that warfare goes on between Carthage and Agathoklès. Sicily in short at this moment fully deserves, in its military aspect, its name of *Trinakria* or *Triquetra*. A triangular warfare is going on. Agathoklès is at war with Carthage. He is also at war with Akragas.

And now Akragas and Carthage, instead of being any longer leagued against him, are at war with one another. CHAP. XII.

Of these three wars the only two that are at all active are the war between Carthage and Agathoklès by sea and the new war between Carthage and Akragas by land. This last followed as a necessary consequence on the great success of the alliance in eastern Sicily. On that side there really seems to have been nothing more left to deliver. Agathoklès was shut up in the immediate Syracusan territory. But the work of liberation could not stop. The Akragantine platform of Greek unity and war with barbarians demanded the deliverance of the Greek towns held by Carthage just as much as the deliverance of those held by Agathoklès. Or rather the yoke of Carthage was the worse, because the more abiding, of the two. As long as Greek life lasted in any shape, an Agathoklès might some day be exchanged for a Timoleôn; where the Greek was held down by the Phœnician, there was but a feeble hope even of an Hamilkar. Xenodikos therefore, with his countrymen and allies, having freed the lands to the east of Akragas, turned their faces westward on the same errand. "He set forth to free the fortresses and towns that were under the dominion of the Carthaginians¹." These words no longer imply, as they would once have done, an advance into the actual barbarian corner, to deliver, it may be, Elymians and Old-Phœnicians. The barbarian frontier had greatly advanced; even Timoleôn had allowed it to be fixed at the eastern Halykos². The host of Akragas had therefore not very far to go north-eastward before opportunities could be found for the liberating work. It may be that they marched as far as Selinous, and for a moment restored the Pillars of the

Xenodikos
invades the
Cartha-
ginian
dominion.

[¹ Diod. xx. 32; καθόλου δ' ἐπιπορευόμενος, τὰ τε φρούρια καὶ τὰς πόλεις ἡλευθέρου τῆς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐπιστάσις.]

[² See above, p. 335.]

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Hérakleia
Minôa set
free by
Akra-
gantines.

Giants to free Hellas. But work was to be found nearer Selinous. The *Minôa* of *Minôs*, the *Hérakleia* of *Euryleôn*, was a Carthaginian possession. *Ras Melkart*, under that name, was a cherished seat of Phœnician power¹. It is clear that *Hérakleia* was now for a while wrested from the dominion of Carthage; and the process is spoken of as one of deliverance². The inference that is suggested is that *Ras Melkart*, with its Phœnician name and its Phœnician coins, was not after all really a Phœnician city. Like the other more distinctly Phœnician creation on the other side of the island, it was most likely practically Greek, or at all events contained a large Greek population which it fell within the objects of *Akragas* at this time to set free. Whether any other town in a like case shared the deliverance of *Hérakleia* we are not told; it is clear from the same evidence which enables us to speak with some certainty of the deliverance of *Hérakleia* that the same deliverance did not reach *Therma*³. The new *Himera* was perhaps too far off for the *Akragantine* commonwealth to go on an enterprise like that of *Thêrôn* towards the old one. Then and now perhaps it needed the long arm of a tyrant to reach it.

Syracuse
blockaded
by Punic
fleet.

The liberating mission of *Akragas* had thus led her into warfare alike with Carthage and with those who in Sicily represented the lord of Syracuse. But these last were also fighting with one another. The garrison and inhabitants of Syracuse were hard pressed for food while their master was winning victories in Africa. Carthaginian ships cruising off the mouths of the harbours made it hard to bring anything in or out. Just now, about the time it

[¹ See above, p. 250.]

[² In Diod. xx. 56 we are told 'Αγαθokλῆς . . . 'Ηρακλέωτας ἡλευθερωκέντας τὴν πόλιν ἠνάγκασε πάλιν ὑποτάττεσθαι.]

[³ From Diod. xx. 56 it appears that *Agathoklês* on his return to Sicily found a Carthaginian garrison at *Therma*.]

would seem when the forces of Akragas had gone west-ward, a number of ships laden with corn were known to be coming towards Syracuse from the north. Twenty triremes were manned in the hope that they might serve as a convoy. They kept good watch, they escaped the vigilance of the Punic cruisers, and sailed forth to the point which is still marked [by our authority] as Megara¹. There they watched for the corn-ships; but the enemy had found them out, and thirty Punic ships were presently upon them. A fight began; the barbarians had the better, and the Greeks had to escape by swimming to shore hard by a Héraion, which must have stood somewhere on the coast of the bay, but of which there seems to be no other notice². The ships began to be prey to the victorious Carthaginians who seized them with iron hands and drew them away from the shore³. Ten ships were then taken. But the work going on by Megara had left the mouth of the Syracusan harbour free. Other ships sailed out and came to the help of their consorts, and the remaining twenty were saved⁴. What followed, what in the end became of the corn-ships, we are not told.

CHAP. XII.

Sea-fight
off Megara.

[¹ Diod. xx. 32; *παρικομσθέντες εἰς τοὺς Μεγαρεῖς*. For the site of Megara Hyblaia, see Sicily, i. 66, and 387, 388; Schubring, *Umwanderung des megarischen Meerbusens*. The site has since been explored and excavated by Cavallari and Orsi, and the results of their researches have now seen the light in a fine publication—*Megara Hyblæa*; Storia, Topografia, Necropoli e Anathemata, Rome, 1892.]

[² The recent explorations have thrown no light on the site of this temple.]

[³ Diod. xx. 32; *τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐπιβαλλόντων σιδηρὰς χεῖρας*. In B. C. 425 the Syracusans had used the iron hands against Athenian vessels (Sicily, iii. 41; Thuc. iv. 25). In 413 the Athenians used them against the Syracusans, but had been met by Gylippos' device of spreading leather over the ships' decks (Sicily, iii. 347; Thuc. vii. 65).]

[⁴ Diodóros' words (xx. 32) are *τὰς δ' ἄλλας (τρίηρεις) ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐπιβοθήσαντες τινες διέσωσαν*. There is nothing about Syracusan ships coming to the rescue, and Orsi (*Megara Hyblæa*, &c., p. 16) reasonably concludes that by *πόλις* Megara itself is intended, and not the comparatively distant and closely blockaded Syracuse. Megara therefore at this date was apparently a small fortified post with a Syracusan garrison. Its

CHAP. XII.

§ 8. *Events in Africa, to the Kingship of Agathoklês.*

A time of two years follows, a blank in Sicily, but full of busy action in Africa.

Mutiny in
camp
quelled by
Agathoklês.

* "A strange mutiny took place in the army of Agathoklês, which shows how dangerous dealings were with mercenary soldiers. A drunken brawl arose between his son Archagathos and an Aitolian officer named Lykiskos, in which Lykiskos was killed¹. The whole body of mercenaries rose. They demanded the death of Archagathos; they demanded their pay; they chose new generals, and took possession of Tunis, leaving Agathoklês to himself. The Carthaginians, hearing this, offered higher pay and rewards to the soldiers, if they would come over to their service². Many of the officers were inclined to accept the offer; Agathoklês feared that he was about to be handed over to the enemy, when he tried one last chance. He threw aside his general's dress³; he harangued the soldiers;

inhabitants had been transported to Syracuse by Gelôn (see Sicily, ii. 498), and the site was long deserted (Thuc. vi. 49). But we are told that in 415 the Syracusans re-fortified the place against the Athenians (Thuc. vi. 75). From a coin in the possession of the writer—the only known numismatic record of the Hyblæan Megara—it appears that at some time in the fourth century B.C. the civic autonomy was at least temporarily revived. Later, it is mentioned as a town in Hierôn the Second's kingdom.]

* From Story of Sicily, p. 246 seqq.

[¹ The quarrel and ensuing mutiny are described by Diodôros, xx. 33.]

[² Diod. xx. 34.]

[³ lb.; ἀποθέμενος τὴν πορφύραν καὶ μεταλαβὼν ἰδιωτικὴν καὶ ταπεινὴν ἐσθῆτα, κ.τ.λ. Πορφύρα here cannot mean, as stated in the text, simply the general's uniform, but is "the royal robe," mentioned again below. Agathoklês, in fact, is here already king. The whole account is of a most theatrical kind. Agathoklês draws his sword (ἐγύμνωσε τὸ ξίφος ὡς σφάζων ἑαυτὸν) and is about to plunge its naked blade into his heart, when the whole army shouts out to him to desist. He is then bidden to change his garments once more and put on "the royal robe" (τὴν βασιλικὴν ἐσθῆτα). As he puts on the purple he sheds tears of joy and gives

he told them of all their exploits ; he called on them not to betray him ; he would rather die by their hands than by those of the Carthaginians. They were stirred at once ; shouts were raised in his favour ; he was called on to put on his general's dress again, and to lead them as before. He struck while the iron was hot. The enemy were looking for the mercenaries to join them ; but the trumpet sounded the war-note ; the Greeks charged, and drove the Carthaginians back to their camp. Two hundred only deserted to the Carthaginians.

CHAP. XII.
Defeat of
Cartha-
ginians.

" Agathoklēs was thus strangely successful, and he went on winning successes¹ ; but he saw that to take Carthage was still beyond his power. He therefore sought for an

B.C. 308.

thanks to the assembled soldiery, who respond by clapping their hands (*κρόειν*),—as if they had been the audience in a theatre and Agathoklēs a successful actor ! Then the trumpets blow and the signal for a charge is given. The staginess of the whole episode smacks strongly of the inventive Douris (cf. Schubert, *Op. cit.* 138, and see above, p. 367, note 2), and one after another his favourite tricks are reproduced—the changes of costume, the hair-breadth 'scape, the shouts and trumpet-blowing, and all the rest of it. Of the interpolated character of the passage a proof may be found in the fact that (as noticed above) Agathoklēs is here already *king*. But Diodōros himself (c. 54) makes Agathoklēs first assume the royal title at a later stage in his career. The immediate march on the enemy, introduced apparently for dramatic effect in Diodōros' source, is corrected by the short notice in Justin (xxii. 8), "*sedato militari tumultu interjectis paucis diebus ad castra hostium exercitum ducit.*" According to Justin, Agathoklēs soothed the mutineers, who were clamouring for arrears of pay, by holding out to them the spoils of captured Carthage. But there is no doffing of royal robes or putting on of sack-cloth.]

[¹ Agathoklēs was now reinforced by the defection of some Numidian tribes (*Νομάδες*) from Carthage. While the Carthaginians were turning against their revolted subjects, Agathoklēs followed them into the interior and inflicted on them a severe defeat in the country of the Ζουφθόνες. But his own camp was plundered by some of his Numidian allies. It was on this occasion that he massacred, in defiance of his plighted word, 1,000 Greek prisoners, amongst whom were over 500 Syracusans ; Diod. xx. 38, 39.]

CHAP. XII. ally in Ophellas, the Macedonian officer who commanded
 Ophellas Kyrênê for Ptolemy lord of Egypt¹. The old kings of
 marches from Kyrênê to join Agathoklès. land had become part of Ptolemy's dominion. Agathoklès
 proposed to Ophellas to join him in the conquest of Carthage. He would leave Africa to Ophellas, and he would then go back to drive the Phœnicians out of Sicily. Ophellas believed him; he gathered an army and many colonists from all parts, and after a march of two months he reached the Syracusan camp at Tunis (307)². Agathoklès received them friendly; but after a few days he accused Ophellas of plotting against him, and set upon him with his own

Murder of Ophellas.

[¹ For the affairs of Kyrênê at this time, see Grote, ch. xcvii. Ophellas had served with distinction under Alexander in Asia. He was influentially connected, having married the Athenian Euthydikê, or Eurydikê, a descendant of the great Miltiadês, and thus secured many Athenian as well as other Greek recruits (Diod. xx. 40). It appears that Ophellas had made a survey of the whole North African coast (see Strabo, xviii. 3. 3, and Grote, l. c.). Such a survey had doubtless more than a purely scientific motive, and Agathoklès may well have regarded Ophellas as a dangerous competitor for African dominion.]

[² For the march of Ophellas, see Diod. xx. 41, 42, and cp. Grote, ch. xcvii; Schubert, 143 seqq. He took with him 10,000 footmen, 600 horsemen, and 100 chariots; and 10,000 others, among them many women and children, accompanied the expedition, which in part assumed a colonizing character. From Kyrênê to the frontier station of Automolai, a distance of 3,000 stadia (c. 325 miles), took eighteen days. From this point the march lay through the waterless desert that stretched between the two Syrtes, where the phantom Lamia that haunted those wilds claimed her tender victims. The route too was infested by venomous snakes, the more dangerous, remarks Diodôros, that their skin was of the same colour as the ground,—an early observation of “adaptive mimicry.” This notice, as Schubert (l. c.) observes, shows that Diodôros' account is taken from a good source, the same natural phenomenon being described by Lucan in his account of Cato's march (Phars. v. 175, 176). Ophellas lost many of his followers through the lack of food and water, and Theophrastos (Hist. Plant. iv. 3) records that in the country of the Lotophagi they were reduced to eating the fruit of the Lotus or Jujube tree (*Zizyphus lotus*), which still abounds in this region. After over two months of toil and privation the survivors succeeded in reaching Tunês.]

men. Then he slew him¹. The army of Ophellas, not know-
ing what to do, entered the service of Agathoklès². CHAP. XII.

Agathoklès had now a stronger force than ever, and about this time news came that all the Macedonian commanders in the East, now that the house of Alexander was extinct, had taken the title of kings. The general or tyrant of Syracuse, carrying on a successful war in Africa, thought he was as great as any of them, and called himself king also³. First of Sicilian rulers, he put his name and kingly title on the coin, but he did not go so far as to put his head⁴. Nor did the new king wear the diadem; a sacred wreath belonging to a priesthood that he held was enough for him. In the strength of his kingship he went on to new conquests, taking Utica⁵ and other towns⁶ which

[¹ Diod. xx. 42; Justin, xxii. 7; and cf. Polyæn., v. 3. 4, for the story of how Agathoklès turned the good looks of his own son Hérakleidès to account with Ophellas. Another "stratagem,"—perhaps from Douris (see Schubert, *op. cit.*, pp. 20, 150).]

[² It was at this juncture (Diod. xx. 43, 44; Justin, xxii. 7) that Bomilkar, "the Marino Faliero of Carthage" (Holm, *G. S. ii.* 250), made his abortive attempt to seize the tyranny. By his death Agathoklès lost a potential ally in the Carthaginian camp, and the event must therefore be regarded as a set-off against the accession of Ophellas' troops.]

[³ Diod. xx. 54. Mr. Freeman, following the order of Diodôros, places the assumption of the royal title by Agathoklès in 307. Diodôros,—probably basing his account on Hieronymos of Kardia (see Schubert, *op. cit.* 156),—makes this the immediate consequence of the adoption of the kingly title by the Diadochoi—Antigonos, Ptolemy, Seleukos, Lysimachos, and Kassander. That Antigonos had taken the title of king in 307 is certain from an inscription (*C. I. A. ii.* 238). Ptolemy, however, does not seem to have begun his reign till Nov. 7, 305 (*Droysen, G. d. Hell. ii.* 140, n. 1). If, therefore, Agathoklès did not adopt the title till after all the Diadochoi mentioned, it must have been later than 305. The considerable proportion of Agathoklès' coins struck before his kingship favours this view.]

[⁴ See Supplement V. p. 487, seqq.]

[⁵ Diod. xx. 54. Having captured 300 Uticans, many of them belonging to the principal families, he tied them up in front of his engines, hoping that the sight would disarm the defenders of the walls. But the unhappy prisoners perished under the bolts of their fellow-citizens.]

[⁶ Among them Hippuakra, or Hippo Diarrhytos (Biserta), which lay on

CHAP. XII. still clave to Carthage, and slaughtering their inhabitants as usual. Carthage was now more closely hemmed in than ever; but there was still no sign of the city being taken.

“The kings of that age called themselves simply ‘King,’ without adding the name of any particular kingdom. So King Agathoklês did not call himself King of Syracuse or King of Sicily. This last he was far from being; besides the Phœnician possessions, many of the Hellenic and hellenized towns had turned against him.”

§ 9. *Overthrow of the Akragantine Alliance.*

We now, after a space of two years, hear again of the action of the Akragantine alliance. We are told vaguely that, under the generalship of Xenodikos, great progress had been made, that many cities had been set free, and that the Sikeliots everywhere—the name now, we may be sure, takes in the men of Agyrium as well as the men of Gela—had begun to cherish the brightest hopes of universal freedom throughout the island¹. But no names are given; specially we have not a word about the cities which had been wrested from the Phœnician. We see only in an indirect way that Hêrakleia is still free². But the head city of Greek Sicily was still held by her own tyrant,

a narrow tongue of land between the sea and a large lagoon. Agathoklês captured this place by means of a fleet, constructed docks and harbours (cf. Appian, Pun. 110), and planned to make it a second place of arms, like Tunês, for his operations against Carthage. The military genius of Agathoklês is clearly shown by his utilization of this site, and his example is now being followed by the French occupants of Biserta. To secure his communications with Tunês he seems to have built the tower mentioned by Appian (Pun. 14) as πύργος Ἀγαθοκλέους, distant 30 stadia from Utica, the foundations of which have been recognized by Tissot (Prov. romaine d'Afrique, 554) at the entrance of the narrow gorge that intersects the Djebel Menzel-el-Ghoul range, on the direct route between Tunis and Biserta.]

[¹ Diod. xx. 56.

[² Diodôros (loc. cit.) says that Agathoklês, on his return from Sicily, Ἡρακλείας ἡλευθερώσας τὴν πόλιν ἠνάγκασε πάλιν ἐνσπέντεσθαι.]

in some Syracusan eyes perhaps still general with his old commission, in his own eyes undoubtedly the new-made king. He was still in the continent where he had taken his kingship; Syracuse and the other strong places of the Syracusan territory were held for him by his generals Leptinês and Dâmophilos. We are left to guess whether any warlike action had taken place between them and the Akragantines since the mercenaries had been driven out of Echetla. Now at least Xenodikos thought that the time was come to strike a vigorous blow against them.

How far did an Akragantine leader deem himself to be warring against Syracuse in the old quarrel of the rival cities? how far to be warring, in the cause of confederate Sicily, for Syracuse against her master?

He set out with ten thousand foot and a thousand horse. The force of Leptinês and Dâmophilos was smaller. From Syracuse and all the outlying forts they collected but eight thousand. In horse they were somewhat stronger than Xenodikos, numbering twelve hundred. How many of these were of the famous horsemen of Syracuse, a class which so many revolutions, and above all the massacres and banishments of Agathoklês, must have sadly tended to lessen? We may believe that the Syracusan army consisted largely of the more tried soldiers. The army of Xenodikos, mainly composed of the citizen levies of Akragas and the allied towns, would most likely, even after their practice of the last two years, be hardly a match for the veteran mercenaries of Agathoklês, professional fighting men, Greek and barbarian.

The armies met in the open field; where, of all the possible sites between Akragas and Syracuse, we are not told. We can only guess that, as the Akragantines were the invaders, the spot would have to be looked for in the Syracusan territory, a territory in which Gela and Kamarina are now not to be reckoned. Nor is anything

CHAP. XII.

Xenodikos
marches
against
Syracuse.Akragan-
tines
defeated.

CHAP. XII. said of the details of the battle, save that it was stoutly
 Break up contested but that in the end the Akragantines gave way.
 of Akra- Fifteen hundred of them and their allies were left on the
 gantine field ; the rest, with their general, escaped to Akragas.
 alliance.

This battle without a name had sadder consequences than those which need always follow a single defeat. We are told, without details and with no further setting forth of causes, that the Akragantines, having undergone this defeat, cast aside their noble enterprise and took no more heed to the hopes of freedom which they had stirred up in their allies¹. We can say no more. We see that Akragas still remained an independent commonwealth, and that Xenodikos kept his place as its general. But she ceased to be the head of a great alliance, the champion of Sikeliot freedom. And we learn the fate of one or two of the members which had formed that alliance, and we can easily get at that of others. One of the most hopeful schemes for the recovery and extension, of the independent life of Greek commonwealths in these decaying days was shattered, one hardly sees wherefore.

§ 10. *Agathoklés in Sicily.*

We are not told whether Leptinês and Dâmophilos did anything to press their advantage any further against the defeated Akragantines. But a mightier and a fiercer than they was at hand. [Leaving his son Archagathos to command his troops on Carthaginian soil, Agathoklés himself, with two thousand chosen men, had set forth for Sicily on a new fleet of his own construction².] When the battle took place, Agathoklés may have already been afloat on his voyage from Africa ; he must at least have been making ready for it. He clearly landed very soon

[¹ Diod. xx. 56 ; διέλυσαν ἐαυτῶν μὲν τὴν καλλίστην ἐπιβολήν, τῶν δὲ συμμάχων τὰς τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐλπίδας.]

[² Ib. 55 ; ἄφρακτα καὶ πεντηκοντόρους ναυπηγησάμενος.]

after the Akragantine defeat. From Africa he sailed by the course by which so many Punic fleets had reached Sicily. His first call was neither to free Syracuse from the Punic cruisers nor to spend his vengeance on Akragas or on any of the towns which Akragas had wrested from his power. While Punic fleets harassed Syracuse, while his lieutenants harassed Carthage, he would himself strike a blow directly at the Punic dominion in Western Sicily.

CHAP. XII.
Return of
Agathoklès
to Sicily.

The first spot of Sicilian ground on which Agathoklès was to set foot as a king was the Greek dependency of Carthage, Selinous. Of the lords and captains of Syracuse none but Hermokratès and Dionysios had pressed so nearly to the heart of the Punic power. We are not distinctly told whether Selinous had joined the Akragantine alliance; we are not even distinctly told whether it now passed into the hands of Agathoklès. But, in the absence of anything to the contrary, we may make both inferences. To his next point we see our way more clearly. He struck south-east along the coast for Hêrakteia. "The men of Hêrakteia had set their city free; but he brought them again into subjection¹." The narrator possibly thought for the moment that Hêrakteia had before been under the dominion of Agathoklès; but it is clear from the whole tale that Hêrakteia had been a possession of Carthage, that it had entered the Akragantine alliance, that after the break-up of that alliance it remained an independent city, and that it was now brought under the power of Agathoklès.

He invades
the Cartha-
ginian
dominion.

Capture of
Hêrakteia.

For him to win a city in such a case would be to strike a blow at once at Carthage and at Akragas. Hêrakteia won, he marched right across the island to his own birthplace at Therma. Here, as in the days of his childhood, Carthage was in possession; a Punic garrison kept the Baths of Himera. What Agathoklès did is not very clear. "He

Agathoklès
marches to
Therma.

[¹ Diod. xx. 56. See p. 438 and note 2.]

CHAP. XII. won them over to him and left them under a truce¹." This has been understood to mean that he left the Punic force in possession²; the more natural meaning of a somewhat confused form of words would rather mean that they capitulated and withdrew under terms. With what feelings the potter who had grown into general, tyrant, and king drew near to the place where his banished father had found shelter and where he himself had first trod the earth is one of the many things which we should be well pleased to know, but over which a veil is thrown.

Agathoklês
takes
Cepha-
lœdium.

Well too should we have been pleased to have had some details of the next stage of his course. "He besieged and took Cephalœdium and left Leptinês there in command³." We can say no more; the Headland, chief of headlands, yielded to Agathoklês, as it had once yielded to Dionysios; what feats of arms were wrought to assault and defend the mountain citadel we know not in either case. We know not even whether Cephalœdium was attacked as an ally or dependency of Carthage or as a member of the dissolved Akragantine alliance. During the two years of its unchronicled activity, the work of liberation and union may have stretched even so far. Our one fact is that Leptinês, late victor of that alliance, had now joined his master.

Leptinês stayed at Cephalœdium; Agathoklês struck inland to the foot of Ætna. There at least the Akragantine mission of freedom had been at work. The last time we heard of Centuripa was when an attempt for its deliverance from Agathoklês came to nought⁴. A later attempt must have been more lucky; Centuripa, though shorn of Akragantine help, was now a free city in the hands of its own citizens.

[¹ Diod. xx. 56; *Θερμίτας προσαγαγόμενος ὑποσπόνδους ἀφῆκε, τῶν Καρχηδονίων φρουρούντων ταύτην τὴν πόλιν.*]

[² Holm, G. 8. ii. 253, says, "[Agathokles] Therma den Karthagern lassen müsste."]

[³ Diod. xx. 56.]

[⁴ See above, p. 386.]

But there were some among them who did not shrink from bringing the tyrant within their walls. Agathoklès directed his way by night; he was seemingly on the point of being admitted within the gates, when the plot of the traitors was found out; the guards came to the rescue, and the new-made king felt his first defeat in being chased down the hill of Centuripa ¹. He then struck back again to the northern sea, to another town where he also had traitors at his bidding. Apollonia on its hill above the waters, once the Sikel home of the Greek god, now we believe as Greek to all outward seeming as Syracuse or Akragas, was free like Centuripa. Either it had never lost its freedom or the help of the allied cities had enabled it to win it back. But disloyal citizens promised to surrender the town to Agathoklès, and he came near to receive it. The plot was found out; the traitors were chastised; and Apollonia made ready for her defence. The siege began. In the first day's fighting the tyrant was beaten back. The next day, after heavy toil, with great loss of his soldiers, he at last forced his way into the town. The failure before Centuripa could now be made up for; there was opportunity and leisure for the amusement of a massacre. The more part of the men of Apollonia were slaughtered, and their goods were made a prey ².

CHAP. XII.
Agathoklès repulsed at Centuripa.

He takes Apollonia.

Massacre of citizens.

But he had still powerful enemies in Sicily. We have not for a good while heard of Deinokratès and his band of exiles, whether they had joined themselves to the liberating efforts of Akragas or had kept aloof. Now that the Akragantine scheme had been thrown up and the Akragantine alliance dissolved, Deinokratès again appears as taking up the cause which Akragas had laid down, so far at least as to withstand the progress of Agathoklès. From this time for several years Deinokratès stands forth

Deinokratès heads movement against Agathoklès.

[¹ Diod. xx. 56.]

[² Ib.]

CHAP. XII.
Deino-
kratês
heads
movement
against
Agatho-
klês.

Army of
Deino-
kratês.

as an actor in Sicilian history on a level with Agathoklês himself. The personal relation between the two men has always been a remarkable one, and it remains so still. The movement in his hands was in some points more promising, in some points less so than it had been when the Akragantine Xenodikos had been the chief leader. The former movement had been the act of an established commonwealth to which other commonwealths joined themselves in willing alliance. It was regular warfare at the bidding of an acknowledged power. The movement of Deinokratês was a movement of an adventurer at the head of adventurers, an adventurer who, as events presently showed, could by no means fully be trusted. But from the military side Deinokratês had many advantages. His followers, if not strictly mercenaries, had become, like mercenaries, professional soldiers; they were habitually under arms; they had become inured to all the toils and hardships of warfare. For fighting purposes they were far better suited than the citizen levies of Xenodikos. And in the state of Sicily and the Greek lands generally in those days, their numbers were great. But when we are told that he commanded twenty thousand foot and a thousand horse, and that all consisted of the veteran soldiers just spoken of¹, we hardly know how to reconcile this statement with another which we find alongside of it. Deinokratês, we are told, took up the mission which Akragas had let drop; he proclaimed himself the protector of freedom everywhere; men flocked to him from all quarters out of love of independence and out of fear of Agathoklês². In an army thus formed, the well-proved exiles could only have been a kernel, though doubtless a precious kernel, which may have gone far to leaven the whole force.

In the campaign that follows we have more than ever to complain of the meagreness of our authorities. We

[¹ Diod. xx. 57.]

[² Ib.]

long to know some details of Agathoklê's success at Cepha-
lœdium and of his failure at Centuripa; but we can at
least call up the spots where the events happened. Now
we only know that Deinokratês encamped somewhere in
the open country—in what part of all Greek or hellenized
Sicily we are left to guess. He challenged Agathoklê's
battle; the tyrant commanding a smaller force than that
of Deinokratês, withdrew before him, venturing on skir-
mishes only; Deinokratês followed, and won repeated vic-
tories without effort ¹.

CHAP. XII.

Repeated
victories
of Deino-
kratês.

From such a narrative as this we turn even to an
anecdote which would seem to belong to somewhere
about this time, but whose place is equally uncertain.
Agathoklê's is besieging a nameless city, but a city, we
are told, of some renown. Its defenders from the walls
mocked the Potter of Therma, as, ages after, the defenders
of Alençon mocked the Tanner of Falaise. "Man of the
pot and the chimney," say these jesters with no certain
whereabouts, "when will you pay your mercenaries?"
"When I take your town," was the tyrant's answer ².
The story breaks off, and we are not told whether the
mercenaries were paid. If they were, we may suspect that
the jesters found themselves in yet harder case than those
who felt the pollarding-knife at Alençon ³.

Anecdote
of Agatho-
klês.

In the almost helpless state of our narrative, Deino-
kratês again slips out of sight for a season, and we again
get a glimpse of the Akragantine leader Xenodikos. No
longer general of a great confederacy, he is still general
of the independent commonwealth of Akragas. But his
defeat has formed a party against him; there is no sign of
treason on his part, but the city is torn by dissensions on
his account. The watchful tyrant marked this state of

Xenodikos
at Akragas.

[¹ Diod. xx. 57; συνεχῶς ἀσυνίτῳ περιπεποιημένος τὴν νίκην.]

[² Ib. 63; cf. Plutarch, Reg. et Imp. Apophth., s. v. Agath.]

[³ See Norman Conquest, ii. 287 seqq.]

CHAP. XII. things as one not a little to his advantage. Now was the time to invade the enemy's country, above all, the country of Akragas. Victorious by sea in his own person, Agathoklês would be no less victorious by land in the person of his general. Leptinês was accordingly sent to harry the territory of Akragas. Xenodikos for a while kept still; at last, stirred by reproaches of cowardice, he drew out the forces of the city. Slightly less in numbers than the army of Leptinês, the force of Akragas was, we are told, yet more inferior in quality¹. It is the contrast which we have come across so often. The soldiers of Xenodikos were citizen-soldiers; they were Akragantine soldiers; Akragas still kept some of its old renown for luxury; its warriors were warriors brought up to an easy life in the pleasant shades of the city, not men to cope with the exiles of Deinokratês or the mercenaries of Agathoklês, so well used to encamp in the open field. The armies met; the Akragantines gave way, and the soldiers of Leptinês chased them to the gates of the city. Five hundred footmen and more than fifty horse were slain. We may compare these figures from a single city with those of the loss which was undergone by Xenodikos when he commanded the forces of the whole confederacy². We may roughly guess that Akragas had supplied about a third of the whole. Great was the wrath and sorrow at Akragas at this second defeat; great was the bitterness against the general who had twice been defeated. Xenodikos shrank from the charges that were gathering against him; special impeachments, it would seem, as well as the regular examination at the end of his term of office³. He became a banished man at Gela.

Akragas
attacked by
Leptinês.

Defeat and
exile of
Xenodikos.

[¹ Diod. xx. 62; τῇ ἀρετῇ πολὺ κατὰδεστέραν.]

[² See above, p. 446.]

[³ Diod. xx. 62; φοβηθεὶς τὰς ἐπιφερομένας εἰθύνas καὶ κρίσεις . . .]

§ 11. *Last African Expedition of Agathoklés.*

* "The cause of the tyrant seemed sinking both in Sicily and in Africa. There Archagathos still held Tunis¹; but he underwent several defeats from the Carthaginians, and earnestly prayed to his father to come to his help. Just at that moment fortune turned in Agathoklés' favour. He himself, with the help of some Etruscan ships², over-
came the Punic fleet before Syracuse; he brought in provisions to the city, and had the sea clear for the way to Africa.

Punic fleet
defeated
before
Syracuse.

"Greatly cheered by these two victories, [—by sea over the Carthaginians, by land over the Akragantines—] Agathoklés left Leptinés in Sicily and again sailed back to Africa. But he found that he had no real hope of success there. He himself suffered a defeat in attacking the Punic camp before Tunis³. A wonderful night followed in both

Agathoklés sails for Africa. B.C. 307.

* From Story of Sicily, pp. 250-252.

[¹ For an account of the operations of Archagathos and his lieutenants Eumachos and Aischrión, see Diod. xx. 57, 58, 59, 60; and cf. Grote, ch. xcvi. A variety of local names occur, none of which have as yet been identified with certainty. Grote supposes that Tokæ is the later Tuca Terebinthina. Tisot (op. cit. 444) thinks that Phellinê is possibly the Pallene of the Tabula Peutingeriana. But the Asphodelôdes with skins like the Ethiopians, the Pithékoussai who lived in strange community with monkeys, Meschela founded by Greeks returned from the Trojan War, Akris, Miltinê, and another Hippukra, have left no clue to their whereabouts.]

[² Diodoros, xx. 61, says that eighteen Etruscan ships came to Agathoklés' assistance. Holm, G. S. ii. 478, lays stress on the importance of this fact. In 307 B. C. the Etruscans were hostile to the Romans, though not openly at war with them. In 306 Rome concluded a treaty with Carthage. Thus Syracuse and Etruria stand together against Carthage and Rome. Agathoklés habitually employed Etruscan mercenaries; but, as Holm (l. c.) justly points out, the contingent of eighteen ships indicates an official alliance.]

[³ Diod. xx. 64. The force that Agathoklés had at his disposal

CHAR. XII. camps¹. The Carthaginians burned their choicest captives to their gods. In so doing they set fire to their camp, and they might easily have been set upon and routed in the confusion. But Agathoklés' own camp was in no less con-

Mutiny
in Agathoklés' camp.

fusion. Seeing that success was hopeless, and having a private quarrel with his son Archagathos, he determined to decamp privily with his other son Hêracleidês and to leave Archagathos and the army to their fate. But the scheme was found out by Archagathos and the soldiers, and Agathoklés was put in bonds in his own camp². But a cry came that the enemy was attacking the camp. At such a moment who could lead them like their old general and king? Agathoklés was brought out in chains; the one cry was to set him free. But the moment he was free, he

He returns
to Sicily.
Nov. B.C.
307.

got away; he found a boat and sailed off with a few companions for Sicily (November, B.C. 307)³. The soldiers slew his sons and then made peace with the Carthaginians⁴. So the famous African expedition of Agathoklés came to an end in utter discomfiture. He had not strengthened his own power; he had not seriously weakened the power of Carthage. But he had planned and carried out, and for a while succeeded in, the most daring enterprise that man had ever planned. And if he himself came back defeated, he pointed the way to others who came back victorious."

consisted of 6,000 Greeks, and about the same number of Gauls, Samnites and Etruscans, some 10,000 Libyans, 1,500 cavalry, and 6,000 Libyan chariots. Agathoklés lost 3,000 in killed.]

[¹ For these events see Diod. xx. 65, 66, 67.]

[² Diod. xx. 68.]

[³ Diod. xx. 69.]

[⁴ Ib. The terms were that they should give up the African cities that they still held to the Carthaginians, receiving in return 300 talents; that those who liked should enter the Carthaginian service, and the rest be settled at Solous.]

§ 12. *The Massacres of Agathoklès at Segesta
and Syracuse. B.C. 306.*

CHAP. XII.

The second return of Agathoklès to Sicily was marked, according to our only account, by an outburst of frantic cruelty which seems strange even in his career. We have no means of checking our story; but we cannot help remembering that there is no subject on which imaginative writers are more certain to run wild than on tales of massacre and torture. The numbers of the victims are sure to be exaggerated, and, in the details of their sufferings, the narrators seem to exercise the same kind of perverse ingenuity as the actual tormentors. Unless we have the evidence of an eye-witness, we may be sure that the story, as we have it, has grown. And we have long ago learned that Sicilian tyrants were looked on as having a kind of common property in ill-doing, so that the deeds or alleged deeds of any one might be freely transferred to any other. With some such deductions as these, we come to the dealings of Agathoklès with Segesta. We have heard nothing of the Elymian city for some while. It has not figured in the later events of Sicilian history; we are only told that at this moment it was in alliance with Agathoklès¹. We are not told where he landed; wherever it was, he sent to Syracuse for a part of his force, and with that force marched to Segesta. A tale follows which has no parallel among the worst recorded deeds of any other Greek. Nay we may even say that it has no parallel in the earlier deeds of Agathoklès himself. In his earlier massacres there is some intelligible motive of policy or passion. Here, as the story stands, a town which is expressly called his ally is made to undergo a measure of suffering such as is not recorded in the case of any other town stormed by barbarians. Hannibal at Himera seems merciful beside Agathoklès at Segesta. So

[¹ Diód. xx. 71; τῇ Ἐγεσταίῳ πόλει οὖσαν σύμμαχον.]

CHAP. XII. the tale is told us, and we can tell it only as it is told¹.

The massacre at Segesta.

Unheard-of barbarity of Agathoklés.

Agathoklés then, having collected his force we know not where, marched to Segesta, and demanded a huge contribution. The city numbered ten thousand citizens, many of them rich men. These were at once commanded to pay down the greater part of their substance. Many complained, and came together to discuss their grievances. These meetings were taken advantage of by Agathoklés to charge the whole city with conspiring against him. His vengeance on the plotters was sharp. The poorer citizens he led down to the stream that flows below the hill of Segesta, the stream to which the Trojan settlement had given the name of the ancestral Skamandros. There he slaughtered them in a body. The rich who had either refused his demands or were thought to have kept something back he reserved for special torture. The record of them reminds us of our own Chronicler's picture of the nineteen winters that England tholed for her sins. Various forms of suffering are described; among them the tender and delicate women of Segesta had to undergo some specially adapted to their sex, among which the special pangs of Saint Agatha were forestalled. But two forms of the tyrant's ingenuity deserve special notice. The military engines of Dionysios were put to a new use. As in later days men have been blown from the mouths of cannon, so now men were bound to the catapults and hurled whithersoever they might fall. Here it is the mockery and the perverted ingenuity that shocks; the actual suffering would be less than in many other forms of death. But we are also told that Agathoklés bethought him of the favourite torture of Phalaris with improvements. Phalaris had enjoyed the cries of his victims, but he had not gone beyond the hearing of the ear; Agathoklés would see with his own eyes

[¹ The details of the massacre are given by Diodórus, xi. 71.]

all that was borne by them that he had doomed to suffer. CHAP. XII.
 He devised a brazen bed, cunningly fitted to the human Tortures devised by Agathoklés.
 shape, on which each limb found its place. On this the sufferer was placed, and a fire was lighted below. In all this we see the conception of a tyrant who had fallen almost as much below Dionysios as Dionysios had fallen below Gelôn. Dionysios could go a long way in the path of cruelty at the bidding of either policy or revenge. But he is never charged with that oriental delight in the actual infliction of suffering which seems here to be attributed to Agathoklés. Even Phytôn of Rhêgion was a political and personal enemy¹; the Segestan victims of Agathoklés had given him no cause of anger whatever. A mind stirred up to the extremity of bitterness by the failure of the greatest scheme that Western Europe had yet seen planned, seems to have found comfort in wreaking its spite on any that came in its way.

The massacre now wrought seems to have amounted to Fate of survivors.
 a practical sweeping away of the whole population of the ancient Elymian city. Some of the unhappy Segestans, seeing what was in store for them, contrived to find what they thought a milder fate at their own hands. They defrauded the tyrant of his amusement by hanging themselves, or even by burning themselves in their own houses. The whole work is said to have been done in one day; but the brazen bed at least must have been made ready beforehand. The whole full-grown population of Segesta were said to have perished; the maidens and boys were carried to Italy and sold to the Bruttians. But one goodly youth was spared alike from death and from foreign slavery. He lived to take the place in the tyrant's household which his fair face won for him, and in after-days to have his revenge².

After making all needful deduction from this story,

[¹ See above, p. 192.]

[² See below, p. 484.]

CHAP. XII. there is enough of truth in it to show that Segesta from this time never recovered its position as a city. There is to this day one living sign of this before our eyes. The famous temple must have been in-building when Agathoklês came; and it remains unfinished¹. The outer columns are there in order; they duly support their entablatures and pediments; but the final touches have never been given to them; the drums remain unfluted as when they were first set up. And the columns fence in nothing; the wall of the *cella* is not there now, and there is no sign that it ever was built. Segesta lived on, during the whole time of Roman dominion, and perished, how we do not exactly know, at the coming of the Saracen. But in all the ages between Agathoklês and the preaching of Christianity, pagan Segesta never found enough of zeal or wealth or energy to bring the unfinished temple to perfection. Segesta still boasted of her Trojan origin; in her later coinage under Roman dominion the legend of Aineias is wrought with ostentatious detail, such as was never thought needful in the old Elymian city². But the real memories of the spot may have spoken but feebly to a new people. For under the hands of Agathoklês Elymian Segesta perished; if the mysterious people who founded her went on at all as an element among the races

Unfinished
temple at
Segesta.

Elymian
Segesta
wiped out.

[¹ The view here expressed that the temple of Segesta was in course of construction at the end of the fourth century B. C. must certainly be rejected. The temple, so far as it was completed, is a homogeneous work contemporary with the fifth-century constructions of Akragas and Selinous. There can be little doubt that the interruption of the work was due to the impoverishment of the Segestans that accompanied the Athenian alliance of 416, or at least to the events of 410-409 B. C. which left them the dependent allies of Carthage. The latest silver coins of Segesta date from about the latter year, and even copper pieces were not issued again till over a century and a half after that date (see Head, *Hist. Num.* 146; and cf. my *Syr. Meds.* p. 91). The Segestans of those days were certainly not in a position to rear such a costly monument, nor, if they had been, would they have reproduced the lines of fifth-century Doric.]

[² There is no allusion to the legend on the coins of the earlier city.]

of Sicily, it must have been on Eryx only. Agathoklès CHAP. XII.
 peopled the town with new inhabitants, of whom we
 have no further account than that they are spoken of as
*deserters*¹. The very name of the city was changed; at
 the bidding of Agathoklès it was no longer to be called ^{Segesta becomes}
 Segesta but Dikaiopolis². Such a change had been made ^{Dikaiopolis.}
 before him by Hierôn; such changes have been made after
 him by not a few princes who found the memories of
 history too strong for them. Yet Ælia did remain the
 formal name even of Christian Jerusalem, and we have at
 least coins of Hierôn's Ætna. No coins of Segesta under
 her new name of Dikaiopolis seem to have been preserved;
 most likely none were ever struck. The deserters whom
 Agathoklès planted there, a motley crowd doubtless with
 no common traditions, would be glad to take up the old
 memories of their new home. They would soon drop new
 Dikaiopolis for old Segesta; they would presently come to
 fancy themselves Trojans, and at a time not far distant
 they would find the advantage of bearing the Trojan name.

It was perhaps while Agathoklès was still at Segesta
 that news came to him which stirred him to a slaughter
 akin to that of Segesta to be wrought in Syracuse itself.
 [This was the news of the murder of his sons by the
 soldiers that he had left behind him in Africa.]

* "In his wrath he sent orders to his brother Antandros, ^{Agathoklès mas-}
 who commanded for him at Syracuse, to put to death all the ^{sacres the}
 kinsfolk, young and old, of the men who had served with ^{kinsfolk}
 him in Africa. And the thing was done³. It is wonder- ^{of his}
 ful that the man who did such deeds as these two last was ^{African}
 allowed to live for seventeen years longer, and then did ^{troops.}
 not die in any public outbreak."

[¹ Diod. xx. 71; ἔδωκεν οικητήριον τοῖς αὐτομόλοις.]

[² Ib.]

* Story of Sicily, p. 254.

[³ Diod. xx. 72.]

§ 13. *Agathoklès' dealings with Deinokratès.*

B. C. 306-305.

The most amazing event in the whole life of Agathoklès now follows. His whole career is a series of the strangest ups and downs recorded in the life of any man. And the moment when he seems to fall lowest is ever the eve of a new rise to greater power. But, wide as was the experience of Agathoklès in various forms of success and failure, one line of conduct at least could never have been looked for from him; no man could have dreamed that Agathoklès would have given up power except under the sternest pressure of necessity. Yet this we shall now see him do, and we shall have to speculate as to his motives, whether it was the act of a moment of despair or part of a plot laid in the deepest subtlety. In Africa his overthrow has been complete; not an inch of ground in that continent obeys his dominion, not a soldier maintains his cause in arms, while Tunis and all that he had held has passed again under the obedience of Carthage. He has come to Sicily to shed a vast deal of blood for no intelligible purpose, and then, as it seemed, to sink for a moment from any place among the chief powers of the island. But his strange fall is immediately followed by a stranger rise, or rather he finds a rival who, for his own subtle ends, will not allow him to fall, but lifts him up again in spite of himself. And, once lifted up again, he finds himself once more in his old place or in a greater. Dominion in Africa has passed away for ever; but dominion in Sicily comes back in full measure, and from dominion in Sicily he goes on to dominion beyond the strait, beyond Hadria; the Sikeliot king takes his place among the potentates of the Eastern Hellenistic world; and in the end he dreams, but death hinders him from more than dreaming, of new warfare on his old Libyan battle-fields. We see him now, with the slaughter of Segesta and Syracuse still

fresh on his hands, going through the land to secure the cities to his obedience, placing garrisons as he goes, to keep down the rising spirit which saw in his misfortunes a new call to the strife for independence¹. Geographical details we again have none; but he seems to go on successfully on his journey till a sudden stroke, the stroke of a trusted friend, hurls him for a moment to the ground. CHAP. XII.

The rival power to Agathoklès in Greek Sicily—and all Sicily is now practically Greek except the actual barbarian corner—is still the Syracusan exile Deinokratès. He still, it would seem, professed to hold up the banner which had fallen from the hands of the Akragantine confederacy, the banner of independence throughout the island. Before long the fact stood revealed that he had not grasped it with the same honest purpose with which we have every reason to believe that Xenodikos and his countrymen had first upraised it. We have seen him the enemy of Agathoklès; we shall see him so again; but we cannot forget that at the very beginning of the tyranny of Agathoklès he was treated by the tyrant with strange favour; his life was spared when others were slaughtered², and even his exile seems to have been through his own free will. At this moment he is still in arms against Agathoklès, and his cause has attraction enough to win over one of the chief instruments of Agathoklès. The tyrant's general Pasiphilos, in command of at least a part of his army and entrusted by him with the keeping of some of his towns, when he heard of the overthrow in Africa, and of the murder of Agathoklès' two sons, came to the conclusion that the cause of his master was the falling cause, and that his own interests would be better promoted by a partnership with Deinokratès. He won over his troops to the same mind; the towns which had been entrusted to him by Agathoklès he kept for himself, and entered into an engagement with

Deinokratès chief opponent of Agathoklès.

Revolt of Pasiphilos.

[¹ Diod. xx. 77.]

[² See above, p. 378.]

CHAP. XII. Deinokratès, the terms of which we are not told¹. But
 Terms
 proposed
 by Agathoklès to
 Deinokratès.
 the terms of another negotiation we do hear. The revolt of Pasiphilos so utterly bowed down the soul of Agathoklès that he gave up all hope; he sent an embassy to Deinokratès, offering terms which amounted to utter effacement of himself, and which, if Deinokratès had really been an honest Syracusan patriot, would have seemed the accomplishment of his dearest wishes. Agathoklès would withdraw from Syracuse. The citizens should be left to their freedom; Deinokratès should return unhindered to his own home. From the rest of his actual dominion he would withdraw no less; he would not altogether cease to be a potentate; but he would remain one on a humble scale compared with that of the king who had ruled at Syracuse and at Tunis. He asked for two towns only on the northern coast, away from both Syracuse and Akragas. They were two towns of his own recent winning, but which, the story implies, were among those which Pasiphilos had carried over to the alliance or obedience of Deinokratès. All else he would give up; he prayed to be allowed to keep, if only for his maintenance, his own birth-place Therma and the mountain city and fortress of Cephalœdium. The extent of the territory of these two towns, towns whose territory adjoined each other, should be the extent of the dominion of Agathoklès.

Insincerity
 of the
 proposals.
 It is hard to believe that this offer of Agathoklès was meant in sincerity, that it was the result of overwhelming fear, of utter failure of heart, following on the desertion of Pasiphilos. So believed our guide from Agyrium²; so therefore, we may believe, did those whom he followed. And it is easy to understand that such an explanation of the facts might at once be set forth by Antandros as an excuse for the conduct of his brother, while Timaios might

[¹ For these events see Diod. xx. 77.]

[² Diodôros (xx. 78) examines the motives of Agathoklès' offer.]

eagerly seize on it as good material for further revilings of his enemy. From different points of view it might seem either more or less disgraceful to have been bowed down by sudden fright than to have laid a plot of extreme cleverness and mischief. But the facts of the story, as they are told us, seem better to agree with belief in the plot. CHAP. XII.

One thing is certain ; the proposals of Agathoklês, whether made in sincerity or in craft, did not please Deinokratês. The purposes of the exiled leader had most likely changed since he first went into exile. The favour then shown to him by Agathoklês need not prove that there was an understanding between them all along ; it does at least prove that Agathoklês from the beginning understood the character of Deinokratês, and saw that he might one day be useful for his ends. Deinokratês had most likely gone forth from exile an aristocrat, but still a republican. He was not for tyranny, either in himself or in any other. He was for a commonwealth, even if a commonwealth in which his own party should not have the upper hand. But the life of an adventurer, largely of a successful adventurer, had changed him. At the head of the greatest force in Sicily, twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse, holding many and great cities at his bidding, he had learned habits of command ; he had learned the feelings of a king, tyrant, master of some kind ; he had lost those of the citizen and magistrate, aristocratic and democratic alike ¹. It is hardly the brother of the tyrant, it is this time rather the exile of Tauro-menion, who draws us the picture of the state of mind of the man who was called on to give up this great position to

[¹ Diod. xx. 79; οὗτος γὰρ μοναρχίας ὧν ἐπιθυμητής, τῆς μὲν ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις δημοκρατίας ἀλλότριος ἦν, τῇ δὲ ἡγεμονίᾳ τῇ τότε οὖσα περὶ αὐτὸν εὐηρεστεῖτο. ἀφηγγεῖτο γὰρ πεζῶν μὲν πλείονων ἢ δις μυρίων, ἱππέων δὲ τρισχιλίων, πόλεων δὲ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων ὥστε αὐτὸν καλεῖσθαι μὲν τῶν φυγάδων στρατηγὸν, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ βασιλικὴν ἔχειν ὑπεροχὴν, τῆς ἐξουσίας οὓσης περὶ αὐτὸν αὐτοκράτορος.]

CHAP. XII. become a single citizen in a democracy. If Deinokratês had gone back to Syracuse, he must have become a private man ; in a free state that loved equality he must have been reckoned as one man among many ; in an election he might be outvoted by the demagogue of the moment, for such were better loved by the multitude than the men of mark who spake boldly to them ¹. In this last saying we see the spirit of the later carpers at democracy who had forgotten how boldly Kleôn rebuked the people, how much more truly Nikias might be said to have humbled himself before them. But the general picture is true ; Deinokratês had lost the true civic spirit ; he longed for the power of the ruler. It was the change which came over Diôn, the change which most likely came over Hermokratês, the change from which nothing short of the unsullied virtue of Timoleôn could keep a man among the temptations which beset a leader of armies in those days.

Perplexity
of Deino-
kratês.

To a man in such a frame of mind the proposals of Agathoklês must have been eminently unattractive. They supplied a test of his republican virtue for which he had no mind. The assertor of the independence of every Sikeliot city could not openly refuse an offer which would at once give him all for which he had professed to be waging war. The man who was dreaming of the tyranny of Syracuse or of the kingship of all Sicily could not accept the terms, he could not honestly carry them out—in the teeth, it might be, when the time came, of the tyrant himself—for they would be the overthrow of all the hopes that he had come to frame. Agathoklês must have laughed in his sleeve, as he sent message after message to Deinokratês, praying for investiture with the humble appanage which was all that he craved. Deinokratês put him off with one answer after another ; one time he demanded that Agathoklês

[¹ Diod. xi. 79 ; τοῦ πλῆθους ἀντικειμένου ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἀγόντων παρησίαν.]

should withdraw altogether from Sicily; at another he called on him to give his children—who were they just then?—as hostages¹. Agathoklès saw through his purposes, and used them to his own ends. While he was carrying on his negotiations with Deinokratès, he had other messages to send to the exiles in the army of Deinokratès. He bade them see how their general was standing in the way of that achievement of independence for which he and they professed to be striving². And his diplomacy was busy in other quarters also. With the treaty which his rebellious soldiers in Africa had made with Carthage he had no concern; but he thought it well to make a treaty of his own. He had, for a while at least, given up all thoughts of African warfare, and in Sicily Deinokratès was just now more dangerous than the barbarian. He agreed to acknowledge the right of Carthage to all the Sicilian cities that she had ever held. He did not except his own Therma for which he was so earnestly pleading with Deinokratès. Hèracleia too was most likely in the same hands. There was a grim pleasantry in acknowledging the Punic right to them, and so, while negotiating with both Carthage and Deinokratès, to throw in an apple of discord between them.

CHAP. XII.
Intrigues
of Aga-
thoklès
against
Deino-
kratès.

His treaty
with Car-
thage.

It was plain by this time that Agathoklès was to be something either more or less than lord of Therma and Cephalædium only. He was contemplating a campaign when he made his treaty with Carthage; for he did not acknowledge the Punic claims for nothing. The price was two hundred thousand *medimni* of wheat, and a sum of money variously stated at a hundred and fifty and three hundred talents³. He had still an army for whose pay

B. C. 305.
Pecuniary
considera-
tion for
concessions
to Cartha-
ginians.

[¹ Diod. xx. 79.]

[² Ib.]

[³ Diodōros (l. c.) says that he received from the Carthaginians in return the gold value of 300 talents of silver. Hultsch (Gr. u. röm. Metrologie, 2nd Ed. 428) regards this gold payment as a concession to the commercial instincts of the Carthaginians. According to the legal exchange, silver was to

CHAP. XII. and maintenance such contributions were needed, and finding, as he most likely expected and hoped, that nothing came of his negotiations with Deinokratês, he determined to lead that army against him, and to settle the quarrel by a battle in the field¹. But he did not run that risk till he had formed an understanding with a part of the army of Deinokratês large enough to counterbalance a frightful inferiority of numbers on his own side. Against the army of the exiles, numbering twenty-five thousand foot and three thousand horse, the king or tyrant, or whatever is his true description, could, after the defection of Pasiphilos, lead no more than five thousand foot and eight hundred horse.

Agathoklês
marches
against
Deinokratês.

Battle of
Torgion.

Whence either army set forth we are not told, and we know hardly better where they met. It was near Gorgion or Torgion, which an ingenious but hardly certain suggestion has placed at Caltavuturo² among the Madonian hills, a site far inland, but whose nearest outlets to the sea are the two special towns of Agathoklês, Cephalœdium and Therma. Possibly then on this side the two armies encamped opposite each other, with no small scorn on the

gold as one to ten, and Agathoklês would therefore receive thirty Carthaginian talents of gold. But the real value of gold was somewhat higher than this, so that Carthage gained by this method of payment. Hultsch further observes that the two figures 150 and 300 are to be explained by the different reckoning of the talent by the Greeks and Carthaginians and represent no real divergence in the statement of the actual amount paid. Timaios in fact,—who largely received his information from a Carthaginian Greek source,—knowing that at Carthage the talent was smaller by one-half, gave the 300 talents of the treaty at their real value of 150. The remarkable correspondence of this transaction with the payment by the Carthaginians of 300 talents to the troops left by Agathoklês in Africa, in return for a similar surrender mentioned above by Diodôros (xx. 69, see p. 454, note 4), should not be overlooked. The duplication of the same episode and the same figures is suspicious.]

[¹ Diod. xx. 89.]

[² Coscia, Delle antiche Città di Sicilia di ignota situazione, cited by Holm, G. S. ii. 479. Hêrychios remarks of this place, *Τόργιον ὅρος ἐν Σικελίᾳ δὲ οὐ νεοττεύουσιν αἱ γῆραι ἀπ' οὗ καὶ αὐτοὶ τόρροι*. Caltavuturo = Castle (or rock) of the Vultures.]

part of the men of Deinokratês for the small numbers that were all that Agathoklês could draw to his banners¹. The armies met; a fierce battle began; but while it was waging, a body of more than two thousand forsook the side of Deinokratês and joined themselves to the forces of Agathoklês. Deinokratês had still greatly the upper hand, but the desertion had thrown his ranks into confusion, and the number of the deserters was believed to be far greater than it was. The men of Agathoklês charged with greater spirit, and presently drove the army of Deinokratês before them. Agathoklês pursued for a little way, and then bade his men to cease from slaughter, and put out a friendly proclamation to the defeated side. He was anxious to put an end to their quarrel; let them go peaceably to their homes; a defeat when numbers were so greatly on their side must have taught them that it was vain to stand against Agathoklês. Unless the proclamation was a mockery, it implies that the exiles were exiles no longer. They had cities and homes to which it was open to them to go. And, if we rightly understand the case, the more part of the Sicilian towns were now, through the former advance of Deinokratês and the change of sides on the part of Pasiphilos, held in the interest of the so-called exiles. That is to say, the army of the exiles was an army of exiles in name only. They were most likely men from all parts, gathered round a kernel of real Syracusan exiles. Against them everything tends to show that the gates of Syracuse were still shut.

It was perhaps these true exiles who found a worse fate after the battle of Torgion than the mass of the defeated enemy. The horsemen, all of them it is said, escaped unhurt to an unknown site called Ambikes. But a body of foot, reckoned at three thousand and at seven thousand²,

[¹ Diod., l. c.]

[² Diodôros, xx. 89, gives the larger figure on the authority of Timaios.]

CHAP. XII. who had had perhaps no share in the flight or had recovered themselves after it, occupied a lofty hill during the night. Their feelings are described in a marked way. They despaired of victory by force of arms; they longed to see their friends, their kinsfolk, their native place and all that they loved in it¹. If these words mean anything, they would point more naturally to Syracusan exiles than to any other class of men in the defeated army. They made terms with Agathoklês; they accepted and trusted his plighted faith; they came down from their strong place and gave up their arms. A force of darters was presently brought up, beneath whose missiles they all perished. An act of perfidious slaughter like this would be inconceivable among the acts of Gelôn; it would be without fellow even among the acts of Dionysios; to the blackness of the record of Agathoklês it seems to make no perceptible addition.

Perfidious
massacre
of prison-
ers.

Reconcilia-
tion of
Agathoklês
and
Deinokratês.

Was all this concerted beforehand with Deinokratês? So it has been thought by a weighty judge². It can hardly be so if I am right in the suggestion that the men slaughtered were Syracusan exiles. But the arrangement entered into between Agathoklês and Deinokratês is strange in any case; it is of a piece with the mysterious mercy shown to him by Agathoklês twelve years before. It may be that Deinokratês, in his later frame of mind, had satisfied himself that he would come nearer to attaining his objects as second under a mighty prince than he could come under a free constitution, while to strive any longer after the first place was too great a risk. Agathoklês and Deinokratês came to terms. Deinokratês, with the remains of the army of the exiles, entered the service of the tyrant. He became the tyrant's trusted general, commanding always a division of his army³. His first act in that character

[¹ Diod. xx. 89; τὴν μὲν ἐκ τοῦ διαγωνίζεσθαι νίκην ἀπελπίσαντες, ἐπιθυμοῦντες δὲ συγγενῶν καὶ φίλων καὶ πατρίδος, καὶ τῶν ἐν ταύτῃ καλῶν.]

[² Grote (ch. xvii.) takes this view.]

[³ Diod. xx. 90.]

was to seize Pasiphilos at Gela and to put him to death, and to make over to Agathoklês all the towns and fortresses that Pasiphilos had held. And to bear out the peculiar character that runs through the whole career of the two men, men marked that Agathoklês, who broke his oaths to all other men, always kept perfect good faith and friendship towards Deinokratês ¹. CHAP. XII.

§ 14. *The Later Years of Agathoklês.* B. C. 304-289.

Of the last sixteen years of the life and reign of Agathoklês we know, just as in the case of Dionysios, far less than we know of the twelve earlier years. He now, at the age of fifty-six, begins a time of seemingly undisputed dominion over Syracuse and the greater part of Sicily. He came distinctly nearer to the position of a King of Sicily than any one had done before him or that any one in Greek or Roman times did again, save during the short hour of the kingship of Pyrrhos, a kingship in some sort handed on from himself. The whole island was not his; Halykos, boundary of Dionysios and Timoleôn, still parted off Greek and Phœnician; but within the Greek land—and the Greek land now includes the Sikel land—the only question is whether Akragas, which had so long withstood the power of Agathoklês, ever became part of his dominion.

We feel that the range of our story is indeed widening when we not only find ourselves in the midst of the Macedonian princes of the East, but when for the first time “the mighty name of Rome” finds a direct place in the main stream of our narrative. We have as yet had glimpses now and then to remind us that the power which, little more than forty years after the death of Agathoklês, was to reckon Sicily among its subject lands was already in being, and had already taken many steps on its path to Empire. And we may be certain that, if we had the Syracuse
and Rome.

[¹ Diod. xx. 90.]

CHAP. XII. original historians of these times preserved to us, the name
 Syracuse of Rome. of Rome would be oftener heard in Sicilian story than it is.
 Historians of Syracuse far apart from each other in date found something to say about Rome and her beginnings, and we may be sure that Philistos carefully watched the course of Rome and that Rome carefully watched the course of the master of Philistos. In his day we have seen that Rome had direct dealings, if not with Sicily, yet with the islands off her northern shore¹; and one can hardly avoid the thought that, at some stage of an Italian career that stretched from Rhêgion to Aukôn, Dionysios may have at some time seen the face of a Roman envoy or may have commissioned an envoy of his own to bear his words to the Roman Senate. Be this as it may, we have now reached a time when the Roman Senate and People and the Sicilian King came more directly across each other's paths. At one moment both were at least threatened by a common enemy and may well have taken counsel together for a common interest. At another moment, in the shifting relations of the Greek states, we find Agathoklès taking the place of that common enemy in a position, perhaps not formally hostile, but certainly unfriendly to Rome. With Agathoklès, with any other Greek prince of that day, any change of policy is possible, according to the interests or the caprice of the moment. In any case each power must have watched the doings of the other with the most careful attention. Each, under whatever pretences and with whatever friends or enemies, was striving to win so much of

[¹ Diodôros (xiv. 93) relates that the Roman envoys on their way to Delphi were taken by pirates of Lipara, but subsequently set free by its Stratêgos; there is no mention of this episode, however, in Mr. Freeman's text. By the Second Treaty between Rome and Carthage (Polyb. iii. 24; Livy, vii. 27) the Romans had the right of trading with the Carthaginian Dominion in Sicily. It is reasonable therefore to suppose that at that time (348 B.C.) the commercial intercourse between Rome and Sicily—which early left its impress on the Sicilian Greek dialect (see Mommsen, R. G. i. 159)—had already begun.]

dominion or supremacy in Southern Italy as was to be had. CHAP. XII.
 And he who had thought that dominion in Sicily might be best won by war in Africa might haply think that dominion in Bruttium and Iapygia might be best won by war in Latium. As things are, we are left to guess; we nowhere hear of Rome and Syracuse crossing swords; we nowhere hear even of their exchanging embassies. But if we had the real records of the time, if we had a fuller record of the deeds of Agathoklês, if we had a more trustworthy record of the deeds of Rome, we should hardly fail to find that two powers which had so many hopes and fears and interests touching one another, had more direct dealings with each other, friendly perhaps at one stage, hostile at another, than our fragmentary narratives reveal to us¹.

It is but dimly that we see Agathoklês in Italy; east of Hadria he stands out a little more distinctly. In the land of his forefathers², the land of his own early exploits³, he wars against both Greeks and barbarians; and once at least he puts on the character of a champion of Greeks against barbarians. In the list of the deliverers which Old Greece sent to the defence of Taras, the name of one Sikeliot ruler seems to have strangely thrust itself in; but so the roll runs; Alexander, Archidâmos, Kleônymos, Agathoklês, Pyrrhos⁴. With the names on each side of him Agathoklês

Agathoklês at Taras.

¹ It is in the middle of the course of events which we have just reached that the continuous narrative of Diodôros, as far as we are concerned with it, comes to an end. In xx. 104, 105 he tells the western career of Kleônymos, without bringing in the name of Agathoklês. Agathoklês' conquest of Korkyra and his campaign in Italy have to be made out, so far as they can be made out, from the fragments of Diodôros' twenty-first book, and from such scraps as we can find elsewhere.

² See above, p. 364.

³ See above, p. 364, 365.

⁴ Strabo, vi. 3. 4; *καὶ γὰρ τὸν Μολοττὸν Ἀλέξανδρον μετεπέμψαντο ἐπὶ Μεσσηπίους καὶ Λευκανοὺς, καὶ ἔτι πρότερον Ἀρχίδαμον τὸν Ἀγησιλάου καὶ*

CHAP. XII. had much to do, though with the one that stands before him perhaps only indirectly.

In Kleónymos we come to another of those deliverers who did so little to deliver. Archidâmos and Alexander in the past, Pyrrhos in the now near future, were men of another kind from the two Spartan brothers of the reign of Agathoklés. Akragas had called Akrotatos into Sicily on an errand of deliverance against Agathoklés himself; but she did not gain much by his coming¹. Akrotatos was now dead; he died before his father Kleomenês. On his death the question of succession arose, the question which in the tenth century of our æra was not argued but fought out one way in the court of Old-Saxon Otto, while to the West-Saxons of the same age the case seemed so clear the other way as to need neither argument nor combat. Shall the younger son or the son of the elder succeed the grandfather? Shall Kleónymos son of Kleomenês succeed his father as King of the Lacedæmonians, or shall Areus son of Akrotatos and grandson of Kleomenês? The elders of Sparta judged as did the wager of battle at the court of Otto. Areus was chosen rather than his uncle². It was whispered that the sentence was influenced by other thoughts than any rule of slight hereditary right, and the fierce temper of Kleónymos had something to do with shutting him out from the honour of Hêrakteid kingship³. Anyhow Kleónymos, like Dôrieus two hundred years before, was unwilling to live as a private man in a city where he had hoped to be a king⁴. He was glad to seek any career elsewhere, and he was well pleased to hearken when Taras, as in

Kleónymos of Sparta.

ὕστερον Κλεώνυμον καὶ Ἀγαθοκλέα, εἶτα Πύρρον. Here Kleónymos and Agathoklés are specially coupled together; but the wording leaves it not quite clear whether either is meant to be marked as an enemy of Rome. Kleónymos at any rate was such.

[¹ Diod. xix. 20.]

[² Paus. iii. 6; Plut. Pyrrh. xxvi; Agis, iii.]

[³ Plut. Pyrrh. xxvi.]

[⁴ See Sicily, ii. 84, 85.]

the days of Archidâmos, sent a voice across the sea to her metropolis, praying that a Hêrakleid prince might again come to deliver the colonists of Sparta from their enemies. CHAP. XIII.

Those enemies are described as Lucanians and Romans¹. Peace had been made between Rome and Samnium, one condition of which was the independence of the Lucanians². Those abiding enemies of the Greek cities were thus likely at any moment to be supported by the power of Rome. Whether eager to strengthen their colonists or anxious to get rid of Kleônymos, the Spartan Senate listened to the prayer of the Tarantines, who were ready with ships and provisions to convey to Italy any force that might be sent to their help. On the familiar recruiting-ground of Tainaron, Kleônymos got soldiers together to the number of five thousand. With these he crossed in the Tarantine ships; he landed at Taras³; he took the command; he enrolled the militia of the city, horse and foot; he gathered other forces from the Italian Greeks till his army was said to reach the tale of twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse. And the Messapians, to whom Taras was to be a woe but who had once at least shown themselves a woe to Taras⁴, also joined his banners, perhaps believing that Lucanians and Romans were likely to prove a greater woe. His presence clearly caused no small fear among the native nations who were hostile to Taras. Two men of the

[¹ Diod. xx. 104.]

[² This appears from Livy, x. 11. Cf. Arnold, Hist. of Rome, ii. 314 seqq.]

[³ For Kleônymos' expedition, see Diod. xx. 104; Livy, x. 2; Ar. de Mir. Ausc. 78; and cf. J. J. Rospat, Philologus, xxiii. 72 seqq., and Mommsen, R. G. i. 378.]

[⁴ Strabo, on the authority of Antiochos, gives the reply of the Delphian Oracle to Phalanthos, who was about to settle his Parthenian colonists on the Italian shore:—

Σατύριόν τοι δῶκα, Τάραντά τε πλοῖνα δῆμον
Ολέησαι, καὶ πῆμα Ἰανύγεσσι γενέσθαι.]

CHAP. XII. Peucetian nation, whose *prænomena* we have as Aulus and Kleónymos in Italy. B.C. 303. Gaius¹, sought to slay him by poison; but their plot was found out, and they suffered death at the hands of Tarantine justice. Of those against whom he came specially to act, his great display of force awed the Lucanians, and they at once made peace with Taras². When Roman vanity is concerned in any narrative, the truth is not easy to get at. But we may safely set aside the story that the Consul Marcus Æmilius drove Kleónymos back to his ships in a single battle, and the yet wilder tale that, on the approach of the Dictator Gaius Junius, he sailed away from Italy without meeting the Romans at all³. The truth is that the Romans joined in the peace with the Lucanians⁴. Eleven years later there was a treaty in force between Rome and Taras, by which no Roman ship of war might come nearer to the city than the headland of the Lakinian Héra⁵. There is no time but this at which such terms are likely to have been agreed on. Rome had no object in warring against Taras, except to please her Lucanian allies, and her Lucanian allies were of little interest to her except as a check on the Samnites. If the Lucanians thought it good to make peace, Rome had no call to fight against Taras and Kleónymos on her own account.

Peace between Taras and Lucanians. Romans probably included in peace with Taras.

Kleónymos had now a grand position, but a difficult one. If there was no enemy to fight against, there was no need for him and his army. But, like so many of the Lacedæmonian commanders on foreign service, like his own

[¹ Arist. de Mir. Ausc. c. 78.]

[² Diod. xx. 104.]

[³ Livy, x. 2. Livy, as Rospatt (Op. cit. 74) points out, makes these events happen a year later than the date of Kleónymos' Italian adventure. But see Mommsen, R. G. i. 378.]

[⁴ Arnold, Hist. of Rome, ii. 315, observes that it is remarkable that Diodōros, while mentioning the treaty between the Tarantines and Lucanians, is silent as to the peace that must now have been concluded between them and the Romans, although "he had just before named the Romans as being also at war with the Tarantines."]

[⁵ Appian, Samnit. 7. See Appendix VIII.]

brother most of all, Kleónymos had altogether fallen away CHAP. XII. from all Spartan virtue. He began with a piece of gross treason against the cause which he had come to support. The men of Metapontion had failed to send their contingent to his force with those of the other Italiot cities. He did not scruple to stir up the Lucanians with whom he had just made his treaty to join him in a sudden attack on Metapontion¹. At the appointed moment he came himself; he wrung from the Metapontines, if the figures be right, the huge sum of six hundred talents, and, under the guise of hostages, he carried off two hundred maidens of the chief families of Metapontion². With the Spartan garb cast aside—no Gylippos had come this time—in-
Kleóny-
mos ruins
the Meta-
pontines.
B.C. 303.
He plans
a descent
on Sicily.
 indulging in every kind of excess, treating his friends as slaves and doing nothing against any enemy³, Kleónymos was seized with a fancy for playing the deliverer on a new field. It is that fancy which brings him within the immediate range of our story. The Spartan of whom Greek Italy was weary would, like his brother, cross over into Sicily, and win back independence for the cities that were under the yoke of Agathoklēs⁴. He came not; but the purpose, the threat, had no small influence on the whole later career of the man whom he threatened.

[¹ For Kleónymos at Metapontion, see Diod. xx. 104; Athen. xiii. p. 605. About the same time (Diod. xx. 101) Agathoklēs was making a piratical descent on Lipara, where he demanded fifty talents. The citizens asked for time to collect this sum, whereupon Agathoklēs plundered the treasures of Aiolos and Hēphaistos. The fact that the Metapontines paid the 600 talents gives a measure of the comparative wealth of the two cities. But Metapontion never recovered from this blow, and its coinage now ceases.]

² Cf. Cæsar Borgia at Capua; but the number is that of the Cardinal Balthasar Cossa at Bologna.

³ Diod. xx. 104; ἀποθίμενος τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἱσθίῃτα, διετέλει τρυφῶν, καὶ τοὺς πιστεύσαντας αὐτῷ καταδουλούμενος· τηλικαύτας γὰρ ἔχον δυνάμεις καὶ χορηγίας, οὐδὲν τῆς Σπάρτης ἄξιον ἔπραξεν.

⁴ Ib.; ἐπεβάλετο γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν Σικελίαν στρατεύειν, ὡς τὴν τυραννίδα μὲν καταλύσων τὴν Ἀγαθοκλέους, τὴν δ' αὐτονομίαν τοῖς Σικελιάταις ἀποκατάστησων.

CHAP. XII.

Unsuccessful
attack
on the
Veneti by
Kleónymos.

He seizes
Korkyra.
B.C. 303.

B.C. 312.

Kleónymos was coming to Sicily, but he put off his coming¹. It was perhaps during this interval that he made a wild and unsuccessful expedition to the head of the Hadriatic gulf, which, as witnessed by the traditions and monuments of Patavium, rests on other grounds than his imaginary defeats at the hands of the Roman consul and dictator². But it is on the Greek side of Hadria that he most concerns us. Sicily might wait till her deliverer could come with greater power to her help. Kleónymos would meanwhile throw himself into the whirlpool of general Greek affairs; he might come forth something more than a Herakleid refused the ancient Spartan kingship; he might come forth a king of the newer type of Kassandros and Agathoklês. To find a centre for his dominion, the coming deliverer of Syracuse began by enslaving the twin-sister of Syracuse. At this moment Korkyra ranked high among those Greek commonwealths which still kept up any measure of freedom. Some years before Korkyraian energy had caused the forces of Kassandros to withdraw from the kindred cities of Apollônia and Epidamnos. Of these Apollônia again became free; Epidamnos was allowed by her kinsfolk to pass under the power of the Illyrian Glaukias, a king likely enough to be no worse master than the Macedonian³. But Korkyra herself was free when Kleónymos swept down through her narrow strait and took her city, whether by storm or on terms is not distinctly said. The citizens had to pay largely in money and to receive a garrison⁴, and Kleónymos himself, founder of the new kingdom, made it his head-quarters for a season. No place could be better suited for one who designed at least to watch the course

¹ Diod. xx. 104; ὑπερθέμενος ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ταύτην τὴν στρατείαν.

² Livy, x. 2. See Appendix VIII.

³ Diod. xix. 78.

⁴ Ib. xx. 104; ἐπλευσεν εἰς Κέρκυραν, καὶ κρατήσας τῆς πόλεως, χρημάτων τε πλῆθος εἰσεπράξατο, καὶ φρουρὰν ἐγκατέστησε.

of Rome and of Agathoklès on the one hand and of the potentates who were tearing Greece in pieces on the other¹. The island still kept the position which it had held in the days of Periklès at the main point of communication between the Greeks of East and West. The Korkyra of Kleônymos was to be the centre and head of a dominion stretching on both sides of Hadria; in his eyes Taras and the other Italiot cities were parts of his realm. His position seemed so strong that his fellow-kings Kassandros and Dêmétrios the Besieger each sought his friendship against the other. He refused to join himself to either². Presently news came of some movement at Taras and the neighbouring cities which he chose to look on as rebellion. He went over to chastise them. But he never reached the objects of his vengeance. The barbarians and the elements fought for the Italiots. He took two unknown towns; but he was presently defeated in battle by the people of the land, and a storm destroyed many of his ships. With what remained of his land and sea-force, he made his way back to Korkyra.

CHAP. XII.
Disastrous
Italian
campaign
of Kleônymos.

This is the last event on our side of the Greek world which is recorded in the continuous text of our Sicilian guide. Our next glimpse, by the feebler light of a fragment, shows us Agathoklès engaged in an Italian campaign in which the occupation of Korkyra seems to come in as a kind of incident. In whose hands was Korkyra at that moment? In our fragmentary narrative we hear nothing of Kleônymos after his return to Korkyra from the hapless Italian expedition just recorded. As far as our narratives are concerned, he might still have been in possession; but on the whole it seems most likely, though the indications are very slight, that Kleônymos had been driven out by

¹ Diod. xx. 104; διανοούμενος ὁρμητηρίῳ τούτῳ τῇ τόπῳ χρῆσασθαι, καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πράγμασιν ἐφεδρεῖν.

² Ib. 105; τούτων μὲν οὐδετέρῳ προσέθετο.

CHAP. XII. Dêmétrios, and that Dêmétrios, in one of his occasional fits of generosity, had given back freedom to the island¹. At all events, it was at this moment besieged, and closely pressed, by land and sea, by the forces of Kassandros². Agathoklês meanwhile, accompanied by his grandson Archagathos, was warring in Italy, against what enemy is not distinctly said. Agathoklês needed very little excuse for attacking either Greeks or barbarians. We only know that he had in his army mercenary Etruscans and Ligurians, and we know how they fared. At some stage of his march, the thought came into his head to deliver—that is the word used³—the city which was just now besieged by Kassandros. The men of Korkyra may have been so unwise as to call in the help of the Syracusan king as captain-general of a kindred commonwealth. In any case the island-lord⁴ grasped at the chance of enlarging his island-realm. He dashed across the narrow sea, as Kleônymos had done.

Agathoklês seizes
Korkyra.
B.C. 300.

Master alike of besieged and of besiegers, the lord of Syracuse became lord of Korkyra; the foundations of Archias and of Chersikratês obeyed a single ruler. Dionysios had opened Hadria to Syracusan fleets and to Syracusan dominion; he never established his power so near to the borders of continuous Hellas as the new possession of Agathoklês. In his voyage to Korkyra, as in his voyage to Africa, Agathoklês pointed the way to rulers of Sicily in far later times. Again and again, when Koryphô had supplanted Korkyra, did the Long Island with the single city pass into the hands of Dukes and Kings of Palermo. The connexion of the two islands lasted even

¹ Diod. xx. 105; see Appendix VIII.

[² Diod. xxi. fr. 2.]

[³ Ib.; *Κέρκυρα* . . . ἐπὶ Ἀγαθοκλέους βασιλέως Σικελίας ἐπρώσθη.]

[⁴ Agathoklês in the above fragment has for the first time the title "King of Sicily." But see above, p. 443, notes.]

when it had become a name, when the King of Sicily who CHAP. XII.
reigned over Corfù had ceased to be a ruler on Trinakrian
soil.

Of Agathoklés in his character of lord of Korkyra two Agathoklés lord of Korkyra.
anecdotes seem to have been preserved, the point of one
of which is clear enough. Some ships of his had carried
off sheep from the coast of Ithakê, and the islanders came
to complain. The man of Therma and Syracuse, oddly
throwing in his lot with the very earliest inhabitants of
his land, told them that they had suffered but a slight
vengeance at Sicilian hands. Their king had once invaded
his island, and he had not only carried off the sheep, but
put out the eye of the shepherd ¹.

The tale points to that jesting and mocking vein which won
Agathoklés the good will of the Syracusan mob. A wilder
story has been thought to point to warfare or proposed war-
fare on the Epeirot coast, for which Korkyra would be the
natural starting-point. Agathoklés is made to ask the Syra-
cusans for two thousand soldiers to enable him to accept an
invitation from some who were seeking to put Phoinikê into
his hands ². This looks like that Phoinikê which lies some-
what inland from the coast that looks from the mainland
on the northern promontory of Korkyra. The confusion
must have been tempting with the better-known warfare in
Phœnician Africa and Phœnician Sicily. The story seems
further to point to some dim memory of the peculiar position
of Agathoklés in his own city, appearing before the Syra-
cusan mob, perhaps as a constitutional king, perhaps rather

The "Phoi-
nikê" of
Polyainos.

[¹ Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth., s. v. Agathokles.]

² Polyainos, v. 3. 6; 'Αγαθοκλῆς δισχιλίου στρατιώτας συντεταγμένους
ἤτησε παρὰ Συρακουσίων ὡς διαβησόμενος ἐς τὴν Φοινίκην, φάσκων τῶν ἐκεῖ
τινὲς προδιδόντας μετὰ σπουδῆς αὐτὸν καλεῖν. See Appendix VIII. [See
Droysen, Gesch. d. Hellenismus, i. 560. But as Schubert (Op. cit. 201)
points out, a town of the name of Φοινίκη would not naturally have the
article before its name. Moreover the inhabitants are spoken of below
as Φοίνικες, which can only mean Carthaginians, and could not be applied
to the inhabitants of the town Phoinikê.]

CHAP. XII. as a republican magistrate. The men were granted; but Agathoklès, when he had got what he wanted, took no more heed to Phoinikè, but went off to take certain fortresses near Tauromenion¹.

Agathoklès returns to Italy.

Mutiny of Ligurian and Etruscan mercenaries.

The anecdote-mongers, as we have sometimes seen, are quite capable of preserving very good material from very good sources. They are equally capable of any misunderstanding or confusion. Nothing here can be made out of the mention of Tauromenion, and the whole value of the story is in the preservation of the name Phoinikè, which the collector clearly did not understand. We know on better evidence that from conquered Korkyra Agathoklès went back to his army in Italy to find that, during his absence, his Ligurian and Etruscan mercenaries had mutinied against Archagathos, demanding their pay. He had other troops with him, by whose means he was able to slaughter them to the number of two thousand². He then began to besiege a town whose name is given as Ethæ³; but the massacre had offended the Bruttians⁴—a notice which looks as if they had before been in his alliance, and therefore as if he were warring against some Greek city. The barbarians gathered in great force and set upon him with such effect that he had to withdraw to Syracuse with the loss of four thousand men.

Of such reverses Agathoklès had had some experience already, and they did not seriously shake his power. He kept possession of Korkyra till he found it convenient to make use of it as a means for winning a powerful ally. We now get a glimpse at his domestic relations. The widow of Damas, the mother of the two sons who were killed in Africa, had died before the African expedition.

¹ Polyain. l. c.; ὁμήσας ἐπὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τὰ περὶ τὴν Ταυρομενίτιν φρούρια κατέσκαψεν. See Appendix VIII.

[² Diod. xxi. fr. 3.]

[³ Ib.]

[⁴ Ib.; τῶν δὲ Βρυττίων ἀλλοτρίως διὰ ταῦτα πρὸς αὐτὸν διατεθέντων, κ. τ. λ.]

The second wife of Agathoklès, she who bore an ill name together with his son Archagathos, must also have died or been divorced. The grandfather of the younger Archagathos took in the end a third wife from the court of Ptolemy of Egypt, Theoxena by name, who has been thought to be a daughter of Ptolemy's queen Berenikè by her first husband¹. The date of the marriage cannot be fixed exactly; but it points to close relations between Agathoklès and the Alexandrine court, where the murder of Ophellas may have been thought to have removed an officer who might be dangerous to his sovereign. Friendship with Ptolemy and Berenikè may also have led Agathoklès to draw nearer to one who was to be the next great name in Sicilian history, and who, if not to be as Timoleôn, was at least not to be as himself,—Pyrrhos of Epeiros.

CHAP. XII.

Marriage
of Agathoklès
with
Theoxena.

The marriage of Lanassa is strangely mixed up in our fragmentary narrative with one of her father's characteristic deeds of treachery and bloodshed. The Syracusan fleet is called out, seemingly to take the bride in royal array² to her new home in Molottis. It seems to be implied that the preparations had raised fear even among the allies of Agathoklès as being greater and of a more warlike air than was needed for a wedding-procession on the waves. Agathoklès found it needful to send a message to Krotôn, ruled then by a tyrant named Menedêmos, who is described as his friend, bidding him fear no danger; the fleet is simply going to Epeiros with the betrothed of the Epeiroi.

His
daughter
Lanassa
married to
Pyrrhos.

[¹ Justin, xxiii. 2; cf. Droysen, G. d. Hellenismus, i. 560, 602.]

[² Diod. xxi. fr. 4; *στολῇ κεκοσμημένην βασιλικῇ*. Schubert regards this stratagem as due to the invention of Douris (who in the succeeding fragment of Diodôros is mentioned by name). As a matter of fact, Krotôn, as we see from the succeeding paragraph, was only taken after a regular siege. In this, the more probable version of the affair, in which the stratagem plays no part, Diodôros probably followed Timaios. But he has impartially repeated both accounts without observing their inconsistency. The point of the "stratagem" would have been the immediate capture of Krotôn by a *coup de main*.]

CHAP. XII. King. We can hardly infer that Lanassa was made to tarry on the road for such an end; we must therefore suppose that it was on the voyage back again that Agathoklês—present, it seems, in person—attacked his confiding ally, besieged his city, walled it in from sea to sea, and brought mines and catapults to bear upon its wall. The Krotoniats and their master surrendered in sheer fear. But they had better have fought to the death; the houses were plundered and the men slaughtered. Agathoklês then made an alliance with the neighbouring Iapygians and Peucetians; he left a garrison in Krotôn and went on to Syracuse.

Agathoklês captures Krotôn.

Called in by Tarantines. It is hard to say in which of all his Italian expeditions it was that Agathoklês appeared as the successor of Kleônymos in the championship of Taras. One might say that it must needs have been the first of all, that no man or city could have trusted him after he had once shown himself in the land. It may specially be said that the alliance just spoken of with Peucetians and Iapygians looks like designs against Taras. But all changes of side are possible in these times, and Messapians had served under Kleônymos. But in truth there is no greater difficulty with the last story than with the first. Agathoklês had no need to show himself personally in Italy for every Italiot and Italian to know what manner of man he was. His career in Sicily and in Africa must have been quite well enough known for the tyrant of Krotôn and the democracy of Taras to be fully aware of the kind of man with whom they had to deal. The truth would seem to be that there is no bound to the human power of being deluded, and that a man like Agathoklês knew perfectly well that, after every deed of treachery and slaughter, he would find fresh victims ready to put themselves into his power for another. And in his dealings with Taras we are not able to speak of treachery and slaughter; for all that is recorded is the simple fact,

without date or detail, that the Tarantines did call him in as a helper. And that character seems best to fit in with the last recorded of his Italian campaigns. There he sets forth at the head of a great force, thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse, while his admiral Stilpôn leads out the fleet to act in partnership. His commission is to lay waste the sea-coast of the Bruttian country; but he has small success; most of his ships are lost in a storm¹. His master by land fares better. He besieges Hippônion, now in Bruttian hands, and takes the town by dint of military engines². The Bruttians as a body are frightened at his success; they make a treaty and give hostages; he leaves a garrison in Hippônion, and withdraws to Syracuse—it may have been to Taras. When Agathoklês' back is turned, the Bruttians repent them of their submission; they break their oaths; they march in full force on Hippônion; they cut the garrison in pieces, and carry off their own hostages. They thus, we are told, set themselves free from the dominion of Agathoklês³. A treaty with him seems to be looked on as the same thing with taking him to master.

We hear no more; Taras is not mentioned; but this campaign or part of a campaign seems more like the act of one charged with the relief of a Greek city than either that in which he conquered Korkyra or that in which he slew the men of Krotôn. Rome and Taras were now at peace; the championship of Taras would not imply hostility to Rome; but Rome and the champion of Taras were not likely to look on one another with very friendly feelings. But on the Tarantine position of Agathoklês there is not a word to say beyond guess-work. If it had to do with the campaign of Hippônion, it must have come very late in his life. That is the last warfare of Agathoklês that is recorded; it may

[¹ Diod. xxi. fr. 8.]

[² Ib.]

[³ Ib.; ἀπελύθησαν τῆς Ἀγαθοκλέους δυναστείας.]

CHAP. XII. not have been the last that he waged ; it was assuredly not the last that he designed.

Another
African
expedition
planned
by Agatho-
klés.

* "When he was seventy-two years old and had reigned twenty-eight years, he began to think of his old warfare, and began to plan another expedition against Carthage¹.

To this end he got together a great army and fleet, and had a camp pitched near Ætna, where his grandson Archagathos commanded. But Agathoklés felt himself failing, and thought it time to provide for the succession. For this he chose his son Agathoklés, which naturally gave offence to his grandson, Archagathos, the son of his elder son, who moreover had shown greater capacity for command. The old Agathoklés sent orders to Archagathos to give up the command of the army to his uncle. On this

Rebellion
of Archagathos.

he rebelled ; he slew his uncle, and began to conspire the death of his grandfather. He is said to have engaged one Mainôn, a special favourite of the old tyrant, whom he had spared in the massacre at Segesta on account of his beauty, to get rid of him by a lingering poison. When Agathoklés felt that his end was coming, he sent away his wife and his young children to the care of King Ptolemy in Egypt², and was quite alone. He held one more assembly of the people. He told them not to continue his power

Agathoklés
poisoned
by Mainôn.

Holds
assembly
for last
time.

* From Story of Sicily, p. 259.

[¹ For Agathoklés' preparations for a new campaign against Carthage and his poisoning by Mainôn, see Diod. xxi. fr. 16.]

[² Justin, xxiii. 2. Droysen (G. d. H. i. 602) points out that, owing to his treaty with Démétrios, Agathoklés had at this time taken up a hostile position towards Ptolemy and the Egyptians. According to this view, he sent Theoxena and her children to Egypt, not for their own safety, but that they might not stand in the way of his son Agathoklés, whom he had marked out for the succession. This Agathoklés was, however, slain by Archagathos.]

to any one else, and specially to punish the rebellion and impiety of his grandson. And so he died, his body, some said, being put on the pile for burning before he was fully dead." CHAP. XII.

The last public act of Agathoklês, when he found that, perhaps both through sickness and poison, perhaps through sickness only, his life was ebbing away, was [as we have seen] to call one more assembly of the Syracusan people¹. There is every reason to believe that, through the whole course of his reign, the holding of the ordinary assemblies had never stopped. In the latter half of his reign, when one massacre after another had got rid of all the party of opposition, there was less reason than ever why the general, tyrant, king, whatever we choose to call him should shrink from gathering together those to whom he had done no damage, and who were not likely to threaten him with any. The bloodiest of tyrants had been so bloody that he could afford to be the mildest for the rest of his days. But this last time he had something more serious to do than simply to crack his jokes for the amusement of an admiring mob. The short report of his speech makes him set forth the impiety of his grandson and call upon the people to punish him; he is further made to say that he restores to them the democracy². Agathoklês, captain-general of Syracuse, would hardly have used this formula; he would have said that there was no democracy to restore, because no democracy had ever been abolished. The people of Syracuse were there in their lawful assembly, listening to the chief magistrate whom they themselves had chosen. What he most likely meant was that he had no wish that the people of Syracuse should continue his extraordinary powers to any member of his family. The son whom he

Syracusan
assembly
addressed
by dying
Agathoklês.

His
political
testament.

[¹ Diod. xxi. fr. 16; ἐκκλησίᾱσας τὸν λαόν.]

[² Ib.; τῷ δήμῳ τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἐφήσεν ἀποδιδόναι.]

CHAP. XII. had wished to succeed him was dead; his grandson was the last man to whom he would wish to hand on anything. It was from fear of him that he had sent his wife and his young children away. He bade them, instead of voting any special powers to Archagathos, to punish him for his crimes. If no such special vote was passed in favour of Archagathos or of any one else, the commonwealth would go on in its ordinary course; no formal restoration of democracy was needed. But with such a people as endless revolutions winding up with his own twenty-eight years of dominion had made the people of Syracuse, the last will of Agathoklés hardly came to more than "After me, the deluge."

[SUPPLEMENT V.]

(By the Editor.)

THE "DESPOT'S PROGRESS" ON THE COINAGE OF AGATHOKLÈS.

THE "Despot's Progress" is well marked on the coinage of Democ^{cratic style} Agathoklès¹. In the earliest period of his rule—though the coinage appears to have been remodelled by the restoration of a gold currency in place of the electrum introduced by Timoleôn and the revival of tetradrachms which had ceased to be struck since the early part of Dionysios' reign—the democ^{cratic style} was still observed. The coinage was more prolific, being supplied by the confiscated property of Agathoklès' enemies. It was more magnificent, and of pure metal, for the pay of his numerous mercenaries and that by his show of wealth the tyrant might increase his influence. But the inscription is still ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ. For the first time, however, the claim to the dominion over the whole island is marked by the introduction of the *triskellè* both as the principal type and as a symbol in the field. (See Holm, *G. S.* ii. 483, and his *La Triquetra ne' monumenti dell' Antichità*, *Rivista Sicula*, 1871.) Nor is the revival of larger silver pieces in the shape of the tetradrachms, and of a head of Persephonè copied from that by the great engraver Eusenetos as it appears on the "Medallions" of Dionysios' time, without its significance. Though disused at Syracuse, coins of the same denomination had been long abundantly issued by the Carthaginian cities and commanders in Sicily, and had become the traditional currency of their mercenaries. It was no doubt to suit the taste of this

¹ For the coinage of Agathoklès see especially Head, *Coinage of Syracuse*, pp. 42 seqq.

New
coinage for
mercen-
aries.

mercenary element, which was ever ready to serve the master who paid it best, that Agathoklēs now made the principal silver coin of Syracuse uniform with the Carthaginian "Camp-pieces" and the prolific mintage of Ras Melkart and Panormos. And as such it is an ominous sign. For the Syracusans themselves the change was not needed, and for the domestic needs of Greek Sicily the Corinthian "Pegasi" of ten litræ continued to be issued. But the new tetradrachms were essentially a mercenary currency.

Second
period of
Agathoklēs'
coinage.

In the second period of Agathoklēs' coinage we find a record of his African victories. These coins were therefore struck later than August, B.C. 310. The most remarkable is a gold stater (Imhoof-Blumer, *Num. Zeitschr.* iii. Pl. v. 2, and p. 43; Head, *op. cit.* pp. 46, 47) presenting on the obverse side a youthful head coifed in an elephant's skin, and on the reverse a winged Pallas with an owl at her feet and the legend ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΟΣ. This coin (see above, p. 410, n. 2) has been brought into connexion with the story of Agathoklēs' letting fly the owls in the face of the Carthaginians on the occasion of his victory over Hannōn and Bomilkar. What is more certain is that Agathoklēs in the case of this issue simply adapted the tetradrachm types of his Egyptian contemporary Ptolemy Sotēr, struck from c. 311 to 305, upon which the head of Alexander the Great covered with a lion's skin is coupled with a similar figure of Pallas Promachos on the reverse, with the difference, however, that she is there wingless, and that an eagle stands at her feet in place of the owl. And the most natural deduction to be drawn from this correspondence is that this coin was struck after the junction with Agathoklēs' African army of the Kyrēnæan contingent under Ptolemy's officer Ophellas in 308 B.C. On the murder of Ophellas, Agathoklēs, as regards at least one part of his forces, usurped the authority of a *Diadochos*, and may even have made use of a Kyrēnæan die-sinker from Ophellas' following; not, it may be suspected, without a definite political intention. It only remained to substitute ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΟΣ for the legend ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΕΙΟΝ ΠΤΟΛΕΜΑΙΟΥ which Ptolemy about this time introduced in place of the earlier ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΟΥ or the Doric ΠΤΟΛΕΜΑΙΩ of his Kyrēnæan staters, and thus the Macedonian example served the Sicilian tyrant for the first introduction of the name of an individual magistrate on a Syracusan coin. Dionysios in the height of his power had never

Name of
Agathoklēs
now intro-
duced.

ventured on such an innovation; it is probable that such an assertion of his personal authority had not so much as crossed his mind.

But while on his gold staters—struck perhaps for a special Tetradrachms object, and so rare that only a single example is at present known—Agathoklès freely followed the example, now being set with by the Diadochoi, of inserting his own name, upon the abundant trophy. silver coinage issued about the same time he had recourse to

a more indirect method of asserting his personal supremacy. The most distinct numismatic monument of his African victories is to be found in the issue of a fine tetradrachm series having on their obverse side a youthful head of the Korè accompanied by the inscription ΚΟΡΑΣ, and on the reverse a winged Nikè erecting a trophy—a design which presents a distinct parallel to certain coins of Seleukos I, struck after B.C. 306. In the field of these coins there appears the *triskelè*—the emblem of Sicilian dominion—and opposite it, in place of the older civic legend ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ, still

universal in the first period of the tyrant's coinage, the name of Agathoklès in the adjectival form ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΙΟΣ. Whether, as on the contemporary Ptolemaic coins with the inscription ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΕΙΩΝ, this adjectival form refers to the coin itself (perhaps *διωράν*), or whether, as has been suggested (Kenner, *Münzsammlung des Stiftes St. Florian*, p. 15; Head, *Coinage of Syracuse*, p. 47), it is to be coupled with the ΝΙΚΗ expressed in the type, it is not easy to determine, and the vagueness of the inscription was perhaps itself not without intention. So much, however, at least is clear, that such a mode of inscription shows a certain hesitation on Agathoklès' part to insert his own name in its baldest form in the place of that of the Syracusans. The trophy itself, from the conical form of the helmet, appears to have been specifically Carthaginian, and from the existence of two distinct classes of these coins, one of fine Syracusan work, the other of much ruder fabric, there can be little doubt that many of them were struck by Agathoklès in Africa. (See G. Romano, *Sopra alcune monete scoperte in Sicilia*, &c., p. 12.) On the other hand the monogram Α/ that appears on the finer variety has been reasonably brought into connexion with the name of Antandros (Romano, *op. cit.*, 17), the brother whom Agathoklès had left behind him as his governor in Syracuse. The dedication to Persephoné the Virgin recalls the special vow of Agathoklès to the Sicilian Goddesses, and the

Indirect introduction of Agathoklès' name.

dedication of his ships on the occasion of his landing on the African shore (see p. 401 and note 3). Another reference to Agathoklès' African enterprise may be found upon some of his bronze coins belonging to the same period of his history. The type in question, which bears on one side the youthful head of Héraklès, displays upon the other a lion passant which has here been thought to symbolize Libya (Head, *op. cit.*, p. 50). It is noteworthy that on this and the other bronze types of Agathoklès' Second Period the name ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ was still retained, although it had been banished from the more precious metals.

Coins of
Agathoklès
with
royal title.

But with the definite adoption of the royal title by Agathoklès, shortly after 305 B.C. (see p. 443, n. 3), even this last remaining trace of autonomous mintage disappears from the Syracusan dies. On the gold staters now struck—no longer on the Attic but on the old Syracusan standard of ninety grains¹—the full royal style is given, ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΟΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ. Above and below a thunderbolt, the same appears on the bronze coins, though on the silver eight-litra pieces, now issued, in accordance with the new gold standard, there is no legend and the *triskelē* alone indicates their attribution to the Lord of Sicily.

Three
periods of
Agathoklès'
coinage.

It will be seen that the coinage of Agathoklès divides itself into three well-marked periods which afford an interesting illustration of the "Despot's Progress." In the first, which extends from his assumption of supreme power in 317 B.C. to some time after his landing in Africa²—perhaps to 308 B.C.—he still so far observed the constitutional usage as to allow the Syracusans to go on striking coins in their own name. In the Second Period, which goes down to the time when Agathoklès became king, the civic name disappears, at least from the silver coinage, and that of the "Guardian of the Peace" and actual tyrant is put forward in a more or less direct fashion, though without any indication of

¹ Head, *op. cit.*, p. 51, considers that the relation of gold to silver was at this time as 1 : 12, and that therefore these gold staters of Agathoklès were equal to only 80 instead of as formerly 100 litræ. They were equal to 10 silver pieces of 8 litræ, to which weight the Syracusan "Pegasi" were now accordingly reduced.

² The monogram *Α* appears on some of the tetradrachms of the earlier class, and if it be rightly referred to Agathoklès' brother Antandros, whom he left behind him as his lieutenant at Syracuse, this fact would show that the earlier coinage continued for some little time after Agathoklès' departure.

his official position. Finally, from about B.C. 304 onwards, Agathoklês placed upon his coins both his name and his royal title. But in no case, even on his latest issues, did Agathoklês introduce his own likeness. The heads are those of Pallas and Artemis. It was not till Hierôn the Second's time, a generation later, that the portrait of the reigning sovereign made its first appearance on the Syracusan dies.]



APPENDIX I.

[*There is a slight lacuna at the beginning of this Appendix.*]

THE AUTHORITIES FOR THE REIGN OF DIONYSIOS.

OF the supreme value of the first work of Philistos there can be no doubt. It was the writing of a man thoroughly well informed and thoroughly able to make use of what he knew. The part which was contemporary would have given us exactly what we want, the means of balancing Thucydides with a Syracusan writer of merit only inferior to his own. During the time which this first work embraced there was but little room for the partiality with which Philistos is charged in his later writings. Dionysios could not yet have come on the field as a prominent actor. The continuation of the Sicilian History, the History of Dionysios, written during a large part of it with equal means of knowledge, lies under grave suspicion as to the good faith of the writer. His four books of the history of Dionysios were written after his banishment by Dionysios (Plut. Diôn, 19), and he is said, in the hope of obtaining his recall, to have left out the tyrant's worst deeds (Paus. i. 13. 9; *εἰ δὲ καὶ Φιλιστος αἰτίαν δικαίαν εἵληφεν, ἐπελπίζων τὴν ἐν Συρακούσαις κάθοδον, ἀποκρύψασθαι τῶν Διονυσίου τὰ ἀνοσιώτατα*). On this head there is a general consent against him. Dionysios of Halikarnassos (De Vett. Script. Cons. iii. 2) in the midst of a good deal of "stylistic" talk which does not much matter, here comes to a point of fact; *Φιλιστος δὲ μμητὴς ἐστὶ Θουκυδίδου, ἔξω τοῦ ἥθους· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐλεύθερον καὶ φρονήματος μεστόν· τοῦτο δὲ θεραπευτικὸν τῆς τυράννων καὶ ἄλλων πλεονεξίας*. Plutarch, who speaks so respectfully of his earlier work, has a whole chapter (Diôn, 36) against him on this head. Timaios is praised for finding fault with him and Ephoros blamed for speaking well of him. Plutarch's own picture of Philistos at this stage stands thus; *ὅς, καίπερ ὡς δεινότητος ἀδίκους*

πράγμασι καὶ πονηροῖς ἤθεσιν εὐσχήμονας αἰτίας περιβαλεῖν, καὶ λόγους ἔχοντας κόσμον ἐξευρεῖν, αὐτὸς αὐτὸν οὐ δύναται πάντα μηχανώμενος ἐξελίσθαι τῆς γραφῆς, ὥς οὐ φιλοτυραννίτατος ἀνθρώπων γένοιτο, καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ἀεὶ ζηλώσας καὶ θαυμάσας τρυφήν καὶ δύναμιν καὶ πλούτους καὶ γάμους τοὺς τῶν τυράννων.

These last words are very striking. They seem so completely to hit off not a few writers of later times. It is not only in the days of Philistos that the wealth and marriages of kings, and of tyrants also, are more thought of than the doings or the sufferings of nations. Philistos in short had become a courtier, neither more nor less; he wrote as a courtier, and that one with his own interests to serve. To take another illustration, after his Gothic War he wrote *Anecdota*; only this time the *Anecdota* were not scandalous, but flattering. The work must have been on the same level of credibility as any other partisan work, remembering that it was the work of a partisan, who, at least down to the time of his banishment, had the best means of knowing everything. In these days of "rehabilitation," one would give something for a favourable picture of Dionysios from one who may, after all, have perceived some better points in him, and who, at any rate, if he did lie, knew that he was lying.

Of the contents of these four books we know something. In the first, the eighth of the whole series, beginning after the fall of Akragas, he must have recorded the rise of Dionysios to power, and he took in the Punic war that began in 387. He specially described (Theôn, ii. 11) the military preparations of Dionysios. In the fourth or eleventh he had occasion (Steph. Byz, in *Τύρρητα*, *Μυσσία*, *Νουκρίη*) to speak of several Italian towns, which implies a narrative of Dionysios' later dealings with Italy, and he specially dwelled on the sumptuous funeral of the tyrant (Theôn, ii. 11; Plut. Pel. 34). This book must therefore have been finished after the death of the elder Dionysios, perhaps immediately on his recall (see Grote, ch. lxxxi). Of the two books devoted to the acts of the younger Dionysios no fragments of any importance seem to be preserved. From the notice of Athanas in Diodôros, xv. 94, it must have gone down to the year 363.

Another seemingly contemporary writer of Sicilian history in the time of Dionysios was Hermeias of Methymna, who wrote, according to Diodôros (xv. 37), ten or twelve (according to different reckonings) books of *Σικελικά*, coming down to the year 376 before

Christ. Our one reference to him is in Athénaios (x. 51), where he speaks of the events of the year 402.

The continuator of Philistos was another native Syracusan, also a contemporary and actor, but on the opposite side. This was Athanis or Athanas, of whom also our remains and notices are but small. According to Diodóros (xv. 94) he began with the acts of Diôn in 356, and wrote thirteen books, which (Plut. Tim. 23, 37) went down at least to the death of Timoleón. He then filled up the gap of seven years (363-356) between Philistos and himself in one book (*προσανέλαβε τὸν ἄγραφον χρόνον ἐτῶν ἑπτὰ ἀπὸ τῆς Φιλίστου συντάξεως ἐν μιᾷ βίβλῳ· καὶ διελθὼν τὰς πράξεις ἐν κεφαλαίοις συνεχῇ τὴν ἱστορίαν ἐποίησεν*). His few fragments, preserved by Athénaios and Plutarch, are useful in their places. That he had a hand in the story which he describes appears from a fragment of Theopompos (212; C. Müller, i. 313). Another writer who was also an actor was Timónidēs of Leukas, of whom Plutarch (Diôn, 31) has preserved some fragments, and in one or two references elsewhere (C. Müller, ii. 83) it seems that his name (an odd confusion) should be substituted for that of Simónidēs.

We have for some time past been for the more part dealing with the writings of men of action, who recorded the events of their own time in which they took a part. Such were Philistos, Athanis, and Timónidēs. And Thucydides himself comes under the same general head, an actor in Thrace, if he were only an inquirer in Sicily. We now come to writers of less practical experience, a class whom Polybios (xii. 25*f*) carefully marks off from the others. We begin with two of the most famous pupils of the rhetorical school of Isokratēs. First comes Ephoros of the Asiatic Kymē, with his thirty books of Universal History, stretching from the return of the Hērakleids to his own time. His narrative ended in the year 357 before Christ; it was continued by his son Dēmophilos down to the year 341. The continuation, as Brunet de Prèsle (28) remarks, was sometimes quoted as the work of the father (see Diod. iv. 1; xvi. 14, 76). Ephoros is in no sense a specially Sicilian historian; our island came in only for its share with the rest of the world. In his fourth book, devoted to the geography of Europe, he naturally spoke of that of Sicily (Strabo, vi. 2. 1), and we can see from the references in Diodóros and Stephen of Byzantium that he must in the course of his narrative

have found a good deal to say about Sicilian matters. Polybios, while he charges him with knowing nothing of military and little of naval affairs (xii. 25 f), still (xii. 23, 28) speaks a good word for him against the attacks of Timaios; but one is bound to say that in the endless cases where Diodôros quotes both Ephoros and Timaios for the numbers of the same army, it is always Ephoros who gives the larger figure. Ephoros was doubtless one of Diodôros' chief authorities in some parts of his story. Yet it does seem a little daring to give, as some German scholars do, a direct reference to Ephoros where Diodôros does not quote him by name, just as if they had his thirty books lying open before them.

Ephoros, according to the well-known saying of his master Isokratês (Cic. Orator, 56), needed spurs, while his fellow-scholar Theopompos of Chios needed reins. Theopompos was therefore set to write the history of his own times. He must have been a more direct authority for Sicilian affairs than Ephoros. It is not clear whether the twelve books of *Hellenika*, in which he continued the story of Thucydides from the year 412 before Christ to the battle of Knidos in 394, touched at all upon Sicily. None of the extant fragments refer to any Sicilian matter. In his other work, the *Philippika*, whose fifty-eight books took in the years 360-336 (Diod. xvi. 3), he devoted three to Sicily, and he is largely quoted by Plutarch and others for the time of Diôn and Timoleôn. There is however some confusion or other in the passage (xvi. 71) in which Diodôros tells us of these Sicilian books;

Θεόπομπος ὁ Χίος ἐν τῇ τῶν Φιλίππων ἱστορίᾳ κατέταξε τρεῖς βιβλίους περιεχοῦσας Συκελικὰς πράξεις. ἀρξάμενος δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Διονυσίου τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου τυραννίδος, διήλθε χρόνον ἐτῶν πενήκοντα, καὶ κατέσπευσεν εἰς τὴν ἔκπτωσιν Διονυσίου τοῦ νεωτέρου. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ βιβλῖαι τρεῖς, ἀπὸ τῆς μῆς τεσσαρακοστῆς ἄχρι τῆς τρίτης καὶ τεσσαρακοστῆς.

The passage is examined by Brunet de Presle, 34, and C. Müller, i. lxxii. It is plain from Athênaios, x. 47, and from several references in Stephen of Byzantium, that Theopompos treated of Sicilian affairs, and specially of the younger Dionysios, in his thirty-ninth book. It would seem then that the three Sicilian books were not xli, xlii, xliii, but xxxix, xl, xli. The mistake does not seem very wonderful. The chronology is more puzzling. It appears that Theopompos recorded the second driving out of Dionysios the Younger in 343. I do not know that this is proved by the reference in Plutarch, Tim. 4, which shows that Theopompos recorded the

slaying of Timophanês, because he most likely told that as a piece of Corinthian history in its proper place. But it does seem to be proved by the reference in Polybios (xii. 4 a) which speaks of the ex-tyrant going to Corinth. Fifty years back from this time, 393-343, would pretty well carry us to the time when Theopompos ended his first work. But if ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς Διονυσίου τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου τυραννίδος means, as it most naturally would, from the accession of Dionysios the Elder, the fifty years must be counted from the first driving out of Dionysios the Younger, 405-356. It seems most likely then that Diodôros confounded the two drivings out, and that he really meant to say that the Sicilian books of Theopompos took in the whole time from 405 to 343. In either case there is the difficulty that the fifty years cover the thirty-four years between 394, when Theopompos ended his *Hellenika*, and 360, when he began his *Philippika*. The most likely explanation is that the three Sicilian books of Theopompos were something like the two Sicilian books of Thucydides. They may well have contained a minute account of Sicilian affairs from 360 to 343, prefaced by a sketch of the events from 405 to 360. Moreover, from Strabo vii. 5. 9 and the other fragments collected by C. Müller, i. 302, it looks as if Theopompos must have said something about the action of Dionysios in Italy and on the Hadriatic in 387-5, in his twenty-first book. That that book contained mention of those parts appears from Stephen of Byzantium in *Λήδεσσα*. That the name of Dionysios was found in it appears from Athênaios, vi. 77. All this must have come in one of the digressions from his main subject for which Theopompos is blamed of some.

We may pass by Diyllos of Athens, who is mentioned several times by Diodôros, and is said (xvi. 14) to have treated of the affairs of Sicily. In the few fragments that have come down to us (C. Müller, ii. 360) there is nothing bearing on Sicilian affairs. According to another passage of Diodôros (xvi. 76) he ended his work with the death of Philip in B. C. 336, but Athênaios (iv. 41) refers to him for later events, and the very passage seems (C. Müller, ii. 360) to be followed by Diodôros (xix. 52), and he has a later reference to him still in a fragment of the twenty-first book. Nymphodôros of Syracuse is a writer of the same age, whom Ebert (Diss. Sic. 180) has taken under his special patronage. He has in his work *περὶ τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ θαυμαζομένων* (Athênaios, xiii. 55)

supplied us with several references on local matters, and with one precious about the god Hadranus (see vol. i. p. 187). So has Kallias of Syracuse, a writer of the age of Agathoklēs, whom Diodōros, in a fragment of the same book, followed by Soudias, blames for his partiality to that tyrant. Dionysios (A. R. i. 72) quotes him for views as to the foundation of Rome. Antandros, brother of Agathoklēs, is referred to by Diodōros as a writer of history (*ἀντὶς συγγραφεὺς*); but of whom not a fragment has come down to us. Dēmocharēs, nephew of Dēmostenēs the orator, is quoted by Lucian (De longævis, 10) for the age of Agathoklēs at the time of his death; he must therefore have touched on Sicilian matters in his Histories, of which Plutarch and Athēnaios have preserved some other fragments. Douris of Samos, the alleged illegitimate descendant of Alkibiadēs, among his other historical works, wrote specially τὰ περὶ Ἀγαθοκλέα, of which some fragments remain. (See p. 367, n. 3.)

Of far more importance for Sicilian history than any of these last must have been the famous Timaios, son of Andromachos of Tauromenion, of whom large fragments remain, and whom Polybios picked out for special criticism.

APPENDIX II.

THE DEBATE IN THE COUNCIL OF DIONYSIOS.

(See p. 19.)

DIODŌROS tells this story twice, the first time in its natural order in xiv. 8, the second time in xx. 78, when comparing the conduct of Dionysios with that of Agathoklēs when he offered (c. 77) to give up the tyranny to Deinokratēs. In both versions Helōris utters the epigrammatic saying, *καλὸν ἐντάφιον ἢ τυραννίς*. Some modern writers have found this a little difficult to translate, as Arnold (Hist. Rome, i. 464), who renders it "a king's robe is a noble winding-sheet," and Grote (x. 644), "that the royal robe was the only honourable funeral garment." Holm (ii. 102) is literal; "das beste Sterbekleid sei die Tyrannis." There is a difficulty certainly; *τυραννίς* can hardly be *ἐντάφιον*, and there is the question

whether a man speaking to Dionysios himself would have used the word *τυραννίς*. Perhaps in a private conclave one so near as Helôris might; but one suspects something of translation in the reporter.

In the first version, Polyxenos gives the advice to ride to the Campanians; *δεῖν λαβόντα τὸν ὀξύτατον ἵππον εἰς τὴν τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐπικράτειαν ἀφιππεύσαι πρὸς τοὺς Καμπανοὺς*. The third speech, here attributed to Philistos, is a retort to that of Polyxenos; *Φίλιστος δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα τὰς ἱστορίας συνταξάμενος, ἀντειπὼν τῷ Πολυξένῳ, προσήκειν, ἔφη, Διονύσιε, οὐκ ἐφ' ἵππου θέοντος ἐκπεδῆν ἐκ τῆς τυραννίδος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ σκέλους ἐλκόμενον προσπίπτειν*. In the second version the speech of Polyxenos is left out; there is therefore no reference to a horse in the last speech, which is here put into the mouth of Dionysios' kinsman (ὁ κηδεστής) Megaklēs, and stands thus; *ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ἐκ τῆς τυραννίδος ἐκπίπτοντα τοῦ σκέλους ἐλκόμενον ἀπείναι καὶ μὴ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι*.

In this case we may almost say that we know, as opposed to clever guessing, whom Diodôros followed in these two different accounts. Plutarch (Diôn, 35) quotes Timaios as saying that the boys dragged about the body of Philistos by a lame leg (see p. 266), and that men mocked, because it was he who had told Dionysios *μὴ δεῖν ἐκ τυραννίδος φυγεῖν ἵππῳ τάχει χρώμενον*, ἀλλὰ τοῦ σκέλους ἐλκόμενον. Then Plutarch adds emphatically that Philistos, in his own history, attributed the saying to another and not to himself. This statement of Plutarch, who had read both Timaios and Philistos, has all the force of a correction. We may be pretty sure that, in the first version, Diodôros is following Timaios and in the second Philistos. It was Megaklēs and not Philistos who made the remark about the leg. But we need not infer either that Polyxenos did not suggest the ride to the Campanians or that Philistos did not mention the suggestion. It seems to fit on well with the message to the Campanians which follows, though a very clever guesser might say that it was made out of that. It is more obvious that Diodôros mentioned it in his direct narrative, where it was a natural part of the story, but left it out in its second reference, where it did not at all bear on his argument.

We have then the real story, as told by Philistos, and either carelessly or wilfully altered by Timaios, so as to make the fate of Philistos himself point a moral. But we may be sure that both were right in the time which they assigned to the story, namely

when Dionysios was besieged by the Syracusans. A contemporary at a distance tells it incidentally, and puts it at a later time, which is clearly wrong. Isokratēs, in the speech which he puts into the mouth of Archidāmos (c. 44), quotes the saying *ὡς καλὸν ἐστὶν ἐντάφιον ἢ τυραννίς* as said to Dionysios by a nameless friend during the Carthaginian siege. The other sayings he does not mention. Of course the incidental reference of Isokratēs is nothing against the direct statement of Philistos; it simply shows how easily stories, then as now, got out of their places. The saying about the *ἐντάφιον* has far more point for a tyrant besieged by his own citizens than for one besieged by foreign enemies. And Dionysios, when besieged by the Carthaginians, could not have called on men in the Carthaginian service to help him.

The saying about *ἐντάφιον* was one which was likely often to be quoted. Plutarch refers to it more than once in his other writings, as Cato Major, 24, An Seni sit Ger. Rep. i. In this last place he denies the position and adds the moral comment; *ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ γε τὴν μοναρχίαν μετὰ τῆς ἀδικίας μὴ παύσασθαι, συμφερόν τειλεωτέραν ἐποίησε*. In the Apophthegms (Dionys. 2) he has got hold of quite another and an opposite story. The occasion is the same, for it is said to be *ἐπεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς τυραννίδος ἐπολιορκεῖτο, συστάντων ἐπ' αὐτὸν τῶν πολιτῶν*. But now his friends exhort him to give up the tyranny to save his life (*οἱ μὲν φίλοι συνεβούλευον ἀπαλλαγῆναι τῆς ἀρχῆς, εἰ μὴ βούλεται κρατηθεὶς ἀποθανεῖν*). He sees an ox die very easily at the hand of the butcher, and says that he will not give up so great a dominion through fear of so short a business as death (*οὐκ ἄηδες ἔστιν οὕτω βραχὺν ὄντα τὸν θάνατον φοβηθέντας ἡμῶς ἀρχὴν ἐγκαταλιπεῖν τηλικαύτην*).

Ælian (V. H. iv. 20) quotes the *ἐντάφιον* story, but places it in the Carthaginian siege and calls the speaker Hellopidēs.

Livy (xxiv. 22), or Damarata the daughter of the second Hierōn, if the words are really hers, got much further wrong. Here, not as usual the *ἐντάφιον*, but the speech of Megaklēs appears, only put into the mouth of Dionysios; "Admonet sæpe usurpatæ Dionysii tyranni vocis, qua pedibus tractum, non insidentem equo, relinquere tyrannidem dixerit debere." Here the "insidentem equo" very feebly represents *ἐφ' ἵππου θέοντος ἐκπηδᾶν* with its special reference.

But the grandest reference ever made to the story is when the Empress Theodora, or Procopius in her name (Bell. Pers. i. 24),

quotes the words of Helôris, without mention of him or of Dionysios. When, during the Nika sedition, it is debated in Justinian's councils whether to abide or to fly, Theodora makes a speech in which she says for herself, *μή γὰρ ἂν γενοίμην τῆς ἀλουργίδος ταύτης χωρίς*, and adds, speaking to the Emperor, *σκόπει μέντοι μή διασωθῇτι ξυμβήσεται σοι ἥδιστα ἂν τῆς σωτηρίας τὸν θάνατον ἀνταλλάξασθαι· ἐμὲ γάρ τις καὶ παλαιὸς ἀρέσκει λόγος, ὡς καλὸν ἐντάφιον ἢ βασιλεία ἐστί.* The change from *τυραννίς* to *βασιλεία* is of course needful when the counsel is addressed to an acknowledged sovereign. And the *ἀλουργίς* supplies exactly what is wanted for the *ἐντάφιον*. Speaking to a lawful prince, *καλὸν ἐντάφιον ἢ ἀλουργίς* would come in well; only was Dionysios, either as *τύραννος* or as *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ*, entitled to an *ἀλουργίς*? A *τυραννικὴ ἐσθῆς* is spoken of. What was it like? See Grote, x. 644; Holm, ii. 430. [Athénaios (x. 47) speaks of the *ἐσθῆτα τὴν ποικίλην* of Nysaios. See p. 291, n. 2.]

APPENDIX III.

THE SITE OF THE HEXAPYLA. (See p. 48.)

THE Hexapyla (Ἑξάπυλα, Diod. xiii. 18) or Hexapylon (Livy, xxv. 24) is not really described by either writer.

There are two points along the north brow of the hill where we distinctly see three roads up the hill meet. The thought comes into the head at each, Can this be the site of the Hexapylon? Was there in either case a gate at the head of each road, and did these gates form part of a single building? If so, and if there were three gates on the inner side, we should make our six gates; only there would neither be six gates side by side, nor yet six gates behind one another. At the head of the modern road, at the point called *Scala Greca*, we see to the left of the road (going up) two marked ways, very near together, one of them with very deep wheel-tracks. At some distance to the right, with the foot of the path quite hidden round a corner of the hill, is the most remarkable way up in any part of Epipolai. It is wrought and turned with the greatest care; it is nearly hidden from sight from down below, and care is taken that he who goes up shall have

his shielded side outwards. A friendly party could thus be brought up without any danger from below, while a hostile party climbing up would be exposed to every danger from above. There must have been a gate at the top of this road, and there clearly was another lower down. The lower part of this road is altogether away from the other roads to the left, and seem to stand in no relation to them. Its landing-place at the top is comparatively near to theirs, though not near enough to be wrought into a single building with them, unless it were on a gigantic scale. This is clearly the most important made ascent—cut in the rock—to any part of Epipolai. If we conceive the Hexapylon as a building with six gates each behind the other, this might very well be the way up to it, and one of the other paths might lead to the smaller gate spoken of by Livy as being near it (xxv. 24), “prope Hexapylon est portula.”

The other group of gates are much closer together, but they are much further to the west than one fancies the Hexapylon to have been. A small projection of the hill has on its east side a road nearly as finished as the one just spoken of. Its lower part is not cut in the rock, but is supported on built stones; at present it has not the same protection as the other road, but, as we are dealing with building, not with cutting, it may have been broken down. This path is carried on as a road or street for a great length southward across the hill. Just as it reaches the top of the cliff, it is joined on the eastern side by another road, and there is a third a little way to the east again. These three seem near enough to have been connected by a building of some kind. I do not think that there is another made ascent eastward till we come to the small posterns spoken of in the text.

It is against this being the site of the Hexapylon, and in favour of the other site by *Scala Greca*, that the wall of Dionysios is continued between the two points, while immediately to the east of *Scala Greca* I do not think there is any built wall along the edge of the cliff, though there seem to be signs of cut walls. This looks as if the built wall of Dionysios had started at this point from the end of an older wall of Tycha. But I do not rely on this with any very great confidence, as I have not tracked out the wall of Tycha with the same care as those of Epipolai or even as the wall on the cliff of Achradina.

Altogether I cannot positively commit myself to any exact site for the Hexapyla. It depends a good deal on what we fancy the Hexapylon to have been like. But it was certainly on the north side, not east of *Scala Greca*, and, I should say, not at any very great distance to the west.

APPENDIX IV.

THE FOUNDATION OF TAUROMENION. (See p. 108 seqq.)

OUR account of the foundation of Tauromenion comes from two confused notices in Diodóros, and one in Strabo, which is quite as puzzling. But there is really no difficulty. Diodóros, copying from different authors, has reported their matter in a somewhat bungling fashion and perhaps a little out of place. He has also forgotten at a later stage what he had written at an earlier. All this we are quite used to in Diodóros. It is the place in Strabo which presents the real difficulty, if there be any.

There is a passage in Diodóros (xvi. 7) which, if we had not read what he had already said in xiv. 58, we should certainly take for a record of the first foundation of Tauromenion. It comes amongst the history of Diôn about 358 years before Christ. The account stands thus ;

Ἀνδρόμαχος ὁ Ταυρομενίτης, Τιμαίου μὲν τοῦ τὰς ἱστορίας συγγράψαντος πατὴρ ὢν, πλοῦτῳ δὲ καὶ ψυχῇς λαμπρότητι διαφέρων, ἥθροισε μὲν τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Νάξου τῆς κατασκαφείσης ὑπὸ Διονυσίου περιλειφθέντας. οἰκίσας δὲ τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς Νάξου λόφον, τὸν ὀνομαζόμενον Ταῦρον, καὶ μείνας κατ' αὐτὸν πλείω χρόνον, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ Ταύρου μονῆς ὠνόμασε Ταυρομένιον.

He goes on to say how the town grew, how its inhabitants became rich and the city famous, till it became a Roman colony in his own day.

Now the description of Andromachos is Ταυρομενίτης, which would strictly imply that Tauromenion was already in being. Otherwise all that is said of his doings, including the naming of the place, reads as if Andromachos was the first founder. Diodóros, no doubt with the writings of Andromachos' son before

him, was so impressed with what he there read that he altogether forgot all that he had written about Tauromenion, its first foundation and its history, in earlier books. He even told over again the story of the naming of the place which he had already told in the earlier account. We may be quite certain that, however Timaios may have exalted the doings of his father, Andromachos did not found Tauromenion, but at most refounded it, or most likely simply received new citizens into an existing town.

The earlier account in xiv. 59 comes in the year [397] when Dionysios and Himilkôn are about to march along the eastern coast of Sicily to meet one another. Himilkôn has just destroyed Messina (see p. 106), and he bids Magôn sail to Tauros (*προσάξας παραπλεῖν ἐπὶ τὸν λόφον τὸν καλούμενον Ταῦρον*). He then goes on to say that Tauros was at that moment—so I understand the story—in the process of settlement by Sikels and the patronage of Himilkôn;

Τούτον δὲ κατεληφότες ἦσαν Σικελοὶ, συγχυτοὶ μὲν τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες, ἡγεμόνα δὲ οὐκ ἔχοντες. τούτοις δὲ τὸ μὲν πρότερον Διονύσιος ἐδεδώκει τὴν τῶν Ναξίων χώραν· τότε δ' ὑπ' Ἱμῖλκωνος πεισθέντες ἐπαγγελίας, τὸν λόφον κατελάβοντο· ὄχυροῦ δ' ὄντος τούτου, καὶ τότε καὶ μετὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἔκουν αὐτὸν, τείχος περιβάλλοντες καὶ τὴν πόλιν, διὰ τὸ μείναι τοὺς ἐπὶ τὸν Ταῦρον ἀθροισθέντας, Ταυρομένιον ὠνόμασαν.

This, I conceive, comes from Philistos. The words *καὶ μετὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἔκουν* must surely have been written after Dionysios' unsuccessful attack on Tauromenion recorded in xiv. 88, and long before the changes made by Andromachos. That is to say, the entry in xiv. 59 does not come from Timaios, while that in xvi. 7 does. One might even think that it was written before Dionysios' taking of Tauromenion recorded in xiv. 96, but as some Sikels were still left (*τοὺς μὲν πλείστους τῶν ἐκεῖ Σικελῶν ἐξέβαλε*), that is not absolutely necessary. In the narrative of the foundation, there is no difficulty whatever; only an event which had just been done or which more likely was still in doing is awkwardly brought in in the middle of the description of the two marches of Himilkôn and Dionysios. The chief source of confusion is when we read just before of the march of Dionysios (xiv. 58);

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀπὸ τῶν Συρακουσῶν ἑκατὸν ἐξήκοντα σταδίου προσαγὰν ἀπασαν τὴν δύναμιν, κατεστρατοπέδευσε περὶ τὸν Ταῦρον καλούμενον.

It is always hard to say to what lengths confusion might or might not reach in the mind of Diodôros. But one would certainly

think that, specially when dealing with eastern Sicily, he must have known that the Tauros in c. 58 and the Tauros in c. 59 are two different places. But a more careful writer would have brought this out more clearly; no doubt Philistos did. The Tauros described as only a hundred and sixty stadia from Syracuse is not the Tauros above Naxos, but the much lowlier Tauros just beyond Xiphonia. So Holm silently points out (G. S. ii. 115, "also am Cap S. Croce"). Dionysios did not get anywhere near the northern Tauros this time.

The passage from Strabo is in vi. 2. 3. He has just casually mentioned that the wrecks of vessels swallowed up in the strait were cast on shore on the coast of Tauromenion, which thence got an unsavoury name (*καταποθέντων δὲ καὶ διαλυθέντων τὰ ναύαγια παρασύρεται πρὸς ἡύδα τῆς Ταυρομενίας ἢ καλοῦσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ συμπτώματος Κοπρία*). He then speaks of Messana, *Mamertina Civitas*, as it was in his day, and how its people liked better to be called *Μαμερτίνοι* than *Μεσσήνιοι*. He then goes on to say that Katana, now Roman *Catina*, had more inhabitants than Messana, but that Tauromenion had fewer than either. (This shows that it could then be put into comparison with them, which it certainly could not now.)

οἰκεῖται δ' ἱκανὸς ἡ πόλις [Μεσσήνη] μᾶλλον δὲ Κατάνη· καὶ γὰρ οἰκήτορας δέδεκται Ῥωμαίους· ἦγον δ' ἀμφόιν τὸ Ταυρομένιον. καὶ Κατάνη δ' ἐστὶ Ναξίων μὲν αὐτῶν κτίσμα. Ταυρομένιον δὲ τῶν ἐν Ὑβλῇ Ζαγκλαίων.

This is a very hard passage. It would be a strange archaism to speak of any people as *Ζαγκλαῖοι* in the days either of Strabo or of Dionysios. And if it means the people of Messana at any time since the overthrow of the sons of Anaxilas (see vol. ii. p. 315 seqq.), it sounds stranger still after the careful distinction just drawn about *Μαμερτίνοι* and *Μεσσήνιοι*. And what people, Greek or barbarian, were at any time entitled to be called *οἱ ἐν Ὑβλῇ Ζαγκλαῖοι*? I confess that I can make nothing out of the words, and I am amazed when Schubring (*Umwanderung des Megarischen Meerbusens*, p. 453) says quite calmly;

"Strabo (268) meint unter Hyblas die Mutterstadt von Tauromenion, Hybla Geleatis (Diod. 14. 59; *οἱ Σικελοὶ κατεληφότες τὸν Ταῦρον*").

As Holm (G. S. ii. 437) says, to get this meaning, one must for *Ζαγκλαίων* read *Σικελῶν*. And, when one has performed this piece

of text-tinkering, one does not seem to be any nearer to a meaning. For the elaborate description in Diod. xiv. 88 (see p. 165 seqq.) cannot apply to Sikels at any Hybla, even Geleatis, but to Sikels much nearer to Naxos. Holm says further ;

“Wenn *Ζαγκλαίων* richtig ist, können wir uns die Sache nur in folgender Weise denken. Als Messana durch Himilkon zerstört wurde, löste sich der alte Bürgerverband im Grossen und Ganzen auf. Diod. xiv. 78 lässt allerdings die Annahme zu, dass viele alte Messenier in die mit Lokrern, Medmäern, und peloponnesischen Messeniern neubevölkerte Stadt zurückkehrten, aber alle werden es nicht gethan haben. Die alten Zankläer, die ja sich immer etwas von den Messeniern geschieden hielten, gingen nach Hybla, wahrscheinlich dem aetnäischen, und von da nach Tauromenion.”

All this may be so ; but, if so, one cannot help wishing that either Strabo or Diodōros had made the facts a little clearer. One can only say ; “Nec scire fas est omnia.”

The topography of Tauromenion comes out best in the account of the unsuccessful attack of Dionysios in Diodōros, xiv. 88. Dionysios finds that a bad watch is kept on the akropolis (*διὰ τὴν ὀχρότητα καὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ τείχους, ῥαθυμοῦντας περὶ τὴν κατὰ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν φυλακὴν εὐρών*). He goes up—by night and in the snow—and seizes one akropolis (*μᾶς μὲν ἀκροπόλεως ἐκυρίευσε*). He then attacks the other part, and leads his army into the city (*εἰς τὸ ἕτερον μέρος παρεισπεσὼν, εἰσήγαγε τὴν δύναμιν εἰς τὴν πόλιν*). Then, *τῶν Σικελῶν ἐπικειμένων ἐξ ὑπερδεξίων τόπων*, he and his company are driven out of the town and thrust down the heights.

Here are several questions. Which are the two akropoleis of Tauromenion ? As Dionysios took one akropolis, there must have been another. Which did Dionysios take ? What is meant by the *ὑπερδέξιοι τόποι* ?

I once thought that the two akropoleis were the Castle and Mola, and that Dionysios took the Castle. So Holm (G. S. ii. 438) says it must have been, if the text is right. But then he wants to play tricks with the text, and for *μᾶς* to read *τῆς*. Then there would be only one akropolis, namely the Castle. Nothing easier certainly than to get rid of facts in this way. But would any transcriber, finding *τῆς* in his text, have changed it into *μᾶς* ? To be sure it is a little awkward, the *μᾶς ἀκροπόλεως* directly after *κατὰ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν* ; but that only means that, when Diodōros wrote

the first phrase, he had not found out that there were two. The genuine text of Philistos, which Diodōros doubtless misunderstood and mangled, would of course make the whole thing clear; as we have not got it, we must make what meaning we can without. I have to thank Mr. Arthur Evans for an explanation which I now think agrees better with the facts and the topography than that which occurred separately to me and to Holm. The two akropoleis are not Mola and the Castle, but the Castle and the hill of the theatre. This last is the one that Dionysios took. From that he burst into the town—*eis τὸ ἕτερον μέρος παρεισπεσὼν εἰσῆγαγε τὴν δύναμιν εἰς τὴν πόλιν*. These last words certainly seem better to agree with an attack sideways, so to speak, from the hill of the theatre than with an attack directly downwards from the Castle. The theatre-hill, much lower than that of the Castle, stands somewhat apart from the ledge on the mountain-side which forms the present town. When the town was, as the ancient walls show, much larger, it was doubtless less isolated from the town than it is now; that is, it would have houses directly below it. But it was none the less isolated from the general mass of the hills, and, as directly commanding a part of the town, it could never have been left without special defence as an akropolis. It would be much more easy than the Castle hill to seize, as Dionysios did, without first occupying the town. One may conceive him marching round—the snow would not be on the lower ground—and making his attack from the west or even from the north. On this last side, from the lower part of the ancient town, near the temple which has become the church of Saint Pancras, the Castle hill and the theatre-hill, lower as the latter is, have a good deal the air of twin heights, while Mola withdraws behind and seems to be only one of several loftier points in the background. At the other end of the town, near the gate of Catania, Mola has somewhat more of the air of an akropolis, but an akropolis of the Corinthian sort. But then Akrokorinthos was the original Corinth, while there is no reason to think that Mola was the original Tauromenion. If any one likes, all three may be reckoned as akropoleis, and Holm in one sentence shows a tendency to reckon more than two; "Nach Diod. xiv. 88 gab es *wenigstens* zwei Akropolen in Tauromenion." My point is that the *μία ἀκρόπολις* taken by Dionysios was the hill of the theatre, and that thence he made his way into the town.

There is one difficulty certainly in looking on the theatre-hill as the akropolis taken by Dionysios. Diodôros says ὤρμησε . . . πρὸς τοὺς ἀνωτάτω τόπους. In no accurate description could the theatre-hill be so called; strictly the words could mean nothing short of Mola, or rather the height yet loftier than Mola. But, even if οἱ ἀνωτάτω τόποι mean anything more than the heights of Tauromenion generally, the attack of Dionysios would not be specially designed for the theatre-hill. He would attack it first, as the best point for a first attack, but the ὁρμή would be further designed for the town, the Castle, Mola itself, if it so happened. He took μίαν ἀκρόπολιν first, as the means towards taking everything else.

When Dionysios has made his way into the town, the Sikels come together to withstand him—τῶν Σικελῶν ἀθρόως βοηθουσάντων. The tyrant and his companions are driven over the rocks; περιεκυλίσθη is the forcible word for what happened to Dionysios himself. The Sikels were ἐπικείμενοι ἐξ ὑπερδαιζίων τόπων, which may be understood, with Holm, of a garrison swarming down from Mola. But it need not mean more than that the Sikels pushed them down from the height of the present town, a steep enough tumble for any tyrant. I cannot believe in any case, with Mr. Dennis (*Handbook to Sicily*, p. 461), that it was from Mola that Dionysios was pushed down.

I believe I am not in accord with the last lights in so seeing, but in all this vivid description I certainly see the tale as it was told by one who was doubtless there, hard by wherever Dionysios was, by Philistos himself. Because the story is about Tauromenion, it does not follow that it came from Timaios. Timaios had no particular interest in glorifying the Tauromenion of days earlier than his father. We surely have Philistos here and Timaios in the sixteenth book.

[With regard to Strabo's statement that Tauromenium was a colony of "the Zanklaians in Hybla," a new suggestion has been put forth by Prof. E. Pais in his recently published *Storia della Sicilia e della Magna Grecia*, vol. i. p. 592 seqq. According to this view Strabo's statement was due to a confusion with the other Tauros near Megara Hyblæa, now Cape Xifonio. Pais would place here another Tauromenium, peopled by Zanklaians who *æ hypothesei* had occupied the neighbouring Hybla previous to the men of Megara.]

APPENDIX V.

THE CARTHAGINIAN ENCAMPMENT BEFORE SYRACUSE.

(See p. 123.)

SOME of these points are instructively treated of by Holm, *Topografia*, p. 268. Our only authority is Diodōros, who doubtless reproduces Philistos, the very best authority next to a Carthaginian officer, as well as he could. But we must always allow something for Diodōros' undoubted gift of misunderstanding his sources. The points in the text come from him. I think I discern a confusion in the passage where he says (xiv. 70), speaking of the beginning of the pestilence, *καὶ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι πρότερον, τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντες παρεμβολὴν, πολλοὶ διεφθάρησαν ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου, ἐλώδους ὄντος τοῦ τόπου καὶ κοίλου*. These words, even if they came straight from Philistos who had seen both sieges, would not have quite the same weight as a direct statement in the narrative that the Carthaginians did occupy the same site as the Athenians. But taking them as a statement of Diodōros directly following Philistos, we may perhaps see that he is thinking of the original camp of the Athenians by Daskōn and the Olympieion, but transfers to it circumstances which belong only to the ground which they occupied in the very last stage of the siege. Then it was that they got on the marshy ground and were visited by pestilence. But the words *ἐλώδους ὄντος τοῦ τόπου καὶ κοίλου* are surely a genuine bit of Philistos. The last epithet exactly hits off the site of the present salt-works, with higher ground on three sides of it.

Diodōros (xiv. 62) seems distinctly to distinguish the general's quarters in the Olympieion from the rest of the camp; *ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν δυνάμεων ἱμῶν κατεσκήνωσεν ἐν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς νεῇ* τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλῆθος ἐν τῇ παρακειμένῃ τόπῳ κατεστρατοπέδευσεν, ἀπέχον τῆς πόλεως σταδίου δώδεκα. And in c. 72 Diodōros distinguishes the siege of the camp from the siege of the fort on Polichna and Daskōn; *ὁ Διονύσιος ἄμα τὴν τε παρεμβολὴν καὶ τὰ φρούρια πολιορκεῖν ἐπεχείρησε*. But the fort on Polichna—τὸ κατὰ τὸν νεῶν τοῦ Διὸς (cap. 63)—must have been close to the general's quarters. This might indeed be explained of a siege of the forts on the hill and of the camp

down below. But further on (cap. 74) Dionysios encamps by the temple and thence besieges the camp; *ἐπεστρατοπέδευσε τοῖς βαρβάροις, πρὸς τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἱερῇ παρεμβολῇ ποιησάμενος*. This surely shows that part of the camp was on the hill. The whole evidence, I think, quite bears out Holm's map at the end of the *Topografia* which I have followed. And the furthest point of the camp to the north as traced by him is exactly twelve stadia in a right line from several points of Achradina and Ortygia. But I cannot attach very much importance to these measurements. The general position seems clear; but to fix the exact extent north and south must be guess-work.

Holm leaves the site of the temple and the projection parted from it to the west by a valley, outside the camp; that is, as Himilkôn's own quarters. This seems to be quite justified by the evidence.

Of the forts, the position of that on Plēmmyrion is clear enough. The other two are described (c. 63) as *τὸ ἐπὶ μέσου τοῦ λιμένος* and *τὸ κατὰ τὸν νεὸν τοῦ Διὸς*. The first can only mean a fort on the point of Daskôn, and we afterwards (c. 72) read of something on Daskôn which could be besieged and taken (*τὸ πρὸς τῇ Δάσκωνι χωρίον ἐξεπολιόρκησαν*), that is doubtless the fort here spoken of. The other description, *τὸ κατὰ τὸν νεὸν τοῦ Διὸς*, is in c. 72 exchanged for *φρούριον ἢ καλουμένη Πολίχνα*. The Doric form seems to come straight from Philistos, but we may be allowed to doubt whether Diodôros quite knew what Πολίχνα meant. All three are said to be near the sea; *ὑποδόμησε δὲ καὶ τρία φρούρια παρὰ θάλατταν*. I do not quite see Holm's difficulty about *παρὰ θάλατταν*. A fort close by the temple could not really be on the sea-shore; but in the general look of the Great Harbour the surviving columns are eminently *παρὰ θάλατταν*, and the perfect temple must have been yet more so.

APPENDIX VI.

HIKETAS AFTER HIS LOSS OF SYRACUSE.

(See p. 315.)

THE statements as to the dealings of Timoleôn towards Hiketas between Timoleôn's complete occupation of Syracuse and the battle of the Krimisos seem at first sight a little contradictory. We gather from the accounts in Diodôros (xvi. 72) and Plutarch (Tim. 24), that Hiketas, after his escape from Syracuse, kept possession of Leontinoi. Diodôros says distinctly;

Τιμολέων μὲν ἐστράτευσεν ἐπὶ Λεοντίνους. εἰς ταύτην γὰρ τὴν πόλιν Ἰκέτας καταπεφεύγει μετὰ δυνάμειος ἀξιολόγου.

Plutarch takes his occupation of Leontinoi for granted;

βουλόμενος ὁ Τιμολέων καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἐλευθερῶσαι καὶ παντάπασιν ἐκκόψαι τῆς Σικελίας τὰς τυραννίδας, ἐπὶ τὰς χώρας αὐτῶν στρατεύων Ἰκέτην μὲν ἠνάγκασεν ἀποστάντα Καρχηδονίων ὁμολογῆσαι τὰς ἀκροπόλεις κατασκάψειν καὶ βιοτεύσειν ἰδιώτην ἐν Λεοντίνοις.

This bit of narrative is oddly casual; but the mention of ἀκροπόλεις in the plural shows that it comes from some writer, whether Timaios or any other, who had a good local knowledge of Leontinoi. Such knowledge is equally plain in the account given by Diodôros, which at first sight seems directly to contradict that of Plutarch. After the passage just quoted, Diodôros goes on;

τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον προσέβαλε τῇ νέᾳ καλουμένῃ πόλει, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πολλῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει συγκεκλεισμένων καὶ ῥαδίως ἀπὸ τῶν τειχῶν ἀμυνομένων, ἄπρακτος γενόμενος ἔλυσε τὴν πολιορκίαν.

The νέα καλουμένη πόλις (see vol. i. p. 371) is as good for Leontine topography as the plural ἀκροπόλεις; but, as narratives of the same event, the two stories cannot be reconciled. Yet they hold the same place in the general narratives of our two authorities, and each goes on directly to mention the campaign which led to the submission of Leptinês. Plutarch has nothing more to say about Hiketas till after the battle of the Krimisos (c. 30). But Diodôros (xvi. 72) has preserved the statement that, while Timoleôn was warring against Engyon, Hiketas made his attempt to win back Syracuse;

περὶ ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ Τιμολέοντος ὄντος, Ἰκέτας, πανδημὶ στρατεύσας ἐκ τῶν Λεοντίνων, ἐπολιόρκει τὰς Συρακούσας, πολλοὺς δὲ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀποβαλὼν ταχίως ἐπανήλθεν εἰς τοὺς Λεοντίνους.

This is a rather casual way of bringing in so large a business as a siege of Syracuse; but some sudden attempt on some point is likely enough. And Diodōros has a later notice of him (xvi. 77), in which we find the key to the seeming contradiction. Timoleōn is making ready for his western march;

ἔχων δὲ πόλεμον πρὸς Ἰκέταν, διελύσατο πρὸς αὐτὸν, καὶ προσλαβόμενος τοὺς μετ' αὐτοῦ στρατιώτας, οὐ μετρίως ἠῤῥησε τὴν ἰδίαν δύναμιν.

This is clearly the same agreement as that recorded by Plutarch; only Plutarch has somehow put it out of place. Possibly his authority did not like to record a failure of Timoleōn. Hiketas submitted; he agreed to pull down his fortress, to give up his mercenaries to Timoleōn, and to live as a private man at Leontinoi. We may suspect that Timoleōn did not much like this last condition. He would have been better pleased to send Hiketas to Corinth as well as Leptinēs; but the permission of residence at Leontinoi, which so well suited the secret schemes of Hiketas, was doubtless the condition of his submitting at all. As for the exact time, it is not needful to suppose that the submission took place so immediately before Krimisos as one would think from Diodōros. It is enough if it came any time between the submission of Leptinēs and the western march, a shorter time, it may be, than is generally thought. The submission of Leptinēs most likely frightened Hiketas; but he took care to avoid banishment from Sicily.

The real difficulty comes later, when, after the battle of the Krimisos, we find Hiketas again acting against Timoleōn in concert with Mamercus. In Diodōros Hiketas comes in again suddenly in c. 82 with the short, but important notice, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸν μὲν Ἰκέταν καταπολεμήσας ἔθαψε. This is just after the peace with Carthage. Plutarch has more to tell. Timoleōn has come back to Syracuse after the battle; and we read (c. 30) how Mamercus, described as tyrant of Katanē, and Hiketas, who is not further described, but who is classed by implication among tyrants, make an alliance with the Carthaginians and ask for help;

τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸν Μάμερκον, τὸν τῆς Κατάνης τύραννον, καὶ Ἰκέτην, εἶτε φθόνῳ τῶν κατορθουμένων ὑπὸ Τιμολέοντος εἶτε φοβουμένων αὐτὸν ὡς ἀπιστον καὶ ἀσπονδον πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους συμμαχίαν πειρησαμένων πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, κ.τ.λ.

Then joining their forces (*συστάντες κοινῇ μετ' ἀλλήλων ἄπαντες*), they—that is surely Mamercus, Hiketas, and the Carthaginians—act against Timoleón's forces in the way mentioned in p. 334. And presently (c. 32) Timoleón wars against Leontinoi and takes Hiketas alive along with Euthymos, the commander of his cavalry (see p. 334). Mamercus had long before (see p. 307) joined Timoleón in the character of lord of Katanê. He simply changed sides, though one may wonder why he did not change sides earlier. But how had Hiketas, the private man at Leontinoi, who had pulled down his fortresses and given up his mercenaries to Timoleón, turned back again into a lord of Leontinoi, master of troops and with a commander of cavalry under him? The only guess I can make is that Mamercus made the league with Carthage spoken of by Plutarch (Tim. 30) as lord of Katanê, and that Hiketas asked and received their help to set himself up in the tyranny again. This would account for his being called *προδότης* as well as *τύραννος* in c. 32.

I have not got any help from Grote, who in xi. 241 accepts Hiketas as a private man at Leontinoi and assumes him again as "despot" in p. 254. He says in p. 241 that "Diodorus does not mention that Hiketas submitted at all." But this surely is his statement at the end of xvi. 77. Holm (ii. 206, 211, 469) explains as little, only saying in p. 211 that Hiketas "in Leontini mächtig geblieben war." Nor have I got anything from Arnoldt, Timoleon, 170, 171. Mitford (c. xxiii. § 3) naturally has his own story. In p. 206 we read how Timoleón "led his restless people first against Icetes in Leontini; but, finding little hope of ready success there, he quickly turned against Leptines of Engynne (sic)." Then "Icetes had confidence enough in his strength, or hope enough in a remaining party, to make an attempt on Syracuse, but was repelled with loss." In p. 209 Timoleón, "not scrupling to try negotiation with Icetes, now no longer connected with Carthage, he engaged that chief to co-operate against the Carthaginians." In p. 216 he comes to the odd phrase of Diodôros in xvi. 82, which gives opportunity for a good deal of declamation against Timoleón—"the abominable tale," "the atrocity of the conqueror." The part that concerns us runs thus;

"With Icetes, chief of Leontini, Timoleón had friendly connection, as formerly noticed, and, in pressing need, had received from him important assistance. The pretence for hostility with

that chief, according to Plutarch, was a report that he had entered into new engagements with the Carthaginians. Diodorus has mentioned no pretence."

Bunbury (art. Hicetas) also seems to assume that Hiketas remained tyrant of Leontinoi throughout. This, if one could believe it, would make everything clear; but it is hard to see how it can be made to agree with the statements either of Plutarch or of Diodóros.

APPENDIX VII.

THE RISE OF AGATHOKLÊS. (See p. 357 seqq.)

It has been taken for granted by some of the best modern writers that the form of government at Syracuse, at the time when we first begin to hear of Agathoklês, was a formal oligarchy. So Grote (xii. 531);

"Twenty years after the death of Timoleon we find the government of Syracuse described as an oligarchy: implying that the constitution established by Timoleon must have been changed either by violence or by consent. The oligarchy is stated as consisting of 600 chief men, among whom Sosistratus and Herakleides appear as leaders."

He speaks to the same effect in p. 537;

"Of the oligarchy which now prevailed at Syracuse, we have no particulars, nor do we know how it came to be substituted for the more popular forms established by Timoleon. We hear only generally that the oligarchical leaders, Sosistratus and Herakleides, were unprincipled and sanguinary men."

He refers naturally to Diodóros, xix. 3, 4, and adds that "Diodorus had written about this oligarchy in a part of his eighteenth book; which part is not preserved."

Much to the same effect says Holm (ii. 219); only he puts in a word of excuse for oligarchy which Grote would not have allowed;

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Now, as I read the story, I do not see any reason to suppose that the forms of the constitution established by Timoleôn had been set aside, either by violence or by consent. I see in the Syracuse of this time a democracy in which the democratic spirit, as Holm says, is weak, a democracy which oligarchic men are able to administer to their own purposes, and which in the end, to escape oligarchy, accepts tyranny. A practical oligarchy keeping up democratic forms is nothing wonderful.

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The first question is about the Six Hundred. Were they a formal Senate of any kind, whether established by violence or by consent? Some passages in Diodôros might be taken that way, and those of Justin look still more like it. But on the whole it seems to me that they were only a political club of oligarchic politics, which formed a marked body, a body which might practically get the chief power into its hands, but which had no legal being. Such perhaps was the famous Pythagorean club at Krotôn; such clubs (ἐξυπόδοι, τὸ ἐταίρικόν, *ἐννομοσταὶ ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς*, Thuc. iii. 82, viii. 54), as is well known, existed in demo-

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εἰς πολλὰ γὰρ μέρη συνέβαινε διαιρεῖσθαι τὰς ἑταιρίας τῶν συνόντων, καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐκάστοις εἶναι μεγάλας διαφοράς. μέγιστον δ' ἦν ἀντίταγμα τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλῆα τὸ τῶν ἑξακοσίων συνέδριον, κ.τ.λ.

It is still clearer in the next chapter when Tisarchos and Dioklēs (or whatever are the right forms of their names; see p. 361) are described as οἱ δοκοῦντες προεστάναι τῆς τῶν ἑξακοσίων ἑταιρίας. By these passages I think we may understand the others, as when (c. 4) we hear of the banishment πολλῶν ἐνδόξων ἀνδρῶν, ὡς ἂν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας κεκοινωνηκότων τῆς τῶν ἑξακοσίων τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων, or when nearly the same words are used in c. 6, or when, as twice in that chapter, οἱ ἑξακόσιοι are spoken of without further description. Everybody, we may be sure, knew them by that name. Now συνέδριον, though it sounds like a regular Senate, is not a real technical word; we do not hear of a συνέδριον among the institutions of Syracuse. On the other hand, ἑταιρία is a word which no one, unless in some flight of sarcastic rhetoric, would apply to any of the legal powers of any commonwealth. We must explain συνέδριον by ἑταιρία, not ἑταιρία by συνέδριον. And it proves yet more that, in the one place where we seem to get an echo of formal language, when Agathoklēs takes the oath in c. 5, that language is democratic; παραχθεις εἰς τὸ τῆς Δήμητρος ἱερὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν, ὥμοσε μηδὲν ἐναντιώσεσθαι τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ. And as soon as he has taken the oath, the account goes on, προσποιηθεις δὲ τῆς δημοκρατίας προϊστασθαι, καὶ δημαγωγῆσας ποικίλως τὰ πλήθη, στρατηγὸς κατεστάθη, κ.τ.λ. That is to say, the forms of the democracy went

on; the assembly was held, and it could sometimes assert itself. (The phrase τῆς δημοκρατίας προέσταςθαι must be compared with the προστάτης τοῦ δήμου at Athens, not a formal office, but the "leader" of a party.) And all this is at the very time when Sôsistratos and his party have just been restored, and when the συνέδριον of the Six Hundred is spoken of as most strongly opposed (μέγιστον ἀντίταγμα) to Agathoklès. I infer that the word συνέδριον, like ὀλιγαρχία, δυναστεία (c. 4, cf. the ἄνδρες μονάρχου in Herod. v. 92 β), ἐδυναστευον (c. 5), are to be taken in a vague practical sense, to be measured by the formal δημοκρατία. When Justin (xvii. 2. 12) says "senatum trucidat," it is most likely a mistranslation of some word like συνέδριον.

I remember only a few years back an use of language very like what I suppose. At the end of 1878 France was a republic; the words "République Française" appeared on the coins, the stamps, on every formal document. Yet the words "republic" and "republican" were constantly used as words of disparagement, implying hostility to the actual state of things. That state of things was sometimes spoken of as a "Marshallate," a word which certainly had no constitutional meaning in French law. This is just like the δυναστεία and the συνέδριον, names describing a fact, but having no legal meaning. In the French case I distinctly remember a paper or proclamation in the interest of the existing powers, complaining of certain persons who "wish to substitute a republican form of government for the institutions under which we live." The Six Hundred most likely used exactly the same language about Agathoklès, προστάτης τοῦ δήμου in a state formally democratic.

The order of events we get wholly from Diodôros; Justin and Polyainos may be used to fill in particular points. The first war in which Agathoklès distinguished himself, that in which Damas is general, is against Akragas. Justin makes it a war with Ætna; "Primo bello adversus Ætnæos, magna experimenta sui Syracusanis dedit." By the war with the Campanians ("sequenti Campanorum tantam de se spem omnibus fecit") he must mean the war waged to deliver Krotôn from the Bruttians. In the first passage, if it stood by itself, one might be inclined to accept "Ætnæos," on the ground that a copyist would be much more likely to put Akragas for Ætna than Ætna for Akragas. But

the slovenly description of the war in Italy, where Krotôn is not mentioned and where "Campani" is clearly used for Italians of any kind, makes us doubt. Anyhow the issue of the Italian war is quite differently conceived in Justin and in Diodôros. It is now that Diodôros draws his black picture of Hêracleidês and Sôsisstratos, and makes one of his references to a narrative which is not forthcoming (see p. 360). Sôsisstratos and Hêracleidês refuse Agathoklês the prize of his exploits; then he attacks them in vain as aiming at the tyranny (cc. 3, 4);

περιαλγὴς γενόμενος, αὐτοὺς διεγνώκοντας ἐπιθέσθαι τυραννίδι κατηγόρησεν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ. οὐ προσεχόντων δὲ τῶν Συρακουσίων ταῖς διαβολαῖς, οἱ μὲν περὶ Σωσίστρατον ἐδυνάστευσαν τῆς πατρίδος μετὰ τὴν ἐκ Κρότωνος ἐπάνοδον. ὁ δὲ Ἀγαθοκλῆς ἀλλοτρίως ἔχων τὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον κατέμενεν ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ μετὰ τῶν κοινπραγούντων.

This is one of the passages to which I have already referred for the use of the word *ἐδυνάστευσαν*. The *δυναστεία* is clearly consistent with the regular outward action of a democratic assembly. *Κατέμενεν* in the opening of c. 4 must not be construed as if Agathoklês stayed in Italy without going back to Syracuse. His return thither is implied in his speaking *ἐν τῷ δήμῳ*, which cannot mean a military assembly. It is not distinctly said that he was banished; but it seems taken for granted. Justin's account is quite different. He mixes the story up with Agathoklês' marriage with the widow of Damas, to which we cannot give a date, except that it must have been after the campaign against Akragas or Ætna. His story is;

"Tantum de se spem omnibus fecit, ut in locum demortui ducis Damasconis sufficeretur, cujus uxorem . . . post mortem viri in matrimonium recepit. Nec contentus, quod ex inope repente dives factus esset, piraticam adversus patriam exercuit. Saluti ei fuit quod socii capti tortique de illo negaverunt."

Of this last detail we have no account in Diodôros. The "piratica," the motive for taking to which is much mere intelligible in Diodôros than in Justin, must mean the Italian warfare recorded by Diodôros in c. 4. The election of Agathoklês as "dux" (*στρατηγός*) at this stage seems quite out of place. In Diodôros he is not made *στρατηγός* till after the oath in c. 5. Justin adds, "bis occupare imperium Syracusarum voluit, bis in exilium actus est." The first time must mean his present banishment and the return recorded by Diodôros in c. 4. The second is his escape from

Akestoridās and his coming back (by favour of Hamilkar) in c. 5, which last Justin goes on to tell again in xxii. 2. 5.

In Italy the Syracusans, or at least Hērakleidēs and Sōsistratos, defend Krotôn and attack Rhêgion. Agathoklēs, in his "piratica," takes the opposite side in both cases. Of the affairs of Krotôn in relation to Syracuse Diodōros tells us something more in xix. 10. It would seem that Hērakleidēs and Sōsistratos were allied with an oligarchic party in Krotôn, that a democratic change—most likely at the same time as their own fall at Syracuse—drove them into banishment and led to a peace with the Bruttians. In the same year (B.C. 317) as the accession of Agathoklēs to the tyranny, he says,

Κροτωνιάται πρὸς μὲν Βρεττίους διελύσαντο, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐκπεπωκυίας τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπὸ τῆς δημοκρατίας, διὰ τὴν πρὸς Ἡρακλείδην καὶ Σωσίστρατον κοινωνίαν . . . δεύτερον ἔτος ἤδη πολεμοῦντες, κ.τ.λ.

He goes on to mention some details of this war with the banished Krotōniates. The mention of the two years' war seems to help us to the date of the events of which we are just now speaking, this first banishment of Agathoklēs, his first Italian campaign, and his first return. They must come about B.C. 315. It is to be noticed that, while at Rhêgion and Krotôn, Agathoklēs fights as a partisan, at Taras he is a mere mercenary.

The war against the exiles and Carthaginians which Diodōros records in c. 4 after the first return of Agathoklēs is not mentioned by Justin. It is in this war that he does his great exploit at Gela (see pp. 366, 367). As he commands only a thousand men, he seems to be still in his old office of chiliarch only. Of the generalship of the Corinthian Akestoridās Justin says nothing, and Diodorōs (c. 5) gives us no explanation of the way in which it came about or how it came to an end. The application to Corinth of course goes along with the earlier application which brought Timoleôn and with the later application from Akragas to Sparta. But one would like to know something about the immediate circumstances. We see that Akestoridās is strong against Agathoklēs, and it looks as if the recall of Sōsistratos which immediately follows the second banishment of Agathoklēs was the work of the Corinthian general. But his name is not mentioned except in connexion with his attempt on Agathoklēs' life, and we do not know what became of him when Agathoklēs came back under the mediation of Hamilkar. But the application to Corinth must have been made by enemies of Agathoklēs; and one is tempted to think that the ground of the

application must have been the supposed (or in truth very real) danger from his ambition. The words are (c. 5) ;

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις αἰρεθέντος Ἀκεστορίδου τοῦ Κορωνθίου στρατηγοῦ, δόξας ἐπιβῆσθαι τυραννίδι διὰ τὴν σύγκεισιν, ἐξέφυγε τὸν κίνδυνον.

Then follows the story of his escape, a romantic story certainly, but one which, as being neither impossible nor improbable nor in any way contradicted, we are not justified in throwing aside.

What follows is one of the most interesting parts of the story. At this point, better than any other, our three writers join to help one another. Justin (xxii. 2. 1) may here be made the text ;

"A Morgantinis, apud quos exsulabat, odio Syracusanorum primo prætor, mox dux creatur. In eo bello et urbem Leontinorum cepit et patriam suam Syracusas obsidere cœpit, ad cujus auxilium Hamilcar, dux Pœnorum, imploratus, depositis hostilibus odiis, præsidia militum mittit."

Diodóros, in his direct narrative (c. 5), says only ;

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν Συρακουσίων καταδεξαμένων τοῖς μετὰ Σωιστραίου φυγάδας, καὶ πρὸς Καρχηδονίους εἰρήνην συνθεμένους, Ἀγαθοκλῆς φυγὰς ἂν ἰδίαν δύναιτο ἐν τῇ μεσογείᾳ συνεστήσατο. γενόμενος δὲ φοβερός οὐ μόνον τοῖς πόλεσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, κ.τ.λ.

Here we get the midland country in a general way, but no mention of any particular place. This is incidentally supplied in the next chapter. When Agathoklés is going to strike his blow, it is from the middle towns, and specially from Morgantia, that he gets help ;

κατέλεξεν εἰς τάξεις τοὺς τε ἐκ Μοργαντίνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῇ μεσογείᾳ πόλεων, καὶ τοὺς αὐτῷ πρότερον συμπορευθέντας πρὸς Καρχηδονίους. οὗτοι γὰρ πάντες πρὸς Ἀγαθοκλέα μὲν εὐνοῦστατα δέκνυντο, πολλὰ προευνεργημένοι κατὰ τὰς στρατείας.

Nothing can fit in better. I do not know whether the higher criticism would infer that, because Diodóros and Justin both mention Morgantia, therefore both must have copied from the same source. Those who are engaged in a *Quellenfrage* seem sometimes to forget that, if two men independently tell the same story without intentional omissions, they cannot well help mentioning some of the same facts, and they are not unlikely even to use some of the same words.

The taking of Leontinoi recorded by Justin is not mentioned by Diodóros, but it is recorded by Polyainos (v. 3. 2), with a very strange addition. Agathoklés has seemingly overcome (νικήσει) the

Leontines in battle. Then he sends his general Deinokratés into the town, saying that he wished to rival the clemency shown by Dionysios (see above, p. 187) to his prisoners at the Helleporos (*ὡς ἄρα φιλοτιμοῖτο πρὸς Διονύσιον καὶ βούλοιο σῶσαι αὐτοὺς, ὡς ἐκείνος ἔσωσε τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἑλλέπορον ποταμὸν πταίσαντας Ἰταλιώτας*). They believe and swear oaths. Then Agathoklés enters the town, and bids the citizens come unarmed to an assembly. Then the Leontine general—so I understand *ὁ στρατηγός*—as chairman of the assembly, puts the question whether they will agree to whatever Agathoklés may require (*ὅτῃ δοκεῖ ὅπερ καὶ Ἀγαθοκλεῖ, αἰρέτω τὴν χεῖρα*). Agathoklés says that what he requires is to kill them all (*δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, πάντας ἀνελεῖν*). So his soldiers kill them there in the assembly, to the number of ten thousand.

The joint mention of Leontinoi by Justin and Polyainos may lead us to accept some taking of Leontinoi at this time; but the story in Polyainos cannot stand as it is. Agathoklés is evidently conceived as already tyrant. Deinokratés, who plays so great a part further on, is conceived as being a general under Agathoklés, an impossible description, but under which may lurk some tradition of the friendship between the two which Diodóros speaks of at the end of c. 8 (see p. 378). One cannot fancy that, at this stage, Agathoklés could have had the means of doing such a massacre, or that it would have suited his purpose to do it. The story reads almost like a ghastly satire on the procedure of subservient assemblies under tyrants. It might well grow out of some case in which extraordinary powers were blindly voted to Agathoklés or to any other.

In the account of Agathoklés' second recall to Syracuse, Diodóros (c. 5) makes no mention of that active part in the matter which Justin (xxii. 2. 5) assigns to Hamilkar. The powers inside Syracuse are now (see p. 371) at peace with Hamilkar; consequently Agathoklés is Hamilkar's enemy as well as theirs. Immediately we read, without mention of any actors, *ἐπείσθη κατελθεῖν εἰς τὴν πατρίδα*. Then follows the oath, which is enforced on him *ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν*. That Hamilkar had something to do with Agathoklés' return might be inferred from the very confused account given by Polyainos (v. 3. 7) of his rise to power; *Ἀγαθοκλῆς πρὸς Ἀμίλκαν ἀνοχὴν ἔθετο, ὥστε ὁ μὲν εἰς Λιβύην ἀπῆγεν*. Then follows the story of the massacre, with the story of the assembly in Diodóros (c. 9) put before it. It seems clear that Hamilkar never did go back to Libya, but the

that chief, according to Plutarch, was a report that he had entered into new engagements with the Carthaginians. Diodorus has mentioned no pretence."

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The first question is about the Six Hundred. Were they a formal Senate of any kind, whether established by violence or by consent? Some passages in Diodôros might be taken that way, and those of Justin look still more like it. But on the whole it seems to me that they were only a political club of oligarchic politics, which formed a marked body, a body which might practically get the chief power into its hands, but which had no legal being. Such perhaps was the famous Pythagorean club at Krotôn; such clubs (*ξύνοδοι*, τὸ *ἑταίρικόν*, *ξυνωμοσίαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς*, Thuc. iii. 82, viii. 54), as is well known, existed in demo-

cratic Athens, and helped greatly towards bringing about the revolution of the Four Hundred. Diodóros, we must remember, uses words so vaguely and carelessly that we cannot argue from him as we can from Thucydides. A single word with a technical sound, which he may have copied without fully knowing its meaning, proves more than several passages containing vaguer words. Thus when (xix. 5) he speaks of τὸ τῶν ἑξακοσίων συνέδριον, μετὰ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ὑφηγημένον τῆς πόλεως, the words by themselves would be most naturally taken of the regular Senate of a government avowedly oligarchic. But in the same chapter he calls the government at the time of which he is speaking a democracy, and just before the passage above quoted he uses words which seem to imply that the oligarchic Six Hundred were simply the greatest and most powerful of several political clubs of various parties;

εἰς πολλὰ γὰρ μέρη συνέβαινε διαιρεῖσθαι τὰς ἑταιρίας τῶν συνόντων, καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐκάστοις εἶναι μεγάλας διαφοράς. μέγιστον δ' ἦν ἀντίταγμα τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα τὸ τῶν ἑξακοσίων συνέδριον, κ.τ.λ.

It is still clearer in the next chapter when Tisarchos and Dioklēs (or whatever are the right forms of their names; see p. 361) are described as οἱ δοκῦντες προεστάναι τῆς τῶν ἑξακοσίων ἑταιρίας. By these passages I think we may understand the others, as when (c. 4) we hear of the banishment πολλῶν ἐνδόξων ἀνδρῶν, ὡς ἂν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας κεκοινωνηκότων τῆς τῶν ἑξακοσίων τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων, or when nearly the same words are used in c. 6, or when, as twice in that chapter, οἱ ἑξακόσιοι are spoken of without further description. Everybody, we may be sure, knew them by that name. Now συνέδριον, though it sounds like a regular Senate, is not a real technical word; we do not hear of a συνέδριον among the institutions of Syracuse. On the other hand, ἑταιρία is a word which no one, unless in some flight of sarcastic rhetoric, would apply to any of the legal powers of any commonwealth. We must explain συνέδριον by ἑταιρία, not ἑταιρία by συνέδριον. And it proves yet more that, in the one place where we seem to get an echo of formal language, when Agathoklēs takes the oath in c. 5, that language is democratic; παραχθεις εἰς τὸ τῆς Δήμητρος ἱερὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν, ὥμοσε μὴδὲν ἐναντιώσεσθαι τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ. And as soon as he has taken the oath, the account goes on, προσποιηθεις δὲ τῆς δημοκρατίας προίστασθαι, καὶ δημαγωγῆσας ποικίλως τὰ πλήθη, στρατηγὸς κατεστάθη, κ.τ.λ. That is to say, the forms of the democracy went

on; the assembly was held, and it could sometimes assert itself. (The phrase τῆς δημοκρατίας προέστασθαι must be compared with the προστάτης τοῦ δήμου at Athens, not a formal office, but the "leader" of a party.) And all this is at the very time when Sôsisistratos and his party have just been restored, and when the συνέδριον of the Six Hundred is spoken of as most strongly opposed (μέγιστον ἀντίταγμα) to Agathoklēs. I infer that the word συνέδριον, like δλιγαρχία, δυναστεία (c. 4, cf. the ἄνδρες μονάρχαι in Herod. v. 92 β), ἐδυναστευον (c. 5), are to be taken in a vague practical sense, to be measured by the formal δημοκρατία. When Justin (xxii. 2. 12) says "senatum trucidat," it is most likely a mistranslation of some word like συνέδριον.

I remember only a few years back an use of language very like what I suppose. At the end of 1878 France was a republic; the words "République Française" appeared on the coins, the stamps, on every formal document. Yet the words "republic" and "republican" were constantly used as words of disparagement, implying hostility to the actual state of things. That state of things was sometimes spoken of as a "Marshalate," a word which certainly had no constitutional meaning in French law. This is just like the δυναστεία and the συνέδριον, names describing a fact, but having no legal meaning. In the French case I distinctly remember a paper or proclamation in the interest of the existing powers, complaining of certain persons who "wish to substitute a republican form of government for the institutions under which we live." The Six Hundred most likely used exactly the same language about Agathoklēs, προστάτης τοῦ δήμου in a state formally democratic.

The order of events we get wholly from Diodôros; Justin and Polyainos may be used to fill in particular points. The first war in which Agathoklēs distinguished himself, that in which Damas is general, is against Akragas. Justin makes it a war with Ætna; "Primo bello adversus Ætnæos, magna experimenta sui Syracusanis dedit." By the war with the Campanians ("sequenti Campanorum tantam de se spem omnibus fecit") he must mean the war waged to deliver Krotôn from the Bruttians. In the first passage, if it stood by itself, one might be inclined to accept "Ætnæos," on the ground that a copyist would be much more likely to put Akragas for Ætna than Ætna for Akragas. But

the slovenly description of the war in Italy, where Krotôn is not mentioned and where "Campani" is clearly used for Italians of any kind, makes us doubt. Anyhow the issue of the Italian war is quite differently conceived in Justin and in Diodôros. It is now that Diodôros draws his black picture of Hêrakleidês and Sôsisstratos, and makes one of his references to a narrative which is not forthcoming (see p. 360). Sôsisstratos and Hêrakleidês refuse Agathoklês the prize of his exploits; then he attacks them in vain as aiming at the tyranny (cc. 3, 4);

περιαλγῆς γενόμενος, αὐτοὺς διεγνώκοντας ἐπιθέσθαι τυραννίδι κατηγορήσεν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ. οὐ προσεχόντων δὲ τῶν Συρακουσίων ταῖς διαβολαῖς, οἱ μὲν περὶ Σωσίστρατον ἐδυνάστευσαν τῆς πατρίδος μετὰ τὴν ἐκ Κρότωνος ἐπάνοδον. ὁ δὲ Ἀγαθοκλῆς ἀλλοτρίως ἔχων τὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον κατέμενεν ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ μετὰ τῶν κοινοπραγούντων.

This is one of the passages to which I have already referred for the use of the word *ἐδυνάστευσαν*. The *δυναστεία* is clearly consistent with the regular outward action of a democratic assembly. *Κατέμενεν* in the opening of c. 4 must not be construed as if Agathoklês stayed in Italy without going back to Syracuse. His return thither is implied in his speaking *ἐν τῷ δήμῳ*, which cannot mean a military assembly. It is not distinctly said that he was banished; but it seems taken for granted. Justin's account is quite different. He mixes the story up with Agathoklês' marriage with the widow of Damas, to which we cannot give a date, except that it must have been after the campaign against Akragas or Ætna. His story is;

"Tantum de se spem omnibus fecit, ut in locum demortui ducis Damasconis sufficeretur, cujus uxorem . . . post mortem viri in matrimonium recepit. Nec contentus, quod ex inope repente dives factus esset, piraticam adversus patriam exercuit. Saluti ei fuit quod socii capti tortique de illo negaverunt."

Of this last detail we have no account in Diodôros. The "piratica," the motive for taking to which is much mere intelligible in Diodôros than in Justin, must mean the Italian warfare recorded by Diodôros in c. 4. The election of Agathoklês as "dux" (*στρατηγός*) at this stage seems quite out of place. In Diodôros he is not made *στρατηγός* till after the oath in c. 5. Justin adds, "bis occupare imperium Syracusarum voluit, bis in exsilium actus est." The first time must mean his present banishment and the return recorded by Diodôros in c. 4. The second is his escape from

Akestoridās and his coming back (by favour of Hamilkar) in c. 5, which last Justin goes on to tell again in xxii. 2. 5.

In Italy the Syracusans, or at least Hērakleidēs and Sōsistratos, defend Krotōn and attack Rhêgion. Agathoklēs, in his "piratica," takes the opposite side in both cases. Of the affairs of Krotōn in relation to Syracuse Diodōros tells us something more in xix. 10. It would seem that Hērakleidēs and Sōsistratos were allied with an oligarchic party in Krotōn, that a democratic change—most likely at the same time as their own fall at Syracuse—drove them into banishment and led to a peace with the Bruttians. In the same year (B.C. 317) as the accession of Agathoklēs to the tyranny, he says,

Κροτωνιάται πρὸς μὲν Βρεττίους διελύσαντο, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐκπεπωκῦτας τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπὸ τῆς δημοκρατίας, διὰ τὴν πρὸς Ἡρακλείδην καὶ Σωσίστρατον κοινωνίαν . . . δεύτερον ἔτος ἤδη πολεμοῦντες, κ.τ.λ.

He goes on to mention some details of this war with the banished Krotōniates. The mention of the two years' war seems to help us to the date of the events of which we are just now speaking, this first banishment of Agathoklēs, his first Italian campaign, and his first return. They must come about B.C. 315. It is to be noticed that, while at Rhêgion and Krotōn, Agathoklēs fights as a partisan, at Taras he is a mere mercenary.

The war against the exiles and Carthaginians which Diodōros records in c. 4 after the first return of Agathoklēs is not mentioned by Justin. It is in this war that he does his great exploit at Gela (see pp. 366, 367). As he commands only a thousand men, he seems to be still in his old office of chiliarch only. Of the generalship of the Corinthian Akestoridās Justin says nothing, and Diodorōs (c. 5) gives us no explanation of the way in which it came about or how it came to an end. The application to Corinth of course goes along with the earlier application which brought Timoleōn and with the later application from Akragas to Sparta. But one would like to know something about the immediate circumstances. We see that Akestoridās is strong against Agathoklēs, and it looks as if the recall of Sōsistratos which immediately follows the second banishment of Agathoklēs was the work of the Corinthian general. But his name is not mentioned except in connexion with his attempt on Agathoklēs' life, and we do not know what became of him when Agathoklēs came back under the mediation of Hamilkar. But the application to Corinth must have been made by enemies of Agathoklēs; and one is tempted to think that the ground of the

application must have been the supposed (or in truth very real) danger from his ambition. The words are (c. 5) :

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις αἰρεθέντος Ἀκεστορίδου τοῦ Κορυθίου στρατηγοῦ, δόξας ἐπιείσθαι τυραννίδι διὰ τὴν σύμψιν, ἐξέφυγε τὸν κίνδυνον.

Then follows the story of his escape, a romantic story certainly, but one which, as being neither impossible nor improbable nor in any way contradicted, we are not justified in throwing aside.

What follows is one of the most interesting parts of the story. At this point, better than any other, our three writers join to help one another. Justin (xxii. 2. 1) may here be made the text ;

"A Morgantinis, apud quos exsulabat, odio Syracusanorum primo prætor, mox dux creatur. In eo bello et urbem Leontinorum cepit et patriam suam Syracusas obsidere cœpit, ad cujus auxilium Hamilcar, dux Pœnorum, imploratus, depositis hostilibus odiis, præsidia militum mittit."

Diodôros, in his direct narrative (c. 5), says only ;

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν Συρακουσίων καταδεξαμένων τοὺς μετὰ Σωιστράτου φυγάδας, καὶ πρὸς Καρχηδονίους εἰρήνην συνθεμένων, Ἀγαθοκλῆς φυγὰς ὡν ἰδίαν δυνάμιν ἐν τῇ μεσογείῳ συνεστήσατο. γενόμενος δὲ φοβερός οὐ μόνον τοῖς πολίταις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, κ.τ.λ.

Here we get the midland country in a general way, but no mention of any particular place. This is incidentally supplied in the next chapter. When Agathoklēs is going to strike his blow, it is from the middle towns, and specially from Morgantia, that he gets help ;

κατέλεξεν εἰς τάξεις τοὺς τε ἐκ Μοργαντίνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῇ μεσογείῳ πόλει, καὶ τοὺς αὐτῷ πρότερον συμπορευθέντας πρὸς Καρχηδονίους. οὗτοι γὰρ πάντες πρὸς Ἀγαθοκλέα μὲν εὐνούστατα δέκοντο, πολλὰ προεuer-γετημένοι κατὰ τὰς στρατείας.

Nothing can fit in better. I do not know whether the higher criticism would infer that, because Diodôros and Justin both mention Morgantia, therefore both must have copied from the same source. Those who are engaged in a *Quellenfrage* seem sometimes to forget that, if two men independently tell the same story without intentional omissions, they cannot well help mentioning some of the same facts, and they are not unlikely even to use some of the same words.

The taking of Leontinoi recorded by Justin is not mentioned by Diodôros, but it is recorded by Polyainos (v. 3. 2), with a very strange addition. Agathoklēs has seemingly overcome (κατήσσει) the

Leontines in battle. Then he sends his general Deinokratēs into the town, saying that he wished to rival the clemency shown by Dionysios (see above, p. 187) to his prisoners at the Helleporos (*ὡς ἄρα φιλοτιμοῖτο πρὸς Διονύσιον καὶ βούλοιο σῶσαι αὐτοὺς, ὡς ἑκάινος ἔσασσε τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἑλλέπορον ποταμὸν πταίσαντας Ἰταλιώτας*). They believe and swear oaths. Then Agathoklēs enters the town, and bids the citizens come unarmed to an assembly. Then the Leontine general—so I understand *ὁ στρατηγός*—as chairman of the assembly, puts the question whether they will agree to whatever Agathoklēs may require (*ὅτφ δοκεῖ ὅπερ καὶ Ἀγαθοκλεῖ, αἰρέτω τὴν χεῖρα*). Agathoklēs says that what he requires is to kill them all (*δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, πάντας ἀνελεῖν*). So his soldiers kill them there in the assembly, to the number of ten thousand.

The joint mention of Leontinoi by Justin and Polyainos may lead us to accept some taking of Leontinoi at this time; but the story in Polyainos cannot stand as it is. Agathoklēs is evidently conceived as already tyrant. Deinokratēs, who plays so great a part further on, is conceived as being a general under Agathoklēs, an impossible description, but under which may lurk some tradition of the friendship between the two which Diodōros speaks of at the end of c. 8 (see p. 378). One cannot fancy that, at this stage, Agathoklēs could have had the means of doing such a massacre, or that it would have suited his purpose to do it. The story reads almost like a ghastly satire on the procedure of subservient assemblies under tyrants. It might well grow out of some case in which extraordinary powers were blindly voted to Agathoklēs or to any other.

In the account of Agathoklēs' second recall to Syracuse, Diodōros (c. 5) makes no mention of that active part in the matter which Justin (xxii. 2. 5) assigns to Hamilkar. The powers inside Syracuse are now (see p. 371) at peace with Hamilkar; consequently Agathoklēs is Hamilkar's enemy as well as theirs. Immediately we read, without mention of any actors, *ἐπίσθη κατελθεῖν εἰς τὴν πατρίδα*. Then follows the oath, which is enforced on him *ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν*. That Hamilkar had something to do with Agathoklēs' return might be inferred from the very confused account given by Polyainos (v. 3. 7) of his rise to power; *Ἀγαθοκλῆς πρὸς Ἀμύλκαν ἀνοχὴν ἔθετο, ὥστε ὁ μὲν εἰς Λιβύην ἀπῆγεν*. Then follows the story of the massacre, with the story of the assembly in Diodōros (c. 9) put before it. It seems clear that Hamilkar never did go back to Libya, but the

tale clearly springs out of the debates at Carthage about him recorded in Justin, xxii. 3. And the story implies that the action of Agathoklēs in Syracuse had something to do with an agreement with Hamilkar.

Justin's account of the recall is that which I have followed in the text (see p. 370). It seems as trustworthy as any story of secret negotiation can be. And some secret negotiation between Agathoklēs and Hamilkar is implied in the whole state of things. Diodōros simply leaves out the relations between those two; he says nothing that contradicts them. And some points in the order of events seem to be better brought out in his narrative. Justin's account gives the impression, though he does not distinctly affirm it, that Agathoklēs was chosen general before he took the Great Oath. And we cannot accept his account of the matter of the Great Oath, as it stands. Justin's account (xxii. 2) is;

"Non pax tantum Agathocli conciliatur, verum etiam prætor Syracusis constituitur. Tunc Hamilcari expositis ignibus Cereris tactisque in obsequia Pœnorum jurat." [There seems to be something wrong in the text.]

Diodōros says;

ἐπείσθη κατελθεῖν εἰς τὴν πατρίδα, καὶ παραχθεὶς εἰς τὸ τῆς Δήμητρος ἱερὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν, ὤμοσε μὴδὲν ἐναντιωθήσεσθαι τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ. προσποιηθεὶς δὲ τῆς δημοκρατίας προίστασθαι καὶ δημαγωγίας ποικίλως τὰ πλήθη, στρατηγὸς κατεστάθη.

The oath would surely come before the election, and I have already said that we seem to have in Diodōros some trace of its formal words. It is impossible to believe that Agathoklēs can have sworn in any formal way "in obsequia Pœnorum;" but some secret agreement between Agathoklēs and Hamilkar may be taken for granted. Agathoklēs would engage to do nothing against Carthaginian interests and Hamilkar would engage to supply him with troops for his own purposes. But that Agathoklēs should openly swear to the peace with Carthage is likely enough; and that may easily have grown into the "obsequia Pœnorum." The supply of the five thousand African soldiers comes from Justin only.

Justin tells the story of the *coup d'état* in a hurried way;

"Veluti reipublicæ statum formaturus, populum in theatrum ad contionem vocari jubet, contracto in gymnasium senatu, quasi quædam prius ordinaturus. Sic compositis rebus immissis mili-

tibus populum obsidet, senatum trucidat; cujus peracta cæde ex plebe quoque locupletissimos et promptissimos interficit."

The theatre seems here to be inferred, because theatres were so often used as places of assembly. But there is no place for the theatre at this stage, nor indeed is there any regularly summoned assembly just now; that comes after the massacre in c. 9 of Diodōros. The place of meeting is the Timoleonteion, which may be meant (see Lupus, 189) by the "gymnasium" in Justin. The "senatus" of Justin seems to come from the account of the arresting and slaying of certain members of the Six Hundred, as recorded by both Diodōros and Polyainos. Diodōros (c. 6) says;

ὥς δ' αὐτῷ πάντ' ἦν εὐτρεπῇ, τοῖς μὲν στρατιώταις παρήγγειλεν ἀπαντᾶν ἅμ' ἡμέρᾳ εἰς τὸ Τιμολεόντειον· αὐτὸς δὲ μεταπεμπόμενος τοὺς περὶ Πείπαρχον καὶ Δεκλέα, τοὺς δοκοῦντας προσεσθάναι τῆς τῶν ἑξακοσίων ἐταιρίας, ὥς περὶ τῶν κοινῇ συμφερόντων διαλεξόμενος.

Polyainos (v. 3. 8) here gives us an account which, whatever we think of the rest, clearly tells what τὰ κοινῇ συμφέροντα were. I think we may also accept his forms of the names;

Ἀγαθοκλῆς, μαθὼν τοὺς περὶ Τίσσαρχον καὶ Ἀνθρώπωνιν καὶ Διοκλέα φίλους ἐπιβουλεύειν αὐτῷ, καλέσας αὐτοὺς ἐνεχείρισεν αὐτοῖς πολλὴν στρατιάν, ἵνα πόλει συμμάχῳ πολεμουμένῃ βοηθοῖεν ἐξελθόντες· καὶ, αὐρίον γε, ἔφη, συνελθόντες εἰς τὸ Τιμολεόντειον μετὰ τῶν ὀπλων καὶ τῶν ἵππων διατάξωμεν τὴν ἔξοδον.

This allied city that was attacked is clearly Herbita, if it be Herbita that was attacked by the Syracusan exiles, as Diodōros says in the beginning of the chapter (see p. 375). Polyainos' statement is one of those which, wherever we find them, we accept instinctively as coming from some good contemporary writer. Diodōros tells us that these men were summoned on "divers urgent and important occasions." Polyainos (clearly not fully knowing his own meaning) tells us (when explained by another place of Diodōros) what those urgent and important occasions were. The only question is whether the forty friends of Tisarchos and the rest who accompany them in Diodōros (ἐπειδὴ παρεγένοντο παραλαβόντες τῶν φίλων εἰς τεσσαράκοντα, προσποιηθεὶς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι, συνελάμβανεν ἀπαντας) can anyhow be multiplied into the military force of two hundred which we find in Polyainos (οἱ μὲν ἄσμενοι ταῦτα ἐδέξαντο ὥς μέλλοντες καὶ δύναμιν στρατιωτικὴν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθεσιν. The number, ἄνδρας τῶν διακοσίων πλείονες, follows directly).

Whether forty or two hundred, they are presently put to death. Polyainos preserves the form of death (*ἐξεκίνησαν*); Diodôros preserves the fact that they were put to death by the vote of something which acted as an assembly, military or civil, or both (see p. 375). Only one is not quite sure as to the words which immediately follow in Polyainos—*ἔσοι δὲ βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἐπιφώνον, καὶ οὗτος προσανηρέθησαν οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν ἑξακοσίων*. Is this meant for an account of the whole massacre, of which Polyainos has another account to which we shall come directly, or do the words come from some misunderstanding of the orders of Agathoklēs as given in Diodôros? *τοῖς στρατιώταις [παρήγγειλεν] ἀναρεῖν τοὺς αἰτίους* [Tisarchos and the others], *καὶ διαρπάζειν τὰς κτήσεις τῶν ἑξακοσίων καὶ τῶν τοῖς κοινπραγούντων*. The Six Hundred make any number of six hundred yet more suspicious than figures in general. Yet in itself six hundred would be a more likely number for the whole slaughter than the untold multitudes who died and the *six thousand* who escaped (c. 8; see p. 377). The orders *ἀναρεῖν τοὺς αἰτίους* must mean that Tisarchos and his companions were killed at once. Otherwise, as they were first of all arrested, one might be tempted to see them in the *ζωγρηθέντες* at the end of c. 8 on whom Agathoklēs sits in judgement (see p. 378).

There is nothing special to say about the details of the massacre, which come wholly from Diodôros. But one cannot doubt that he is right in placing the scene in the assembly after the massacre. Polyainos (v. 3. 7, see above, p. 378) has got hold of a version in which it comes six days before the massacre, immediately after Agathoklēs' agreement with Hamilkar (see above, p. 370);

ὁ δὲ, συναγαγὼν ἐκκλησίαν τῶν Συρακοσίων, ταύτην, ἔφη, τὴν ἡμέραν ἡνὲξάμην, ἐν ᾗ τοὺς πολίτας ὄφρομαι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἔχοντας. ταῦτα λέγων, τὴν χλαμύδα περιελὼν καὶ τὴν μάχαιραν αὐτὸν ἰδιώτην ἀπέφηνε. τῶν Συρακοσίων ὡς ἀνδρὶ δημοτικῷ καὶ μετρίῳ τὴν πολιτείαν ἐπιτρέψάντων, ὁ δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἔκτην ἡμέραν πολλοὺς φονεύσας τῶν πολιτῶν, διώξας δὲ πλείους τῶν πεντακισχιλίων αὐτὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν Συρακοσίων κατέσχευεν.

Here the five thousand driven out seems a more likely form of the six thousand who escaped (see above, p. 377). Otherwise this version is a manifest confusion between the election of Agathoklēs in c. 5 of Diodôros as *στρατηγός* and *φύλαξ* and his second election in c. 9 as *στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ*. But it is not unlikely

to preserve a small bit of chronology, namely that the massacre took place on the sixth day after the first election.

The report given by Diodôros (xix. 9) of the second election is remarkable for its use of words. Agathoklès will have no colleagues, then, *συγχωρήσαντος τοῦ πλήθους μοναρχεῖν, οὗτος μὲν ἐχειροτονήθη στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν φανερώς ἐδυνάστευε, καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποιεῖτο*. Here in *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* we have the formal words of the vote, conferring a definite office; *μοναρχεῖν* and *ἐδυνάστευε* are vaguer words of Diodôros' own. *Δυνάστης, δυναστεύειν*, like the Italian *signore*, are in some sort colourless; that is, they do not express the same condemnation as *τύραννος*; yet they would hardly be used of any one who was without all cavil either a lawful king or a lawful magistrate. *Μόναρχος* is a word of the same kind (see Herod. vii. 154; Pol. ii. 48. 12). But the mind of Diodôros would seem to be floating between this use of it, and the etymological sense in which it might be said of any magistrate who had no colleague in his office.

It is to be noticed that Diodôros rather shrinks from calling Agathoklès *τύραννος*. He does not give him the name in the same regular and almost formal way in which he gives it to Dionysios. In c. 65 he is *δυνάστης*, in c. 70 he is *τύραννος*, but in a casual way.

The three writers whose accounts we have been trying to put together show very clearly the difference of their several positions. Diodôros is writing a full narrative to the best of his ability. He is, I imagine, mainly following Antandros; he would doubtless have other books before him as well; he uses Timaios, but he clearly does not at this stage take him as his chief guide. Antandros would of course tell his story in the way most favourable to his brother. He could not leave out the massacre; all the world had heard of it; he might tell it as gently as he could; but Diodôros would have sense enough to see that on that matter he must look to other sources as well. Hence the pathetic descriptions, hence the general denouncing of such doings done by Greeks towards Greeks (see p. 376). This last Diodôros may have copied from Timaios or from any one else; but I know not why he should not have been able to make it for himself. But though Antandros

could not keep the massacre out of sight, he might very easily leave out the dealings of his brother with Hamilkar, which most people who knew of them would look on as treasonable, but which would not be known to all the world as the massacre was. These explain why Diodôros, so full on the massacre, has nothing to say about the dealings with Hamilkar. Justin, on the other hand, or rather Trogus before him, was not writing a full narrative, but a summary. He is therefore less careful than Diodôros—who is careful in a way—as to the details and order of facts. But he preserves the negotiations with Hamilkar, which he most likely read in Timaios, who was sure to enlarge on them. His mention of Morgantia and Leontinoi shows clearly that he had good local materials before him. But he did not always understand them, or he failed to reproduce them in another language; hence the misconceptions about “*senatus*” and “*obsequia Pœnorum*.” Polyainos too had excellent materials before him. But then he was not writing a full narrative, or even a summary; he was simply picking up anecdotes for his special purpose. He worked in anything that seemed telling for that purpose without much regard to order or consistency. He thus preserves to us some most valuable details amidst a great deal of confusion. The whole story furnishes a delightful field for comparative criticism.

APPENDIX VIII.

THE OCCUPATION OF KOR KYRA BY KLEÔN YMOS AND AGATHOKLÊS. (See p. 476 seqq.)

THE stream of our narrative, in itself none of the clearest, is now losing itself in the swamp of fragments and anecdotes. Yet Arnold, who understood Greek and who had read Diodôros, does not part from him without somewhat of a sigh. See *Hist. of Rome*, ii. 317.

The accounts of the doings of Kleôn ymos in the 104th and 105th chapters of his twentieth book form the end of our continuous story. They are the last that touch Sicily, and that only indirectly. The first to be noticed is that, though Diodôros (c. 104) speaks of the Tarantines as being at war with both Lucanians and Romans

(πολεμον ἔχοντες πρὸς Λευκανοὺς καὶ Ῥωμαίους), he says no more about any Romans. He records a peace which the Lucanians made with the Tarantines (οἱ μὲν Λευκανοὶ καταπλεγύντες φιλίαν ἐποίησαντο πρὸς τοὺς Ταραντίνους); but he says nothing about any peace with Rome. Livy further (x. 2) records warlike operations (see p. 474) between Kleónymos and a Roman army; that army is not to be seen in Diodôros, unless it lurks under some other name than that of Roman.

Now it seems certain that a peace between Rome and Taras must have been concluded about this time. It is implied in the whole familiar story, at which we shall have presently to glance, of the dealings between Rome and Taras which led to the coming of Pyrrhos. Appian (Samn. 8) has preserved one of the clauses of the treaty by which no Roman ship of war—perhaps more likely, one only—might pass the Lakinian headland (παλαιῶν συνθήκων, μὴ πλεῖν Ῥωμαίους πρόσω Λακινίας ἄκρας). These παλαιαὶ συνθήκαι could not have been actually older than this war, though of course they might have re-enacted some older agreement. Arnold (ii. 315) takes for granted that it must have been at the same time as the peace with the Lucanians, as otherwise "we cannot conceive that Cleonymus could so immediately have engaged in other enterprises." That is to say, it must have been concluded before Kleónymos seized on Korkyra. Droysen, on the other hand (Geschichte der Diadochen, ii. 2. 189 :—it is as hard to use the index to the second edition of the *Hellenismus* as to use that to Sussehl's Politics), makes the Roman treaty lurk in Diodôros' words in c. 105), where he says (see p. 477) that Kleónymos at Korkyra heard that the Tarantines had revolted from him (πυθόμενος ἀφιστηκέναι); "Er erfuhr jetzt, dass Tarant von ihm 'überfallen' sei; so verstand er den Vertrag, den die Stadt mit Rom geschlossen und in dem sich die Römer verpflichtet hatten, ihre Schiffe nicht über das lakinische Vorgebirge hinaussegeln zu lassen." Holm says nothing on the point. Droysen's view seems to be only an arbitrary guess, put forth, as usual, as if it were a fact that could not be spoken against. Arnold's argument would be conclusive if we were dealing with a reasonable man and not with Kleónymos, and even with Kleónymos it has some force.

Droysen's whole understanding of Diodôros' 105th chapter follows on this assumption of his. He takes the raid on some part of Italy there made by Kleónymos, and in which he is defeated by certain

βάρβαροι not further described, to be that spoken of by Livy (x. 2, see p. 476), in which Kleónymos was driven off by some Roman commander, either Marcus Æmilius or Gaius Junius. The Romans, according to this view, must have gone to help the Tarantines by virtue of the new treaty. But it is clear that Livy did not so understand it. He looks on this landing of Kleónymos in the Sallentine country as his first landing in Italy; "*Classis Græcorum, Cleonymo duce Lacedæmonio, ad Italiæ litora appulsa, Thurias urbem in Sallentinis cepit.*" Moreover, Diodóros was quite capable of leaving out altogether even so important a fact as the treaty between Rome and Taras; but I cannot think that he was capable of hiding such a treaty under the veil of a Tarantine revolt against Kleónymos, still less that he would speak of an army led by a Roman consul or dictator simply as *βάρβαροι* without any further account. To my mind the two alternative stories in Livy read like two romances out of the annals of the Æmilian and the Junian houses, in which the Junian flatterers draw the longest bow. The difficulty is where among the acts of Kleónymos to put the expedition to the head of the gulf, which Livy goes on to record. The defeat of Kleónymos at Patavium was witnessed by abiding trophies and commemorative games in Livy's own city. This is quite another kind of evidence from Æmilian and Junian funeral orations.

Geography will hardly help us to this raid of Kleónymos. Diodóros says that he took *τὸ καλούμενον Τριόπιον*, and some other town without a name. Only where is Triopion? No one seems to know. I cannot find it in any map or in the Dictionary of Geography. Again, where is the "*Thuriæ*" taken by Kleónymos in one of Livy's stories? "*Thurias urbem in Sallentinis cepit.*" Grote (xii. 206), surely in a forgetful moment, took it for Thourioi; but that is not "*in Sallentinis.*" Droysen again takes for granted that it is Hyria or Uria. To a panegyrist of the Æmilii one place was doubtless as good as another.

Arnold (ii. 316), more prudently, says that Kleónymos employed his arms with various success in plundering operations along the eastern coast of Italy till at last he was beaten off by the inhabitants." But it is odd when he adds, "and obliged to return to Greece," though Korkyra is undoubtedly a part of Hellas. That he went back to Korkyra is perfectly plain in Diodóros; *δυσὶν ἐλαττώμασι τηλικούτοις περιπεσὼν, ἀπέπλευσε μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς τὴν Κέρκυραν.*

Droysen (ii. 2. 190) knows much more about it ;

"Seine Abwesenheit, so scheint es, benutzte Demetrios zu einem Seezuge gegen die Insel, dessen Erfolg die Befreiung derselben und die Vertreibung des Kleonymos gewesen zu sein scheint. Auch Leukas, dem Lande der Akarnanen gegenüber und, wie es scheint, bisher noch in Kassandros Händen, wurde auf diesem Zuge befreit."

Certainly, while all these kings and tyrants were going about, any place might be in the hands of anybody at any moment. The possession of Korkyra and Leukas by Dêmêtrios is not unlikely to be implied in a scrap of Dêmocharês of Leukonoê, preserved by Athenaios (vi. 62 ; C. Müller, ii. 419). This makes Dêmêtrios at the time of his famous visit to Athens in B.C. 302 come thither from Korkyra and Leukas (*ἐπανελθόντα δὲ τὸν Δημήτριον ἀπὸ τῆς Λευκάδος καὶ Κερκύρας εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας*. Cf. Grote, xii. 517, 518), and that he set it free (cf. Droysen, ii. 2. 241, 242) is also suggested by the words of our fragment of the twenty-first book of Diodôros, by which we learn that Agathoklês came to Korkyra when it was besieged by Kassandros, as a deliverer ;

Κέρκυρα πολιορκουμένη πλοίοις καὶ πεζοῖς ὑπὸ Κασσάνδρου βασιλέως Μακεδόνων, καὶ ἐτοίμη οὐσα ἀλωθῆναι, ὑπὸ Ἀγαθοκλέως βασιλέως Σικελίας ἐρρύσθη.

The territorial titles of the kings show that this is a late writer's paraphrase or summary, and not the exact words of Diodôros ; but the word *ἐρρύσθη* is pretty safe to be genuine ; and it seems to imply that Agathoklês professed to deliver Korkyra, and not merely Kleônymos, from Kassandros. And Agathoklês, whom Kleônymos had threatened, was not likely to go to his help. It does therefore seem most likely that, when Agathoklês occupied Korkyra by a victory over the besieging force of Kassandros, it was at that moment a free city from which Dêmêtrios had lately driven out Kleônymos. But under whatever pretext he went, he took the prize to himself.

Grote (xii. 607), seemingly forgetting what he had said in p. 517, says that, at the siege by Kassandros, "Kleonymos then retired (or perhaps had previously retired) to Sparta."

The story in Polyainos (v. 3. 6) about Agathoklês at Phoinikê is very odd. I think, with Droysen (ii. 2. 242), that *Φοινίκη* must mean the Epeiroi town, but that Polyainos thought that it meant

Phœnicia in some shape, most likely Carthage. This is shown by his adding, ὁ δὲ λαβὼν τοὺς στρατιώτας Φοίνιξι μὲν μακρὰν χαίρειν ἔφη. Stephen of Byzantium does not tell us the *ἔθνικόν* for the people of the town *Φοινίκη*; but it cannot have been *Φοίνικες*. The story seems to be wildly jumbled up out of several. The constitutional position of Agathoklēs must be genuine; no anecdote-monger would think of it. But, as told, it can hardly have anything to do either with an expedition to Epeiros Phoinikē or with the great expedition to Phœnician Carthage. The story about Tauromenion must surely be out of place in either.

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
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